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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of changes in health care 
provision, whilst recognising the simultaneous effects of consequent changes in health 
on effective labour supplies and the resource claims made by the health care sector. The 
resource allocation issues have been explored in theory, by developing an extension of 
the standard Rybczynski theorem from a low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin framework, 
and empirically, by developing a Computable General Equilibrium model, calibrated to 
a purpose-built dataset for the UK.   
The theory predicts that, if the government is solely concerned with improving per 
capita income, a morally questionable policy of targeting health care provision towards 
skilled workers performs best. Furthermore, the impact of an expanding health sector on 
the outputs of non-health sectors is shown to depend on the sign and magnitude of a 
scale effect of increased effective labour supplies and a factor-bias effect of changes in 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour, although the latter effect dominates if effective 
labour supplies are relatively inelastic with respect to health care provision.  
The theoretical predictions are not generally validated by the applied model due to 
added real-life complexities. The main findings are that a rise in NHS expenditures, the 
employment of foreign health care-specific skilled workers, and costless factor-neutral 
and skill-biased technical change in the UK health sector have a positive impact upon 
overall welfare via direct improvements in population well-being and indirect benefits 
from increased worker incomes. The study indicates that if an expansion of the health 
sector is financed from a reduction in state benefits, the non-working households and 
pensioners may require some compensation since they rely relatively heavily on these as 
a source of income.  
The presence of health care-specific factors and rising pharmaceutical prices impact 
negatively upon the health sector and overall welfare, suggesting the importance of 
tackling rising input costs and structural rigidities. This may be achieved by the 
immigration policy, although since effects on domestic workers if their wages are not 
sustained, and on countries of origin faced by a ‘brain-drain’, are negative, in the long-
term increasing the number of medical school places may be more desirable. Another 
suitable policy response is to purchase a more effective pharmaceutical product. Fairly 
small productivity gains in health care were shown to generate overall welfare gains. 
Finally, factor-neutral and skill-biased technical improvements yield significant welfare 
gains and cost-savings in the health sector. Such technical improvements may come in 
the form of improved medical procedures, which have been developed abroad yet are 
freely available or have been funded by charitable institutions, but also may reflect 
domestic policy which aims at reducing administrative overheads so that more resources 
can be devoted to front-line staff.  
The sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of the waiting lists with respect to health 
care indicates the importance of ensuring that additional resources are effectively 
employed, attainable by the technical and administrative improvements in health care. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The interactions between health care, health and the remainder of the economy are 
multiple and complex. As early as the Basic Needs approach to development of the 
1970s1, which treats health care and other goods such as education, sanitation and 
housing as basic necessities, these linkages are in very general terms understood to be as 
follows. On the one hand, changes in income impact upon the consumption and/or 
provision of health care and other goods, which affects the health of populations in 
terms of mortality and morbidity (illness). On the other hand, changes in health impact 
upon the well-being of populations, with associated consequences for labour market 
participation, productivity and income. Such forward and backward linkages are 
important for developing and developed countries alike. 
Many developing countries find themselves locked in a vicious circle leading from 
poverty to ill health and to poverty again. Health care systems in these countries are 
underdeveloped and many suffer from high prevalence rates for mainly communicable 
diseases, some incurable (such as AIDS) but the majority easily preventable by 
vaccination, so that the potential effects of improved health care systems on the labour 
market and the rest of the economy, especially in the long term, are considerable. 
Illustrative in this respect are the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health 
                                                 
1
  Streeten et al. (1981), Stewart (1985) and Afxentiou (1990). 
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(CMH)’s rough calculations that an additional investment by 2007 of $27 billion a year 
by rich countries (0.1% of donor GDP) and $35 billion a year by poor countries (1% of 
their GDP) would save 8 million lives a year by the end of the decade and yield 
worldwide economic benefits of $186 billion a year.2  
In contrast, developed countries have much higher living standards and levels of health 
and so are thought to be on the “flat of the curve”, where the marginal contribution of 
health care to health is minimal and other factors, like changes in diet, lifestyle 
(drinking and smoking), environment and education, seem more important in explaining 
variations in health.3 The most common health problems in these countries concern non-
communicable diseases related to diet and life style (themselves related to social class), 
such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and cancers, a fact which seems to corroborate 
this view. This being said, many former sceptics of the contribution of health care to 
health are now willing to accept that, even after allowing for diet and lifestyle, health 
care does make a difference for specific conditions, such as cardiovascular disease. 
According to David Cutler, an American aged 45 today will live 4.5 years longer than in 
1950 because of a decline in cardiovascular disease, of which two-thirds can be 
attributed to better medical care and the remaining third to behavioural changes such as 
stopping with smoking. Apart from gains in longevity, medical care also enhances the 
quality of life through pain relief and increased mobility. The rise in medical costs 
 
2
  “The Health of Nations”, The Economist, 22 December 2001, p95-96. CMH (2001). 
3
  Folland et al. (2001,  p108) on  the production function of health. 
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partially reflects improvements in treatment quality enabling less drastic treatments and 
a more rapid recovery.4
The majority of developed country health care systems arguably fail to deliver specific 
medical services to a “satisfactory” standard, which is commonly attributed to limited 
financial means and an inefficient use of resources. In the UK pressures are visible, 
among others, in terms of poor health outcomes for some diseases (such as cancer), poor 
quality of services, including long waiting lists and waiting times for certain treatments, 
and inequities in access and health outcomes. These pose significant costs on society, in 
addition to the cost of health service provision. The Confederation of British Industry 
(2001) for example estimates that the direct cost of absence from work due to sickness 
for UK business amounts to nearly £11 billion a year, whereas total cost to society, 
including poorer quality services and products and the cost of increased welfare 
payments, nears £23 billion in total (approximately 2.3% of GDP in 2001). In future, 
health care costs, which have to be paid for somehow, are bound to rise with the 
prospect of an ageing population and advances in medical technology.  
While the interdependencies between health care, health and the rest of the economy are 
now widely acknowledged, economic models which are used to assess these fail to 
incorporate the main channels through which interactions take place. The majority of 
empirical studies employ partial equilibrium techniques and/or econometric analyses 
and so conceal or ignore altogether differential effects of changes in health and health 
care across sectors, factors, households and their implications for the government 
 
4
  These and other examples are reported by Paul Wallace in “The Health of Nations: A Survey of 
Health-Care Finance”, The Economist, 17 July 2004, p8. 
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budget. The small range of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that does 
exist is diverse in application area. Health or health care has been modelled in a 
developing country context as one of many basic needs (Basic Needs models), as having 
an external effect on the labour market in the form of improved labour productivity 
(Externality models), or by analysing the disastrous consequences of epidemics 
(HIV/AIDS models). Though each of these strands of literature has its own merits, most 
of the reviewed models do not assess the endogenous impact of changes in health care 
provision on the health of the population, the labour force and its impact on production, 
income and welfare over time in a (developed country) CGE setting.5  
Empirical studies typically fail to account for the main feature of rich and poor nations’ 
health care systems, namely that they treat and (partially) cure people, i.e. improve their 
health, which not only makes them “feel better” but also enlarges the effective size of 
the working and non-working populations, further explained below. At the same time 
health care systems use factors of production including labour, which have to be paid 
for and reduce the effective supply of workers available to the rest of the economy. It is 
in addressing this caveat that this thesis seeks to make a contribution. By doing so, it is 
hoped to improve the understanding by the general public of the role of health care in 
the economy and to aid policy makers in their pursuance of improving the functioning 
of health care systems, the health of the population, welfare and economic growth.  
 
5
  An exception is Dixon et al.’s (2004) CGE model of the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and 
health interventions on the Botswana economy. Whereas the pandemic and the mitigating effects of 
two health policies are endogenously modelled, other health expenditures are assumed not to impact 
on the health of the population, the labour force and welfare. 
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There are various ways in which an expansion of the health care sector enlarges the 
effective size of the working and non-working populations. A higher level of health care 
provision enlarges effective labour supply in the short term by augmenting the 
aggregate working time of current workers and reduced wastage by premature death. It 
does so in the longer term by reducing death rates among those young who are destined 
to enter the work force. However, one must bear in mind that it also increases the 
number of people who are not part of the work force, the young and the retired, through 
reduced deaths. These are an additional source of demand for health services (and other 
goods), so reducing the availability and/or level of treatment for the current work force 
and thus its effective size. Moreover, both groups of non-workers are usually recipients 
of transfers from the working population (e.g. state benefits for children, state pensions 
for the retired), with the associated distortions.  
Although in principle a model of the economy which incorporates health care provision 
effects can be constructed for any country, the UK is taken as a case study. The UK is 
an archetype of a developed country health care system in which government provision 
and funding dominates. By funding health care from general taxation the UK 
government has been able to keep a tight lid on health care expenditures, whilst 
securing access to the majority of the population and reaching overall satisfactory health 
outcomes. The National Health Service (NHS) appears to be highly cost-effective 
relative to other industrialised countries6; however, many argue that excessive public 
control has led to systematic underfunding of and inefficiencies in health care provision, 
both of which the UK government seeks to address. Problems manifest themselves in 
 
6
  See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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various ways, but typically revolve around the issue of rationing, i.e. the conflict 
between potentially unlimited demands and limited financial means, and in this respect 
the UK does not differ from any other country. By focusing on the UK this study is able 
to model the impact of changes in health care policy and health care-related conditions 
which impinge upon the issue of rationing, either alleviating the rationing constraint or, 
in the case of the latter, straining it.  
The analysis is novel in three respects. The first contribution is in terms of international 
trade theory, by developing an extension of the standard Rybczynski Theorem from a 
low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin model which casts light on some of the resource 
allocation issues related to the provision of health care. While there is a strong literature 
on endogenous labour supply models7, these have in the main been based on direct 
labour supply responses to higher wages. In this model, changes in the effective supply 
of skilled and unskilled labour come from changes in the size of the health care sector 
(which in this UK-centred example is largely determined by the government). The 
second contribution is in terms of data, by constructing a dataset for the UK for the year 
2000, which is employed in the calibration of the CGE model. The dataset contains 
detailed information on health, health care use, income and benefit variables for 
individuals living in private households in Great Britain and is available for use in MS 
Access. The final contribution is in terms of empirics, by developing a CGE model for 
the UK with an extended health care component, the first of its kind, which analyses in 
greater detail the health care-related resource allocation issues.  
 
7
  E.g. Martin (1976) and Martin and Neary (1980). 
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1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the macro-economic impacts of changes in 
health care provision using a general equilibrium model of the UK economy, whilst 
recognising the simultaneous effects of consequent changes in health upon effective 
labour supplies and the resource claims made by the health care sector. The first part of 
the study uses a simple theoretical Heckscher-Ohlin model to assess the main 
interactions, whereas the second part employs an applied CGE model, calibrated to a 
purpose-built dataset for the UK. Within this general aim, the following research 
questions may be answered.  
What is the impact of changes in health care policies and health care-related conditions 
on: 
¬ non-health care sectors?  
¬ production factors, especially skilled and unskilled labour?  
¬ households?  
¬ and overall welfare? 
And, finally, how do policies aimed at alleviating rationing in public health care 
compare? In other words, which policy is more successful in improving household and 
overall welfare? 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
This study employs a CGE model to analyse the interactions between health care and 
the remainder of the economy. Below follows a short introduction to this methodology 
and a motivation of why it is favoured to other research techniques.  
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A CGE model is derived from micro-economic optimisation behaviour under 
constraints of all agents in the economy and, unlike other partial equilibrium or macro-
econometric approaches, is calibrated to a comprehensive set of consistent and balanced 
macroeconomic accounts, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).8 This ensures that key 
behavioural and accounting constraints are satisfied and serves as a check on the 
'reasonability' of the outcomes. A CGE model can be made sufficiently disaggregated, 
fit to the purpose of the study, and subsequently put to use in simulations of how 
changes in certain economic conditions are mediated through price and quantity 
adjustments in markets. Moreover, the CGE technique allows for counterfactual 
analysis, i.e. answering ‘what if’ questions, and is not just restricted to “learning from 
the past” like econometric studies are. A CGE model thus possesses strong theoretical 
foundations and mimics the functioning of the economy by capturing the interactions 
between the various sectors of the economy.  
Naturally, a CGE model is not without limitations itself. First and foremost, unlike 
econometric studies, it is not possible to statistically validate the structure and 
underlying assumptions of the CGE model. As the SAM only reflects a 'snapshot' in 
time and does not contain detailed time series such as are used in econometric analyses, 
the direction of effects is more reliable than the magnitude. The more so since many of 
the parameters and elasticities are imposed rather than empirically estimated. CGE 
modellers address this issue by carrying out sensitivity analyses, which goes a long way 
to assessing the potential errors from using parameters not acquired through 
 
8
  For an overview of CGE modelling see Bandara (1991), Blonigen et al. (1997), Devarajan et al. 
(1994, Chapters 1-3), Devarajan et al. (1997), Dixon and Parmenter (1996), Reinert and Roland-
Holst (1997) on the use of SAMs, and Shoven and Whalley (1984, 1992). 
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econometric methods. Devarajan et al. (1994, p1-14) further comment on often heard, 
but contradicting and refutable, criticisms that CGE models are “too complicated”, 
“make too many assumptions”, “require too much data”, “give counter-intuitive results” 
(which is better considered as a complement), “tell us what we already know” and are 
“‘black boxes’ that cannot be understood by the uninitiated”. Nevertheless, as noted by 
Scarf and Shoven on the imperfections of CGE models, CGE models are superior in that 
“there are no competing formulations that…provide the flexibility and conceptual 
wealth of the general equilibrium model” (Scarf and Shoven, 1984).   
Within the stated research objectives of this thesis, CGE modelling is preferred to other 
methods because of its theoretical tractability in terms of the behaviour of the agents in 
the economy and its ability to incorporate interdependencies and feedbacks. The 
linkages that are of interest are those between public and private health care, other 
product markets (including the main input suppliers to health care, such as 
pharmaceuticals and medical instruments), factor markets, especially for skilled and 
unskilled labour, government budget implications and household welfare effects of 
changes in health. Such linkage effects are concealed in econometric studies, whereas 
partial equilibrium models by nature (partially) leave these out.  
Often heard rationalisations for the partial equilibrium approach include the relative 
smallness of the health care sector and the high degree of specialisation (i.e. 
intersectoral immobility) of highly skilled staff and high-tech capital. The UK’s NHS 
currently employs an approximate 1.3 million people, 4.3% of the total work force, 
which makes it the third biggest employer in the world after the Chinese Army and 
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Indian Railway9 and suggests that health care is anything but small. The majority of 
health care staff, even those that are skilled, is in practice inter-sectorally mobile 
(managers and associated staff, laboratory technicians, ancillary workers) so that 
expansion or contraction of the health care sector will impact on other sectors. 
Furthermore, as was noted in the background to the research problem, there are other 
strong interactions with the rest of the economy and with policy-making, certainly in the 
longer term, so that it is arguable that general equilibrium modelling may be more 
appropriate for the analysis of some issues.  
1.4 MEASUREMENT OF HEALTH AND CHANGES IN HEALTH 
The explicit modelling of the impact of health care on the health of the population, first 
and foremost requires the definition of an appropriate measure of health. As is apparent 
from the vast amount of literature on health status measures and indicators of health, 
this proves to be a contentious issue.10 Since this thesis is concerned with (labour) 
resource allocation issues of health care provisioning, health is explicitly measured in 
terms of the size of effective, i.e. ‘able to work’, labour endowments, thereby avoiding 
controversies surrounding the choice of a particular health indicator.  
Specifically, it is postulated that the labour force is working if healthy and not working 
if ill and that a change in health has a parallel effect on effective labour endowments. 
Consequently, a decline in health is equivalent to a reduction in the number of people 
able to work (full-time and/or part-time) and so reduces effective labour endowments, 
 
9
  “NHS is world’s biggest employer after Indian rail and Chinese Army”, Sam Lister, Times Online, 
20 March 2004. 
10
  A literature review is outside the scope of this thesis, though a good starting point for the interested 
reader is the World Health Organization (2002) publication on Summary Measures of Population 
Health.   
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whereas an improvement in population health is equivalent to an increase in effective 
labour endowments available for use in the production sectors.  
These changes in health come about through changes in the size of a non-tradable health 
care sector. The health care sector employs labour in the “production” of healthy people 
by treating the ill, i.e. health care adds value to the ill. Ill persons who are not yet 
(successfully) treated and therefore (partially or fully) unable to work are recorded in an 
artificial “waiting list” sector. The remaining part of the labour force that is healthy is 
by definition employed in one of the production sectors. Within this framework and 
given the initial waiting lists, the number of new ill and the quality/cost of treatments,  a 
rise in the provision of health care in a given period increases the number of people 
treated and cured and thereby reduces the waiting lists and increases effective labour 
supplies.  
There are limitations to modelling health and changes in health in this fashion. In the 
background to the research problem, the impact of an increase in the provision of health 
care on the size of the non-working population, i.e. children and pensioners, has been 
acknowledged. Although the CGE model accounts for these population groups, it does 
not model longer-term population processes (births, deaths, transitions from young to 
working and from working to retired), nor does it model the decomposition of those 
moving from young to working into skilled and unskilled. The obvious advantage of 
modelling in this way is its simplicity. The major disadvantage is that it requires the 
“translation” of the rather complex health transition from “ill” to “well” into a one-
period model, yielding the previously mentioned limitations. 
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1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses the interactions 
between health care and non-health care sectors in their simplest form, using a low-
dimension Heckscher-Ohlin framework of a small open economy which is modelled on 
the UK. It captures changes in effective, i.e. able to work, labour endowments following 
a change in the provision of government-provided health care whilst recognising 
resource claims made on the labour market by the health care sector. Rybczynski-style 
predictions of an increase in health care expenditures on outputs are derived and 
subsequently assessed for sensitivity to key assumptions, most importantly the presence 
of health care-specific skilled labour. The results of an increase in health care 
expenditures are contrasted with those of changes in health care provision stemming 
from the immigration of foreign health care-specific skilled labour and productivity 
improvements in health care due to factor-neutral and skill-biased technical change 
respectively, given the size of the health care budget.  
Chapter 3 reviews empirical literature applied to the economic effects of health and 
health care provision, focusing on CGE models. It identifies the major shortcomings in 
the literature, most notably the absence of the simultaneous impact of changes in health 
care provision on effective labour endowments and the health sector’s demands for 
labour, which will be addressed in the CGE model of the UK economy developed in 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the health care system and policy of the UK through 
time, illustrated by facts and figures, and highlights the pressures faced by the UK 
government (and many other developed countries) and the policy options it has in 
resolving these. It thereby not only provides the foundations of the UK-focused CGE 
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model with health care provision effects developed in Chapter 6, but also gives the 
range of policy options and shocks that will be scrutinised using this applied model and, 
where possible, employing the theoretical framework of Chapter 2.  
Chapter 5 presents the dataset, the UK 2000 SAM, to which the CGE model of Chapter 
6 is calibrated, in tabular form. It contains economic data disaggregated by sector, 
which are predominantly taken from the UK Input-Output Supply and Use Tables for 
2000 and are distributed over factors and households using data from the General 
Household Survey 2000-01. The latter dataset, readily available in MS Access, is a 
valuable source of information for a range of socio-economic characteristics of private 
households living in Great Britain, in the context of this thesis most notably health and 
health care use data, and so complements Chapter 4’s portrayal of the UK’s health care 
system and performance.  
Chapter 6 outlines the CGE model for the UK with health care provision effects and 
presents simulation results which cover current issues in (developed country) health 
care systems and that of the UK in particular. Model experiments include increasing 
government expenditures on health care, a rise in the price of pharmaceuticals, the 
immigration of health care-specific skilled labour and productivity improvements in 
health care stemming from factor-neutral technical change, skill-biased technical change 
and technical change embodied in pharmaceuticals respectively. The applied nature of 
the CGE model allows for a more accurate and detailed representation of the UK 
economy, its health care system, health and welfare compared to the theoretical tool 
developed in Chapter 2. Specifically, the CGE model differentiates between eleven 
sectors (among which are health care and its main intermediate input suppliers), three 
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factors (capital, skilled and unskilled labour), the government and five types of 
households (characterised by age and working status of its members), and separates 
public from private health care in consumption. More realism is also obtained in terms 
of the modelling of health care provision effects by incorporating direct increases in the 
‘well-being’ of the population next to indirect improvements in health through 
increasing the size of effective, i.e. ‘able to work’, labour endowments. The added 
complexities ensure that the results of Chapter 6 (among others in terms of health, 
effective endowments, factor rewards, sectoral outputs, household income and welfare) 
complement those of Chapter 2 (mainly in terms of sectoral outputs), where the latter 
provides some insight into effects operating in the background of the former. The final 
chapter draws conclusions and outlines limitations and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A 
HECKSCHER-OHLIN FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a theoretical exposition of the interactions between government-
provided health care and the outputs of non-health goods in a small open economy, via 
changes in the size of effective (i.e. ‘able to work’) labour endowments. In the theory of 
international trade, the Rybczynski (R) theorem predicts the repercussions of changes in 
endowments, such as labour and capital, on the structure and level of production. This 
theorem has its foundation in the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade, 
which therefore provides a natural starting point for assessing health provision effects. 
The standard exposition of the HO model treats factor supplies as fixed, which has led 
to the development of variable factor supply models (e.g. Martin, 1976, Martin and 
Neary, 1980). Whereas these models allow labour supply to respond to changes in real 
wages, in this chapter changes in effective labour supply come from changes in the size 
of health provision (which for the UK is largely determined by the government). A 
number of modifications to the HO model are considered in order to produce a model 
that is more representative of reality.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the impact of labour 
endowment changes on outputs in the conventional HO model. Section 2.3 considers 
endowment changes which are health-related and conditioned on the output of a non-
tradable health sector in the HO model that is adjusted accordingly.  Section 2.4 gives a 
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theoretical overview of the impact of health-conditioned changes in effective labour 
supply when alternative modifications are made to the HO model, most importantly the 
introduction of health care-specific skilled labour. This section includes an analysis of 
Rybczynski-type effects when the government allows foreign health care-specific 
skilled labour to enter the UK in order to alleviate the rationing of health care. The 
consequences of different types of technology shocks in the health sector on sectoral 
outputs are examined in Section 2.5. The final section concludes with a general 
overview. 
2.2 CHANGES IN RELATIVE FACTOR SUPPLIES AND USE IN A 
LOW DIMENSION HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL  
The low dimension HO model describes two regions, two factors and two goods. The 
two regions are the UK, which is modelled in detail, and the rest of the world (ROW). 
In line with the small country assumption the UK engages in world trade at a given set 
of world prices which will not be affected by its trading activities. In order to focus on 
the differential impact of changes in health provision across labour types, the two 
factors are skilled and unskilled labour. Factor endowments are exogenous and owned 
by a single representative household, who maximises utility subject to the income 
earned from the supply of these factors. It is assumed that households in the UK and 
ROW have identical homothetic utility functions. With respect to production there are 
two sectors (1 and 2), which compete for skilled and unskilled labour in the production 
of goods. Representative producers in these two sectors maximise profits by optimal 
employment of factors of production, using constant returns to scale (CRTS) production 
technologies which are sectorally identical across regions. Product and factor markets 
are perfectly competitive and factors of production are perfectly mobile between 
sectors, but not between countries.  
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In this framework the source of trade comes from differences in national factor 
endowments and factors used in the production of different goods, hence the label of the 
‘factor proportions’ model of trade. The assumptions regarding national factor 
endowments and factor intensities in production are that: (1) The UK is relatively 
abundant in skilled labour, and (2); sector 1 is relatively intensive in skilled labour at 
any common factor price ratio (i.e. there are no factor intensity reversals). In order to 
specify the equations of the model, utility and production are described by linear 
homogeneous functional forms.1  
On the consumption side, the representative household will seek to consume at levels 
which maximise utility subject to the budget constraint. This is formally described by:  
Maximise   1 2( , )U U C C 
subject to  1 1 2 2p C p C Y   
where  denotes the utility of the representative household, the consumption of 
good 
U iC
i (i = 1,2), ip  the price of good i, Y  the income of the representative household. 
The solution to the utility maximisation problem is given by the Marshallian demand 
functions: 
        (2.1) 1 1 1 2, ,C C P P Y 
                                                 
1
  Production and utility functions exhibit strictly convex technologies and preferences respectively so 
that the second order sufficient conditions are always satisfied. 
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U
        (2.2) 2 2 1 2, ,C C P P Y 
On the production side, the producer in industry i seeks to maximise profits in two 
stages. Firstly, producer i minimises production costs by choosing the optimal 
combination of factor inputs for a given output level. Subsequently, given the outcome 
of the first stage, the optimal, i.e. profit-maximising, level of output is established. The 
property of linear homogeneity of output levels in terms of factor inputs, i.e. CRTS 
technology in production, implies that the production function of sector i is fully 
described by the unit isoquant. All other isoquants are simply radial projections of the 
unit isoquant and, consequently, the cost-minimising relative factor input ratio is 
independent of the level of output. It is therefore convenient to formulate and solve the 
cost-minimisation problem faced by producer i in terms of unit output values, given by: 
Minimise  (1)i S S Ui iTC w a w a 
subject to  , 1S Ui if a a   
where  denotes costs of producing one unit of output in sector (1)iTC i (i = 1, 2), the 
price of labour type 
lw
l (l =S,U), and the input-output coefficients  and  are 
defined as 
Sia U ia
S iia S X i  and U iia U X i , with  and  denoting the quantities of 
skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, employed by sector 
iS iU
i, and iX  being the 
output of sector i. Also, sector 1 is assumed to use skilled labour relatively intensively, 
i.e. 1 1 2 2S U S U!  or in terms of input-output coefficients 1 1 2S U S Ua a a a! 2 . 
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Solving the producer’s cost minimisation problem for the production of one unit of 
output yields the following expressions for the unit factor demand equations: 
 S S S Ui ia a w w         (2.3), (2.4) 
 U U S Ui ia a w w         (2.5), (2.6) 
Total factor demands of producer i are obtained by multiplying equations (2.3) to (2.6) 
by the output of sector i, iX : 
         (2.7), (2.8) i SiS a X i
i
i
         (2.9), (2.10) i U iU a X 
Turning to the second stage of the producer optimisation problem, the profit 
maximisation problem of producer i becomes:  
Maximise i i i S i U i i i S S i U Ui ip X w S w U p X w a X w a XP        
where iP  denotes the profit of producer i. This expression is linear in output iX , so that 
the solution to the profit maximisation problem does not contain output levels. Instead, 
the following zero profit conditions (also referred to as unit price or unit cost equations) 
result: 
 i S S U Ui ip w a w a         (2.11), (2.12) 
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1
2
The price (exogenous to the producer) received for one unit of output i equals the cost 
of producing one unit of output i. The result whereby profit maximisation of firms leads 
to zero profits follows from the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and 
CRTS (Euler’s theorem). This is, of course, also descriptive of the long-run equilibrium 
under perfect competition when there is freedom of entry and exit. 
Supply and demand for goods resulting from the household’s and producer’s 
optimisation problems meet in product markets. Equilibrium in the product markets is 
obtained by adding the following market clearing conditions: 
         (2.13) 1 1C X E 
        (2.14) 2 2C X M 
where 1E  and 2M  denote exports of good 1 and imports of good 2 respectively.
2
Imports are bought and exports are sold at (exogenous) world prices, which requires a 
link between domestic and world prices.  World prices are converted into domestic 
prices by introducing an exchange rate to the model: 
 
w
i ip p ER         (2.15), (2.16) 
where ER denotes the price of one unit of foreign currency measured in domestic 
currency, and wip  is the world price of good i. 
                                                 
2
  Good 1 is exported and good 2 is imported due to the assumption that the UK is relatively abundant 
in skilled labour, which is relatively intensively used by sector 1.This result is known as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (for a proof of this theorem see for example Falvey (1994, pp. 18-19). 
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The exchange rate adjusts such that the trade balance is in equilibrium, represented by: 
 1 1 2 2 0p E p M         (2.17) 
Similarly, factor markets clear through factor price adjustments. The full employment 
conditions are: 
         (2.18) 1 2S S S  
         (2.19) 1 2U U U  
where  (U ) denotes the fixed endowments of skilled (unskilled) labour. S
The household derives income from participation in the two labour markets and receives 
an income of: 
    1 2 1 2S UY w S S w U U         (2.20) 
The full set of equations of the HO model is displayed in Table 2.1.3
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  The implementation of the HO model involves choosing a numeraire and making one market clearing 
equation redundant. The former, known as the normalisation procedure, is required as all the demand 
and supply equations of the model are homogeneous of degree 0 in prices, such that only relative 
prices can be established. The latter, known as Walras’ Law, states that if n-1 markets are in 
equilibrium the nth market will automatically be in equilibrium. 
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Table 2.1 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model for a Small Open Economy 
 
COMMODITY MARKETS 
 
 
  
Demand  1 1 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.1) 
  2 2 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.2) 
Unit price equations (i=1, 2) i S S U Ui ip w a w a   
 
(2.11), (2.12) 
Market Clearing 1 1C X E1   
  
(2.13) 
 2 2C X M  2  
 
(2.14) 
FACTOR MARKETS 
 
 
Demand (i = 1, 2) 
  
 S S S Ui ia a w w  
 
(2.3), (2.4) 
 i S iS a X i  
 
(2.7), (2.8) 
  U U S Ui ia a w w  
 
(2.5), (2.6) 
 i U iU a X i  
 
(2.9), (2.10) 
Market Clearing 1 2S S S   
 
(2.18) 
 1 2U U U   
 
(2.19) 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
 
  
   1 2 1 2S UY w S S w U U     
 
(2.20) 
FOREIGN SECTOR 
 
 
Price equations (i=1, 2) 
  
w
i ip p ER  
 
(2.15), (2.16) 
Balance of Payments constraint 1 1 2 2 0p E p M   
 
(2.17) 
Endogenous variables: 1C , , 2C 1X , 2X , , , , , , , , , , , , 
, , , 
1S 2S 1U 2U 1Sa 2Sa 1Ua 2Ua 1P 2P Sw
Uw Y 1E 2M , . ER
Exogenous variables: S , U , , . 1
wp 2
wp
Source: Adapted from Dinwiddy and Teal (1988). 
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The impact of a shock to endowments on sectoral production in the HO model is given 
by the R theorem (Rybczynski, 1955). This theorem states that, at unchanged product 
prices, an increase in the endowment of one factor, while holding the endowment of the 
other factor constant, results in a more than proportionate increase in the production of 
the good using the growing factor intensively and an absolute decline in the production 
of the other good. Also following from the derivation of the R theorem is the result that 
increasing the endowments of both factors in the same proportion leads to an increase in 
the production of both goods in that proportion.4  
Two particularly important features of the HO model for the derivation of these 
outcomes are that, from equations (2.3) to (2.6), the input-output coefficients are a 
function of relative factor prices only, while, from equations (2.11) and (2.12), factor 
prices solely depend on relative product prices. That is, if both products are produced in 
equilibrium, the zero profit conditions can be solved for factor prices, given product 
prices.5  
The R theorem may be formally derived from the full employment conditions.6 
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) can be rewritten in terms of the input-output coefficients: 
 1 21 2S Sa X a X S         (2.21) 
 1 21 2U Ua X a X U         (2.22) 
                                                 
4
  Another corollary is that increasing the factor endowments in a ratio equal to the factor ratio in one 
sector increases the output of that sector and leaves the output of the other sector unchanged. 
5
  The absence of product specialisation requires sufficiently similar relative factor endowments 
between the UK and the ROW (Falvey, 1994, pp. 16-17). 
6 
 The derivation is usually associated with Jones (1965). 
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From equations (2.3) to (2.6) we have  l l S Ui ia a w w  for l = S, U and i = 1, 2 so that 
total differentiation of (2.21) yields: 
     (2.23) 1 2 1 21 2 1 2S S S Sda X da X a dX a dX dS    
After further manipulation this expression can be written as: 
     (2.24) 1 21 1 2 2 1 2 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆS S S S S Sa a X XO O O O   S 
where a ‘^’ denotes a proportionate change, S ii S SO  is the proportion of factor S 
used in sector i, and 1Si
i
O  ¦ . 
As commodity prices are unchanged due to the assumption that the UK is a small open 
economy, factor prices are constant such that ˆ 0lia   for all l, i. Hence equation (2.24) 
can be simplified to: 
 1 21 2
ˆˆ ˆ
S SX XO O S         (2.25) 
Repeating this derivation for unskilled labour results in: 
 1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
U UX XO O ˆU         (2.26) 
where U ii U UO   is the proportion of factor U used in sector i, and . 1U i
i
O  ¦
Solving for the proportional changes in output yields: 
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A HO FRAMEWORK 
 
 2-11
   
2 2
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
U SSX
O O
O
 U        (2.27) 
 
1
2
ˆˆ
ˆ
S UUX
O O
O
 1S        (2.28) 
where 1 2 1 2 1 1 0S U U S S UO O O O O O O    !  under the assumption that sector 1 is 
relatively skill-intensive compared to sector 2. 
If the economy’s skilled/unskilled labour endowment ratio increases (i.e. ), 
equations (2.27) and (2.28) can be rewritten in terms of the following expressions: 
ˆ ˆS U!
 
 2
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ 0
S S U
X S
O
O
  !       (2.29) 
 
 1
2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ 0
U S U
U X
O
O
  !       (2.30) 
The proportional change in the production of goods in increasing order of magnitude is 
thus captured by: 
        (2.31)  1 ˆˆ ˆX S U X! ! ! 2ˆ
1
Conversely, a fall in the economy’s skilled/unskilled endowment ratio (i.e. ) 
yields: 
ˆˆU S!
        (2.32) 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆX U S X! ! !
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Finally, balanced growth in factor endowments (i.e. ˆ ˆS U ) results in 
        (2.33)  2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆX U S X   1
The R theorem identifies the special cases of a change in one factor endowment only, 
i.e.  or . ˆ ˆ0,   0S U!  ˆˆ 0,   0U S!  
Expressions (2.31) and (2.32) demonstrate a “magnification effect” of factor 
endowments on product outputs occurs. If the pool of skilled (unskilled) labour expands 
more rapidly than the pool of unskilled (skilled) labour, the production of the skill- 
(unskilled-) intensive good grows at a higher rate than either factor, whereas the 
production of the other good grows (if at all) at a slower rate than either factor. 
Intuitively, if both sectors are to continue using unchanged input mixes, the only 
manner in which the additional skilled (unskilled) labour can be employed is by 
expanding production of the skilled- (unskilled-) intensive good and contracting the 
output of the unskilled- (skilled-) intensive good, the latter releasing the necessary 
unskilled (skilled) labour needed to increase the production of the skilled- (unskilled-) 
intensive good. 
Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the Rybczynski special cases of , 
 and balanced growth 
ˆ ˆ0,   0S U!  
ˆˆ 0,   0U S!  ˆ ˆS U  respectively.  
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Figure 2.1 Growth in skilled labour 
 
Figure 2.2 Growth in unskilled labour 
 
Figure 2.3 Balanced growth in labour endowments 
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The skilled-unskilled labour ratios in the production of good 1 and good 2 (measured 
from  and 1O 2O  respectively) remain constant at the given factor prices. Consequently, 
given that all factors are fully employed, the change in factor endowments alters the 
equilibrium combination of output from a to b, along the given skilled-unskilled labour 
ratio lines. In Figure 2.1 (Figure 2.2) the output of the S-intensive (U-intensive) good 1 
(2) increases following a rise in skilled (unskilled) labour endowments, whereas the 
output of the U-intensive (S-intensive) good 2 (1) decreases. In Figure 2.3 the output of 
both goods increases by the common growth rate of the labour endowments.  
2.3 EFFECTIVE LABOUR ENDOWMENTS, RESOURCE USE AND 
CHANGES IN HEALTH PROVISION  
2.3.1 Introducing illness and health 
The need for and existence of a health sector stems from the presence of people with ill 
health. Assuming that all people are working if healthy and not working if ill, a decline 
in population health caused by illness reduces the number of people able to work (full-
time and/or part-time) and so reduces effective labour endowments, whereas an 
improvement in population health increases effective labour endowments available for 
use in the production sectors. Ignoring for the moment the cost and resource claims 
associated with reaching a particular level of health, and assuming that a health measure 
is agreed on, a change in health thus has a parallel effect on effective labour supply.  
The repercussions of a change in the health of the population on the structure of output 
are analogous to those predicted by the R theorem following changes in relative factor 
endowments. If health improvements are equal across labour types, balanced growth, as 
in expression (2.33) and Figure 2.3, prevails. If, on the other hand, skilled (unskilled) 
labourers were to benefit more than unskilled (skilled) labour from a health 
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improvement, the magnification effect, as in expression (2.31) (expression (2.32)), 
results. The latter includes the special cases identified by Rybczynski for which the 
health of only one labour type improves, given the health of the other labour type 
(Figure 2.1 and 2.2). 
The analogy of the impact of a change in population health with the conventional HO 
model and R results breaks down with respect to per capita income. Whereas this 
analysis accounts for the presence of people potentially able to work but not working 
because of ill health, the conventional HO model excludes these by assuming that all 
factor endowments are fully employed and so the population is identical to the working 
population. Consequently, any change in factor endowments leads to a corresponding 
change in the value of total output and has a minor effect on per capita income for 
sufficiently similar factor endowment changes. In the extreme case where endowments 
change in the same proportion at given world prices, the output of each sector changes 
by the same proportion, so does its value and, given wages, so does the income of each 
factor. It follows that per capita real income (and the consumption of both goods) is 
unchanged.  
In contrast, illness reduces effective labour endowments and thus reduces the total value 
of output. Given a rise in the number of people unable to work due to illness, and 
assuming a redistribution mechanism from the well (working) to the ill (not working, 
but still consuming), this results in a fall in per capita real income. In the example 
above, if an equal proportion of each labour type falls ill and so cannot work, the total 
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value of output, factor income and hence real income per capita (and consumption) falls 
by the same proportion. 7
The discrepancy between the standard R results and an analysis of health-related 
effective endowment changes with respect to per capita income may be formally 
derived by comparing two variables, per capita income of the working population and 
per capita income of the total population (working and non-working due to ill health). 
In the initial equilibrium per capita income, I , of the working population (denoted 
by E ) is: 
 
S E U E
E
E E
w S w UI
S U
         (2.34) 
where ES  and EU  denote effective, i.e. able to work, endowments of skilled and 
unskilled labour respectively.  
Total differentiation of equation (2.34), given that 0S Udw dw  , yields: 
 
S E U E E E
E E
S E U E E E
w dS w dU dS dUdI I
w S w U S U
§ ·  ¨  © ¹¸
    (2.35) 
so that the proportionate change in per capita income of the working population equals: 
  
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ S E E U E E E E E E
E
S E U E E E
w S S w U U S S U UI
w S w U S U
§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹
   (2.36) 
                                                 
7
  Of course, if illness implies inevitable death there is no need to redistribute income and per capita 
income remains unchanged. 
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A HO FRAMEWORK 
 
 2-17
ˆ
After further manipulation equation (2.36) yields: 
   ˆˆE E EI S UY J         (2.37) 
where S E
S E U E
w S
w S w U
Y    denotes the share of skilled labour in the total income of the 
working population and E
E E
S
S U
J    denotes the share of skilled labour in total 
effective labour supply. 
Developing the expression for Y J  yields: 
 
 
  
S U E E
S E U E E E
w w S U
w S w U S U
Y J          (2.38) 
which is positive assuming that , i.e. skilled workers earn a higher wage 
relative to unskilled workers. 
Sw w! U
From (2.37) an improvement in health for both types of workers if identical, i.e. 
, does not affect per capita income of the working population. 
Additionally, if the health improvement is higher for skilled (unskilled) labour relative 
to unskilled (skilled) labour, i.e.  ( ), per capita income of the 
working population will rise (fall). Thus if the government is solely concerned with 
maximising per capita income of the working population, equation (2.37) provides an 
argument for targeting government health policy in terms of the provision of treatments 
to skilled workers only (or worse, to deteriorate the health of the unskilled).  
ˆ ˆ 0E ES U !
ˆ ˆ 0E ES U! ! ˆˆ 0E EU S! !
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In the initial equilibrium per capita income of the total population, working and not 
working, is  
 
S E U Ew S w UI
S U
         (2.39) 
Total differentiation of equation (2.39) yields: 
 
S E U Ew dS w dUdI
S U
        (2.40) 
so that the proportionate change in per capita income of the population can be derived 
as: 
    ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 ˆE E E E EI S U S UY Y Y     U     (2.41) 
Given that the total population does not change ( and  are exogenous), S U ˆI also 
represents the proportionate change in total income or GDP and, in the absence of 
intermediate inputs, the proportionate change in the total value of output at world prices. 
From equation (2.41) an improvement in health for both labour types,  and 
, generates an increase in per capita income of the population even if health 
improvements are equal across labour types (i.e. 
ˆ 0ES !
ˆ 0EU !
ˆ ˆ 0E ES U ! ). Nevertheless, for a 
given level of health improvement of the unskilled, , the increase in per capita 
income will be higher the more the health of skilled labour is improved relative to the 
health of unskilled labour. Hence, if the government’s prime objective is to maximise 
ˆ 0EU !
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per capita income of the total population, equation (2.41) suggests a policy predicament 
of targeting treatments towards all skill types, but relatively more to skilled labour.  
Bearing this in mind, in the following sections the change in the health of the population 
will be modelled on a non-traded health sector. Throughout the analysis it is assumed 
that health solely affects income, via its impact on labour market participation, and does 
not appear in the utility function. Any gains from changes in health are thus purely 
monetary. 
2.3.2 Introducing health care  
The improvement in health must be accounted for in terms of cost and resource use. It is 
assumed that the changes in health come about through changes in the size of a non-
tradable health sector, H. Ethier (1972) assessed how the introduction of a non-traded 
good alters the Rybczynski result. In the presence of a non-traded good, an increase in 
the endowment of each factor will be partially absorbed by the production of the non-
traded good, and so output changes in the remaining traded good sectors depend on the 
factor intensity in the non-traded sector and the characteristics of demand for the non-
traded good. The analysis here differs in the respect that changes in effective labour 
endowments are conditioned upon changes in the production of a non-tradable health 
sector.  
Health care is provided by the government, is free at the point of use, and its 
expenditure is determined politically and thus is exogenous to the model. The necessary 
finance for health care provision is obtained directly from households via a lump-sum 
transfer. The health sector employs skilled and unskilled labour in the ‘production’ of 
healthy people by treating the ill, i.e. health care adds value to the ill. Ill persons who 
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are not (successfully) treated and therefore unable to work are recorded in an artificial 
waiting list sector, W.8 The interrelations between the health sector and the waiting list 
sector in a one-period framework are depicted in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 Public health care, demand rationing and the waiting list 
Beginning of period 
waiting list 
End of period 
waiting list 
 
In this framework health status is measured in terms of ability to work. The output of 
the health sector, ‘well’, is the number of people treated and ‘cured’ and thus able to 
work, the remainder being added to the waiting list.9 Also following from Figure 2.4 is 
that the change in the size of the waiting list sector depends on the number of people 
who become ill (i.e. the number of people demanding treatment), the size of the health 
sector (i.e. the number of available treatments of a given quality and cost) and the 
effectiveness of health care in curing people (i.e. the effectiveness of treatments), the 
latter two determining the number of ill recovering from illness. Consequently, given 
 
8
  In this UK-centred example, it is assumed that the given health budget is insufficient to treat all those 
presenting themselves as ill, such that the waiting list is positive. 
9
  An alternative interpretation, involving scaling in terms of worker-hours, is that it is the proportional 
reduction in the degree of illness of all, with the proportion of ‘semi-cured’ workers becoming an 
addition to the effective labour force. 
Newly ill 
Number of treatments 
of certain quality/cost 
Remain ill 
Well 
Production of health care, XH, 
determined by fixed budget 
Skilled labour Unskilled labour
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the number of new ill and the quality/cost of treatments, a rise in the provision of health 
care, HX , increases the number of people treated and cured, and thereby reduces the 
waiting list, W, that period. 
The introduction of a health sector and an artificial waiting list sector alters the 
equations of the HO model developed previously.  
Starting with the consumption of health care, health care demand is rationed such that: 
         (2.42) HC X H
where HX  denotes the amount of health care that the given health budget can purchase 
and  is the consumption of health care.HC
10
  
Given the output of health care, HX , a representative producer minimises the cost of 
production. Assuming CRTS in the production process this yields the equivalent of 
expressions (2.3) to (2.6) for the input-output coefficients for health care: 
 S S S UH Ha a w w         (2.43) 
 U U S UH Ha a w w         (2.44) 
where the input-output coefficients  and  are defined as S Ha U Ha S HHa S X H   and 
U H HHa U X HS
                                                
,  and  denote the quantities of skilled and unskilled labour, HU
 
10
  The exogenous health budget is modelled via a lump-sum transfer by the representative household 
and consequently dealt with when discussing household income. If the health good had a price to the 
household then its introduction to the model would change the demand equations for good 1 and 2. 
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respectively, employed by the health sector and sector H is assumed to be the most 
skill-intensive of all sectors, 1 1 2S U S U S UH Ha a a a a a! ! 2
H
H
.
11
Total demands for skilled and unskilled labour by the health sector follow from 
multiplication of the input-output coefficients by the output of the health sector: 
         (2.45) H S HS a X 
        (2.46) H U HHU a X 
The price of health care to the government is determined by the cost of producing one 
unit of health care, the equivalent of the zero-profit conditions (2.11) and (2.12) for 
health care:  
 H S S U UHp w a w a        (2.47) 
where  denotes the price of health care.    Hp
Ignoring the loss of working time in undergoing treatment, the full employment 
conditions (2.18) and (2.19) are substituted by: 
        (2.48) 1 2 HS S S S   E
W
                                                
         (2.49) ES S S 
 
11
  This is equivalent to 1 1 2 2H HS U S U S U! ! , which is in contrast to the conventional HO models 
with a non-traded good that assume the factor-intensity of the non-traded good sector is in between 
those of the traded sectors. In this model health care is intrinsically non-tradable.  
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E
W
        (2.50) 1 2 HU U U U   
         (2.51) EU U U 
where ES  and EU  denote effective, i.e. able to work, endowments of skilled and 
unskilled labour respectively and  and  the amounts of skilled and unskilled 
labour, respectively, on the waiting list.  
WS WU
In agreement with the linkages displayed in Figure 2.4, the size of the waiting list for 
skilled and unskilled labour in a typical period depends on the size of the initial waiting 
list, the incidence of illness (number of new illness cases as a proportion of given total 
endowments) and the output of the health sector:  
   0; ,W W H W SS S X S ir S  ' 0; ,W H W H W SS X S X S ir S 0w w     (2.52) 
   0; ,W W H W UU U X U ir U  ' 0; ,W H W H W UU X U X U ir U 0w w    (2.53)
where  and  denote initial (given) waiting lists, and  and  the exogenous 
illness rates for skilled and unskilled labour respectively, and  and  are 
decreasing functions of health sector output.
0
WS
0
WU Sir Uir
WS WU
12
 Finally, the household derives income from three sources of employment, the two 
tradables sectors and health care, such that equation (2.20) is replaced by: 
                                                 
12
  The second-order derivative of the waiting lists with respect to health care is assumed positive, so 
that waiting lists are decreasing in health care but at a decreasing rate. Waiting lists can not become 
negative. 
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1 2 1 2S H U HY w S S S w U U U T      
W
   (2.54) 
where  denotes the exogenous lump-sum transfer paid by households to finance the 
provision of health care, given by: 
T
         (2.55) H HT p X 
The full HO model with a non-tradable health sector is displayed in Table 2.2.  
The formal derivation of the R theorem within the context of this model is identical to 
the standard procedure, with the difference that changes in effective labour supply are 
conditioned upon changes in health provision. Starting with the full employment 
conditions (2.48) to (2.51), rewritten in terms of the input-output coefficients: 
 1 21 2S S S H EHa X a X a X S S S         (2.56) 
 1 21 2U U U H EHa X a X a X U U UW         (2.57)  
where l l S Ui ia a w w 
E
 for l = S, U and i = 1, 2, H. 
Total differentiation of (2.56) yields: 
  (2.58) 1 2 1 21 2 1 2S S S H S S S HH Hda X da X da X a dX a dX a dX dS      
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Table 2.2 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model with Health Care 
 
COMMODITY MARKETS 
 
  
Demand  1 1 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.1) 
 
  2 2 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.2) 
 
 
H HC X  
 
(2.42) 
 
Unit price equations (i=1, 2, H) i S S U Ui ip w a w a   
 
(2.11), (2.12), (2.47) 
Market Clearing 1 1C X E1    
 
(2.13) 
 2 2C X M2   
 
(2.14) 
FACTOR MARKETS 
 
  
Demand (i = 1, 2, H)  S S S Ui ia a w w  
 
(2.3), (2.4), (2.43) 
 i S iS a X i  
 
(2.7), (2.8), (2.45) 
  U U S Ui ia a w w  
 
(2.5), (2.6), (2.44) 
 i U iU a X i  
 
(2.9), (2.10), (2.46) 
Market Clearing 1 2 H ES S S S    
 
(2.48) 
 E WS S S   
 
(2.49) 
 1 2 H EU U U U    
 
(2.50) 
 
E WU U U   
 
(2.51) 
Waiting Lists  0; ,W W H W SS S X S ir S  
 ' 0; , 0W H W H W SS X S X S ir Sw w    
 
(2.52) 
  0; ,W W H W UU U X U ir U  
 ' 0; ,W H W H W UU X U X U ir U 0w w    
 
(2.53) 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
  
    1 2 1 2S H U HY w S S S w U U U T        (2.54) 
 H HT p X  (2.55) 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
FOREIGN SECTOR 
 
 
  
Price equations (i = 1, 2) w
i ip p ER  
 
(2.15), (2.16) 
Balance of Payments constraint 1 1 2 2 0p E p M   
 
(2.17) 
Endogenous variables: 1C , , , 2C HC 1X , 2X , HX , , , , , , , , , , , 
, , , , , ,  , , , , , Y , , 
1S 2S HS ES WS 1U 2U HU EU WU
1Sa 2Sa S Ha 1Ua 2Ua U Ha 1p 2p Hp Sw Uw 1E 2M , . ER
Exogenous variables: S , U , , , , , , ,T . 1
wp 2
wp Sir Uir
0
WS
0
WU
 
Since total skilled labour endowments, S, the illness rate, ir, and initial waiting list for 
skilled labour, , remain unchanged, the right-hand side of equation (2.58) may be 
rewritten as:  
0
WS
 0E W W HdS dS dS S X dX   w w H
S
    (2.59) 
Manipulation of equation (2.58) yields: 
  (2.60) 1 21 1 2 2 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆS S S S S S S S S H EH H Ha a a X X XO O O O O O      
where, as before, a ‘^’ denotes a proportionate change, while S ii S SEO   denotes the 
proportion of  employed in sector i, and ES 1Si
i
O  ¦  for i = 1, 2, H. 
Expression (2.59) can be rewritten as: 
 
ˆ ˆW
H
S
E SWXS H G HX        (2.61) 
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where  ' 0; ,W
H
S W H
W H W SX
H W W
S X S X S ir S
X S S
H w 0HX   w !  denotes the absolute value of 
the elasticity of the waiting list for skilled labour with respect to the production of 
health care, and 0S W EW S SG  !  the ratio of skilled labour on the waiting list to 
effective skilled labour endowments, the “dependency ratio” for skilled labour.13
Combining (2.60) and (2.61), while substituting ˆ 0Sia   for i = 1, 2, H (small country 
assumption) and ˆ ˆHX T  (as ˆ 0Hp  ), yields: 
  1 21 2ˆ ˆ WHSS S S SW X ˆHX XO O G H O   T     (2.62) 
Repeating this derivation for unskilled labour results in: 
  1 21 2ˆ ˆ WHUU U U UW X ˆHX XO O G H O   T     (2.63) 
where U ii U UEO   denotes the proportion of  employed in sector EU i, 1U i
i
O  ¦  for 
i = 1, 2, H, and 0U W EW U UG  !  the ratio of unskilled labour on the waiting list to 
effective unskilled labour endowments, the “dependency ratio” for unskilled labour.  
 ' 0; ,W
H
U W H
W H W UX
H W W
U X U X U ir U
X U U
H w    !w 0
HX
                                                
 denotes the absolute value of the 
elasticity of the waiting list for unskilled labour with respect to health care output. 
 
13
  Note that this implies that the elasticity of effective skilled labour endowments with respect to the 
production of health care, ˆ ˆE HS X , is equal to W
H
S
SWXH G . 
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Expressions (2.62) and (2.63) form a system of two equations in two unknowns, 1ˆX  and 
2
ˆX . Solving for the proportional changes in output yields: 
   1 2 2 2 2ˆˆ W WH HS UU S S U S U U SW W HX XTX O G H O G H O O O OO ª º   « »¬ ¼H   (2.64) 
   2 1 1 1 1ˆˆ W WH HU SS U U S U S S UW W HX XTX O G H O G H O O O OO ª º   « »¬ ¼H   (2.65) 
where 1 2 1 2 0S U U SO O O O O  !  under the assumption that sector 1 is relatively skill-
intensive compared to sector 2. 
The extreme possibility of W
H
S
XH  = WHUXH  = 0, implying the absence of any (positive) 
impact of health sector output on effective labour endowments, simplifies equations 
(2.64) and (2.65) to: 
 1 2
ˆ
ˆ
S U S UH H
TX O O O OO ª ¬ 2 º¼      (2.66) 
 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ
U S S UH
TX O O O OO ª ¬ H º¼       (2.67) 
Expressions (2.66) and (2.67) reflect the proportionate changes in output of sectors 1 
and 2 respectively following a change in government expenditures on health care, 
assuming the latter impacts the labour market only via the resource claims it makes. 
Since the skill-intensity of the health sector differs from the economy-wide effective 
endowment ratio, a change in the size of the health sector will affect the amount of 
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skilled relative to unskilled labour available for use in the tradables sectors. Hence, the 
relationships depicted in (2.66) and (2.67) describe the “factor-bias effect” of a change 
in health care output. The remaining terms of equations (2.64) and (2.65) depict the 
“scale-effect” of a change in health care output, i.e. the impact of improved health on 
effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, which was investigated in section 
2.3.1.14 It is useful to consider the factor-bias effect in isolation first, before continuing 
with the overall impact, i.e. factor-bias plus scale effects, of an increase in the output of 
health care on the production of the non-health sectors.  
2.3.3 Factor-bias effects 
If government expenditure on health care increases ( ), given that the health sector 
is the most skill-intensive sector, the skilled-unskilled effective labour endowment ratio 
for the rest of the economy must fall. On the basis of the R theorem, one expects the 
output of the relatively skill-intensive traded good (sector 1) to fall and the output of the 
other traded good (sector 2) to rise.
ˆ 0T !
15
 There are two cases to consider, depending on 
whether the middle-ranking sector (sector 1) has a skilled-unskilled labour ratio greater 
or less than the effective endowment ratio. Let j js S U j , where j = 1, 2, H or E (for 
the effective endowment ratio), then the two cases are as follows.16  
                                                 
14
  These terms resemble equations (2.27) and (2.28), but now with changes in effective labour supply 
conditioned upon the provision of health care. 
15
  In theory, the output of the other good (2) could fall as well, but this situation is precluded here as the 
health sector is assumed to be the most skill-intensive of all sectors. If this is not the case, the output 
of sector 2 would fall. 
16
  At least one sector must have a skilled-unskilled labour ratio greater than and at least one must have 
skilled-unskilled labour ratio less than the effective endowment ratio. If the skill-intensity of the 
health sector were to remain unspecified, there would be six possible outcomes depending on the 
ordering of skill intensities in the three sectors relative to the effective endowment ratio, being:        
(1) 1 2H Es s s s! ! ! , (2) 1 2H Es s s s! ! ! , (3) 1 2H Es s s s! ! ! , (4) 1 2E Hs s s s! ! ! , (5)  
1 2 E Hs s s s! ! ! , and (6) 1 2E Hs s s s! ! ! . 
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Case 1:   1 2H Es s s s! ! !
The health sector is more skill-intensive than sector 2, so 2
2
S H
U UH
SO O
O O! , or 
2 2 0S U S UH HO O O O ! , hence from equation (2.66) 1ˆ 0X  . Similarly, the health sector 
is more skill-intensive than sector 1, so 1 1 0S U S UH HO O O O !  , hence from equation 
(2.67) . In order to assess whether or not  exceeds 2ˆ 0X ! ˆT 2ˆX , the latter is subtracted 
from the former, yielding:  
 
   1 2 1
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S U U U S SH HT X T
O O O O O O
O
ª º    « »« »¬ ¼
2
U
   (2.68) 
Since 2 11U UHO O O   , 2 1S SH 1SO O O    this expression can be simplified to 
 
1 1
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S UT X T
O O
O
ª º  «¬ ¼»
      (2.69)  
1 Es s!  implies 1 1 0S UO O ! , and therefore .  2ˆ ˆT X!
Thus  implies . Figure 2.5 illustrates.  1H Es s s s! ! ! 2 12ˆ ˆ ˆ0T X X! ! !
The given government health budget, T , is allocated efficiently to purchase factors of 
production,  and , at given factor prices and technology. The remaining factor 
inputs are allocated to sector 1 (measured from the south-west corner of the ‘health 
box’) and 2, giving equilibrium point a. As the government budget is increased, , 
labour employed in health care increases to  and , while the amount of labour, 
HS HU
ˆ 0T !
*
HS
*
HU
and the skilled-unskilled labour ratio, for the rest of the economy falls. Consequently, 
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the output of the relatively skill-intensive good 1 decreases, whereas the output of good 
2 rises, as indicated by b. 
Figure 2.5 Factor-bias effects in the HO model - Case 1 
 
Case 2:  1 2H Es s s s! ! !
This situation is identical to case 1, except for the ordering of the middle-ranking sector 
1 relative to the economy-wide endowment ratio. 1Es s!  implies 1 1 0S UO O  , so that 
2
ˆ ˆX T! , and the overall ordering of proportionate changes in sector output equals 
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1X T! ! ! X
                                                
. Figure 2.6 depicts this situation. 17
 
17
  In Case 1 ( ) sector 2’s output expands proportionally less than the increase in the health 
budget, in Case 2 ( ) by proportionally more. 
Figure 2.5
Figure 2.6
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Figure 2.6 Factor-bias effects in the HO model - Case 2 
 
2.3.4 Factor-bias and scale effects: homogeneous health and treatments 
Returning to equations (2.64) and (2.65) with positive waiting list elasticities, there are 
a myriad of possibilities, depending on the ordering of skill-intensities in each of the 
three sectors and the artificial waiting list, relative to the overall (effective) endowment 
ratio, and the waiting list elasticities for skilled and unskilled labour. To limit the 
number of possible outcomes of an expansion of the health sector, waiting lists are 
henceforth postulated as being homogeneous in ill health and, thus, in treatment across 
labour types. Equal proportions of each labour type fall ill from one type of illness, 
which affects labour types in the same way and requires a unique type of treatment, 
which needs the same amount of health provision and is equally effective across labour 
types.18 Assuming that health care is allocated in proportion to the number of each 
labour type becoming ill – and so not targeted to any particular skill type, an increase in 
health provision, given initial waiting lists (which are, by assumption, proportionate to 
                                                 
18
  Evidence suggests that the incidence of illness is higher in low-income groups and that these groups 
consume less health care and are less efficient “producers” of health (i.e. respond less well to 
treatment), but for simplicity of exposition this is abstracted from.  
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U
total endowments of the respective labour types) and the incidence of illness, leads to 
identical proportionate reductions in the waiting lists of skilled and unskilled labour and 
thus an equi-proportionate rise in effective skilled and unskilled labour endowments.  
Hence, the expansion of the health budget induces balanced growth in effective labour 
endowments. 
In terms of the specification of the HO model with health care, the assumption of 
homogeneity in terms of illness and treatment simplifies the waiting list equations so 
that  and  and Sir ir  WS  WU  are identical functions (see equations (2.52) and 
(2.53)). Furthermore, with respect to the R theorem derivation, 0W W
H H
S U
X XH H H  !  and 
0S UW WG G G  ! . Equations (2.64) and (2.65) thus become: 
   1 2 2 2 2ˆˆ U S S U U SHTX GH O O O O O OO ª º   ¬ ¼H    (2.70) 
   2 1 1 1 1ˆˆ S U U S S UH HTX GH O O O O O OO ª º   ¬ ¼    (2.71) 
The scale effects of an expansion of the health budget for sector 1 and 2 are given by, 
respectively:  
 1 2 2ˆˆ S U STX GH O OO ª ¬ º¼       (2.72) 
 2 1 1ˆˆ S S UTX GH O OO ª ¬ º¼       (2.73)  
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and the factor-bias effects for sector 1 and 2, respectively, are: 
 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ
F
S U U SH
TX O O O OO ª ¬ H º¼      (2.74) 
 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ
F
U S S UH
TX O O O OO ª ¬ H º¼
1
S
     (2.75) 
where 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
FX X X   and 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆF S2X X X  . 
Equations (2.70) and (2.71) can be further simplified using 1 21U UH UO O O    
and 11S SH 2SO O O   , which, after manipulating terms, yields: 
   1 2 2ˆˆ 1 U STX GH O O OO ª   ¬ º¼      (2.76) 
   2 1 1ˆˆ 1 S UTX GH O O OO ª   ¬ º¼      (2.77) 
Or, equivalently: 
   1 2 2ˆˆ 1 U ST ˆX TGH O OO         (2.78) 
   2 1 1ˆˆ 1 S UT ˆX TGH O OO         (2.79) 
where 1 2 1 2 0S U U SO O O O O  !  under the assumption that sector 1 is relatively skill-
intensive compared to sector 2. 
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If government expenditure on health care increases ( ), given that the health sector 
is the most skill-intensive sector, the skilled-unskilled effective labour endowment ratio 
available to the rest of the economy falls, whereas, at the same time, both the skilled and 
unskilled effective (i.e. able to work) labour endowments rise in the same proportion for 
skilled and unskilled labour. Consequently, on the basis of the R theorem, the output of 
the skill-intensive good (sector 1) as well as the output of the other good (sector 2) may 
fall or rise, depending on the sign and magnitude of the factor-bias and scale effects. 
There are a total of seven cases to consider, depending on the magnitude of the elasticity 
of effective labour endowments with respect to health care, i.e. the waiting list elasticity 
times the dependency ratio and, as before, depending on whether the middle-ranking 
sector (sector 1) in terms of skill-intensities has a skilled-unskilled labour ratio greater 
or less than the effective endowment ratio. One case is illustrated below, whereas the 
other six possibilities are included in the appendix to Chapter 2, Section A1. 
ˆ 0T !
Case 1:  and 1 2H Es s s s! ! !   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
   
19
According to the first part of the condition above, i.e. the ranking of the skill-intensities, 
the health sector is more skill-intensive than sector 2, so 2
2
S H
U UH
SO O
O O! , or 
2 2 0S U S UH HO O O O ! , hence from equation (2.74) 1ˆ 0FX  . Since the health sector is 
also more skill-intensive than sector 1, 1 1 0S U S UH HO O O O ! , and hence from equation 
                                                 
19
  The lower boundary for GH can be derived from either equation (2.70) or equation (2.76) by setting 
. Notice that the value of the lower boundary is positive but less than 1, given that the health 
sector is more skill-intensive than sector 2, that sector 2’s skill-intensity lies below the effective 
skilled-unskilled labour endowment ratio and that 
1
ˆ 0X !
0O ! .  
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(2.75) . Sector 1 has a higher skilled-unskilled labour ratio compared to the 
effective endowment ratio, so that 
2
ˆ 0FX !
1 1 0S UO O ! , and from equation (2.73) and 
hence . Similarly, sector 2 has a lower skilled-unskilled labour ratio 
compared to the effective endowment ratio, so that 
2
ˆ 0SX !
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0F SX X X  !
2 2 0U SO O !  and from equation 
(2.72) . Therefore, using the first part of the condition for Case 1,  sector 2’s 
output rises, whereas sector 1’s output will rise or fall depending on whether the scale 
effect outweighs the factor-bias effect. This, as well as the ranking of  compared to 
1
ˆ 0SX !
ˆT
2
ˆX  (and 1ˆX , for ), is determined by the magnitude of the elasticity of effective 
labour endowments with respect to health care, 
1
ˆ 0X !
GH , given by the second part of the 
condition for Case 1.  
In order to assess whether or not  exceeds ˆT 2ˆX , the latter is subtracted from the former 
(using equation (2.79), yielding:  
 
  1 1
2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S UT X T
GH O O
O
ª º   «« »¬ ¼
»      (2.80) 
Since 1 1 0S UO O !  and 1GH  , 2ˆ ˆ 0T X ! .  
Using equation (2.76),  2 21 U S
OGH O O!    implies .1
ˆ 0X ! 20
The ranking of 2ˆX  and 1ˆX  is obtained from equations (2.78) and (2.79): 
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2 1 2 2 1 1ˆˆ ˆ 1 U S S UTX X GH O O O OO ª º     ¬ ¼    (2.81) 
which, given 11U UH 2UO O O    and 11S SH 2SO O O   , can be simplified to: 
  2 1 ˆˆ ˆ 1 S UH HTX X GH O OO          (2.82) 
Since , H Es s! 0S UH HO O ! ,  so that, given 1GH  , 2 1ˆ ˆX X! .  
Thus  and 1H Es s s s! ! ! 2   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
     implies 
. Figure 2.7 illustrates this situation. 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ 0T X X! ! !
Figure 2.7 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 1 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2 2
2 2
U S S UH H
U S
O O O OGH O O
! 
20
  The same result is achieved by combining equation (2.70) and . 
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The maximum possible endowments21 of skilled and unskilled labour are exogenous 
and equal to  and U . As before, inputs into the health sector are measured from , 
while those unable to work and thus on the artificial waiting list are measured from 
. At the original level of health provision, the number of potential skilled and 
unskilled workers remaining on the waiting list are  and  respectively (and by 
virtue of the previous assumptions are in the same proportion as the economy’s 
endowment ratio). The inner box then gives the skilled and unskilled labour available to 
work in the two tradables sectors. Measuring inputs for sector 1 from the south-west 
corner of the ‘health’ box and inputs into the production of sector 2 from the north-east 
corner of the ‘waiting list’ box allows us to determine the equilibrium point at a.  
S HO
WO
WS WU
As the government budget is increased, , labour employed in health care increases 
to  and  while the provision of extra health care reduces the numbers on the 
waiting lists to  and . The new equilibrium is given by b. Given the original 
waiting list size, the factor-bias effect, captured by the move from ( , ) to ( , 
),  increases the output of sector 2, whereas output of sector 1 is almost reduced to 
zero. Subsequently, given the new size of the health sector, the scale effect, reflected by 
the change in the waiting lists from ( , ) to ( , ), increases the output of 
both sectors. In Figure 2.7, the scale effect for sector 1 outweighs the factor-bias effect, 
such that the output of both sector 1 and 2 rises. 
ˆ 0T !
*
HS
*
HU
*
WS
*
WU
HU HS
*
HU
*
HS
WU WS
*
WU
*
WS
 
21
  In the sense that there is no ill health, and hence no need for health provision. 
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Table 2.3 summarises the proportionate changes in output of non-health sectors if the 
health sector expands for all seven cases (Cases 2-6 are developed in the appendix to 
Chapter 2, Section A1).  
Table 2.3 Output changes in the HO model following a rise in health expenditures 
Relative factor 
intensities 
Waiting list elasticity and dependency ratio assuming 
homogeneous health and treatment 
Output changes for 
 
ˆ 0T !
Case 1.   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
     2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ 0T X X! ! !  
Case 2.   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
      2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ0T X X! ! !  1 2H Es s s s! ! !  
Case 3. 1GH !  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X X T! ! !  
Case 4.   1 11 11 11
S U U SH H
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
!     1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ0X T X! ! !  
Case 5.   1 11 11 11 1
S U U SH H
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
      1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X T X! ! !  
Case 6.   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
     2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X T X! ! !  
1 2H Es s s s! ! !  
Case 7.   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
      2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ0X T X! ! !  
 
The rankings of relative output changes based on factor-bias effects alone (Section 
2.3.3) are preserved only if the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to 
health care,GH , is ‘small enough’ (and less than one), which is illustrated by Case 2 and 
Case 7. In these cases, the output of the unskilled-intensive good 2 rises and the output 
of the other good falls. Gradually increasing GH  leads to a rise in production of the 
skilled-intensive sector 1 as well, provided it is less than one (Cases 1 and 6). 
Improvements in GH  thereafter makes the output rise for sector 1 stronger than that of 
sector 2 (Cases 3 and 5), which could in one particular situation lead to a fall in output 
for sector 2 (Case 4). 
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2.4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL: 
INTRODUCING SPECIFIC FACTORS 
The previous section illustrated the impact of health-related endowment changes, 
conditioned on the output of a non-tradable health sector, on the outputs of non-health 
goods in a simple, low-dimension HO model. Whereas this has led to important 
insights, it is unclear to what extent the results carry over to a more complex model. In 
the theory of international trade, a general body of theory has been developed to 
examine the generality of results of simple models. Whereas various modifications have 
been examined in detail elsewhere,22 this section concentrates on one particular 
assumption which, if altered, is expected to have a significant impact upon the results. 
This is the assumption of perfectly mobile factors of production. Most of the value of 
health care output represents value-added in the form of wages to health care personnel, 
so that if part of the labour endowments is assumed specific to sectors, i.e. immobile, 
the output change of health care is restricted and, also, non-health outputs are less 
responsive to changes in endowments. The section includes an analysis of Rybczynski-
type effects when the government allows the immigration of foreign health care-specific 
skilled labour in order to alleviate rationing of health care. Before proceeding with the 
introduction of specific factors, other possible extensions important to the HO model 
with health care are briefly addressed. These are: the use of intermediate products, the 
impact of removing the small country assumption and the issue of dimensionality.  
2.4.1 Intermediate inputs, small country assumption and dimensionality 
Intermediate inputs are of secondary importance compared to value added in the 
production of health care. Also, according to Falvey (1994), adding inter-industry flows 
 
22
  Falvey (1994) provides a useful survey. 
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to the conventional HO model does not change its basic results. While there are two 
alternative measures of factor intensity - direct (value added only) and total (factor use 
in value added and intermediate inputs) - the ranking of products by either measure is 
the same. If the intermediate good is not also produced as a final product, the number of 
factors and products is unequal, which leads to dimensionality problems. 
The small country assumption implies that prices are fixed on world markets. Allowing 
for a ‘large country’ in the sense that it can influence the terms of trade implies that 
product prices and thus factor prices are not constant anymore in the analysis of health 
conditioned labour endowment changes. The theory of immiserising growth 
(Bhagwati,1958) suggests that growth in the country’s more abundant factor - here 
skilled labour, where the growth would be caused by an improvement in health, may 
reduce welfare by turning the terms of trade against its exports and so reduce the real 
income of the growing country. 
Ethier (1984) and more recently Falvey (1994) investigate the impact of changing the 
(relative) dimension of the model from a 2 x 2 to an n x m HO model with n products 
and m factors. The R theorem derived from the simple HO model carries over to a 
higher dimension HO model as correlation, provided that . There is a tendency 
for an increase in those outputs using intensively those factors whose endowments have 
risen and a decline for the others. If endowments of one factor rise, it can be shown that 
there exists at least one sector for which the relative output change exceeds the relative 
endowment change and at least one sector for which the relative output change is 
negative. In between these two extremes, the more (less) intensive a good is in the 
expanding factor, the higher (lower) the relative output change.  
n mt
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2.4.2 Specific factors 
The existence of specific factors is often cited as a reason why the impact of changes in 
factor endowments on domestic outputs may be smaller in reality that that predicted by 
the R theorem. The Specific-Factors (SF) model (also known as Ricardo-Viner, or 
Jones-Neary model) assumes that a factor in each sector, usually capital, is specific to 
the sector and hence immobile across sectors, whereas the other factor, labour, can 
move freely between the sectors. As a consequence, in the conventional HO model there 
are two rental rates for the capital stock in each sector next to a uniform wage rate.  
The SF model arose in reaction to the inability of conventional trade models to explain 
factor-owner reactions to international trade policies. While the R theorem predicts that 
factor returns remain unaffected by changes in endowments, in reality a policy such as 
liberalisation of immigration restrictions leading to a rise in labour supply is strongly 
opposed by workers and much favoured by capital owners, which seems at odds with 
the theory. The SF model reconciles such real world phenomena with conventional 
trade theory by showing that in the short-run some factors are temporarily locked in, so 
that factor rewards change in response to external shocks, whereas in the long run 
initially locked-in factors will become mobile, and respond to differences in sectoral 
factor rewards, so that gradual adjustment to long-run equilibrium can take place. The 
SF model can thus be interpreted as a short term version of the conventional HO 
model.23  
 
23
  Examples are Mayer (1974), Neary (1978) and Neary (1996). Another version regards the SF model 
as a generalisation of the Ricardian model. The capital stocks in the two sectors are treated as two 
different types of factors so as to encompass factors that are always immobile between sectors (e.g. 
land in one sector and capital in the other). This implies a 3-factor, 2-sector model. See for example 
Jones (1971) and Caves et al. (1999, Chapter 6). 
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The conventional SF model with two sectors and three factors, labour and two types of 
sector-specific capital, arrives at different conclusions regarding the impact of factor 
endowment changes on factor returns and the composition of outputs compared to the 
conventional HO model. With respect to factor returns, the SF model predicts that 
growth in labour supply lowers the wage and increases rents to both types of sector-
specific capital, whereas growth in either capital type improves wages and reduces 
rents. Specific factors therefore share a common interest contradicting that of the mobile 
factor, which is to welcome any policy that leads to a rise in the supply of the mobile 
factor labour and to disapprove of those leading to an increase in either type of specific 
capital.  
In terms of output changes, the SF model shows that the outputs of both sectors rise 
following an increase in the supply of the mobile factor, irrespective of factor 
intensities, but remains inconclusive about the ordering of these relative changes.24 An 
increase in the supply of a specific capital type would lead to a less than proportionate 
rise in the output of its sector of employment (which invalidates the magnification effect 
of the standard R theorem), but would still result in a fall in the output of the other 
sector as the supply of its specific factor is fixed and some of the mobile factor has been 
drawn into the expanding sector.  
The specific factor introduced into the HO model with health care is skilled labour. 
Compared to the tradable good sectors 1 and 2 the health sector is the sector in which 
skills are mostly specific. In order to keep the number of modifications to a minimum, 
 
24
  The ranking of relative output changes is influenced not only by relative factor intensities, but also by 
the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of (factor) substitution in both sectors. 
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while still addressing the question of how factor-specificity alters the results, the 
specificity of skilled labour is narrowed down to health care only. The remainder of 
skilled labour endowments is non health care-specific, or tradables-specific, and can 
move freely between sector 1 and 2. Unskilled labour remains perfectly mobile. In 
terms of the HO model with a non-tradable health sector (Table 2.2) this implies the 
following changes.  
Firstly, there are two types of skilled labour, health care-specific skilled labour and 
tradables-specific skilled labour. Each of these types of labour has exogenously fixed 
total (potential) labour endowments and is assigned a separate waiting list. The market 
clearing equations for skilled labour, (2.48) and (2.49), thus become: 
 1 2
T
ES S S          (2.83) 
         (2.84)   T TES S S  TW
E
H
W
         (2.85) HHS S 
        (2.86) H HES S S 
where  and  denote total potential (and exogenous) skilled labour endowments 
specific to tradables and health care respectively, 
TS HS
T
ES  and 
H
ES  effective, i.e. able to 
work, skilled labour endowments specific to tradables and health care respectively and 
 and  the number of tradables- and health care-specific skilled workers on the 
waiting list respectively.  and  represent the quantities of (tradables-specific) 
T
WS
H
WS
1S 2S
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skilled labour employed by sectors 1 and 2 respectively and  is the amount of (health 
care-specific) skilled labour employed in the health sector. 
HS
The waiting list equation for skilled labour (2.52) is replaced by:  
   0; ,T T T T TW W H W SS S X S ir S  ' 0; ,T T T T TW H W H W SS X S X S ir S 0w w    (2.87) 
   0; ,H H H H HW W H W SS S X S ir S  ' 0; ,H H H H HW H W H W SS X S X S ir S 0w w    (2.88) 
where  and  denote the initial (beginning of period) waiting lists for tradables-
specific and health care-specific skilled labour respectively,  and  the exogenous 
illness rates for tradables-specific and health care-specific skilled labour respectively 
and  and  are decreasing functions of health output. 
0T
WS
0H
WS
T
Sir
H
Sir
T
WS
H
WS
Secondly, instead of a uniform wage, , the two types of skilled labour earn a sector-
specific wage,  in the tradables sectors and  in the health sector. Household 
income, as displayed in equation (2.54), changes as follows: 
Sw
T
Sw
H
Sw
    (2.89)    1 2 1 2T HS S H U HY w S S w S w U U U T      
The unit factor demand equations for sector i, i = 1,2, equations (2.3) to (2.6), are 
substituted by: 
  TS S S Ui ia a w w         (2.90), (2.91) 
  TU U S Ui ia a w w         (2.92), (2.93) 
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A HO FRAMEWORK 
 
 2-46
Unit factor demands for health care, equations (2.43) and (2.44), are replaced by:  
  HS S S UH Ha a w w         (2.94) 
  HU U S UH Ha a w w 
H
      (2.95) 
Finally, the unit price equations (2.11), (2.12) and (2.47) are adjusted so that they 
incorporate the health care- and tradables-specific wages: 
 
H
H S S U UHp w a w a        (2.96) 
 
T
i S S U Ui ip w a w a                   (2.97),(2.98) 
where i = 1, 2. 
The full set of equations of the model with health care adjusted for health care-specific 
(and tradables-specific) skilled labour is displayed in Table 2.4. 
The formal derivation of the R theorem for the SF model with health care is identical to 
the standard procedure, with the difference that changes in effective labour supply are 
conditioned upon changes in health provision and that, while the prices of tradables, 
unskilled labour and tradables-specific skilled labour remain the same, the price of 
health care and health care-specific skilled labour may change.   
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Table 2.4 The Specific-Factors Model with Health Care 
 
COMMODITY MARKETS 
 
  
Demand  1 1 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.1) 
 
  2 2 1 2, ,C C P P Y  
 
(2.2) 
 
 
H HC X  
 
(2.42) 
 
Unit price equations (i=1, 2) T
i S S U Ui ip w a w a   
 
(2.97), (2.98) 
 
H
H S S U UH Hp w a w a   
 
(2.96) 
Market Clearing 1 1C X E1    
 
(2.13) 
 2 2C X M2   
 
(2.14) 
FACTOR MARKETS 
 
 
  
Demand (i = 1, 2)  TS S S Ui ia a w w  
 HS S S UH Ha a w w  
(2.90), (2.91) 
 
(2.94) 
i = 1, 2, H i S iS a X i  
 
(2.7), (2.8), (2.45) 
i = 1, 2   TU U S Ui ia a w w  
 HU U S UH Ha a w w  
 
(2.92), (2.93) 
 
(2.95) 
 
i = 1, 2, H i U iU a X i  
 
(2.9), (2.10), (2.46) 
Market Clearing 
1 2
T
ES S S   
 
(2.83) 
 
T T
E WS S S  T
H
 
  
(2.84) 
 
H
H ES S  
 
(2.85) 
 
H H
E WS S S   
 
(2.86) 
 1 2 H EU U U U    
 
(2.50) 
 
 
E WU U U   
 
(2.51) 
Waiting Lists  0; ,T T T T TW W H W SS S X S ir S  
 ' 0; ,T T T T TW H W H W SS X S X S ir S 0w w    
(2.87) 
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Table 2.4 Continued 
  0; ,H H H H HW W H W SS S X S ir S 
 ' 0; ,H H H H HW H W H W SS X S X S ir S 0w w    
 
(2.88) 
  0; ,W W H W UU U X U ir U  
 ' 0; ,W H W H W UU X U X U ir U 0w w    
 
(2.53) 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
  
  
 
1 2
1 2
T H
S S
U H
Y w S S w S
w U U U T
   H
     
 
(2.89) 
 
 H HT p X  
 
(2.55) 
FOREIGN SECTOR 
 
  
Price equations (i = 1, 2) w
i ip p ER  
 
(2.15), (2.16) 
Balance of Payments constraint 1 1 2 2 0p E p M   
 
(2.17) 
Endogenous variables: 
1C , , , 2C HC 1X , 2X , HX , , , , , , , , , , , 
, , , , 
1S 2S HS
T
ES
H
ES
T
WS
H
WS 1U 2U HU
EU WU 1Sa 2Sa S Ha , , , 1Ua 2Ua U Ha ,  , , , , , , Y , 
, 
1p 2p Hp
T
Sw
H
Sw Uw
1E 2M , . ER
Exogenous variables: TS , , U , , , , , , , , ,T . HS 1
wp 2
wp TSir
H
Sir Uir
0T
WS
0H
WS
0
WU
 
The following equations summarise the relative output, input, factor price and output 
price changes following a change in the size of the health budget in the SF model, using 
the assumption that waiting lists are homogeneous in ill health and, thus, in treatment 
across labour types (for a full derivation see the appendix to Chapter 2, Section A2).25
   
 
 2
2 2
1
ˆ 2 1
ˆ
1
T
T T
SU H
S UH H U S
T
X
O I GHVT GHGH T VT O O
ª º« » « »  « »¬ ¼
   (2.99) 
                                                 
25
  Note that those factor prices and output prices which are not mentioned do not change in value. 
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1
1 1
2
ˆ 2 1
ˆ
1
T
T T
SU H
S UH H S U
T
X
O I GHVT GHGH T VT O O
ª º« » « »  « »¬ ¼
   (2.100) 
   ˆ ˆ 1H U S UH HX TVT GH T VT   H     (2.101) 
     ˆˆ 1 1H S SH Hp TGH T GH T VT    U H

    (2.102) 
    ˆˆ 1 1HS S Hw TGH GH T VT    U H     (2.103) 
     ˆˆ 1 1S U S UH H Ha TVT GH GH T VT     H    (2.104) 
     ˆˆ 1 1U U S UH H Ha TVT GH GH T VT    H    (2.105) 
where T
i
T
i ES SSO   denotes the proportion of tradables-specific skilled labour 
employed in sector i, with 1T
iS
i
O  ¦  for i = 1, 2, and T
i
T
i EU U UO   denotes the ratio 
of unskilled labour employed in sector i  to total unskilled labour employed in the 
tradables sectors, with 1T
iU
i
O  ¦  for  and 1,2i  
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
0T T T T T T T TS U U S S U U SO O O O O O O O O      !  under the assumption that sector 1 is 
relatively skill-intensive compared to sector 2.  
Compared to the HO model the following new terms appear: HS S SH Ha w pT  H   
( U U UH Ha w p HT  ) represents the cost share of health care-specific skilled labour 
(unskilled labour) in the output of health care, so that 1U SH HT T  . V  denotes the 
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elasticity of substitution between health care-specific skilled labour and unskilled labour 
in health care, defined as    ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆHU S S UH Ha a w wV    , and  TH EU UI   is the ratio 
of unskilled labour employed in health care to total unskilled labour employed in the 
tradables sectors. The latter parameter appears as, due to the sector-specificity of skilled 
labour, the tradables sectors now compete with the non-tradable health care sector only 
in terms of unskilled labour, with an expansion in health care initially reducing the 
supply of effective unskilled labour available to sectors 1 and 2. 
The additional parameters complicate the effect of a rise in health care expenditures, 
, on changes in outputs (and prices) compared to the HO model. Since the 
proportionate changes in outputs of the tradables sectors lend themselves for 
comparison with the outcomes of the HO model, they are considered first.  
ˆ 0T !
Factor-bias effects: 
In the absence of scale effects ( 0H  ), 0GH  , so that given 
1 1 2 2
0T T T TS U U SO O O O   ! , 
0l HT !  for ,l S U , 0I ! , and a positive substitution elasticity in health care, 0V ! , 
from equation (2.99)  and from equation (2.100) . The 
expansion of the health care sector reduces supply of unskilled labour available to the 
tradables sectors so that, conforming with the R theorem, the output of the unskilled-
intensive good, sector 2, must fall and the output of the other good, sector 1, must rise, 
thereby reversing the rankings of the HO model with health care (see section 2.3.3). 
Due to the specificity of skilled labour to health care (and the remainder to tradables) 
the supply and hence use of this factor in health care does not change. Figure 2.8 
illustrates. 
1
ˆ ˆ 01
FX X ! 2 2ˆ ˆ 0FX X 
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Figure 2.8 Factor-bias effects in the SF model 
 
Factor-bias and scale effects: 
Using equations (2.99) and (2.100), the difference in the proportionate change in 
outputs of sectors 1 and 2 for a given positive substitution elasticity V  and positive GH , 
yields: 
  
 
   
2 2
1 2
ˆ2 1
ˆ ˆ
1 T T
U H
S UH H U S
T
X X
IVT GH
GH T VT O O
  
  
   (2.106) 
Limiting the range for the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health 
care, GH , to 0 1GH  , given 
2 2
0T TU SO O ! , 0l HT !  for ,l S U , and 0I ! , yields 
. Also, from (2.99) , whereas from (2.100) the sign of 1 2ˆ ˆ 0X X ! 1ˆ 0X ! 2ˆX  is 
indeterminate and depending on the health sector’s use of unskilled labour relative to 
the tradables sectors (I ): the higher the value of this parameter, the more the positive 
health effect of an increase in health expenditures is counteracted by a reduction in the 
availability of unskilled labour, which for the unskilled intensive sector implies that a 
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contraction is more likely. Hence, 0 1GH   and 0V !  implies , 1ˆ 0X ! 1ˆ ˆ 2X X! , but 
with  or , depending on 2ˆ 0X ! 2ˆ 0X  I . Again, compared to the HO model, the 
ranking of the proportionate changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2 is reversed. Figure 2.9 
illustrates the boundary case for which 2ˆ 0X  , which is given by 
   
1 1 1
2 1T T TS U SI GH O O O GH   0! . As the waiting list for health care-specific labour 
falls, effective supply and hence the use of this factor changes (in the same proportion 
as effective supply of tradables-specific skilled and unskilled labour). 
Figure 2.9 Factor-bias and scale effects in the SF model - 0 1GH  , 2ˆ 0X   
 
The ranking of the remaining variables, for 0 1GHd   and 0 V  f ,  can be derived 
as: ,  and . In the presence of health care-
specific skilled labour, part of the increase in the expenditures on health care is 
absorbed by a wage increase, resulting in a rise in the price of health care, where 
 (a magnification effect). The output of the health sector thus increases, 
ˆ ˆ 0HT X! ! ˆ ˆ 0HS Hw p! ! ˆ 0U Ha ! ! ˆS Ha
ˆ ˆ 0HS Hw p! !
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but by less than the rise in expenditures on health care: . Due to the rise in 
the relative wage of health care-specific skilled labour, substitution towards relatively 
cheaper unskilled labour is observed: 
ˆ ˆ 0HT X! !
ˆ 0S Ha  , . ˆ 0U Ha !
The boundary case of 1GH   (and 0V ! ) yields proportionate changes in outputs of 
, which replicates the rankings of the HO model, with 
proportionate changes in the input-output coefficients and prices reduced to zero: 
. In this situation, an increase in government expenditures 
on health care is fully absorbed by a change in health care production since the relative 
change in the latter is matched by a change in the effective supply of all labour types. 
Consequently, the prices of health care and health care-specific skilled labour remain 
the same and input-output coefficients do not change.  
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0HX X X T   !
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0HS U S HH Ha a w p    
For 1GH !  the proportionate changes cannot be determined without imposing further 
restrictions on I  and V  (see Table 2.5). If factor substitution in health care is limited 
(V  small), the additional effective supply of all labour, especially health-care specific 
skilled labour, cannot be absorbed by the health sector so that this sector contracts. 
Given the rise in the health care budget, the unit cost of health care and so the price of 
health care-specific skilled labour must rise, generating limited factor substitution in 
favour of unskilled labour. Also, waiting lists rise and effective endowments of all 
labour types fall. The effects on tradables’ outputs depend on the health sector’s reliance 
on unskilled labour relative to that of tradables (I ). For a large I , the tradables sectors 
are less dependent on unskilled labour - but sector 2 relatively more so than sector 1 - so 
that following the fall in effective labour supplies, sector 1 expands and sector 2 
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contracts. For a small I , the tradables sectors are relatively more dependent on 
unskilled labour relative to the health sector, so that both sectors contract.  
For a high V , the additional supply of health-care specific skilled (and unskilled) labour 
can easily be absorbed by the health sector so that this sector expands.  The unit cost of 
health care provision and the health care-specific skilled wage fall, generating factor 
substitution in favour of this relatively cheaper factor of production. Also, waiting lists 
fall and effective endowments of all labour types rise. For a large (small) I , the 
tradables sectors are less (more) dependent on unskilled labour - but sector 2 relatively 
more so than sector 1 - so that following the rise in effective labour supplies, sector 2 
expands and sector 1 contracts (expands).  
Table 2.5 Output changes in the SF model following a rise in health expenditures 
Constraints on parameters assuming homogeneous health and treatment 
Waiting list elasticity 
and dependency ratio  
Substitution elasticity 
health care 
The health sector’s use of 
unskilled labour relative to 
the tradables sectors 
Output changes 
for  ˆ 0T !
 
 
1 1
1
0
2 1
T T
T
S U
S
GH O OI O GH

    1 2ˆ ˆ 0X X! !  
0 1GH   ˆ0 0HXV !  !   
 
1 1
1
2 1
T T
T
S U
S
GH O OI O GH

!   1 2
ˆ ˆ0X X! !  
 
 
2 2
2
0
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O OI O GH

    1 2ˆ ˆ0 X X! !   10
ˆ 0
S H
U H
HX
T GHV T
 
 
  
 
2 2
2
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O OI O GH

!   1 2ˆ ˆ0X X! !  
 
 
2 2
2
0
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O OI O GH

    2 1ˆ ˆ 0X X! !  
1GH !  
 1
ˆ 0
S H
U H
HX
T GHV T
!
 !
  
 
2 2
2
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O OI O GH

!   2 1ˆ ˆ0X X! !  
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Table 2.5 summarises the proportionate changes in output of the non-health sectors if 
the health sector expands in the SF model. In contrast with the HO model (Table 2.3), 
the results hold independently of the skill-intensity of the tradables sectors relative to 
the health sector (only the relative use of unskilled labour matters), while factor 
substitution in the health sector comes into play.   
Table 2.6 summarises the proportionate changes in outputs, unit factor demands and 
prices for three conventional values for the elasticity of substitution between health 
care-specific skilled labour and unskilled labour in health care: 0V   (Leontief 
production technology), 1V   (Cobb-Douglas production technology) and V of  
(perfect substitutability between factors of production) respectively. 
Table 2.6 Sensitivity of SF results for factor substitution in health care 
V o  0  1  f  
1
ˆX  
 
0
  
 
 2
2 2
ˆ 2 1
1
T
T T
SU H
S H U S
T O I GHT GHGHT O O
ª º« »« » « »¬ ¼
 
 
 2
2 2
2 1
ˆ
T
T T
S
U S
T
O I GHGH O O
ª º« »« »« »¬ ¼
 
2
ˆX  
 
0
  
 
 1
1 1
ˆ 2 1
1
T
T T
SU H
S H S U
T O I GHT GHGHT O O
ª º« »« » « »¬ ¼
 
 
 1
1 1
2 1
ˆ
T
T T
S
S U
T
O I GHGH O O
ª º« »« »« »¬ ¼
 
ˆ
HX  
 
0
 
 ˆ 1U SH HTT GHT
 
ˆT
 
ˆS Ha  
 
0
 
   ˆ1 1U SH HTT GH GHT  
 
0
 
ˆU Ha  
 
0
 
   ˆ1 1U SH HTT GH GHT 
 
0
 
ˆ
H
Sw  
 
ˆ
S HT T
 
   ˆ1 1 S HTGH GHT 
 
0
 
ˆHp  
 
ˆT
 
   ˆ1 1S SH HTGH T GHT 
 
0
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Typically, when factors employed in health care are perfectly substitutable (fourth 
column), all adjustment to an increase in the health care budget takes place via the 
production of health care (and other goods), whereas in the absence of factor 
substitution in health care (second column) all adjustment takes place via the price of 
health care and the wage of health care-specific skilled labour. The intermediate case of 
unitary elasticity of substitution in health care is displayed in the third column. 
2.4.3 Immigration of health care-specific skilled labour in the SF model 
In a rationed public health care system such as the UK’s National Health Service, the 
government may consider importing foreign skilled workers to the health care sector so 
as to alleviate the rationing constraint. The model developed in the previous subsection 
is suited to analysing the Rybczynski-type effects of such a policy change.  
The following equations summarise the relative output and factor supply changes in the 
SF model following immigration of health care-specific skilled labour, , whilst 
maintaining the size of the health budget to its original value, . As before, it is 
assumed that waiting lists are homogeneous in ill health and, thus, in treatment across 
labour types, and in addition that the income generated by the additional foreign 
workers remains within the economy, so that the trade balance is unaffected (for a full 
derivation see the appendix to Chapter 2, Section A3).  
ˆ 0HS !
ˆ 0T  
 
 
 
  
 2
2 2
1
ˆ 11
ˆ
1
T
T T
H U SH HSS H
S UH H U S
S
X
O I GH V T TG T GHGH T VT O O
ª º  « » « »  « »¬ ¼
 (2.107) 
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1
1 1
2
ˆ 11
ˆ
1
T
T T
H U SH HSS H
S UH H S U
S
X
O I GH V T TG T GHGH T VT O O
ª º  « » « »  « »¬ ¼
 (2.108) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
S H
H
S UH H
S
X
G T
GH T VT
         (2.109) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
S H
H
S UH H
S
p
G T
GH T VT
          (2.110) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
H
S
S UH H
S
w
G
GH T VT
          (2.111) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
U H
S H
S UH H
S
a
VT G
GH T VT
         (2.112) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
U H
U H
S UH H
S
a
VT G
GH T VT
         (2.113) 
where the difference in the proportionate changes in tradables’ outputs is given by: 
        
2 2
1 2
ˆ1 1
ˆ ˆ
1T T
H
S UH
S UH HU S
S
X X
G T I GH V T T
O O GH T VT
    
  
SH H
    (2.114) 
Factor-bias effects: 
In the absence of health effects ( 0H  ), 0GH  , so that given 
1 1 2 2
0T T T TS U U SO O O O   !  and 0l HT !  for ,l S U  and 0I ! , and with a positive 
substitution elasticity in health care, 0V ! , immigration of health care-specific skilled 
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labour,  , leads to a fall in health care-specific skilled wages, a fall in the unit 
cost of health care provision and hence, given the health care budget, a rise in health 
care output, . For 
ˆ 0HS !
ˆ 0HX ! S UH HV T T , the fall in health care-specific skilled wages 
induces limited substitution of health care-specific skilled labour for unskilled labour so 
that overall employment of unskilled labour in health care rises and thus the relative 
supply of unskilled labour available for the tradables sectors falls:    and 
. In contrast, for 
1
ˆ ˆ 01
FX X !
2 2
ˆ ˆ 0FX X  S UH HV T T! , so much of the unskilled labour is 
substituted by skilled labour in health care that the employment of unskilled labour in 
health care falls, and the effective supply of unskilled labour for the rest of the economy 
rises, despite the expansion of the health sector, so that  and 
. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate. 
1
ˆ ˆ 01
FX X 
2 2
ˆ ˆ 0FX X !
Figure 2.10 Factor-bias effects of skilled labour migration in health care - 
S UH HV T T  
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Figure 2.11 Factor-bias effects of skilled labour migration in health care - 
S UH HV T T!  
 
 
Factor-bias and scale effects: 
For positive health effects, 0GH ! , the effects of a rise in health care-specific skilled 
labour, , on changes in outputs (and prices) become more complicated. The 
results are nevertheless similar to the SF model results in Table 2.6. 
ˆ 0HS !
Ceteris paribus, for 
a ‘small’ elasticity of effective endowments with respect to health care the factor-bias 
results pertain, though the formerly contracting sector may now expand, depending on 
the reliance of health care on unskilled labour relative to tradables (for lower values of 
I ). For a ‘large’ GH  the signs of the proportionate changes cannot be determined 
without imposing further restrictions on I  and V : for low (high) levels of factor 
substitution in health care, i.e. V  small (large), immigration of health care-specific 
skilled labour and effective labour supply changes cannot (can) be absorbed by the 
health sector so that this sector contracts (expands), with associated effects on prices, 
factor demands and outputs as obtained for the SF model.    
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2.5 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
There are generally two opposing views on the origins of the many problems that health 
care systems face nowadays, both supported by a large body of evidence (see Chapter 
4). On the one hand, one may argue that insufficient resources have been devoted to 
health care, whereas on the other hand one may trace back the problems to 
inefficiencies in the provision of health care. The impact of an increase in health care 
expenditures across sectors and factors, given production technologies, has been 
assessed in previous sections. This section departs from previous analyses in that health 
improvements do not originate from an increase in the use of health care inputs, but 
from an improvement in productivity of those inputs - i.e. the more efficient use of 
existing health care resources. Productivity improvements in health care are modelled 
via technical change, which can be either factor-neutral (Hicks-neutral) or skill-biased. 
Factor-neutral technical change (FNTC) increases the productivity of both labour types, 
whereas skill-biased technical change (SBTC) increases the productivity of skilled 
relative to unskilled labour. There are various ways of defining and implementing these 
types of technical change (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999, p32-33)). 
This section adopts the approach of Jones (1965) in using the proportionate changes in 
input-output coefficients as a measure of technical change, which generally may be 
decomposed into an effect due to factor price changes at given technology and an effect 
of a change in technology at given factor prices. The requirement for adoption of a new 
technology, in which case it is technical progress, is that unit costs must fall at current 
factor prices. This condition will be tested for both FNTC and SBTC. The HO model 
with health care is taken as point of departure; technical change in the SF version of the 
model is considered in the appendix to Chapter 2, sections A4 and A5. 
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2.5.1 Factor-neutral technical change in health care using the HO model 
FNTC increases productivity of skilled and unskilled labour without altering the ratio of 
marginal products for a given skilled to unskilled labour ratio. In terms of the 
production function for health care this type of technological progress, using Jones 
(1965), implies that  (and ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a   ˆ 0lia   for l = S, U and i = 1, 2). Per unit 
of output of health care, less inputs of skilled and unskilled labour are required, so that 
unit factor demands fall in identical proportions.  
The new technology will be adopted if the unit cost of health care at current factor 
prices falls. At unchanged factor prices, total differentiation of the unit cost equation for 
health care (2.47) yields: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆH S S U UH H H Hp a aT T        (2.115) 
where S S SH Ha w p HT   and U U UH Ha w p HT   are the cost shares of skilled and 
unskilled labour in the output of health care respectively,  and 1S UH HT T   by 
definition. Substituting ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a    in equation (2.115) gives  , so 
that unit cost of health care falls and the new technology will be adopted. 
ˆ ˆ 0Hp a 
Since the health budget, H HT p X  , is unchanged, the proportionate change in the 
output of health care can be derived as ˆ ˆ 0HX a  ! . This information is used to derive 
the proportionate changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2. 
Substitution of  and ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a   ˆ ˆ 0HX a  !  in equation (2.58) and (2.59) 
yields after further manipulation: 
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A HO FRAMEWORK 
 
 2-62
 1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
W
H
S
S S SW XX XO O G H   a      (2.116) 
Repeating this derivation for unskilled labour results in: 
 1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
W
H
U
U U UW XX XO O G H   a      (2.117) 
Equation (2.116) and (2.117) resemble equation (2.62) and (2.63), but with   replaced 
by , and 
ˆT
aˆ l HO  for  disappearing from the term in brackets.  ,l S U 
Solving for the proportional changes in output: 
 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ W
H H
S
U S S UW WX
aX O G H O G HO
WU
X
 ª «¬ º»¼     (2.118) 
 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ W
H H
U
S U U SW WX
aX O G H O G HO
WS
X
 ª «¬ º»¼     (2.119) 
which, using the assumption of homogeneous health and treatments across labour types, 
gives:  
 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ
U S
aX GH O OO
 ª ¬ º¼       (2.120) 
 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ
S U
aX GH O OO
 ª ¬ º¼       (2.121) 
Comparison of the solution values for the proportionate changes in outputs in a model 
in which the increase in health care production stems from FNTC, , with ˆ ˆ 0HX a  !
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those of the model where the production increase was induced by an increase in 
expenditures on health care, ˆ HX T , reveals that the former model only yields scale 
effects. This is due to the technological improvement being neutral across factors, 
thereby eliminating factor-bias effects (the proportionate change in health care 
employment equals , for ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 0H l HHL a X a a     ˆ ,L S U ). Since only scale effects 
matter, FNTC in health care of magnitude  results in proportionate output changes, as 
shown in Table 2.7.  
aˆ
Table 2.7 Output changes in the HO model following FNTC in health care 
Relative factor 
intensities 
Waiting list elasticity and dependency ratio assuming 
homogeneous health and treatment 
Output changes for 
 
ˆ
ˆ 0HX a  !
Case 1.  2 20 U S
OGH O O    1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0HX X X! ! !  
Case 2.    2 2 1 1U S S U
O OGHO O O O    1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0HX X X! ! !  1 2H Es s s s! ! !  
Case 3.  1 1S U
OGH O O!   1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0HX X X! ! !  
Case 4.  2 20 U S
OGH O O    1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ0HX X X! ! !  
1 2H Es s s s! ! !  
Case 5.  2 2U S
OGH O O!   1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ0HX X X! ! !  
 
How do the results of the HO model with FNTC-induced changes in health care output 
compare to those of the HO model in which health care output rose due to an increase in 
expenditures on health care? 
In the absence of factor-bias effects the change in output for sector 1 cannot be negative  
(as in Cases 2 and 7 of Table 2.3). If the skill intensity of sector 1 exceeds the effective 
endowment ratio, the outputs of sector 1 and 2 rise, and the output change in the former 
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exceeds that of the latter. If the skill-intensity of sector 1 is smaller than the effective 
endowment ratio, the output of sector 1 rises whereas the output of sector 2 falls. The 
role of the magnitude of the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health 
care is to change the relative position of the change in health care output (i.e. the size of 
FNTC). The larger is this elasticity, the larger the magnitude of the changes in outputs 
of non-health sectors, i.e. the more likely that there is a magnification effect. 
2.5.2 Skill-biased technical change in health care using the HO model  
SBTC increases the productivity of skilled labour only, while leaving the productivity 
of unskilled labour unchanged.26 Following Jones (1965) this type of technological 
progress implies that , ˆ 0S Ha  ˆ 0U Ha   and ˆ 0lia   for l = S, U and i = 1, 2. Skilled 
labour in health care is more productive so that less input of skilled labour is required 
per unit of output of health care.27  
The new technology will be adopted if the unit cost of health care at current factor 
prices falls. From equation (2.115), ˆ ˆ 0H S SH Hp aT  , so that the new technology will 
be adopted. 
Given the health budget, H HT p X  , the proportionate change in the output of health 
care can be derived as ˆ ˆ ˆ 0H H S SH HX p aT    ! . Using this result in the derivation 
for the proportionate changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2 yields: 
                                                 
26
  Each skilled worker can so to speak treat more patients. Note that the technological improvement 
pertains to the health sector only, in contrast to some trade economists who use factor augmentation 
as applying to the factor in all sectors. In that case technical change is equivalent to an endowment 
change of the relevant factor. 
27
  It can be shown that this type of technical change falls in the category of “unskilled labour using” 
(“skilled labour saving”) technical progress, which occurs when, at constant relative wages, the ratio 
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2 2
1
2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ
W W
H
S U
S U S S UH W WXS H
S S U U S U SH H H
a
X
T O G H O G H
O T O O O O O O
ª º « » « »  « »¬ ¼
HX
H
  (2.122) 
 
 
 
1 1
2
1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ
W W
H
U S
S S U U SH W WXS H
S U S S U U SH H H
a
X
T O G H O G H
O T O O O O O O
ª º « » « »  « »¬ ¼
HX
H
  (2.123) 
which, using the assumption of homogeneous health and treatments across labour types, 
gives:  
   1 2 2 2 2 2ˆˆ S H S U S S S U U S U SH H H HaX T GH O O T O O O O O OO
 ª º    ¬ ¼H  (2.124) 
   2 1 1 1 1 1ˆˆ S H S S U S U S S U U SH H H HaX T GH O O T O O O O O OO

Hª º    ¬ ¼  (2.125) 
where 1 2 1 2 0S U U SO O O O O  !  under the assumption that sector 1 is relatively skill-
intensive compared to sector 2 (and health care is the most skill-intensive sector of all). 
As with improvements in health induced by an increase in expenditures, the term 
involving GH  is the scale effect, whereas the remainder represents the factor-bias effect. 
                                                                                                                                               
of skilled to unskilled labour employed in health care falls. See for example, Findlay and Grubert 
(1959)’s analysis of technical change which uses capital and labour as factors of production. 
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Factor-bias effects: 
In the absence of scale effects ( 0H  ) and given 0O ! , ˆ 0S Ha !  and 0 1S HT  : 
 1 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ (1 ) 0 SF H U S S S S UH H H H
a
X X O O T T O OO
 ª º    !¬ ¼  
  2 2 1 1ˆˆ ˆ 1 0SF H S U S S S UH H H HaX X T O O T O OO
 ª º    ¬ ¼  
so that more (less) of skilled and unskilled labour is employed in sector 1 (2). In health 
care, production and thus employment of unskilled labour rises by 
.
ˆ
ˆ 0H S SH HX aT  ! 28 Employment of skilled labour in health care falls by 
 since the fixed health care budget constrains the output expansion.    ˆ1 S SH HaT 0
Figure 2.12 Factor-bias effects of SBTC in the HO model 
 
 
                                                 
28
  The reader can verify that 1ˆ ˆ HX X!  further requires  2 20 S U S U SH HT O O O O   2 .   
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Furthermore, compared to an expenditure-induced expansion of the health sector, the 
factor-bias effects of SBTC in health care have the reverse sign: the innovation benefits 
the skilled-intensive sector and harms the unskilled-intensive sector by saving on the 
use of skilled labour, thereby making it relatively more abundant in the rest of the 
economy. Figure 2.12 illustrates. 
Factor-bias and scale effects: 
The proportionate changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2 can be conveniently rewritten as:  
   1 2 2 2ˆˆ 1S H S U S S UH HaX T GH O O T O O OO S H
 ª º    ¬ ¼  (2.126) 
   2 1 1 1ˆˆ 1S H S S U S UH HaX T GH O O T O O OO S H
 ª º    ¬ ¼   (2.127) 
so that the difference in the proportionate changes in tradables outputs is: 
     1 2 ˆˆ ˆ 1 1S H S S U UH H H HaX X T GH O O O OO
 ª º     ¬ ¼S H  (2.128) 
For positive health effects, 0GH ! , the effects of SBTC on changes in outputs become 
more complicated in that they depend on the rankings of skill-intensities relative to the 
overall effective endowment ratio, the cost-share of skilled labour in health care and the 
size of the elasticity of effective endowments with respect to health care. In order to 
avoid the development of all feasible rankings, the following patterns are derived.  
From (2.126) and given 2 2 0U SO O ! ,     1 2 2ˆ ˆ 0S S U SH HX aGH T O O Ow w    !  so 
that for a higher scale effect the relatively skill-intensive sector expands more. 
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Similarly, from (2.127),    2 1 1ˆ ˆS S S UH HX aGH T O Ow w    O
2
, which is positive 
(negative) if the middle ranking sector has a greater (smaller) skill-intensity than the 
overall effective endowment ratio, i.e. for  ( ). Thus, a 
higher elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health care intensifies the 
factor-bias effect in sector 1 and, depending on the relative rankings of skill-intensities, 
reinforces or mitigates the factor-bias effect in sector 2. Despite the latter ambiguity, the 
gap between the output change of sector 1 and sector 2 is increasing in 
1 2H Es s s s! ! ! 1H Es s s s! ! !
GH , since given 
that health care is the most skill-intensive sector, 0S UH HO O ! , so that: 
     1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S S S UH H H HX X aGH T O O Ow  w    ! . 
2.6 OVERVIEW 
This chapter has examined the impact of endowment changes on sectoral outputs using 
a low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework, where endowment changes 
originate from a non-traded, government-provided health sector. Below follows an 
overview and interpretation of the main findings, and the implications for the likely 
effects of expanding health care provision in the UK. In doing so, frequent references 
are made to the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
In international trade theory the impact of endowment changes on sectoral outputs is 
described by the Rybczynski (R) theorem. Using a conventional HO model with two 
factors (skilled and unskilled labour) and two goods (differentiated by skill-intensity) 
the R results predict that an increase in the relative endowment of skilled (unskilled) 
labour results in a more than proportionate increase in the production of the skill-
intensive (unskilled-intensive) good, and a less than proportionate increase (if at all) of 
the other good.  
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If endowment changes originate from a change in health, where an improvement 
(reduction) in health is assumed to have a parallel effect on effective, i.e. able to work, 
labour endowments, the correspondence with the conventional R results ceases to hold 
with respect to per capita income, which includes people who are unable to work due to 
ill health. Typically, an identical improvement in health for skilled and unskilled labour 
does not affect the per capita income of the working population, whereas the per capita 
income of the total population rises. Also, if the health improvement is relatively higher 
for skilled (unskilled) labour, per capita income of the working population will rise 
(fall), whereas per capita income of the total population always rises. Setting aside other 
considerations such as well-being and equity, both indicators favour a government 
policy of health care provision biased towards skilled workers. 
If a change in health derives from a change in government provision of non-traded 
health care which is free at the point of use, the R predictions are altered. The concept 
of a waiting list is introduced for both skill types which records ill persons who are not 
(successfully) treated and therefore unable to work. The remainder of the skilled and 
unskilled labour endowments is by assumption employed in either health care or the 
tradables sectors. Consequently, an increase in the production of health care, ceteris 
paribus, reduces the waiting list of skilled and unskilled workers and thus increases 
their effective endowments.  
The change in effective labour endowments following a change in health care provision 
is shown to consist of three multiplicative factors - the dependency ratio, the absolute 
value of the waiting list elasticity and the proportionate change in the output of health 
care - where the first two factors combined represent the elasticity of the effective 
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labour supply with respect to health care provision. The dependency ratio measures the 
proportion of ill on the waiting list relative to effective labour endowments, i.e. the ratio 
of non-working to working. The waiting list elasticity measures the proportionate 
reduction in the waiting list in response to a one percent rise in the production of health 
care.  
According to the aforementioned relationship, the impact of an increase in health care 
provision on effective endowments, i.e. the improvement in health of a particular labour 
type, is greater: (1) the greater the dependency ratio, (2) the greater the waiting list 
elasticity, and (3) the greater the proportionate change in health care provision. 
The first is a so-called ‘leverage’ effect of a change in health care provision, since 
ceteris paribus a higher dependency ratio implies that more people are benefiting from 
an increase in health provision. The second effect shows that the greater the 
effectiveness of a change in health provision in treating and curing people, the more a 
given increase in health care output, given the dependency ratio, reduces the waiting 
list. The third effect is trivial, since given the waiting list and dependency ratio, a bigger 
increase in health care output reduces the waiting list by more. 
Unequivocal determination of values for the waiting list elasticity and the dependency 
ratio and thereby explicitly pinpointing the elasticity of effective labour endowments 
with respect to health care proves to be a complicated task.29 Evidence presented 
elsewhere in this thesis30 suggests that whereas unskilled workers generally have poorer 
 
29
  See also Section 6.4.4 for the calibration of waiting list parameters for the UK focused Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model. 
30
  See for example Section 3.2.3, 4.3.6, 5.3.2 and 6.4.4. 
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health, skilled workers are thought to be more effective users of and responders to 
health care so the dependency ratio and the waiting list elasticity (in absolute value) are 
likely to be respectively higher and lower for unskilled relative to skilled workers. Due 
to the counteracting effects of a higher (lower) dependency ratio and lower (higher) 
waiting list elasticity for unskilled (skilled) labour, the true size of the elasticity of 
effective endowments of unskilled and skilled labour with respect to health care remains 
unclear. One may also argue that if health inequalities across labour types exist, the 
government may want to correct these by targeting health expenditures at those with 
poorer health outcomes (effectively the third factor mentioned). This then equalises the 
impact of health care provision on effective labour endowments.   
Consequently, in this theoretical framework and after presenting the general outcomes 
of an increase in the provision of health care on non-health outputs, the magnitudes of 
the dependency ratio and the waiting list elasticity are for simplicity assumed identical 
for both skill types by employing the homogeneity assumption.31 This assumption posits 
that labour types are homogeneous, i.e. equal, in terms of illnesses incurred, treatments 
needed, health care resources used, effectiveness of treatments and thus health. 
Assuming that health care is indeed allocated in proportion to the number of each labour 
type becoming ill - and so not targeted to any particular skill type, an increase in health 
care provision thus leads to identical proportionate reductions in the waiting lists and 
thus to an equi-proportionate rise in effective skilled and unskilled labour endowments. 
Hence, postulating homogeneity in terms of health across labour types implies that the 
 
31
  Based on empirical evidence, these parameters are calibrated differently across labour types in the 
CGE model of Chapter 6, so that the impact of an expansion of the health sector on effective labour 
endowments differs. 
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expansion of the health care budget induces balanced growth in effective labour 
endowments (and a rise in per capita income of the total population). 
The impact of an increase in health expenditures on the outputs of non-health sectors 
may be decomposed into a factor-bias effect and a scale effect. The former measures the 
impact of the health sector on effective endowments remaining for tradables in terms of 
the resource claims it makes, whereas the latter measures the health improvement 
following the expansion of the health sector which by virtue of the homogeneity 
assumption is in proportion to the overall endowment ratio.  
Postulating homogeneity and assuming that the health sector is the most skill-intensive 
sector32, the factor-bias effect is negative for the relatively skill-intensive good and 
positive for the relatively unskilled-intensive good. That is, an expansion of the health 
sector, given that it is the most skill-intensive good, reduces the skilled-unskilled 
effective labour endowment ratio for the rest of the economy so that, on the basis of the 
R theorem the output of the relatively skill-intensive traded good must fall and the 
output of the other good must rise. The scale effect is always positive for the skill-
intensive good, but may be negative for the unskilled-intensive good, depending on the 
ordering of the skill-intensity of the middle ranking (skill-intensive) sector relative to 
the overall effective endowment ratio. The borderline case, where the skill-intensity of 
aforementioned sector equals the overall effective endowment ratio, replicates the R 
corollary that increasing the effective endowments in the same proportion as the factor 
ratio in one sector, increases the output of that sector and leaves the output of the other 
sector unchanged.  
HEALTH PROVISION EFFECTS IN A HO FRAMEWORK 
 
 2-73
                                                                                                                                              
Whether or not the outputs of the tradable good sectors rise or fall following an increase 
in health expenditures thus depends on the sign and relative magnitude of each sector’s 
factor-bias and scale effects. The analysis establishes that the rankings based on factor-
bias effects alone are preserved when scale effects are added, provided that the elasticity 
of effective labour supply with respect to health care, i.e. the waiting list elasticity and 
dependency ratio combined, is small enough (and less than one). Gradually increasing 
the elasticity leads to a rise in the production of both the unskilled-intensive and skill-
intensive goods provided it is less than one, whereas for improvements in the elasticity 
beyond one the output rise for the skill-intensive good exceeds that of the unskilled-
intensive good, which could in one particular situation even show a decline.  
Which of these situations is likely to prevail in the UK? Despite the uncertainty about 
the magnitude of the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health care for 
skilled relative to unskilled labour, one may safely argue that, at least for developed 
countries, the elasticity lies well below the value of one.33 Consequently, given the 
aforementioned assumptions an exogenous increase in health expenditures is expected 
to benefit the unskilled-intensive sector and harm or possibly slightly benefit the 
skilled-intensive sector. 
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with extensions to the HO model and 
repercussions for the HO-based results. The main modification considered is the 
presence of specific factors, being skilled labour in health care and skilled labour 
employed in the tradables sectors. Health care-specific skilled labour earns a health 
 
32
  This is in line with the data presented in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.3). 
33
  See also Chapter 6 Section 6.4.4, where the elasticities are close to 0.1. 
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care-specific skilled wage and has its own waiting list, different from, respectively, the 
wage and waiting list of tradables-specific skilled labour. The health care-specific 
skilled wage adjusts in response to changing demands on this specific factor and so 
factor substitution takes place. Furthermore, due to the specificity of skilled labour the 
reliance of health care on unskilled labour relative to tradables sectors plays a role in the 
determination of the impact of an increase in health expenditures on non-health outputs.  
Allowing for specific factors is shown to reverse the factor-bias effects of an increase in 
health expenditures, as an expansion of the health sector reduces the supply of unskilled 
labour remaining for tradables, so that, on the basis of the R theorem, the output of the 
unskilled-intensive good falls and the output of the other good rises. An assessment of 
the total, i.e. factor-bias and scale, effects is not straightforward since scale effects 
depend on the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health care, the 
substitution elasticity in health care and the dependence of the health sector on unskilled 
labour relative to the tradables sectors. Restricting the former parameter to a likely value 
of below one (and assuming some substitution between health care staff) allows the 
reproduction of the factor-bias effects, although the output of the unskilled-intensive 
good may now rise if health care is relatively less reliant on the use of unskilled labour.  
The Specific-Factors (SF) model has also been subjected to a shock in total health care-
specific skilled labour endowments via the immigration of foreign skilled labour. Such a 
policy may be motivated by the desire to alleviate the rationing constraint imposed by 
the exogenous health budget and the presence of specific factors. In the absence of 
remittances, the increased supply of health care-specific skilled labour from abroad 
lowers its wage and the unit cost of health care, which - given the fixed health budget - 
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results in an increase in health care provision. For limited (considerable) factor 
substitution in health care in favour of skilled labour, factor-bias effects are found to be 
positive (negative) for the skill-intensive good and negative (positive) for the unskilled-
intensive good, since overall employment of unskilled labour in health care rises (falls) 
and so the relative supply of unskilled labour available for tradables sectors falls (rises). 
The incorporation of scale effects and limiting the range of the elasticity of effective 
endowments with respect to health care, alter these results in a similar fashion as for an 
increase in the health budget. Specifically, the factor-bias effects continue to hold, 
although the contracting sector may now expand if health care is relatively less reliant 
on unskilled labour. 
A final modelling exercise that has been carried out is to let the expansion in the health 
sector originate from an improvement in the productivity of labour rather than an 
increase in the health care budget, again to alleviate the constraint imposed by the 
exogenous health care budget. Productivity improvements in health care are modelled 
via technical change, which can be factor-neutral or skill-biased by respectively 
increasing the productivity of skilled and unskilled labour or increasing the productivity 
of skilled labour only.  
If technical change is neutral across factors, factor-bias effects are removed so that in 
line with the aforementioned scale effects, the relatively skill-intensive tradable sector 
expands, whereas the unskilled-intensive tradable sector may or may not contract 
depending on the ordering of the skill-intensity of the middle ranking (skill-intensive) 
sector relative to the overall effective endowment ratio. Factor-neutral technical change 
applied to the SF version also yields scale effects only, although due to the homogeneity 
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assumption (and limiting the elasticity of effective endowments with respect to health 
care to a value between zero and one) tradables-specific skilled labour and unskilled 
labour grow in the same proportion, which yields balanced growth in tradables outputs.  
If technical change is skill-biased, the health sector saves on the employment of skilled 
labour so that factor-bias effects reappear and, in line with the R theorem, benefit the 
skilled-intensive good and harm the unskilled-intensive good. The inclusion of scale 
effects is shown to intensify the factor-bias effect in sector 1 and, depending on the 
relative rankings of skill-intensities, either reinforces or mitigates the factor-bias effect 
in sector 2, whilst magnifying the gap between the outputs of the two tradables sectors. 
Skill-biased technical change applied to the SF model yields similar factor-bias effects, 
since health care expands and needs more unskilled labour, thereby reducing the amount 
of unskilled labour available to the rest of the economy and making skilled labour 
relatively more abundant. When allowing for scale effects (and limiting the elasticity of 
effective endowments with respect to health care to a value between zero and one), 
factor-bias effects are maintained, though if health care is relatively less reliant on the 
use of unskilled labour the formerly contracting unskilled-intensive sector may now 
expand.  
In conclusion, this chapter has analysed the economic impact of an expanding health 
sector in a simple, low-dimension general equilibrium framework. In applied models 
with added complexities, such as many of the models reviewed in Chapter 3 and the 
applied model of Chapter 6, the foregoing predictions are most unlikely to be wholly 
true. Nevertheless, these effects will still operate in the background and thus give a 
useful guide to the interpretation of the outcomes of such a model. 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Various strands of empirical literature on the economic effects of health and health care 
provision have emerged. These can be divided into health economics literature, 
econometric studies and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (although the 
first two strands are overlapping). 
In the health economics literature the contribution of health care to improving health has 
received a vast amount of attention.1 At the macro level the contribution of health care 
to the health status of the population is typically summarised by a health production 
function, assuming that an agreement can be made on the measurement of the output 
health. It is typically assumed that health status is a function of health care (health 
inputs) and other factors (such as diet, lifestyle, environment, education, human biology 
and technology) which shift the production function up or down, and that it exhibits the 
law of diminishing marginal returns. Empirical medical historical studies and 
econometric studies have been employed respectively to assess the validity of the 
production function throughout history and to estimate the function, and in particular 
the elasticity of population health to health care expenditure. In respect of the former, 
medical historians find that the contribution of health care to historical downward trends 
in population mortality rates had probably been negligible until well into the twentieth 
                                                 
1
 This section is based on Folland et al. (2001), Chapters 5 and 6. 
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century. Improved health had most probably to do with public health measures (such as 
immunisation programs and improved sanitary and sewage systems), an increase in 
knowledge through education on the sources of diseases, and improved nutrition 
through increased supply of food stuffs.2 A central conclusion from econometric studies 
is that, whereas the marginal contribution of health care to health - measured by 
mortality rates and illness indicators such as working days lost due to illness, or other 
physiological measures like blood pressure and cholesterol levels - is significant, the 
marginal effect on health in developed countries is small, suggesting that we are almost 
“on the flat of the curve.” Other factors, like changes in diet, lifestyle (alcohol and 
cigarette consumption), environment (pollution) and education, seem more important in 
explaining variations in health. The macro-oriented focus of these empirical studies 
conceals important differences with respect to the effectiveness of different types of 
health care (such as prenatal care) for different population groups (effects are shown to 
differ for example across ethnic groups). Furthermore, by focusing purely on the partial 
question of the impact of health care on health, feedback effects to resource allocation 
issues which bear on health care (and hence health) as well are ignored. 
At the micro level the Grossman model of health demand3 provides the theoretical 
starting point for much subsequent empirical work. Grossman uses human capital theory 
to explain the demand for health. In this approach health is a form of durable (human) 
capital that produces an output of healthy time, which can subsequently be employed in 
income-enhancing activities. This is equivalent to the standard human capital theory, in 
 
2
  However, the former two factors have themselves most probably been fuelled by advances in medical 
research. 
3
  See for example Grossman (1972, 1999). 
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which knowledge capital (narrowly defining human capital) enhances productivity, 
wages and thus provides an incentive for individuals to invest in education and training. 
Each person inherits an initial stock of health, which depreciates with age and can be 
augmented by investment. Health investments are produced by time invested in health-
improving activities and money spent on health inputs, such as medical goods. The 
demand for health care goods is thus a derived demand for inputs into the production of 
the health commodity. The demand for this commodity stems from its dual nature of 
making people ‘feel better’, i.e. by entering a person’s utility function as a consumption 
good, and of increasing the number of healthy days available for income-augmenting 
activities as an investment good. By describing the behaviour of individuals in terms of 
allocation of time and money between health and non-health activities, Grossman is 
able to show how the demand for health and health care arises and how the resulting 
allocation is affected by changes in factors such as age and level of education. 
Theoretical predictions derived from the Grossman model have been the subject of 
research in a wide variety of empirical studies.4 Although the Grossman model of health 
capital yields important insights into the determinants of health, health care demand, 
and resource allocation towards health and non-health activities, it operates at the 
individual level, which calls into question its theoretical and empirical applicability at a 
macro level. With respect to the former, in many countries, such as the UK, health care 
provision depends on the availability of government-rationed public health care (below 
demand levels) such that an investment model of health (care) demand is simply not 
applicable. Furthermore, and related to the previous argument, the partial nature of the 
Grossman model precludes the inclusion of important general equilibrium effects such 
 
4
  Folland et al. (2001, Chapter 6, pp.131-133). 
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as links between the demand and supply side of health care, labour markets and the 
government budget. Finally, in terms of empirics, measurement problems which are 
persistent at the micro level are exacerbated at the macro level by aggregation issues 
and by lack of data at the national level. 
Econometric models of economic effects of health and health care focus on multiple 
linkages between health, health expenditures, human capital, productivity, wages, 
income and economic growth in an attempt to establish the direction and magnitude of 
effects.5 Apart from their common theme, these studies differ vastly in terms of 
estimation technique (e.g. time series, cross-section and panel data analysis), level of 
application (micro, macro), country or countries of application (developed, developing) 
and results. With respect to the latter the consensus that emerges is that effects work 
both ways. A major drawback of this literature is its highly aggregated nature, such that 
differential effects across for example sectors, labour types and household types cannot 
be distinguished, nor are the general equilibrium effects (such as linkages with the 
government budget) explicit. 
This chapter surveys studies that employ CGE models. Applied literature focusing on 
general equilibrium effects of changes in health and health care provisioning on the 
economy is small but diverse in terms of application area. The few CGE studies that 
exist are arranged into three groups to show the diversity in research themes; they are, in 
chronological order, models of health or health care as a basic need (Basic Needs 
 
5
  Illustrative of this type of literature are: Bhargava et al. (2001), Bloom and Canning (2000), Bloom et 
al. (2001), Bloom et al. (2004), Crémieux et al. (1999), Ettner (1996), Hamoudi and Sachs (1999), 
Hitiris and Posnett (1992), Jamison et al. (2003), Knowles and Owen (1997), Mayer (2001a,b), 
Pritchett and Summers (1996), Strauss and Thomas (1998), Stronks et al. (1997) and Thomas (2001). 
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models), CGE analyses of health care as having an external effect (Externality models) 
and studies of epidemics (HIV/AIDS models). The models are discussed in three self-
contained sections, each with separate introductory paragraphs and a summary of the 
model structures and results. 
Two related groups of models not covered in this literature review are general 
equilibrium studies applied exclusively to health care sectors (Health Sector models) 
and CGE models of health insurance (Health Insurance models). These studies focus on 
the medical care market of developed countries, such as The Netherlands and the United 
States, and consequently share a common concern for issues of cost-containment, 
efficiency and equity in provisioning of health care and health insurance. The former 
type of studies6 claim to be of the general equilibrium type, but since the model domain 
spans health care markets only and abstracts from the “rest of the world”, they are truly 
partial in nature. Although the detailed level of analysis of medical care7 may represent 
a constructive addition to the CGE studies surveyed in this chapter, the partial 
equilibrium character of such models precludes general equilibrium aspects such as the 
resource claims of health care (i.e. competition for scarce factors of production such as 
capital and labour), government budget implications and the impact on effective labour 
supply of improved health, which are crucial for our understanding of the economic 
 
6
  Chatterji and Paelinck (1991) develop a purely theoretical general equilibrium model. Canton and 
Westerhout (1999a, b) and Folmer et al. (1997) construct a model applied to the Dutch 
pharmaceutical and health care market respectively, which are employed to analyse financial reform 
measures. 
7
 The models typically feature the behaviour of patients, general practitioners, medical specialists, 
pharmacists, drug producers (brand name and generic), parallel importers, insurance companies and 
hospitals and the various interrelationships between them. Special attention is devoted to the presence 
of market failures such as information asymmetries between patients, physicians and pharmacists 
(principal-agency problems) and imperfect competition in the market for pharmaceuticals enabled by 
patenting. 
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impact of health care provision. The latter category8 focuses on health insurance which, 
although the financial side of health care is important for determining its economy-wide 
effects and will feature in some fashion in the CGE model, is not the prime focus of this 
thesis. Finally, the literature review excludes global assessments of changes in health 
which concentrate on the uncertainty following a disease outbreak and consequent 
reductions in international travel, foreign direct investment and economic performance.9
3.2 BASIC NEEDS MODELS  
3.2.1 Introduction 
Basic needs models are the earliest type of models that recognise the economy-wide 
effects of improved health. Basic needs models attempt to incorporate the basic needs 
approach to development into a general equilibrium framework.10 This review covers 
two archetypal basic needs models, which are illustrative of their development over 
time.11 The basic needs approach arose in reaction to earlier views on development and 
integrates many of their elements and policy recommendations into a comprehensive 
framework aimed at the goal of basic needs satisfaction. The basic needs approach as 
such was treated completely for the first time at the 1976 Tripartite World Conference 
 
8 
 Ballard and Goddeeris (1999) study the efficiency and equity effects of financing universal health 
insurance coverage, using a computational general equilibrium model of the US for 1991. 
Johansson’s (2001) overlapping generations model investigates macro-economic effects of different 
types of health insurance for the elderly in the context of an ageing population demanding more 
health services. Finally, Bednarek and Pecchenino (2002) employ an overlapping generations general 
equilibrium model of the US for 1998 to examine the effect of the tax-benefit system underlying the 
US health care system on the well-being of different age and socio-economic groups as well as 
overall welfare. 
9 
 An example is Lee and McKibbin’s (2003) study of the global economic effects of SARS based on 
the G-Cubed (Asia Pacific) model. 
10
  See Streeten et al. (1981), Stewart (1985) and Afxentiou (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of 
the basic needs approach. 
11 
 These are Vianen and Waardenburg (1975) and Kouwenaar (1986). Another example, not covered by 
this review, is Van der Hoeven (1987, 1988). 
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on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division 
of Labour of the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
3.2.2 The basic needs approach  
The basic needs approach to development concentrates on the fulfilment of basic needs 
of all, but especially of, the poor. Basic needs refer to certain standards of nutrition 
(food, water), living conditions (housing, sanitation and clothing), universal provision 
of health and education and participation in the decision-making processes geared 
towards basic needs satisfaction. At the heart of the approach (Kouwenaar, 1986, p6 and 
further) lies the belief that by an initial investment (redistribution) the sectoral structure 
of supply (demand) can be altered in favour of small-scale, labour-intensive sectors, 
which produce commodities demanded especially by low-income groups.12 The latter 
thus benefit in terms of employment, income and consumption. A virtuous circle of 
growth that is (income-) equalising is set into motion, which via improved consumption 
of the poor benefits their health. The latter effect can be interpreted as an investment in 
human capital or as inducing labour-augmenting technological progress in the sector of 
employment. The role of the government is accommodating, and so is one of 
formulating goals, policies, monitoring the results, adapting policies accordingly and 
channelling information to the relevant parties, in dialogue with the people involved. 
The chief disadvantage of the basic needs approach is that, despite the nobility of 
purpose, translation of the idea of basic needs satisfaction into policy is not trivial. The 
basic needs approach as an all-embracing development strategy is often accused of 
being “rather vague”, “arbitrary”, “intellectually clumsy” and to “suffer from political 
 
12
  In practice this is achieved by the introduction of price distorting measures and/or the removal of 
existing ones, such as sector-specific tariffs. 
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unreality”. Streeten et al. (1981, p8) comment: “While there is virtually universal 
agreement on the objective, there is much disagreement on its precise interpretation 
and on the most effective way of achieving it.”  
A recurrent question in the basic needs literature, and indeed the source of much 
criticism, is whether a trade-off exists between economic growth and expenditures on 
basic needs.13 This debate is much older than the basic needs literature itself and has 
been explored in the human capital literature. In the short term attention to basic needs 
fuels expenditures on social sectors which, given outlays on other goods and income, 
curbs savings, investments, capital accumulation and hence growth. A counterargument 
in support of the basic needs approach is that consumption of basic goods and services 
may in the long run increase labour productivity and growth by virtue of being an 
investment in human capital. The latter hinges upon the conjecture that investments in 
human capital are more productive than are alternative physical investments. 
Figure 3.1 Health in a basic needs framework 
                                                 
health care 
other 
goods 
health 
mortality 
morbidity 
sectors/goods population 
working 
time 
labour 
productivity 
fertility 
(birth rate) 
production income 
13
  See Streeten et al. (1981) and Afxentiou (1990) for an elaborate discussion of the growth-basic needs 
trade-off. The general equilibrium models that find a trade-off between growth and basic needs 
impose rather pessimistic assumptions of “…unimpeded flow of exports to developed countries, … 
ever-present population pressures and … that the economic restructuring required for the satisfaction 
of basic needs is unlikely to take place….” (Afxentiou 1990, p253). 
 3-8 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                                                
3.2.3 Health as a basic need 
The role of health and health care implicit in basic needs models is summarised in 
Figure 3.1. From left to right the first linkage flows from health care (and other goods) 
to health, arguably the most difficult component of the modelling exercise. Frances 
(1985, p17) labels this the “meta-production function”. This production function 
translates household consumption of health care and other basic needs into so-called 
“full life indicators”, in this case health achievements such as mortality and morbidity14 
reductions at the individual level. The transformation requires two steps: an allotment of 
household consumption among individual members of the family and a conversion of 
consumption per person into “life achievements” at the individual level. 
Improved health affects the well-being of working and non-working populations, of 
which the former may augment effective labour supply. The effect of better health on 
labour is two-fold. Lower mortality and/or morbidity allows a labourer to work longer, 
the quantity or working time effect, and he or she may witness a rise in the amount of 
work per time-unit, the labour productivity effect. In the basic needs models emphasis is 
on the second consequence, often referred to as the human capital effect, which is put 
forward as the principal argument against the existence of a basic needs-growth trade-
off.15 The working-time and labour productivity effects augment effective labour supply 
and, if that additional labour is employed, raise the quantity of production in the 
economy. Consequently higher income levels (depending on the participation in the 
labour market and alterations in the wage structure) enable households to spend more on 
 
14
  Morbidity is defined as the incidence (number of new cases) or prevalence (number of existing cases) 
of a particular disease or of all diseases in a defined population, within a given time period. 
15
  The absence of any working time effect of improved health presumes the beneficiary decides to work 
less by the amount of the working time gained. 
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goods and services, which can be devoted to elevating their health status. The 
realisation of the latter depends on the preference structure of the actors, the availability 
of goods and price levels. 
The presence of linkages between health care and other goods is conceived to be crucial 
in basic needs modelling and has repercussions for costs, results and design of 
policies.16 A well-known example is the relationship between health care and education. 
Better-educated individuals are more likely to look after personal hygiene, which 
enhances their health status and that of others by minimising health risks and, vice 
versa, healthier individuals have a greater capacity and incentive to learn.17
A final element of Figure 3.1 is the effect of improved health on population growth. 
Higher levels of health and other basic needs indicators lower mortality, morbidity and 
influence fertility and birth rates18, which has implications for poverty and growth. This 
issue dates back to the work of Thomas Malthus, who predicted that policies that 
improve health would reduce mortality rates and, given birth rates, raise population 
growth to rates above the level of growth of food supply. “Positive checks”, such as 
famines, would be unavoidable unless people set in motion “preventive checks”, i.e. 
 
16
  For example Streeten et al. (1981, p47-51). 
17
  See for example Grossman (1972, 1999) who posits that educated people are more efficient  
“producers” of health and are greater consumers of health care (i.e. are more effective responders to 
treatment and have a greater taste for health). 
18 
 Fertility, i.e. the ability of women to give birth to children, rises, which in turn affects the choice of 
number of children, measured by the crude birth rate. 
 3-10 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                                                
have fewer children.19 The question of whether or not improved health lowers birth rates 
is heavily debated in the basic needs literature.20
3.2.4 Vianen and Waardenburg’s Tanzanian model 
Vianen and Waardenburg’s (1975) multi-sector model is a basic needs model in nature 
as it focuses on developing countries in general and Tanzania specifically, and 
incorporates health care as a basic need, although it was published a year before the 
ILO’s formulation of the basic needs approach to development. 
The model is “structuralist” as opposed to “neoclassical” in viewing the world as 
institutionally and behaviourally rigid and relying heavily on government intervention, 
rather than seeing the world as smoothly-adjusting, relying on the price mechanism, 
which stems from its developing country focus. Furthermore, all equations are linear, 
have constant coefficients, and are not derived from micro-economic optimisation. 
Hence the approach to modelling health care in a general equilibrium framework is 
rather ad hoc. Overall the model appears to have few general equilibrium features, but 
due to its inclusion of economy-wide health care linkages it is discussed here.  
The model is large (1255 equations and variables), is calibrated to data from 1969 and is 
recursively dynamic in that, once the time path of the exogenous variables is known as 
are starting values for lagged endogenous variables, one can solve for the values of the 
remaining endogenous variables. The focus on health care is apparent from the detail on 
 
19
  Verschoor (2000, chapter 4) provides an overview of the work of Malthus, the demographic 
transition, and of the literature on fertility decisions. 
20
  For a critical appraisal of the relationship between basic needs and population growth see Afxentiou 
(1990). 
 3-11 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
                                                
health care sectors (six), age groups (five), disease categories (seven) and types of 
labour in health care and other sectors (four). 
Vianen and Waardenburg make a distinction between an economic and a health 
component, each containing several sectors. The health component relies on economic 
sectors in terms of intermediate inputs and education of its skilled labour inputs (ratio of 
skills from medical education is assumed to be fixed). Conversely, health care produces 
healthy or semi-healthy people who work and consume. Total consumption and savings 
depend on the size and composition of the population, which in turn is also affected by 
health care. 
The economic component is centred on the input-output approach by employing fixed 
coefficient Leontief production functions. Final demand is endogenously dependent on 
income and population of each age group, save for exogenously given government and 
private consumption of health care.21 One type of capital is produced by the 
construction sector. The labour markets for some skill types are segmented by sector of 
employment or age. These markets are characterised by lack of substitution and, in the 
absence of an equilibrating price mechanism, unemployment. 
When a person falls ill he or she needs and thus demands health care. Remaining 
demand comes from a referral system, by which patients are referred to specific types of 
care. The authors assume that the need for treatments will never be smaller than the 
supply of treatments and that substitution of capacity to meet demand is not possible. 
 
21
  Exogenously given private and government expenditures on health care determine the value of 
production and supply of medical treatments, which is not necessarily sufficient to equalise need for 
and provision of treatments. 
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The total capacity of each institution is expressed in terms of total cost, not in terms of 
value of output as that ignores externalities. The number of people recovering is a 
function of the numbers treated per institution and independent of treatment type. 
Moreover, some patients recover spontaneously without treatment. One type of care, 
public health care, is preventive and influences the number of ill in the current year. The 
effect of public health expenditures on the number of ill is approximated by the inverse 
of preventive cost per person multiplied by the total amount of public health 
expenditure, based on estimates of other studies. 
The authors introduce a labour productivity effect of health care by special treatment of 
disabled people. In contrast to optimally recovered healthy people who are able to work 
just as before they incurred an illness, there is a number of disabled people multiplied 
by some coefficient (<1) representing the proportion of time they can do their job as if 
healthy. 
The study presents a numerical exercise for only one period, 1970, using a “shifting 
system” which simulates a change in size and age composition of the population by 
accounting for births, deaths and movements between age cohorts, all influenced by the 
health care system. The authors report on changes in size and composition of the 
population (population grows by 2.55%, with considerable growth in the <1 age cohort 
and the cohort of 1-4 years old declining) but emphasize the weakness of the statistical 
data and therefore potentially unreliable results. 
Vianen and Waardenburg acknowledge the data deficiencies of their research, by and 
large explained by the limited data availability and the computational capacity of that 
era. They propose a sensitivity analysis for certain coefficients and exogenous variables 
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and to expand the time frame of simulations, so as to analyse the effects over time of 
improved health care on health and economic growth. Other items on their research 
agenda are to create an evaluation function (i.e. a welfare function) for appraising 
policies and subsequently to employ the model as a programming tool. With the latter 
the authors imply adding endogenous variables to the model, which would become 
feasible after the creation of additional degrees of freedom. 
Other improvements pertaining to the latter are to incorporate more general equilibrium 
features. Firstly, a government budget constraint would restrict government 
expenditures on, for example, health care. Secondly, the establishment of markets for 
some variables with prices as equilibrating variables would do justice to the fact that 
(some) markets do clear through price adjustments. Furthermore, the assumption of a 
segmented labour market (by skill type and for some skill types by age and sector of 
employment) is rather rigid. Allowing for different degrees of substitutability between 
labour types would be a more realistic alternative.22 Finally, the use of non-linear 
behavioural equations derived from micro-optimisation processes would remove the ad 
hoc character of the model and replace it with consistent behaviour firmly grounded in 
economic theory. 
3.2.5 Kouwenaar’s basic needs policy model for Ecuador 
Kouwenaar’s (1986) model with special reference to Ecuador is the only Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) based, neoclassical basic needs model, as opposed to the 
 
22
  Evidence suggests for example that some higher skilled labour types (such as doctors) are less mobile 
across sectors compared to low skilled labour (such as ancillary workers), due to their highly 
specialised knowledge related to the sector they are employed in. On the other hand, some basic tasks 
performed by highly skilled workers can easily be carried out by lower skilled workers (for example 
nurses taking over some of the responsibilities of doctors).  
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previously discussed structuralist model. It thus includes prices and their effect on 
resource allocation, income and demand, though Kouwenaar does incorporate certain 
market imperfections, such as imperfect competition in commodity markets, imperfect 
substitutability between domestic and traded goods, credit and labour rationing, 
segmentation of the labour market and short run immobility of capital, characteristic for 
structuralist models. 
The model is designed to assess policies aimed at basic needs satisfaction in the medium 
to long term. The model is recursive dynamic and consists of a main iteration, which 
produces the equilibrium for the current year, and an updating iteration in which the 
exogenous variables of the main iteration are adjusted. Updating is either carried out 
endogenously, via functions of the equilibrium solution of the previous period, or 
exogenously, e.g. according to historical growth rates. 
The model is structured upon a detailed classification of, among others, sectors (48), 
consumption categories (27), occupation groups (10), institutions (10) and households 
(9). Kouwenaar abandons the rather ad hoc approach to modelling of the structuralist 
models, and their frequent use of simple linear equations, by deriving behavioural 
equations of producers and consumers from micro-optimisation using more 
sophisticated production and utility functions, such as Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) functions. The nominal exchange rate is chosen as the numéraire. 
The closure is savings-driven, with fixed foreign savings and all other savings being 
determined residually, although alternative closure rules are experimented with. 
Dynamic adjustments occur via capital accumulation, population growth, labour supply 
changes and adjustments in basic needs. 
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Health, as one of the basic needs, is measured in terms of the 'output' life expectancy as 
a function of 'input' indicators such as the adult illiteracy rate, per capita public health 
expenditures and per capita disposable income. Several linear and non-linear equations 
using these variables are fitted either from cross-country data or estimated at the country 
level for Ecuador. The author constructs a composite index of human well-being, as a 
weighted average of individual basic needs indicators and monetary variables. 
Basic needs in general and health specifically affect population and labour supply 
growth. Specifying the link from basic needs to population growth is an option within 
the model. If the option is applied, birth and mortality rates are decreasing non-linear 
functions of average per capita disposable income (Kouwenaar 1986, p202). 
Additionally, health affects sector productivities in the longer-term. Specifically, the 
constant term for labour (the share parameter) in each CES production function is a 
function of average life expectancy and years of schooling. The technical specification 
assumes labour augmenting technological progress23, and is described by: 
where L* and L represent sector employment in efficiency units and 
person years respectively. E and S are indices of average life expectancy and of 
schooling of the employed labour force in a sector (Kouwenaar 1986, p267). 
  
* ED SELL  
Kouwenaar uses the model for a variety of static, one-year and dynamic, five-year 
policy simulations aimed at basic needs satisfaction, of which the latter type is only of 
interest as it incorporates feedback effects between the economy and basic needs such 
as health. Counterfactual simulations include an increase in direct taxes accompanied by 
a fixed subsidy on basic food products, a reduction in wage disparities, land reform 
 
23
  This type of technological progress coexists with factor neutral technical change.  
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(redistribution of land) and more equal access to credit and government services. The 
results are compared to a base time path. Although the repercussions of changes in 
health (care) on the economy are not directly apparent (as this is not the main focus of 
the model), favourable effects observed in static simulations are strengthened in the 
dynamic counterparts and seem to confirm the self-reinforcing processes between 
production, employment and productivity, income and basic needs, and the absence of a 
trade-off between basic needs and growth. This is for example illustrated by the final 
simulation, in which the redistributive effect of improving access for the poor is 
strengthened by the labour-augmenting productivity increase following from 
government investments in services. 
3.2.6 Summary  
Basic needs models are the earliest type of models to recognise the economy-wide 
effects of improved health. These recursive dynamic CGE models are designed to 
implement the basic needs approach to development current in the 1970s into a 
comprehensive modelling framework. Health and health policy fulfil only a minor role, 
and it has proved virtually impossible to disentangle the effect of improved health  
(care) within the counterfactual simulations. Nevertheless it seems that the positive 
feedback effects of basic needs into the economy via population and labour market 
linkages counteract the negative short-term effects on growth, supporting the view that a 
trade-off between basic needs and growth is absent. 
The application to developing countries implies that the modellers not only face data 
problems but also implement rigidities in the model and abstract from various general 
equilibrium elements. The structuralist model of Vianen and Waardenburg (1975) is 
demand-driven and characterised by the absence of prices. The approach to modelling 
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economic behaviour is rather ad hoc as behavioural equations are linear, have constant 
coefficients, and are not derived from micro optimisation. Kouwenaar’s (1987) model 
has more neoclassical general equilibrium features by including prices and behavioural 
equations of producers and consumers derived from micro-optimisation using more 
sophisticated non-linear production and utility functions. 
Kouwenaar (1986) models the effect of health on population growth and incorporates 
labour augmenting technological progress brought about by changes in health and 
education. The working-time effects of health, other than those caused by changes in 
demographic variables, are only included in the health-focused model of Vianen and 
Waardenburg (1975). In this model the number of people recovering is a function of the 
number of treatments, apart from those who recover spontaneously without treatment. 
3.3 EXTERNALITY MODELS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The general class of externality studies formulates CGE models, which explicitly 
account for the presence of external effects, such as changes in health, education and the 
environment. These models have the dual purpose of quantifying the effects of policies 
aimed at reducing (encouraging) the negative (positive) externality and of assessing 
how inclusion of an externality alters well-established results of economic policies such 
as trade liberalisation. The most known type of all externality models is concerned with 
economic-environmental linkages, so-called environmental models. As a by-product, 
these models may quantify health effects of environmental degradation, usually 
greenhouse gas emissions, on labour supply and productivity via changes in mortality 
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and morbidity, and their repercussions on associated medical expenditures and 
welfare.24
Health externality studies account for the positive effect of improved health on the 
economy. This type of research has its origins in the human capital literature, which 
studies the link between human capital formation (especially education), productivity 
and growth, and the body of literature focusing on the importance of adjusting trade 
policy models for market imperfections.25
3.3.2 Health as an externality 
Externalities arise if a consumer (producer) is affected by the actions of another 
consumer (producer) without some form of compensation being paid or received. Hence 
there is no market and thus no price for the externality (Johansson 1991, p64-66). In the 
case of positive externalities, such as improved health, this leads to underproduction of 
the externality and a welfare loss to society. In the CGE modelling literature on health 
externalities this definition is not entirely appropriate as the positive effects of improved 
health spill over to the labour market and are internalised in the price of labour via 
supply and productivity effects. There is thus a market and a price for the externality in 
which its value is realised. 
3.3.3 Savard and Adjovi’s CGE model of Benin with externalities 
Savard and Adjovi’s (1997) model for Benin is the sole CGE model including health as 
an externality. The authors assess the economy-wide effects of economic, fiscal and 
 
24
  A selection of environmental CGE models featuring side effects on health are: Beghin et al. (1999), 
Bruvoll et al. (1999), Garbaccio et al. (2000), Li (2002), Mayeres and Van Regemorter (2003), 
Resosudarmo (2003) and Vennemo (1997). 
25
  See for example Corden (1997). 
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public sector reform measures adopted under the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
of the late 1980s, early 1990s using a static CGE model of Benin with health and 
education externalities. CGE models based on classical assumptions predict (small) 
economic benefits from trade liberalisation. The authors’ purpose is to verify whether 
these results still hold in the presence of positive health and education externalities. 
Savard and Adjovi impose for education both a labour-augmenting and a factor-neutral 
externality and for health a labour-augmenting externality. The labour-augmenting 
externality increases the productivity of labour, whereas the factor-neutral externality 
enhances the productivity of both factors, labour and capital, in a similar fashion. In 
contrast to factor-neutral externalities, the labour-augmenting externality changes the 
cost-minimising combination of inputs because, at constant factor prices, producers will 
have an incentive to use more of the increasingly productive factor labour. In 
concordance with the Basic Needs literature, the authors give a two-fold interpretation 
to the labour-augmenting health externality, it being both a productivity effect of 
improved physical condition and a longevity effect, according to which a healthier 
population lives longer, resulting in a higher ratio of older, more experienced and more 
productive workers relative to young labourers. 
The magnitude of externalities differs by sector. Sectoral value added is a CES function 
of a labour composite and capital. The constant term, the shift parameter, of this 
function is multiplied by the neutral education externality. The labour composite is a 
CES function of informal and formal labour demand. For each of these factors the share 
parameters are multiplied by the education and health externalities. The externality 
parameters take the form of a constant elasticity function. For the labour-augmenting 
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health externality by sector i (:i) we have: .
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represent government expenditures on health in the current and base year respectively, 
and 9i is the sector-specific health expenditure elasticity for labour. Its value lies 
between zero and one (like all other externality elasticities), implying a decreasing 
marginal external effect.26
The authors acknowledge that their treatment of externalities suffers from a serious 
shortcoming, which is the lack of endogenous effects on labour supply. In the case of 
education, making the choice of more education will reduce the supply of labour at least 
in the short run. Improved health in the long run induces people to work more hours, 
whereas the income effect of the rise in productivity will encourage them to work less 
and take more leisure time. The absence of working time effects other than changes in 
longevity implies that income and substitution effects of improved health cancel out in 
total. 
The actors in the model are the government, firms, the rest of the world and three 
households (urban poor, rural poor, and non-poor). The sector structure distinguishes 
between public sectors (health, education, other administrative services) and seven 
private sectors (with further disaggregation of agricultural sectors). Factors of 
production are capital and labour. 
                                                 
26 
 The authors assume that health impacts most on agriculture, less on manufacturing and least on 
services. For education, the reverse order is postulated. In absolute terms, the externality values 
chosen are relatively low (in the range of 0.003 to 0.06). 
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Savard and Adjovi model the labour market in great detail to reflect stylised facts for 
Benin. Standing out is the notion of “déflatés” (Savard and Adjovi 1997, p8), referring 
to laid-off former pubic sector employees. This labour type is in a state of “waiting 
unemployment” and coexists with informal labour, modern labour and bureaucrats (civil 
servants). For the latter two categories, the demand side determines the market and 
wages are fixed. This demand is always satisfied from the pool of unemployed and 
informal labourers. Wages of informal labour are flexible and adjust to absorb déflatés 
or adjust to changes in hiring in the modern sector or civil service. Déflatés choose to 
remain in a state of unemployment or opt for the informal sector based on changes in 
their wage relative to the base year. 
The model is parameterised using a nested Leontief-CES structure for production and 
nested Linear Expenditure System (LES) - Cobb Douglas (CD) structure for utility. 
Foreign trade is modelled using the Armington assumption of imperfect substitutability 
between domestic and imported goods and the small country assumption. Welfare is 
evaluated using the Equivalent Variation (EV). To avoid free lunches foreign savings 
are fixed and the exchange rate is the equilibrating variable. Total investments are fixed 
and determine savings such that government deficits are financed from domestic private 
savings. The marginal propensity to save by household is endogenous. The consumer 
price index is chosen as the numéraire. 
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The authors perform essentially one simulation, a 10% reduction in import duties, and 
subsequently impose several scenarios targeted at keeping the government budget 
balanced. These involve cutting various categories of government expenditures.27
The first simulation shows that trade liberalisation enhances production in some sectors, 
household income and welfare, and GDP (growth of 0.53%). Due to a loss of tariff 
revenue the government deficit rises. When accompanied by a reduction in government 
expenditures, the authors find that the presence of externalities may invert the results of 
economic and financial liberalisation as a cut in government expenditure has negative 
spillover effects on domestic product and public sector employment. Lay-offs in the 
public sector increase unemployment and put pressure on informal wages, which has a 
negative influence on income, especially of poor households. Savard and Adjovi 
therefore conclude that “…it may be much more beneficial to reduce civil service 
salaries and to remove the constraints on wages in the modern sector in order to relieve 
the pressures on the government’s budget.” (Savard and Adjovi 1997, p18). 
The authors make several suggestions on improvements to their analysis. These include 
endogenising tax evasion, incorporating public goods in the utility function and 
modelling the production of education and health care in more detail by explicit 
treatment of the endogenous labour supply effects of improved health and education. An 
additional shortcoming of the model is that it is static and thereby not capable of 
capturing the long run effects of externalities and the time-path of adjustment towards a 
new equilibrium. Also, the authors do not explicitly consider people who are not 
 
27 
 Tax increases are ruled out in the presence of a relatively big informal sector and the danger of tax 
evasion. 
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working, i.e. age groups such as children and pensioners, or the unemployed. These 
population groups claim resources, financed by other households with working 
members and/or the government, such that an increase in their health accompanied by 
additional resource claims has repercussions for the welfare of remaining population 
groups. Once these aspects are accounted for, the model could be employed to assess 
the overall repercussions of changes in health on the size and composition of the 
population, the labour force and its feed back effects on the economy in terms of 
production, income and welfare. 
3.3.4 Summary 
Externality models account for the presence of external effects, such as health, 
education and environmental effects, in a CGE framework. Only one CGE model on 
health (and education) externalities presently exists, namely Savard and Adjovi (1997). 
This type of work originates from human capital theory and trade policy models 
adjusted for market imperfections. In line with the former type of literature, Savard and 
Adjovi focus on the labour productivity effect of improved health according to which 
health externalities, as a constant elasticity function of public health expenditures, are 
incorporated using labour augmenting technological progress in production. The health 
externality thereby influences the optimal combination of inputs in production and 
relative wages. Hence, the pure externality definition, in which the absence of 
compensation is crucial, does not cover such spillover effects to the labour market. 
Following the second body of literature, Savard and Adjovi verify whether the standard 
CGE results of (small) economic benefits from trade liberalisation still hold in the 
presence of positive health and education externalities. The authors find that the 
occurrence of externalities may invert the results of economic and financial 
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liberalisation as a cut in government expenditure on health and education, aimed at 
maintaining the government deficit, has negative spillover effects on domestic product 
and public sector employment, household income and welfare. 
The main shortcomings of Savard and Adjovi (1997) are a lack of dynamic effects, no 
distinction between working and non-working or age groups, and absence of 
endogenous labour supply effects (i.e. the impact of better health on working time) and 
utility gains from improved health. 
3.4 HIV/AIDS MODELS 
3.4.1 Introduction 
HIV/AIDS models assess the economic impact of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus) and AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) using CGE analysis. The 
virus HIV that causes AIDS was first isolated in 1983. Estimates show that in 2003 
almost five million new infections with HIV occurred and almost three million people 
died of HIV/AIDS related causes, bringing the total of people currently living with 
HIV/AIDS worldwide to 38 million, 1.1% of the world’s adult population. By far the 
most affected region is Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for approximately 70% of 
worldwide HIV/AIDS cases and has a prevalence rate of at least seven times the world 
prevalence rate (UNAIDS, 2004). It comes to no surprise therefore that most empirical 
models of the macroeconomic implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic are applied to 
Sub-Saharan Africa.28
 
28
 This is not to say that HIV/AIDS does not pose a threat to other countries and/or regions. For 
example, countries in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), despite 
recording relatively low prevalence rates, are witnessing some of the fastest growing rates of 
HIV/AIDS infection in the world. 
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3.4.2 The economic impact of HIV/AIDS 
Dixon et al. (2002) succinctly enumerate the main effects of HIV/AIDS on the African 
economy, namely reduced labour supply, reduced labour productivity and a worsening 
of the balance of payments. Labour supply falls through increased mortality and 
morbidity, and the impact may differ across sectors depending on relative skill 
intensities and difference in incidence across skill types. The long duration of the illness 
lowers labour productivity, which in turn reduces competitiveness, profits and hence 
government’s tax earning ability. The latter effect combined with the pressure on 
government spending to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS increases the potential for 
fiscal crises. Finally, a fall in productivity lowers exports while at the same time 
HIV/AIDS sufferers usually require expensive imports of health care goods. The 
deterioration of the trade balance may lead to defaults on debts and an appeal for 
international assistance. 
As noted by Arndt (2003) and Arndt and Wobst (2002), the basic consensus of the early 
literature on the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS that appeared in the early nineties 
was that AIDS had little net (negative) macroeconomic impact measured in terms of per 
capita GDP.29 Conclusions reached by more recent studies are considerably less 
sanguine and show more often than not a strong negative association between HIV 
prevalence and per capita GDP.30 This change in tone stems from the explicit 
recognition of the long term, dynamic nature of the pandemic, accompanied by 
improved data. Given the disease’s long incubation period, relatively small but 
 
29
  Kambou et al. (1992)’s CGE model for Cameroon and Cuddington’s (1993) econometric model for 
Tanzania are examples of earlier studies. 
30 
 CGE examples are: Arndt and Lewis (2000), Arndt and Lewis (2001), Arndt and Wobst (2002), and 
Arndt (2003). The latter three models focus more on the implications for labour markets and human 
capital accumulation. An example of a recent econometric study is Dixon et al. (2001a). 
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sustained negative impacts on rates of accumulation, be it of physical or human capital, 
and technological progress are sufficient to bring about a significant fall in growth in the 
long term. 
The discrepancy between short run and long run effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
particularly apparent from the manner in which the pandemic affects human capital 
formation. Whereas in the short run a fall in labour supply may increase per capita GDP 
as more capital and land are available per worker in production, in the long term a 
decline in the rate of human capital accumulation may negatively influence growth and 
levels of per capita income. Hamoudi and Birdsall (2002) explore four ways in which 
the epidemic is likely to affect the rate of human capital formation and the productivity 
of the existing human capital stock in Africa, most of which feature in some form in the 
CGE studies discussed later. Firstly, the loss of adults, among which many teachers, 
affects Africa’s ability to supply education. Evidence shows not only that AIDS 
disproportionally affects adults of working age but also that, at least in the first wave of 
the epidemic, HIV was much more likely to infect the relatively well-educated workers, 
making the teacher profession relatively vulnerable to the epidemic.31
Also, given a drastic fall in life expectancy, the time horizon over which to reap returns 
to education is shortened, which lowers the willingness to invest in and thus demand for 
schooling. Arndt and Wobst (2002) argue that children whose parents die from AIDS-
related causes are less likely to go to school as the need for children, or indeed orphans, 
to work becomes more pressing, thereby further depressing the demand for education. 
 
31 
 Equally alarming is the relatively high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 20% among health care nurses 
in South Africa reported in Dixon et al. (2002). 
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Moreover, the loss of skilled people of working age negatively affects productivity of 
those who remain behind in the presence of increasing marginal returns or positive 
externalities to human capital. Hamoudi and Birdsall (2002) argue that an 
agglomeration of skilled workers is much more effective than an equal amount of 
workers each acting on their own. The stylised fact of “brain drain”, whereby skilled 
labour migrates to relatively skill abundant places to increase its income, is used in 
support of this line of reasoning. Arndt and Wobst (2002) similarly reason that the 
decline in productivity of the workforce is a reflection of the replacement of more 
experienced workers (who die from AIDS related causes) by relatively inexperienced 
workers (who are of school age but forced to work), who are less productive and are 
less likely to innovate. 
Finally, insofar as human and physical capital are complementary inputs in production, 
a loss of physical capital reduces the ability of skilled workers to contribute to 
production and thus their productivity.32 The erosion of the physical capital stock is 
attributable to a reduction in domestic savings, via a shortening of time horizons and 
large, sustained outlays for medical care,33 and a fall in attractiveness to foreign 
investments. 
Economists have two methods of quantifying the overall effect of HIV/AIDS 
prevalence on the economy, as measured by GDP per capita, these being an 
econometric modelling framework and a computable general equilibrium analysis. CGE 
 
32 
 The loss in productivity stemming from externality or complementarity issues may further magnify 
the slowdown in human capital accumulation by lowering the returns to education. 
33
  Medical costs include purchases of treatments by households and delivery of treatments by the 
government, but also refer to medical expenses of firms on medical insurance, death benefits and 
spouse’s and disability pensions, cost of absenteeism and even funeral costs. 
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studies are being reviewed here.34 Econometric analyses35 use calibrated neo-classical 
growth models and similar to the CGE studies, hypothesise that changes in per capita 
income are determined by changes in physical and human capital accumulation and 
productivity. A priori, the effect of the pandemic on the growth rate and level of income 
is indeterminate.36 An increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS lowers productivity and 
leads to a fall in the savings rate and population growth. The former two effects reduce 
the ratio of capital to labour and income per capita over time. The latter effect works in 
the opposite direction by raising the capital-labour ratio and per capita income over 
time. The overall impact depends on which of these effects predominate and therefore 
remains an empirical question. 
The prime disadvantage of growth models compared to CGE models is that they fail to 
capture the differential impact of the epidemic across sectors, factors and the population 
and the various interactions between different parts of the economy, such that it is 
unclear how the overall result comes about. Dixon et al. (2002) add that, due to the 
explicit incorporation of inter-sectoral differences with respect to loss of labour, of 
which the relatively skilled and sector-specific types may be difficult to replace, CGE 
studies generally predict a relatively greater negative economic impact of HIV/AIDS. 
 
34
  The review discusses five CGE models applied to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which are exemplary of 
their development over time. Excluded are Shombi Sharp’s 2002 model for the Russian Federation, 
used by the UNDP (2004), and the Centre for International Economics’ model for Papua New 
Guinea, used by AusAID (2002). 
35
  Dixon et al. (2002) is a good source of references for econometric work on HIV/AIDS. 
36
  See Dixon et al. (2001a, pp.412-414) and Cuddington (1993, pp.178-182). 
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3.4.3 Kambou, Devarajan and Over’s Cameroon model 
Kambou et al.’s (1992) model for Cameroon is the first CGE model to assess the 
economy-wide impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The authors presume that the 
epidemic affects the economy solely via exogenous reductions in labour supply and 
abstract from increases in public and private health expenditures. The research is 
motivated by epidemiological evidence of a highly unequal distribution of HIV 
infection, biased towards highly skilled urban workers, which could have severe 
consequences for economic growth, per capita income and overall welfare: “Indeed, 
were it not for the fact that AIDS kills the skilled population in disproportionate 
amounts, some may argue that the macroeconomic impact of the disease in Sub-
Saharan Africa is unimportant. Africa's population is growing so rapidly, the argument 
goes, that the additional deaths due to AIDS will hardly be noticeable in the aggregate 
statistics.” (Kambou et al. (1992, p111). 
The model (see Table 3.1) is employed in static and recursive dynamic simulations of a 
skill-neutral reduction in overall supply of rural, urban skilled and urban unskilled 
labour, representing a total of 30,000 workers per year (0.8% of the labour force), and 
skill-biased reductions in supply of each labour category of 10,000 a year, holding other 
skill categories constant. The base run, which serves as a reference case against which 
the effects of reduced labour supply are measured, reflects status-quo assumptions of no 
changes in the internal and external environments within which the economy operates. 
In the static simulations a skill-neutral reduction of labour supply leads to a rise in 
wages, which translates into higher production costs and higher prices, especially for 
sectors with labour-intensive production processes. An increase in the cost of 
production, combined with a fall in investment demand due to a sharp reduction in 
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government savings, reduces output and employment. The rise in domestic prices brings 
about a deterioration of the trade balance as exports decrease and imports rise due to a 
fall in international competitiveness. The contraction of the external sector has negative 
consequences for government savings since tariff revenues fall. The fall in especially 
government savings exacerbates the contraction of the economy in the dynamic skill-
neutral simulations by depressing investments and average real GDP growth falls by 
approximately 50% (two percentage points) relative to the base run. 
The skill-biased experiments reveal that sectors contract, the extent depending on 
relative factor proportions in each sector. Shortages of rural labour lead to an 
agricultural output decrease proportionally larger than the decrease in output of other 
goods, whereas in the case of a fall in urban labour, manufacturing and service sectors 
show relatively large production decreases (Rybczynski type effects). The authors note 
that, although HIV/AIDS brings an overall loss to the economy, some sectors may gain 
depending on relative price changes. For example, the food sector expands following a 
fall in the supply of urban skilled labour as this makes rural labour relatively cheap. In 
aggregate though, the contraction of manufacturing and construction is relatively more 
pronounced. A fall in supply of urban skilled labour hits the economy hardest, with 
sharpest reductions in output experienced by manufacturing and construction sectors. 
The assumed growth rate of 1% for urban skilled labour is insufficient to absorb the loss 
of 6% of urban skilled labour, in contrast with rural labour which still grows in the 
presence of HIV/AIDS, causing the economy to contract and GDP growth rates to fall 
by relatively more. 
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Kambou et al.’s main result is thus that, when evenly distributed across the population, 
HIV/AIDS approximately halves the average growth rate of real GDP, a reduction of 
two percentage points, and that most of this impact comes from the loss of urban skilled 
labour. Such a heavy loss of Cameroon’s most skilled and productive type of labour 
signifies a decline in the rate of return to human capital investments, productivity and 
growth. This leads Kambou et al. (1992) to conclude that: “… a people-centred 
development approach is bound to fail.” and that the impact of alternative government 
(and household) responses to HIV/AIDS needs to be assessed (Kambou et al. 1992, 
p123). 
3.4.4 Arndt and Lewis’s South African model 
Arndt and Lewis (2000, 2001) advance the analysis of Kambou et al. (1992). The 
authors not only model the demographic effects of HIV/AIDS, but also account for 
behavioural effects, through government and household responses to mitigate the 
negative consequences of the disease. Arndt and Lewis find a substantially greater 
impact compared to Kambou et al. (1992) due to improved demographic estimates of 
the magnitude of the epidemic, which is substantially larger than originally thought, as 
well as an explicit account of the long duration of the pandemic such that negative 
effects cumulate.37 The results are published in two separate articles, a study addressing 
the macro-economic implications of HIV/AIDS (Arndt and Lewis, 2000) and a paper 
concentrating on sectoral impacts and unemployment (Arndt and Lewis, 2001).38
 
37
  Analyses are carried out for ten instead of five years. Additionally, Kambou et al. (1992) did not 
contain a time dimension. They use the period of 1987 to 1991 to compare scenarios and report 
results in terms of average annual growth rate differences. 
38
  Unless stated otherwise the reported results are from both papers. 
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Arndt and Lewis’s model is relatively more sophisticated in terms of aggregation, 
functional forms and market structure (see Table 3.1). The authors employ a translog 
production function for capital and labour inputs, which permits different substitution 
elasticities between pairs of inputs. This functional form emulates South Africa’s reality 
of marked differences in factor utilisation featuring the simultaneous existence of high 
unemployment of unskilled and full employment of professional labour. A novel feature 
of government behaviour is that government consumption expenditure as a share of total 
absorption (private consumption, government consumption and investments) is 
exogenous but across the seven spending categories can accommodate a variety of 
allocation rules, including increased health spending at the cost of other goods or deficit 
spending at the cost of savings, which crowds out investment. The latter crowding-out 
mechanism is incorporated in the AIDS scenario. Finally, to conform to reality, real 
wages for unskilled, skilled and informal labour are set institutionally above market 
clearing levels, such that the level of employment becomes the equilibrating variable. 
Levels of unemployment result from simple subtraction of employment from labour 
supply. The wage for professional labour is set in the market. 
Arndt and Lewis compare a hypothetical No-AIDS scenario with an AIDS scenario to 
distil the differential impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Features of the AIDS scenario 
are: a slow-down in population and labour force growth by skill category (unskilled 
labour is taxed relatively heavily); a fall in labour productivity (effective labour input by 
skill type is reduced proportionally with the projected AIDS deaths one period hence); 
total factor productivity growth drops by up to one half of the No-Aids rate at the height 
of the epidemic (reflecting among others cost of hiring, training adjustments, 
absenteeism and slow-down in technical progress); households struck by AIDS reduce 
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savings and increase health spending to 10 to 15% of total spending at a cost of non-
food items; and finally the health share in government expenditures rises from 15% in 
1997 to 26% in 2010 by augmenting the deficit (the share of non-AIDS related spending 
is assumed constant). Only the first effect was considered by Kambou et al. (1992). 
Against the backdrop of these assumptions the AIDS scenario lowers economic growth 
compared to the No-AIDS scenario, at a maximum of 2.6 percentage points in 2008. As 
a result, the overall size of the economy measured in terms of real GDP is considerably 
lower, in 2010 by about 17%, relative to a situation without the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
This welfare measure is biased upwards due to stark increases in health and related 
expenditures to fight AIDS, which do not signify a welfare improvement in this 
model.39 Therefore, the authors employ absorption excluding AIDS-related expenditures 
and private expenditures on food as an alternative welfare indicator. The difference in 
this real absorption measure is 22% in 2010.40 Arndt and Lewis argue that further 
information on per capita GDP and absorption is required, as the slowdown in 
population growth may leave welfare per capita unaffected or may indeed lead to an 
improvement per capita. Whereas in Kambou et al. (1992) per capita income remains 
approximately constant, Arndt and Lewis find a fall in GDP and absorption per capita. 
Specifically, in 2010 per capita GDP is 8% lower and absorption per capita is lower by 
13%, indicating that the decline takes place disproportionally in non-health, non-food 
expenditures. Decomposition of the total effect on real GDP in 2010 reveals that the 
 
39 
 A deficiency in Arndt and Lewis’s analysis is that it does not include a measure of health status in the 
utility function such that improvements in well-being of the ill are not positively valued. 
40
  These figures are from Arndt and Lewis (2000). Arndt and Lewis (2001), although based on the same 
model and assumptions, report slightly higher estimates: real GDP is about 20% lower in 2010 
compared to the No-AIDS scenario, real absorption is 24% lower. 
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change in total factor productivity and government spending (reducing savings and 
investments) account for the major part of the GDP decrease, 34% and 45% 
respectively.41 Finally, although Arndt and Lewis (2000) expected to find a fall in 
unemployment for the high-unemployment unskilled labour category in South Africa, as 
AIDS impacts on this category more than others, the model results suggest the contrary. 
The unemployment rate for unskilled labour actually increases marginally relative to the 
No-AIDS scenario, because the HIV/AIDS pandemic not only reduces labour supply 
growth (labour supply is 17% smaller in 2010 in the AIDS scenario) but also slows 
down production growth and thus labour demand. This issue is further elaborated in 
Arndt and Lewis (2001). 
The authors label the high unemployment of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in South 
Africa as an employment problem.42 The data suggest that job creation performance 
over the past thirty years for this category has been dismal relative to other skill types. 
Formal sector employment failed to grow in line with unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
supply in the 1970s and actually declined in the 80s and 90s, leaving total employment 
for lower skilled labourers in 1999 at 92% of its level in 1970. Although the authors 
recognise the complexity of South Africa's history, they attribute this phenomenon to a 
single factor, namely the neo-classical explanation that the lower-skilled labour types 
have systematically priced themselves out of the market. A combination of institutional 
 
41
  Decomposition of the change in real GDP is implemented via progressive elimination of effects. This 
method is subject to path dependency. The authors use the following order of elimination: total factor 
productivity is eliminated first, followed by government deficit spending (replaced by displacement 
of government expenditures on other goods), factor-specific productivity declines and reductions in 
labour supply. The latter two account for the remaining 8% and 13% respectively. 
42
  Rather confusingly, Arndt and Lewis (2001) suddenly change the labour classification in their 
analysis from informal, unskilled, skilled and professional labour types to unskilled, semi-skilled, 
skilled and highly skilled labour categories. Consequently, labour market results are reported in terms 
of the latter typology. 
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factors such as labour unions, wage bargaining councils and labour legislation have led 
to the creation of a relatively rigid wage for lower skilled labour types that is set well 
above market-clearing levels. Their hypothesis is supported by data on real 
remuneration trends across labour classes. Evidence shows that real wages for semi- and 
unskilled labour has grown by up to 250% of the 1970 level, whereas for highly skilled 
and skilled labour these have remained relatively close to the 1970 level (at 90% and 
110% respectively).43
Arndt and Lewis (2001) put forward two additional factors, apart from the slow-down in 
growth explanation, to motivate the fact that the unemployment rates of unskilled and 
semi-skilled are largely unaffected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. These stem from 
changes in the structure of the economy caused by the differential impact of the 
pandemic across sectors. Firstly, a fall in savings (associated with the pandemic) brings 
about a fall in investment demand and lowers the production of investment goods by the 
construction and equipment sectors. These sectors use unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
relatively intensively and take up a significant share of total wage payments to these 
categories (approximately 16%). Additionally, AIDS-induced morbidity effects on 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour lower the output of sectors using these labour types 
relatively intensively even more, exacerbating the negative effects on employment. 
In the light of the above, Arndt and Lewis (2001) advocate a policy of real wage 
moderation (or even decline) for unskilled and semi-skilled labour to stimulate 
 
43
  The growth paths of real remuneration for labour in the model simulations (reported in Arndt and 
Lewis 2001 only) are set conservatively relative to the evidence. Specifically, real wages for the 
lower skill types grow at 2% (less than the average annual growth rate of 3.5% over 1970-1999). 
Real remuneration for skilled labour remains constant and remuneration for highly skilled labour is 
formed in the labour market. 
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employment, especially in equipment and construction sectors that use these factors 
intensively, investment and growth. This would palliate the negative economic 
consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and reduce unemployment rates. They assess 
the effect of this policy by comparing different growth paths of real wages with the 
original scenario. The model results show that constant real wages for semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour improve GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points annually relative to the 
No-AIDS scenario, whereas a fall of 1% annually increases GDP growth by 
approximately 1 percentage point. This change in growth performance stems from 
improvements in employment and is further encouraged by a rise in investments. For 
example, an annual decrease in real wages for semi-skilled and unskilled labour of 1% 
reduces the unemployment rate to a level of 17 percentage points below the level in the 
base case, which at 41% is still high. 
Arndt and Lewis (2001) recognise that the distributional effects of this policy across 
households with employed members who prefer a real wage rise, versus households 
with unemployed members who rather see real wages fall, are not trivial and should be 
investigated in more detail in future. Nevertheless, as a first indication, the authors find 
that the real value of total factor payments to unskilled and semi-skilled labour remains 
constant. This suggests that the reduction in wages offsets the increase in payments to 
the newly employed and has no adverse distributional effects across households. 
Another avenue for future research listed by Arndt and Lewis (2000) is to improve the 
empirical basis of the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Alternative intervention 
policies aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic, next to a policy of wage 
moderation, need further scrutiny. Finally, currently not modelled are dynamic 
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implications over time of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, such as the impact of a reduction in 
education spending on skill accumulation and growth of labour supply by skill type. 
3.4.5 Arndt and Wobst’s Tanzanian model 
Arndt and Wobst (2002) zoom in on an under-investigated element of Arndt and 
Lewis’s (2001, 2002) analysis of the potential economic implications of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic via its effect on labour markets and human capital accumulation. The central 
hypothesis of Arndt and Wobst is that in poor countries such as Tanzania, where the 
stock of human capital is small, not the death of skilled people but the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on growth in the human capital stock, i.e. rates of human capital 
accumulation, matters more for economic performance in the long term. Evidence 
points to a strong relationship between educational attainment, productivity and 
technological progress, and earnings, such that higher education levels may enhance 
economic growth significantly. A CGE model of Tanzania addressing the implications 
of skills upgrading is the last of three analyses undertaken by the authors to scrutinise 
this research question. The authors commence with a labour force survey (LFS) analysis 
and a study of rates of human capital accumulation using education transition matrices 
(ETMs) for the 1990s of which results are used to derive tentative conclusions on the 
economic impact of HIV/AIDS via changes in skill upgrading. 
A comparison of the 2000/01 LFS with the 1990/1991 LFS shows that the age structure 
of the Tanzanian labour force has changed in favour of the young and less experienced. 
The shares of children of 10-14 years old and juveniles of 15-19 years old in the work 
force have increased relative to the share of medium age employees of 20-34 years old. 
This pattern agrees with the loss of educational capacity, due to teachers dying from 
AIDS, and a fall in education demand by children, forced to work to compensate for the 
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loss in income of AIDS stricken parents of prime-age and, to a lesser extent, older age. 
Moreover, in line with the LFS results, the authors find a sharp fall in the share of the 
school age population of 5-14 years old enrolled in primary education. The trends in 
school enrolments in Tanzania are deciphered in more detail using the novel approach 
of estimating ETMs at provincial, regional and national level. 
An ETM captures the way in which children move through the education system. For a 
given education level a child has three options for the following year, which are to 
progress to the next educational level, to remain in the same educational level and to 
exit the education system and enter the labour force. The probabilities of each of these 
outcomes for all education levels are put into one comprehensive transition matrix, T. 
Reading row-wise the diagonal entries represent the probability of repeating the same 
educational level and the following entry to the right of the diagonal represents the 
probability of progressing to the next educational level. Exit probabilities for each 
education level are put in the matrix by adding an additional column. All other entries 
are zero by assumption and rows add up to one such that all choices are accounted for. 
If is the enrolment in year t, with the entry for grade 1 positive and all other entries 
zero, then the number of individuals at each educational level, S, at t+1 equals: 
.
tE
tt EST ' 44 Using a minimum cross-entropy approach, the authors estimate non-
stationary ETMs, which permit transition probabilities to evolve over time according to 
a linear trend, and stationary ETMs, in which probabilities are constant.45 Arndt and 
Wobst find that trends in secondary school enrolment, which is relatively small in size, 
 
44
  Enrolment in first educational level is supplied exogenously, such that probability of repeating grade 
1 is set to zero. 
45
  For more information the reader is referred to Appendix B of Arndt and Wobst (2002). 
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have been positive. More importantly, trends in primary school enrolments are negative 
from grade 4 onwards and especially so for boys. For grades 4 to 7 exit probabilities are 
increasing, which is in line with the large increase in the share of 10-14 year olds in the 
labour force. 
The final part of Arndt and Wobst (2002) is a CGE analysis of the implications of skill 
upgrading (defined as a reduction of the share of the low-skilled and an increase the 
share of the medium and high skilled in the labour force) using a static CGE model for 
Tanzania. A salient feature of the Tanzanian model (see Table 3.1) is that it accounts for 
the presences of large wedges between producer and consumer prices, such that 
households may opt to produce entirely for own consumption (home consumption). 
Another distinguishing feature is that factors of production are mobile, but only to a 
certain degree, which is activity and/or scenario related. Capital employed in (non-) 
agricultural sectors can only move freely across (non-) agricultural sectors. Labour is 
mobile if rural-urban migration is permitted, but made specific to agriculture and non-
agricultural sectors when it is not, in which case (non-) agricultural labour mobility is 
restricted to (non-) agricultural sectors only. Finally, land is only employed in 
agriculture and perfectly mobile within sub-sectors. 
Skill upgrading is simulated by transferring 2% of low-skilled to medium skilled 
workers and 1% of the medium skilled to the high skilled category, given the total 
number of agricultural and non-agricultural workers. Two scenarios are used, which 
either allow or forbid rural-urban migration. In the migration-permitting scenario 
agricultural labour of a certain skill type can migrate and change into non-agricultural 
labour of the same skill class (and vice versa). Migration is a function of relative 
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agricultural/non-agricultural wages, which are maintained at a constant level by labour 
flows between the categories. In the scenario which prohibits migration total 
agricultural and non-agricultural labour is fixed. In this set-up, migration is ultimately 
governed by low demand elasticities for agricultural products combined with larger 
opportunities for skilled workers in urban areas. Consequently, when migration is 
allowed, skill upgrading entails larger increases in the medium and high skilled 
workforce in non-agricultural sectors compared to their agricultural counterparts. 
The authors find that skill upgrading with migration leads to a higher real GDP relative 
to the scenario in which migration is prohibited (increases by 0.42% compared to 0.35% 
without migration). Not only do workers move to a higher and more productive skill 
class, but also from agricultural to more productive non-agricultural jobs. Secondly, in 
the absence of migration agricultural GDP improves by relatively more from skill 
upgrading. This results from a rise in productivity of more skilled agricultural workers 
and the large number of (low skilled) workers involved in skill upgrading. Nevertheless, 
the cost to the agricultural sector of migration is relatively small compared to the gains 
to the non-agricultural sector due to productivity differences and the fact that the 
agricultural sector cannot easily absorb highly skilled workers. The latter factor, 
combined with strong reductions in marginal product following an increase in the size 
of the highly skilled labour class, ensures that real wages of highly skilled labour in 
agriculture decline when migration is not permitted and logically, when migration is 
allowed, these workers have the highest propensity to migrate. 
Arndt and Wobst conclude that the observed patterns of skill upgrading agree with a 
development strategy which enhances agricultural production. This improves demand 
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by the majority of the population for non-agricultural products and permits migration 
from rural to urban areas without significant cost to agricultural sectors. The slowdown 
in skill upgrading observed in the LFS and ETM analyses, of which HIV/AIDS is likely 
to be a contributing factor, would diminish such positive processes. The authors also 
note the negative effects of the strong shift in age structure towards younger, 
inexperienced workers who are less productive and less likely to innovate. 
Although certain aspects of Arndt and Wobst (2002) are innovative, especially the use 
of ETMs, one could criticise their work on several points. Firstly, the model is static and 
not dynamic and therefore does not capture adjustment processes over time. Secondly, 
their analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy via changes in the rate of skill 
accumulation is essentially qualitative. Three separate studies were carried out, and the 
results of the LFS study and ETM analyses are not directly incorporated in the CGE 
model simulations in the form of ‘No-AIDS’ versus ‘AIDS’ scenarios. The latter 
procedure is fairly common in CGE models of the economic impact of HIV/AIDS (see 
for example Kambou et al., 1992 and Arndt and Lewis, 2000, 2001). Instead, the 
authors argue that they “… do not know and cannot know what educational and labour 
force trends would have prevailed in the absence of the pandemic.” (Arndt and Wobst, 
2002, footnote p39). Hence, no guesstimates of the likely impact of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic on the education and labour market are implemented in the CGE simulations 
and no quantitative but only tentative conclusions are derived. 
3.4.6 Arndt’s Mozambique model 
Arndt (2003) is a development of Arndt and Lewis (2000, 2001). He complements their 
CGE analyses with the results of Arndt and Wobst (2002) for Tanzania and thereby 
addresses the caveats of the latter. 
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The author develops the ETM of Arndt and Wobst (2002) into an education and skill 
transition matrix (ESTM), which governs transition between various scholastic levels 
(lower and upper primary, secondary and tertiary) and workforce skill levels (unskilled, 
skilled and highly skilled). People who are not working and not in school (infants) and 
those who retire from the labour force or die are incorporated as a first and last class in 
the matrix respectively. The ESTM for Mozambique is estimated over the years 1996 to 
1999, a period in which effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic were minor, and which is 
therefore assumed to reflect a ‘No-AIDS’ situation. The effects of HIV/AIDS are 
derived from available demographic projections and trends in transition probabilities 
estimated by Arndt and Wobst (2002) for Tanzania over a period containing a 
substantial number of AIDS-related deaths. Typically, AIDS increases the death rates; 
increases the probability of moving from a lower level of schooling to the unskilled 
workforce; reduces the likelihood of moving from secondary to tertiary education; 
increases the probability of changing from tertiary education to the skilled labour force 
(as opposed to highly skilled); and, at each level of educational attainment, reduces the 
chance of remaining in school. 
The resulting ESTMs with and without AIDS are subsequently employed in CGE 
simulations of a base ‘AIDS’ scenario and a ‘No-AIDS’ scenario. A second AIDS 
scenario, ‘Education’ is imposed, which looks at the effect of education policy in the 
presence of the pandemic. The ‘Education’ scenario maintains the transition 
probabilities of the ‘No-AIDS’ scenarios while the demographic effects of AIDS, i.e. 
increases in the death rates and proportional reductions in the probability of remaining 
in a category, still obtain. Education policy is hypothesised to cost 25% and 50% of 
base funding levels in the first two years of the simulation period (1% of GDP 
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approximately), after which an increase of 3% per annum in terms of real foreign 
currency takes effect for the remainder of the simulation period. Incremental 
expenditures on education are funded through direct taxation of urban households. 
The three scenarios have different implications for labour force projections. Without the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic the skilled and highly skilled labour categories grow rapidly, 
while the AIDS scenario depresses skill upgrading to lower, albeit still positive, rates of 
growth for the two skilled labour types. The pool of unskilled labour is larger in the 
‘AIDS’ scenario than in the ‘No-AIDS’ scenario due to a rise in school drop-out rates. 
When the education policy is put in place, growth of the higher skilled labour categories 
is only marginally affected by the epidemic, which stems from the relative smallness of 
the highly skilled labour segment compared to the large pool of unskilled labour, i.e. the 
potential new entrants into the educational system. This implies that the indirect effects 
of the pandemic on transition probabilities are more important than the direct effects on 
death rates, and signifies the importance of maintaining the flow of new entrants into 
the skilled segments of the workforce to preserve future stocks of (highly) skilled 
labour. 
The alternative labour force projections, together with assumptions on productivity 
growth and physical capital accumulation, are fed into a recursive dynamic CGE model 
for Mozambique (see Table 3.1). The productivity of each factor is assumed to decline 
proportionally with the share of the relevant adult population that has AIDS. Physical 
capital accumulation across sectors is governed by profit rate differentials. They are 
financed by government, foreign and private (firms and households) savings, of which 
the latter two may vary across scenarios. In the ‘AIDS’ scenario foreign savings and 
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private savings rates are assumed fixed, whereas in the ‘No-AIDS’ scenario a slight 
degree of responsiveness (elasticities below 0.5) to rates of return to capital is permitted. 
Results indicate that the economic repercussions of HIV/AIDS are potentially sizeable. 
Arndt finds a relatively large decline in the growth rate of real GDP compared to earlier 
studies. Real GDP growth falls by between 2.8% and 4.3% in 2010, leading to a 
reduction in real GDP in 2010 of 14% to 20%. On a per capita basis the growth rate is  
between 0.3% and 1% lower in 2010, leading to a per capita GDP of about 4% to 12% 
less compared to the ‘No-AIDS’ scenario. A decomposition of the effects of AIDS show 
that reduced population growth and human capital accumulation (24%), reduced 
physical capital accumulation (35%) and most importantly reduced productivity growth 
(41%) are the main drivers of the reduction in growth rates. Moreover, sectors that 
produce investment goods (other manufacturing and construction) are particularly hard 
hit, whereas agricultural sectors are not so much affected. Given the labour force 
projections of the ‘AIDS’ scenario relative to the ‘No-AIDS’ scenario, the pandemic 
reduces output of sectors that intensively use highly skilled and skilled labour and 
capital, whereas sectors that use unskilled labour intensively tend to expand as a share 
of GDP (Rybczynski type effects). The former factors happen to have relatively high 
productivity growth rates compared to the latter, which magnifies the differences in 
GDP growth rates. The assumption of technical change biased towards human and 
physical capital, in stark contrast to earlier studies, such as Arndt and Lewis (2000, 
2001), which impose Hicks-neutral technological progress, is key in explaining the 
growth differential. If Hicks-neutral technical change is imposed, the growth differential 
falls to 2.5%, slightly below the estimate of Arndt and Lewis (2000). Output per worker 
and wages differ significantly in the ‘Education’ scenario compared to the base ‘AIDS’ 
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scenario, whereas total real GDP is approximately the same for the entire simulation 
period. Labour supply in the ‘Education’ scenario is relatively low due to the policy of 
maintaining school enrolment rates. Greater stocks of human capital and a larger 
amount of capital per worker imply higher output per worker (11% higher in 2010 
compared to the base ‘AIDS’ scenario). A reduction in the amount of unskilled labour 
implies an increase in unskilled wages (by 14% in 2010), but as the value added share in 
GDP rises, education instead of working as an unskilled labourer overall generates a 
higher payoff. Growth rates in the two ‘AIDS’ scenarios also differ substantially. In the 
early stages education policy slows down economic performance as taking people out of 
the labour force reduces the contribution of otherwise working individuals to the 
economy, but later such a policy pays off in terms of higher growth rates. By 2010 real 
GDP growth is 0.6 percentage points higher in ‘Education’ compared to the base 
‘AIDS’ scenario, due to more rapid human capital accumulation, i.e. enhanced 
productivity of a more skilled labour force. 
In spite of a high degree of uncertainty around the results,46 the long but finite duration 
and severity of the impact of the pandemic suggests that effective mitigating policies, 
such as the education policy, and preventive policies, aimed at reducing HIV infections, 
implemented today may have a high pay-off in the long term. Arndt (2003) illustrates 
this by net present value (NPV) calculations of successful education and preventive 
policies. He finds that, assuming that the growth enhancement of 0.6% of education 
policy persists up to 2020, additional education expenditures in the order of 5% of GDP 
 
46
  For example, Arndt (2003) stresses that the productivity impact of AIDS is speculative because of a 
thin empirical base, which makes estimates of technical change and the impact of AIDS thereon 
highly implausible. 
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per year from 2002 to 2010 are justified. Similarly, if effective preventive policies 
reduce AIDS deaths and result in a per capita growth benefit of 0.3%, additional 
preventive expenditures of 2.5% of GDP from 2002 to 2007 are warranted, based on a 
per capita GDP measure of evaluating preventive policy only. The assumption that the 
pandemic is severe, long-lasting but nevertheless finite is critical and signifies a 
departure from Kambou et al. (1992), whose viewpoint was that a people-centred 
development approach (such as investments in human capital) would be fruitless as 
AIDS reduces the life expectancy of educated people. Instead Arndt assumes that over 
time a vaccine is likely to become available and that together with behavioural changes 
and changes in human biology this will eventually cut back HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. 
Until that time, policies that aim at reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS and the duration 
of the pandemic are justified. 
Arndt (2003) is sophisticated compared to the previous HIV/AIDS models in 
simultaneously considering the consequences of HIV/AIDS for labour, physical and 
human capital accumulation and the rate of - human and physical capital biased - 
technological change, and in assessing the potential of preventive and mitigating 
policies (such as education policy) in a recursive dynamic CGE setting. Nevertheless, 
the reliability of data and thus results remains a problem (indeed in all studies), which 
can only be ameliorated in due time when more is known on the effect of HIV/AIDS on 
productivity growth and labour supply by skill type. Furthermore, Arndt (2003) does 
not address the issue of resource allocation, which needs to change considerably and 
raises questions about feasibility if policy recommendations were to be carried out. 
Priority setting amongst the most cost-effective government responses, which is much 
needed but can lead to controversial outcomes, may therefore not be carried out. 
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Instead, the author’s objective is to show that proposed policies are likely to have a high 
payoff such that (Arndt, 2003, page iv): “… imaginative initiatives, including costly 
ones, can be considered.”  
3.4.7 Dixon, McDonald and Roberts’ Botswana model 
Dixon et al. (2004) report preliminary results of the effects of health care interventions 
aimed at reducing the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the Botswana economy. It 
is the first of its kind in explicitly modelling health policies which target the pandemic 
directly and thereby represents a marked improvement upon previous analyses, which, 
at best, examined indirect (e.g. labour market and education) policies aimed at 
mitigating the effects of the pandemic on the economy or, in the case of Arndt (2003), 
evaluated the impact of preventive policies using NPV calculations based on GDP per 
capita only (not endogenously modelled in the CGE framework). Two types of health 
care interventions are considered: reductions in other sexually transmitted diseases 
(STD) which reduces the probability of HIV transmission and a health education 
programme (EDU) which focuses on prevention by reducing the number of newly 
formed sexual relationships. 
The analyses are carried out in a recursive dynamic CGE model for Botswana (see also 
Table 3.1) with an embedded “compartmental” epidemiological model. The latter 
endogenises the impact of the epidemic on labour supply via changes in mortality. It 
distinguishes high risk and low risk populations, which are each subdivided into those 
who are currently infected and those who may become infected. Changes over time are 
then derived from population numbers in the previous period plus a series of 
transmission parameters.  
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The policy interventions are modelled endogenously in the sense that they impose costs 
in terms of material and skilled labour (in the economic component of the CGE model) 
and benefits in terms of the preservation of life (in the epidemiological component). A 
total of five shocks/policies are modelled incrementally which describe the impact of: 
- AIDS, modelled on HIV/AIDS prevalence estimates of UNAIDS;  
- AIDS and the associated rise in government expenditures on health care (HE), 
assuming that real health care provision quadruples over 1994-2020;  
- AIDS with HE and an STD policy intervention which reduces the chance of HIV 
transmission through sex between high risk partners by 50% and by 30% if at 
least one low-risk partner is involved, and costs US$ 0.39 per capita;  
- AIDS with HE and an EDU policy that yields fewer new sexual partnerships 
(25% across all risks) and costs US$ 0.35 per capita;  
- and AIDS with HE, STD and EDU policies combined. 
The results of each of these scenarios are presented in terms of macroeconomic 
indicators relative to the population in the base period (due to lack of data on household 
numbers and size) and are reported relative to the ‘No-AIDS’ baseline.  
The AIDS pandemic is shown to increase ‘per capita’ GDP relative to the baseline, 
whereas interventions reduce it. The closure rule of maintaining the capital-labour ratio 
is responsible for this counterintuitive result: the AIDS scenario produces the lowest 
workforce, i.e. highest capital/labour ratio (and so GDP per capita) and interventions 
yield a higher workforce, thereby reducing capital/labour ratio (and GDP per capita).  
In contrast, private consumption ‘per capita’ rises until 2010 and subsequently falls in a 
scenario in which the government responds to the AIDS pandemic with increased health 
expenditures. The EDU policy which reduces the number of new sexual partners is not 
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sufficient to avert a fall in per capita private consumption, whereas the STD policy (and 
STD and EDU policy combined) is. The AIDS scenario alone at first yields a growth 
path of private consumption per capita above the baseline, but after 2014 below the 
baseline in agreement with diminishing returns to input substitution.  
Given the pattern of per capita consumption and fixed absorption shares destined for 
investments, government consumption ‘per capita’ must rise considerably and at an 
increasing rate to yield the rise in per capita GDP. The results confirm that this is the 
case, even with STD and EDU policy interventions in place. Also as expected, the 
AIDS pandemic, combined with increased health care expenditures, significantly 
reduces ‘per capita’ disposable income for each household type (by up to 50% in 2020 
compared to the baseline). The STD and EDU interventions are shown to mitigate these 
effects by more than half. Effects differ across households and factors, but the picture is 
far from clear and more research is needed into interpreting these results. In general, the 
AIDS pandemic yields higher capital-labour ratios and thus higher wages, whereas 
interventions will lower this effect. 
Overall, Dixon et al.’s (2004) preliminary paper on the AIDS pandemic in Botswana 
clearly advances previous CGE analyses by assessing the impact of various health 
policies. Nevertheless, as the authors recognise, ‘much remains to be done’. The authors 
mention three model refinements currently underway in order to ‘provide estimates of 
greater reliance to policy makers’. These are the inclusion of morbidity (productivity 
and absences from work) effects associated with HIV infection, disaggregation by 
household of epidemiological consequences and the inclusion of a third type of health 
policy in the form of Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART), which has become a viable 
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policy option (the price for ART drugs has fallen considerably) and delays the onset of 
the disease.  
Further improvements are needed in terms of the CGE model itself. For example, the 
paper does not address the impact of the epidemic on human capital accumulation, the 
importance of which was demonstrated by Arndt and Wobst (2002) and Arndt (2003). 
The changes in asset ownership are not considered and results seem to hinge upon the 
assumption of maintaining capital stocks, which may prove difficult for a country hit by 
the AIDS pandemic.   
In addition, from the point of the reader not all model assumptions are clear from the 
paper (e.g. What is the numéraire? How is consumption demand modelled? What is the 
closure rule with respect to the trade balance? What are the welfare effects and how are 
they modelled?). The same is true for the impact of the epidemic and interventions on 
sectors, which are not reported either. Finally, Dixon et al. distinguish government 
expenditures on health care from those related to the specific STD and EDU health 
interventions. This suggests that the former type of expenditures does not yield benefits 
in terms of saved human lives. Nor do health expenditures in general and the specific 
STD and EDU policies enhance utility, so that people do not ‘feel better’ if the effects 
of illness are reduced. It is not clear what government expenditures on health care 
comprise and it may be that they overlap with the STD and EDU health interventions.  
3.4.8 Summary 
HIV/AIDS models assess the economic impact of HIV/AIDS using CGE analysis. Most 
empirical models of the macroeconomic implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic are 
applied to Sub-Saharan Africa, where the pandemic is at its worst. Kambou et al.’s 
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(1992) model for Cameroon is the first CGE model to assess the economy-wide impact 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in a series of static and recursive dynamic simulations. The 
authors presume that the epidemic affects the economy solely via exogenous reductions 
in labour supply. Kambou et al. (1992) find that HIV/AIDS approximately halves the 
average growth rate of real GDP, a reduction of two percentage points, and that per 
capita income remains approximately constant. Arndt and Lewis’s (2000, 2001) 
recursive dynamic model for South Africa not only models the demographic effects of 
HIV/AIDS, but also accounts for behavioural effects, through government and 
household responses to mitigate the negative consequences of the disease. In stark 
contrast with Kambou et al. (1992), per capita GDP and absorption are 8% and 12% 
lower in the ‘AIDS’ scenario compared to the ‘No-AIDS’ scenario and the growth 
difference is much larger (at a maximum of 2.6%). Improved demographic estimates of 
the magnitude of the epidemic, as well as an acknowledgement of its long term dynamic 
nature are explanatory factors of the differences in results. Arndt and Lewis (2000, 
2001) show that, given the long incubation period of AIDS, relatively small but 
sustained negative impacts on rates of growth of labour supply, physical capital and 
(Hicks-neutral) technological progress produce a significant fall in growth in the long 
term. Arndt and Wobst (2002) and Arndt (2003) assess the impact of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic on the rate of human capital accumulation and (future) stocks of labour 
supply by skill type. Given the evidence of a strong link between educational attainment 
as measured by skill level, productivity and technological progress, and earnings, the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic may lead to a less-educated, less-skilled work force and 
significant reductions in economic growth. In AIDS-stricken countries the education 
sector typically contracts from the supply side due to teachers dying from AIDS and 
from the demand side as children are forced to work to compensate for the loss in 
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income of AIDS-stricken parents. The result is a simultaneous increase in the share of 
young, unskilled people in the workforce and fall in the share of the school age 
population enrolled in primary education. Using Education Transition Matrices, which 
capture the way in which children move through the education system, Arndt and Wobst 
(2002) find negative trends in (primary) school enrolments for Tanzania. A static CGE 
analysis of skill upgrading of the labour force, which shows that real GDP improves, 
forms the basis of the qualitative conclusion that the observed slowdown in skill 
upgrading caused by HIV/AIDS generates negative effects on the economy. This would 
be further exacerbated by the strong shift in age structure towards younger, 
inexperienced workers who are less productive and less likely to innovate. Arndt (2003) 
explicitly incorporates an Education and Skill Transition Matrix, which governs 
transition between various scholastic levels and workforce skill levels, into a recursive 
dynamic CGE model for Mozambique and, using trends in transition probabilities from 
Arndt and Wobst (2002), derives quantitative conclusions on the effects of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic (although careful interpretation is still required due to the weak 
empirical basis). Arndt (2003) finds a relatively large negative economic impact 
compared to earlier studies, which is largely explained by the assumption of 
technological change biased towards human and physical capital. The HIV/AIDS 
pandemic results in a reduction in real GDP growth of 2.8% to 4.3% at most and, 
although population and labour supply growth fall as well, per capita GDP falls by 
about 4% to 12% compared to a ‘No-AIDS’ scenario. Arndt (2003) also assesses the 
impact of a mitigating education policy, which maintains transition probabilities while 
demographic effects of the AIDS pandemic take place. In the later stages such a policy 
enhances growth rates by 0.6% compared to the base ‘AIDS’ scenario, due to the 
enhanced productivity of a more skilled labour force. The author supports other 
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mitigating policies and preventive policies which, implemented today, may have a high 
pay off in the long term, because of the long, but finite, duration and severity of the 
impact of the pandemic. This is a departure from Kambou et al. (1992), who described a 
people-centred development approach (such as investments in education) as fruitless 
because of the shortened lifespan of educated people. Nevertheless, issues of resource 
allocation and priority setting among policies are ignored. Dixon et al. (2004) are the 
first to model endogenously the impact of the AIDS pandemic and two possible health 
interventions to mitigate its impact (an STD policy and an education policy aimed at 
reducing the number of new sexual partnerships) using a recursive dynamic CGE model 
of the Botswana economy with an embedded epidemiological model. The simulations 
illustrate the severe consequences of the pandemic, which up to halves disposable 
household incomes per capita by 2020, and the significance of health interventions, 
which reduce the adverse effects by more than half. The results are nevertheless 
preliminary (the model is being refined in terms of household disaggregation, morbidity 
effects of HIV/AIDS and modelling Ant-Retroviral Treatment), and the authors realise 
that much remains to be improved, especially with respect to physical and human 
capital accumulation (being respectively ‘overly optimistic’ and not modelled at all). 
From a reader’s point of view model assumptions and results are not clear, nor is the 
definition of government expenditures on health care, as opposed to those related to 
specific STD and education policies.  
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Table 3.1 HIV/AIDS models: summary of model structure
Study  Country Time period Aggregation Functional forms Market Closure Dynamics* 
Kambou et 
al. (1992) Cameroon 
Calibration: 
1979-1980.5 
 
Simulation: 
1987-1991 
11 sectors (agriculture, 
manufacturing, services) 
4 factors (rural, urban 
unskilled and urban skilled 
labour (mobile), sector-
specific capital) 
1 representative household 
Production: 
Leontief, Cobb 
Douglas, CES 
Utility: Cobb 
Douglas 
Trade: Armington 
assumption 
 
Capital: fixed in the short run 
Imports: small country assumption 
Exports: market power 
Macro closure: savings driven 
Government expenditures: fixed 
Foreign savings: exogenous 
Exchange rate: flexible 
Numéraire: world import price 
R: rural, urban unskilled and 
urban skilled labour supply grows 
by 2%, 3% and 1% 
Capital stock updated by 
investment  (shares are function 
of profit rate differentials) 
Arndt and 
Lewis 
(2000, 
2001) 
South Africa 
Calibration: 
1997-2000 
 
Simulation: 
2001-2010 
14 sectors (3 services: 
social, government, and 
health) 
5 factors (professional, 
skilled, unskilled, and 
informal labour, capital) 
5 households (income 
quintiles) 
7 government consumption, 
3 government investment 
types 
corporate account 
Production: 
translog, Leontief 
Utility: Cobb 
Douglas 
Trade: Armington 
assumption 
Investment 
demand: activity 
specific capital 
coefficient matrix 
Sectoral factor market distortions 
by fixing sector to average return 
Wage informal, unskilled and 
skilled labour fixed relative to 
numéraire 
Trade: small country assumption 
Macro closure: savings driven 
Government expenditure shares: 
fixed 
Foreign savings: exogenous 
Exchange rate: flexible 
Numéraire: producer price index 
R: unskilled, skilled and 
professional labour grows by 
3.05%, 1.6% and 3.1% up to 
2001, afterwards rates vary 
Exogenous growth trajectory real 
wages informal, unskilled and 
skilled labour 
Capital stock updated by 
investment (as function of profit 
rate differentials) 
Total factor productivity grows 
exogenously 
Arndt and 
Wobst 
(2002) 
Tanzania Calibration: 1998 
12 activities (4 agricultural) 
12 commodities 
9 factors (3 agricultural and 
3 non-agricultural labour 
types with different 
education level) 
12 households (rural and 
urban) 
Production: CES in 
value added, 
Leontief in 
intermediate inputs 
Utility: LES 
Trade: Armington 
assumption 
Factors: fully employed, segmented 
markets 
Trade: small country assumption 
Macro closure: savings driven 
Investment and government 
spending: fixed shares 
Foreign savings: exogenous 
Exchange rate: flexible 
Numéraire: consumer price index 
Explicit modelling of marketing 
margins and home consumption 
S 
* R = recursive dynamic; I = intertemporal optimisation; S = static. Reported growth rates correspond to a ‘No-AIDS’ scenario. 
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Table 3.1 continued 
Study  Country Time period Aggregation Functional forms Market Closure Dynamics* 
Arndt 
(2003) Mozambique 
Calibration: 
1997 
 
Simulation: 
1998-2010 
19 productive sectors 
6 factors (highly skilled, 
skilled and unskilled non-
agricultural labour; skilled 
and unskilled agricultural 
labour; physical capital) 
2 households (rural and 
urban) 
Production: 
translog 
Utility: Cobb 
Douglas 
Trade: Armington 
assumption 
Rural-urban migration:  wage 
differentials (elasticity of 0.2%) 
Sector-specific capital 
Government deficit: fixed 
nominally 
Government consumption by 
commodity: fixed share of  total 
endogenous government 
consumption 
Macro closure: savings driven 
Foreign savings: exogenous 
Trade: small country assumption 
Exchange rate: flexible 
Numéraire: consumer price index 
R: exogenous population growth 
Labour supply growth: trends 
transition matrix 
Exogenous productivity growth 
highly skilled, skilled, unskilled 
labour, capital of 4%, 3%,, 2% and 
3% respectively (agrees with total 
factor productivity growth of 2.7%) 
Capital stock updated by investment 
(function of profit rate differentials) 
Foreign savings, domestic savings 
rates function of rate of return to 
capital in ‘No-AIDS’ scenario 
(elasticities of 0.5 and 0.25 
respectively),  fixed in ‘AIDS’ 
scenario 
Dixon et 
al. (2004) Botswana 
Calibration: 
1993/94 
 
Simulation: 
1994-2020 
41 multi-product sectors,  
54 commodities 
12 factors (land, capital, 
labour by: skill, citizen / non 
citizen, social class) 
5 households (rural/urban 
employed/self-employed, 
non-citizen)  
Production: CES  
Trade: Armington 
assumption 
Transport and 
marketing margins 
(endogenous 
function of 
efficiency 
marketing services) 
Factor: no full employment in 
general 
Baseline: efficiency parameters 
production, investment shares total 
absorption and real volume of 
government expenditures vary 
In scenarios these are fixed: implies 
optimistic view in the sense that 
physical capital accumulation is 
maintained 
R: no-AIDS baseline 1994-2020 
using univariate ARIMA time series 
forecasts for real GDP, imports, 
exports, real gross domestic 
investments and population based on 
1960-1993. Availability of each 
labour type grows with workforce 
* R = recursive dynamic; I = intertemporal optimisation; S = static. Reported growth rates correspond to a ‘No-AIDS’ scenario.  
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3.5 OVERVIEW 
The applied literature focusing on the general equilibrium effects of changes in health 
and health care on the economy is small but diverse in terms of application area. The 
earliest type of models that acknowledge the economy-wide effects of improved health, 
Basic Needs models, were designed to implement the basic needs approach to 
development of the 1970s in a comprehensive framework, with its overarching goal of 
basic needs satisfaction. Improved health features in terms of demographic variables, 
working time and labour productivity effects. Nevertheless, health and health policy 
fulfil only a minor role, and it has proven virtually impossible to disentangle the effect 
of improved health within counterfactual simulations. Furthermore, Basic Needs models 
typically are recursive dynamic and applied to developing countries, and by virtue of the 
latter suffer from lack of data, a rather ad hoc approach to modelling of economic 
behaviour (not based on microeconomic optimisation behaviour) and abstraction from 
several general equilibrium elements (such as the endogeneity of prices and the 
government budget). 
Externality models account for the presence of external effects, such as changes in 
health, education and environmental effects, in a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) framework. To this date only one CGE model of health externalities exists, that 
of Savard and Adjovi (1997). Health improvements appear endogenously in the form of 
improved labour productivity as a function of government expenditures on health 
(relative to the base year), which influences the optimal combination of inputs in 
production and relative wages. The main aim of the model, and indeed of most 
externality models, is to assess whether the standard CGE result of (small) economic 
benefits from trade liberalisation holds in the presence of positive health and education 
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externalities. The conclusion is negative, as cuts in government expenditure on health 
and education, aimed at maintaining the government deficit, have negative spill-over 
effects on domestic product and public sector employment, household income and 
welfare. A major benefit compared with the Basic Needs literature is that this model is a 
‘pure’ CGE model, i.e. firmly grounded in microeconomic optimisation behaviour, and 
accounts for various inter-sectoral linkages. However, it too is applied to developing 
country issues in which health is only of secondary importance. Further caveats are a 
lack of dynamic effects, no distinction between working and non-working or age 
groups, and absence of endogenous labour supply effects (i.e. the impact of better health 
on working time) and utility gains from improved health. 
The recent class of models of HIV/AIDS assesses the economic impact of HIV (Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus) and AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) using 
(recursive) dynamic CGE analysis. Generally, this literature models the negative health 
consequences of the pandemic by imposing exogenous demographic and behavioural 
scenarios on the economy. Typical features of the pandemic are that it reduces labour 
supply by skill type, lowers factor productivity and increases household and 
government expenditures on health care at the cost of expenditures on other goods (like 
education) and savings. Under these assumptions the literature’s main conclusion is that 
the slow-down in physical capital accumulation (due to lower savings and investments), 
productivity growth, population growth and human capital accumulation (due to a fall in 
supply and demand for education) reduces economic growth and results in a fall in per 
capita income in the long term compared to a “No-AIDS” scenario. 
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HIV/AIDS models share with the foregoing strands of literature the application to 
developing countries and associated data problems. They are relatively more 
sophisticated though, modelling the impact of changes in health in greatest possible 
detail and focusing solely on this issue as opposed to more broad development issues. 
As with Externality models, HIV/AIDS studies incorporate changes in productivity, and 
as do Basic Needs models, they consider changes in the size and composition of the 
population and labour force. These negative health effects are, with the exception of 
Dixon et al.’s (2004) preliminary paper, imposed on the economy in exogenous 
scenarios of the likely impact of HIV/AIDS on a variety of model parameters. 
HIV/AIDS models generally do not assess endogenously the effects of government 
health policies (or household spending) on the health of the population and labour 
supply, most likely, due to the incurable nature of the disease. This is illustrated by 
Arndt (2003), which considers the modelling of a health policy in the form of a massive 
HAART (Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy) approach. This is not implemented, 
as treatment and distribution costs are found to be prohibitive and effectiveness would 
be relatively low, a finding contradicted by Dixon et al. (2004). Nevertheless, in the 
latter study other government expenditures on health care do not affect health and  
welfare. Expenditures on health care in the HIV/AIDS literature are thus generally seen 
as a consequence of the disease - which is not curable up to this date – and therefore 
have no positive health and welfare impact whatsoever, and instead crowd out other 
expenditures (like education, which negatively affects skill accumulation) or reduce 
savings, investments and hence growth. 
From the foregoing analysis one may conclude that, although the labour productivity 
effect of improved health is well-established, most of the reviewed models do not 
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endogenously assess the impact of changes in health care provision on the size and 
composition of the population, the labour force and its impact on production, income 
and welfare over time in a (developed country) CGE setting. This thesis attempts to 
address this caveat by modelling the endogenous labour supply, i.e. working time, effect 
by skill type of changes in health care provision, whilst recognising the resource claims 
made by the health care sector in terms of capital and, more importantly, labour inputs, 
using a CGE model for the UK.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an overview of the UK health care system and policy. It provides the 
foundations for the UK-focused model with health provision effects developed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and sets the scene for the range of policy options that will be 
scrutinised. Rather than giving a full-fledged historical account of all aspects of UK 
health care (as in Rivett, 1998), the UK health care system is described from a policy 
perspective (following the approach of Klein, 2001), with priority areas discussed in 
more detail. A policy-oriented approach is justifiable on the grounds that the UK health 
care system is highly politicised (for example, from the 1980s - when waiting lists 
became sizeable, “doing something about waiting lists” became a sine qua non of 
electoral programmes of all political parties). Most of health care in the UK is in fact 
provided publicly through the National Health Service (NHS) and so, more than in any 
other country in Europe, changes are largely politically motivated.  
Section 4.2 outlines the evolution of the UK’s health care system up to its present state, 
supported by some facts and figures in section 4.3. Section 4.4 highlights the pressures 
in UK health care and those policy options the government has in resolving these that 
can be handled in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. The challenges 
faced by the health care system in the UK, and in other countries around the world, 
typically revolve around the issue of rationing.  
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4.2 THE EVOLUTION OF UK HEALTH CARE 
The UK health system approaches a so-called ‘command model’ of health care 
provision, which uses central planning to finance, produce and allocate health care 
according to some predetermined criteria. In the UK, the criterion of equity (fairness) 
has been the single most important influence in the development of the NHS (Office of 
Health Economics, 2002, p10). How did this system come about? This section provides 
an account of the development of the health care sector in the UK over time, dominated 
by NHS provision.1 The analysis is narrowed down geographically to England as, 
encouraged by devolution, health service provision differs from that in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales.2
4.2.1 Pre-1948: the inheritance of the NHS 
Early 20th century health care was provided predominantly by family or general 
practitioners (GPs), voluntary hospitals and municipal (local authority) hospitals. 
General practice was almost invariably a business run by one man single-handedly. GP 
care was free of charge for low-paid workers under Lloyd George’s National Insurance 
Act of 1911, but not for their wives and families and not for those workers with a higher 
standard of living, whose demands were curtailed by fees-for service. Voluntary 
hospitals, financed by voluntary contributions and income from their investments, were 
often founded for the benefit of the sick poor by philanthropists and social reformers 
(such as William Marsden’s Royal Free Hospital) or by citizens “proud of their towns 
and anxious to perpetuate their names” (Rivett, 1998, p7). They were the most 
 
1
 It follows the policy-oriented approach towards the history of UK health care of Klein (2001), 
supplemented with elements of the more factual account of Rivett (1998). 
2
  The European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999) is a good reference for health care 
developments in the UK constituencies of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 4-2  
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
prestigious type of hospitals, were responsible only to themselves, and aimed to provide 
quality care to a limited number of patients, usually excluding the elderly and 
chronically ill. Although well-managed, the reliance on voluntary contributions meant 
that ‘voluntaries’ struggled to fulfil their duties. The 1929 Local Government Act 
allowed local authorities to develop Poor Law institutions (‘workhouses’) into 
municipal hospitals. Institutional funding came from local taxation (the ‘poor rate’) and, 
although being proper hospitals, most kept their Poor Law functions by providing social 
as much as medical care. They mostly focused on diseases with a high external cost to 
society (infectious diseases like tuberculosis and smallpox) and functioned as a 
‘dumping ground’  for cases that were not likely to improve with treatments and so were 
transferred to them by the voluntaries (i.e. the elderly and chronically ill). 
The Pre-NHS system, being largely a private system with limited access for the poor 
and minimal private insurance, led to extensive unmet need of those unable to pay, high 
morbidity and mortality and low expectations: “Pain and discomfort were accepted as 
part of life to be endured with stoicism. The family doctor had to be tough to get on with 
his many interesting and rewarding tasks….Working class people did not expect to be 
comfortable. Most went hungry…Many were miserably cold in winter…Successful 
treatment by the family doctor was accepted with gratitude and the many failures were 
tolerated without rancour or recrimination.” (Rivett, 1998, p2).  
The supply of health care was poorly co-ordinated (the relationship between the 
municipal and voluntary hospitals was strained due to the regular dumping of chronic 
cases onto the municipal sector) and unequal across regions (suppliers were located in 
the more prosperous areas).  
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Finally, by the mid-1930s, the system was no longer financially viable. While advances 
in medical knowledge, medicines and technology drove up costs of provisioning, 
charitable giving and local taxation were not yielding nearly enough funding to support 
hospital activities.  
The inadequacies of the health system set the stage for change. But while observers 
agreed that the health care system required improvements, there was disagreement as to 
how the health care system should be organised in the future. In the late 1930s and early 
1940s three visions emerged: (a) extending National Insurance (supported by the British 
Medical Association and adopted post-war by many European countries), (b) 
establishing health care as a local government service (as subsequently adopted in 
Scandinavia) or (c) creating an independent, centralised service supported by public 
funds. The last choice, of nationalisation, was favoured by the experience of communal 
action and the increased sense of social solidarity during the Second World War. The 
war had, in effect, nationalised the health system already: for example, a National Blood 
Transfusion Service had been set up for treatment of military and civilian casualties, and 
an Emergency Medical Service to provide care in emergency situations. An important 
political factor enhancing the “command” model’s prospects for adoption was the 
election of a post-war Labour government by one of the largest majorities in British 
history. The Attlee government was explicitly committed to a programme of public 
ownership and had Aneurin Bevan, a radical and passionate proponent of the NHS, as 
Minister of Health.  
The creation of the NHS in 1948 was the result of a great many compromises (Klein, 
2001, p9, discusses these as dilemmas) on party-political differences, interests of central 
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versus local government and of government versus the various care suppliers, and on 
the extent of coverage (inclusion of mental illness and dental care), many of which 
remained unresolved until well after the implementation.  
4.2.2 The 1948 NHS framework 
The 1946 NHS Act envisaged (citation from Klein, 2001, p1): “…a comprehensive 
health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the 
people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness, 
and for that purpose to provide or secure the effective provision of services.”   
The service was comprehensive in scope (provision of care ‘from cradle to grave’; no 
health care area was excluded), available to all (irrespective of contribution) and free at 
the point of need. The creation of the NHS brought 1,143 voluntary and 1,545 
municipal hospitals (amounting to nearly 500,000 beds) into public ownership with 
negligible additional resources, but what did change was that the poor now had access 
to medical services, i.e. ‘the masses joined the middle classes’. In order to make sure 
that finite resources were employed where they were most needed, Bevan introduced 
some organisational changes.  
The hospital service was administered by centrally-appointed (rather than elected) 
bodies and all recurrent spending was financed by the central government (H.M. 
Treasury) through general taxation. Administrative powers and funding were devolved 
to local regions on the basis of requirements for service delivery. Health regions 
typically differed from history-based local government regions. However, local 
authorities retained their health functions of providing community care.  
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It was originally envisaged that all medical personnel would become salaried state 
employees. But GPs insisted on retaining their independence, which forced Bevan to 
compromise. Whereas specialists received salaries, subject to negotiable terms of 
service and the right to treat private patients in NHS hospitals, GPs who joined the NHS 
continued to be paid on a capitation basis (seen as a “defence against the perils of state 
servitude” Rivett, 1998, p30). Since people were free to register on a GP’s list and GPs 
were being contracted to provide care for those on their lists at established fees and 
allowances (so-called responsibility fees), a GP’s income would depend on his/her list 
size, services offered and revenues from other, non-NHS, activities.  
Despite many reforms, especially those in the 1990s, much of the basic structure of the 
1948 NHS remains in place today.  
4.2.3 Emerging problems: from meeting needs to rationing 
Instead of being a unified system, the NHS was polarised into GP, local authority 
(community) and hospital (i.e. regional) care, which continued to create administrative 
problems for years. More substantial, however, were the financial problems caused by 
escalating expenditures in response to rising demands, compounded by growing 
inefficiencies.  
Rising expenditures 
The cost of the NHS far exceeded initial projections, which were based on presumptions 
that pre-war health care expenditure trends were appropriate predictors of future trends 
and that health care expenditure would be ‘self-liquidating’ by improving population 
health. With the benefit of hindsight, these presumptions were clearly wrong. Firstly, 
medical practice is intrinsically expansive due to technological advances, which raise 
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expectations and demands for new and often more expensive drugs and treatments.3 
Secondly, providing a free service in itself encourages demand. Thirdly, improved 
health tends to enhance health care demand rather than reducing it. Generally, people 
feel they would benefit from some form of health care (even if health improvements are 
marginal). More important in this respect though is the impact of ageing: improvements 
in life expectancy imply that people live longer and so demand further health care, 
which is generally more expensive because of the ‘survival of the unfit’ (Rivett, 1998, 
p111), meaning that curing people of simple, cheap diseases enables them to fall ill 
from more complex and expensive diseases.4  
Inefficiencies: supplier-induced demand and pay disputes 
The early NHS had a built-in institutional inefficiency, which was the demand 
generated by the professional providers of the service, a problem known as supplier-
induced demand. The GPs were the so-called ‘gatekeepers’ of the health care system, 
which meant that patients could only access the system via an appointment with the GP 
(or practice nurse), who could then, if necessary, effect immediate treatment or direct 
the patient to the ‘right’ specialist. Whilst this system is in itself efficiency enhancing, 
                                                 
3
  Technical progress which reduces the unit production cost may increase the total cost of health care 
as the fall in price is likely to cause a rise in demand. If the technical improvement is purely quality 
enhancing, demand (including demand of those previously deemed untreatable) at any price goes up. 
However, once adjustments for improvements in health outcomes are carried out, for example in 
terms of preventing more serious conditions from developing and increasing the length of life, the 
cost may well fall rather than rise. The presence of insurance further enhances cost by inducing 
patients and/or doctors to choose higher cost treatments as they are reimbursed anyway (moral 
hazard). See Folland et al. (2001, p310-313). 
4
  See Emmerson et al. (2000, Section 7) for more on the impact of ageing on health care costs in the 
UK. The authors report on evidence which suggests that the greatest proportion of health care 
spending amongst the elderly tends to be incurred in the final stages of one’s life so that it is not age 
or longevity per se that matters for per capita health care costs, but remaining length of life. 
Longevity is not a problem as long as people live longer in a healthy state. Accordingly, the 
differences in health spending across age groups would be explained by differences in the 
composition of the age groups in terms of decedents (costly) and survivors (less costly) and the 
positive impact of ageing on future health care spending would be much less than predicted. 
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by for example reducing search costs and curbing frivolous demands, it places financial 
control at the discretion of GPs and specialists. Since their incomes were only loosely 
related to the number of patients treated (specialists’ salaries, GPs’ responsibility fees) 
and costs were covered by the NHS, doctors were primarily concerned with improving 
patient welfare without regard to any financial constraints. If doctors prescribed more 
and/or more costly medicines, there was little anyone could do.  
Another source of cost escalation was the increased pressure exerted by the medical 
profession for increases in their pay. Since the private sector was virtually non-existent, 
the NHS effectively had a monopoly of employment of medical labour. It determined 
not only demand, but also supply (by determining the number of medical school places) 
and indirectly set an upper limit on labour payments via its system of capped budgets, 
introduced in the 1950s, from which all health care costs, including labour, had to be 
met. Wages were essentially fixed in bilateral bargaining rounds between the 
Department of Health (DoH) and the medical profession, in which the latter fared 
particularly poorly in the 1950s.  Consequently, the NHS had been able to depress the 
incomes of the medical profession, to the dismay of the latter: for example, whereas 
average incomes in the period 1950-59 rose by 20%, the average income of GPs and 
health administrators had fallen by the same percentage.5 However, since the 1950s 
periodic reviews of remuneration throughout the NHS have been carried out. The 
outcome of the consequent bilateral bargaining between the Minister of Health 
(constrained by the Treasury) and the medical profession (represented by the British 
 
5
  Next to the GP as ‘gatekeeper’, this was the second efficiency-enhancing measure incorporated in the 
original NHS. The so-called ‘pool’ system for GPs was abolished in 1966, when a basic allowance 
(i.e. salary element) was introduced in the calculation of GP earnings. 
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Medical Association and other unions) - the latter threatening strike action and 
withdrawal from the NHS - usually recommended increases in remuneration.  
Potential solutions: the role of user charges and rationing  
In the early 1950s, changing the system of NHS finance in favour of an insurance-based 
system was deemed undesirable by Bevan for reasons of equity, i.e. fairness in the 
distribution of resources (Klein, 2001, p29). With respect to health care provision, it 
was argued that the allocation of health care ought not to depend on the contribution 
made but on needs. On the funding side, a progressive tax system could achieve a more 
equal distribution of income. Moreover, and particularly relevant for later governments, 
the political cost of doing so would be very high. By 1958, despite the many (mainly 
financial) problems and controversies (mainly about introducing charges, discussed 
below) there was a consensus on the NHS amongst all parties involved: “As an 
institution the NHS ranked next to the monarchy as an unchallenged landmark in the 
political landscape of Britain” (Klein, 2001, p25). Ever since, it has been virtually 
impossible for governments to attack the NHS (they simply had to work with it) and 
resulted in political parties competing to become the NHS’s ‘best friend’. 
The unwillingness of the Attlee and subsequent governments to change the system of 
health care funding meant that the NHS was compelled to compete with other 
government departments for general tax revenues, further compounding the financial 
problems.6 For example, in the 1950s the NHS’s reputation as a ‘penitent financial 
sinner’ - Bevan talked about the ‘cascades of medicine’ pouring down British throats 
                                                 
6
  At the same time this financial constraint led to the ‘advantage’ of keeping the NHS cheap by 
international standards. 
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(Klein, 2001, p31) - meant that expenditures on the NHS rose only marginally, despite a 
period of economic growth, with detrimental effects on, for example, hospital provision.  
Not surprisingly, politicians reverted to a policy of charging user fees, the absence of 
which had led to excess demand in the first place; in 1952 a 5d prescription charge was 
introduced, as was a flat rate of £1 for ordinary dental treatment. However, pricing 
policy - although regularly surfacing throughout the history of the NHS7 - never played 
a major role in NHS revenue generation and demand management. According to Bevan, 
nominal charges would only marginally affect demand and revenue. If charges were to 
be substantial, one would have to introduce exemptions for the least well-off to protect 
equity, which would increase administrative costs, bring back the means test into the 
health service and reduce revenue (most health care demand derives from poorer people 
so that most of health care demand would be charge exempt).8 Moreover, introducing 
charges could prevent people with middle incomes but genuinely in need from seeking 
access to health care and could compromise the doctor-patient relationship.    
The financial crisis of the late 1940s and early 1950s - caused by the incompatibility 
between ever expanding demands and limited resources - led to the recognition that the 
provision of an adequate health service was utopian. Consequently, the NHS rather than 
being an instrument for meeting needs, as originally intended, became an instrument for 
rationing scarce resources. The “bottom-up” approach for allocating budgets was 
replaced by a “top-down” approach, in which capped budgets were determined for local 
 
7
  Like ‘hotel’ charges to hospital patients in the 1950s, prescription charges in the 1960s and 
thereafter, and consultation charges for primary care in the 1990s. 
8
   A means test would impose payment for services according to ability to pay. While ensuring access 
to the poorest, a means test was considered morally wrong as it implies identification of a ‘sub-class’ 
of payers, which runs against the principle of providing free health care irrespective of contribution. 
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authorities, which had discretionary power over how to allocate expenditures within the 
centrally determined limit. This implied increased professional autonomy, but at the 
same time increased conflicts between the centre (the government), unable to control 
clinical autonomy of the NHS providers (“policy making through exhortation”, Klein 
2001, p39), and the periphery (local authorities, the medical profession, etc.), forced to 
work within centrally imposed budgetary limits. 
Geographical inequities in health care 
The increased focus on cost control resulted in the neglect of the distribution of health 
care, which deteriorated significantly in the 1950s. Given the overall constraints on the 
health budget, basing the distribution of capital on historic inheritances which favoured 
the southeast of England (London) was politically most appealing.9 The 1962 Hospital 
Plan of Enoch Powell was the first attempt to allocate resources to needs according to 
centrally determined criteria based on national norms for the appropriate number of 
beds for each region. These, and other plans to increase hospital size, were only 
partially carried out, primarily for political reasons: (1) politicians as vote-maximisers 
favour negative action (such as avoiding hospital closure) over positive action (which, 
except for pay increases, offers hardly any political gains); (2) in fact, whatever action 
was undertaken, the size of the waiting lists remained constant, around 600,000, due to 
the feed back of improved services to increased referrals by GPs; (3) politicians largely 
work for the benefit of the next government due to the time-lag between policy design 
and implementation; (4) labour in the NHS is well organised as an interest group (via 
BMA, trade unions) and so governments favoured current spending (including wage 
                                                 
9
  Although, in terms of labour, the measure of restricting access of new entry GPs to well-endowed 
areas seemed successful in improving geographic distribution. 
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payments) over capital spending; and (5) consumers of health care, who would favour 
increased availability of hospital services, lacked institutional representation to voice 
their concerns (Klein 2001, p59).  
Practical difficulties resulting from uncertainty about the future size and composition of 
the population and its geographical diversity further complicated central planning. 
Consequently, governments gradually abandoned planning through norms on the 
desirable level of provision in favour of an equitable distribution of resources across 
regions. The 1976 Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) rationed available 
resources according to needs by weighting the population by age, gender and mortality 
factors. This formula, as any other, could not guarantee equity in access, so 
geographical differences in access (possibly motivated by spatial variations in health 
outcomes and so needs) could well, and in fact did, arise (so-called ‘postcode 
rationing’). Also, the RAWP was based on growth; regions which were relatively 
underprovided simply received a relatively rapid annual increment of growth so that no 
region was made worse off. In periods of recession, as became apparent in the 1980s, 
this could not be sustained.  
4.2.4 The 1991 Reforms: introducing the internal market 
Since 1948, the NHS has been subject to numerous changes and reforms. The most 
radical of these, however, were those outlined in the 1989 White Paper “Working for 
Patients” of the Conservative Thatcher Government, which passed into law in 1990 as 
the NHS and Community Care Act.  
Despite the many successes (rising number of nurses, doctors, dentists, more treatments, 
fall in waiting times, reduced regional inequalities, etc.) there were continuous, and 
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increasing pressures, both external (e.g. media published scare stories on the NHS on a 
daily basis) and internal (the medical profession’s discontent with the NHS) on 
subsequent governments to change the health service. These demands ultimately 
originated from the government’s inability to resolve the widening gap between 
demands and resources, which had been present ever since the establishment of the 
NHS in 1948, but which had grown worse in the periods of economic crisis of the 1970s 
and 80s.  
There was disagreement as to what drove the increased excess demand: was the NHS 
under-funded or were resources simply used inefficiently? The former view, held by the 
medical profession (the so-called ‘inputters’), demanded increased cash injections and 
supported a move towards health insurance to secure extra funding.10 The latter opinion, 
held by the Thatcher government (the ‘outputters’), saw the solution in improvements in 
efficiency (which principally referred to productivity: squeeze more outputs out of 
available inputs) by changing the incentive structure on the supply side.11 Since 
conclusive evidence supporting either position was absent, the political debate turned 
into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Klein 2001, p151). It demonstrated once more that there 
was no agreed way of measuring the ‘adequacy’ of health care expenditures. 
The drastic proposals of “Working for Patients” were prepared and implemented in 
haste by a Thatcher government which was aspiring to, and indeed secured, another 
term in office in 1992. The consultation process borrowed ideas from North America’s 
 
10
  For reasons explained before, user charges to curb demands and recover costs never really came off 
the ground. 
11
  Besides productive efficiency, allocative efficiency (supplying the types and quantities of health care 
that consumers want) had to be improved. 
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health care reforms, put forward by leading expert Alain Enthoven (Rivett, 1998, p360), 
and lessons learnt from reforms in education (Klein, 2001, p161), and excluded the 
medical profession,  in the presence of which consensus was deemed impossible. 
Working for patients 
The White Paper contained amongst others, two major changes, which together created 
the internal, mimic, market. Firstly, purchasers (Health Authorities - HAs) were 
separated from providers (Hospitals and Community Health Services). The former 
received funds from the government with which to purchase health services required by 
their populations on a weighted capitation basis (prohibiting the cross-boundary flows 
allowed under the RAWP). The latter were transformed into independent NHS Trusts, 
which had to compete (along with private providers) for contracts with purchasers of 
health care. Secondly, the 1991 reforms introduced the concept of GP fundholding. GPs 
who entered the scheme were allocated a budget, based on their list size, with which to 
purchase health services for their patients from NHS Trusts (and also the private sector). 
The GP budget covered most costs of treatments, including staff costs, prescription 
medicines and a range of hospital services, and any remaining surplus could be 
reinvested in the GP’s practice12, so encouraging the efficient use of resources (in line 
with the idea of the GP as gatekeeper). Conversely, if GPs failed to keep within budgets 
(and if NHS Trusts made losses) their independent status would be revoked. 
Fundholding was implemented gradually and voluntarily, and those who did not join the 
scheme continued to be controlled by HAs. By allowing consumers to switch between 
                                                 
12
  NHS trusts making a profit from sales to GPs were also allowed to retain (and accumulate) these 
funds for discretionary use. 
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GPs if unhappy about the services they provided, the GPs were to be made more 
responsive to consumer demand.  
The internal market in practice 
Within five years, virtually all hospitals had become NHS Trusts and approximately 
50% of GPs had opted to become fundholders. Hence, in the 1990s effectively two NHS 
models were running in parallel (fundholding and non-fundholding).  
It seems probable that fundholding led to efficiency gains in some areas. For example, 
with respect to prescription behaviour, a GP fundholder who trades off a budget surplus 
with patient health from prescribing would prescribe less items per patient and 
substitute cheaper, generic drugs, compared to a non fundholder, who seeks perfect 
patient health only (which can never be optimal given diminishing marginal returns).13
It remains nonetheless unclear whether overall efficiency in health care improved, due 
to sharp rises in management costs and some features of the internal market that did not 
work in practice (see also Klein, 2001, p174 and p194 and further). Firstly, money did 
not seem to follow patients. For example, people did not readily change GPs in practice 
and so responsiveness of GPs to consumer demand was rather weak. Similarly, HAs 
were dependent on NHS Trusts for the provision of health care for their populations, 
Trusts being relatively better informed about health services, and were reluctant to 
change providers as this could endanger the stability of service provision. Their focus 
on building long-term relationships with NHS Trusts reduced competition and 
consumer choice. Secondly, the notion of an internal market was unrealistic as the NHS 
                                                 
13
  See for example Whynes et al. (1997a, b). 
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consisted of a collection of different types of markets, some monopolistic (such as 
ambulance and accident and emergency services, and the medical profession itself with 
its restricted competition among its members), others highly competitive (such as 
elective surgery). Competition varied across regions, with the London area being 
relatively more competitive compared to other regions and having been hit relatively 
hard by the 1991 reforms. Consequently, government intervention to smooth the impact 
of the reforms on the capital was required, thereby enhancing costs. Government policy 
to allow mergers between NHS Trusts for the sake of slimming down the NHS also ran 
contrary to the aim of promoting competition. 
The record with respect to equity was also mixed. Critics of the internal market feared 
that hospitals and GPs would refuse expensive treatments and select only the healthiest 
patients who were less costly to treat (‘cream skimming’) so as to safeguard their 
budgets. Whereas these fears proved unfounded, the introduction of the internal market 
did seem to create a ‘two-tier health system’: there was evidence that NHS Trusts, in 
competing for patients from the fundholding sector, treated fundholders’ patients more 
quickly than non-fundholders’ patients, which ran counter to the stated objective of fair 
and equal access for all. 
The detrimental equity consequences, together with inefficiencies arising from, for 
example, increased bureaucracy, are likely to have led to the abolition of the internal 
market by the Labour government in 1999.14  
 
14
  See also Koen (2000), Docteur and Hoxley (2003, p37-39), Propper (2001, p174-176) and Smee 
(2000) for an assessment of the UK’s reform experience. 
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4.2.5 1997 and onwards: Politics of the Third Way 
In 1997 the Labour party, led by Tony Blair, came to power in a landslide victory and 
brought with it new politics (referred to as the “Third Way”) and a new approach to 
health care provision. It was keen to avoid the mistakes made by previous Conservative 
governments and Labour governments (‘Old Labour’), but at the same time aimed to 
build on what had worked previously. It laid out its vision for the future of the NHS in 
the White Paper “The New NHS: Modern-Dependable”. 
The New NHS: Modern-Dependable 
As regards the NHS organisation, the Labour government partially rolled back some of 
the features introduced by the Conservative government. The competition of the internal 
market was replaced by cooperation (partnership) between organisations (including the 
private sector), with a greater role for primary care providers (local GPs and nurses) in 
the provision of health services. Firstly, the internal market was abolished, while 
retaining the split between purchasers and providers. And secondly, fundholding was 
discarded and replaced by Primary Care Groups (PCGs). The creation of the latter 
institutions essentially implied the universalisation of fundholding. PCGs simply 
combined all GPs and other primary care providers in a given geographical area. 
Initially, PCGs were formally part of HAs, with devolved responsibilities for managing 
the budget for the health care of their patients. Over time, they were intended to become 
freestanding Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), still accountable to HAs but with the 
additional task of providing community health services. PCGs would operate within a 
‘single cash limited envelope’ (Klein, 2001, p205), which covered their population’s 
share of all NHS services (which, as in GP fundholding, included prescribing).   
 4-17  
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
                                                
Beyond organisational reforms, the Labour government targeted the following areas of 
health care provisioning for improvements, which it identified from past experience. 
Firstly, it placed greater emphasis on improving public health (apparent from, for 
example, the decisions to appoint a Minister for Public Health and to ban tobacco 
advertising) and reducing inequalities in health. This focus arose from the recognition 
that health care is only one of the many factors influencing population health, and hence 
that health care policy aimed at reducing ill health and inequalities in health should be 
part of a broader policy framework, including education, housing, and so on. Secondly, 
it concentrated on the development of instruments for promoting efficiency and quality. 
Having discarded the internal market, a new mechanism had to be put in place to ensure 
that both the efficiency and the quality of health care were promoted. Improved 
performance measurement (by Performance Indicators15), supported by the threat of 
central interventions if providers underachieved, was seen as the way forward. 
Moreover, it created several institutions, among them the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE),16 which regulated the medical profession.17 Both of these measures 
were part of a stated aim to renew the NHS as a genuinely national service, offering fair 
access to health care of consistently high quality, in which postcode rationing was no 
 
15
  Performance Indicators (PIs) actually date back from the early and mid-1980s but were in those days 
of minimal importance. The use of PIs to achieve efficient provision is not without problems: as 
‘sticks’ (punishments if providers underperform) PIs may increase rather than reduce pressure on 
providers thereby frustrating efforts to perform well, whereas as ‘carrots’ (subsidies to reduce 
inefficiencies) PIs may create perverse incentives by rewarding providers who fail to meet targets 
and could lead to focus on dimensions of performance subject to financial incentives at the expense 
of performance in unaffected areas. 
16
  The main purpose of NICE is to give guidance to patients, health professionals and the public on 
current “best practice” in terms of individual health technologies (including medicines, medical 
devices, diagnostic techniques, and procedures) and the clinical management of specific conditions. 
Using both clinical and economic evidence, NICE recommends treatments for use in the NHS if they 
are deemed cost-effective (providing good value for money). See also NICE (2003). 
17
  See Klein (2001, p209-211) and Rivett’s update on Quality at http://www.nhshistory.net [13 July 
2004] for the multiple forms of regulations and audits created by the Labour government in recent 
years. 
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longer acceptable. The government was determined to enhance confidence in the NHS 
as a public service which should be responsive to needs and wishes of carers and 
patients.    
The new NHS in practice: the re-emergence of rationing 
Labour’s election promises of 1997 in the sphere of health care included, amongst 
others, to reduce the waiting list by 100,000 people by the time of the next election, to 
reduce waiting times for hospital inpatient admission to a maximum of 18 months, to 
end waiting for cancer surgery and to set high quality standards for hospitals. These 
improvements were to be funded by cutting management costs (as preceding 
Conservative governments had pledged) by £1 billion. The original policy of fiscal 
austerity as part of the campaign to get rid of its ‘tax and spend’ image was relaxed 
somewhat with respect to the NHS, and eventually abolished altogether in 2000 (made 
possible by a favourable global environment), when the government conceded that the 
NHS had been systematically under-funded, with too few doctors and nurses. Blair 
announced that spending on the NHS would rise from 6.7% in 2000 to 8% of GDP in 
2006, equal to the EU average. Since then, frequent announcements of additional 
funding for the NHS and organisational reforms have been made in a number of White 
Papers, starting with The NHS Plan (DoH, 2000a).18
The government’s commitment to explicit targets and its stress on performance 
measurement made the NHS a more and more transparent organisation and its 
                                                 
18
  For a detailed factual analysis of recent developments in UK health care policy and the role of 
successive Secretaries of State for Health - Frank Dobson (1997-1999), Alan Milburn (1999-2003) 
and John Reid (1993-) - therein, see the updates of Rivett (1998) available from 
http://www.nhshistory.net. For the NHS plan and progress made since, see 
http://www.nhs.uk/nationalplan/  and http://www.publications.dh.gov.uk/nhsplan/ [13 July 2004]. 
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shortcomings accordingly became increasingly visible to the public, a problem further 
compounded by heightened media attention to the service. Amongst many other 
examples, the case of ‘Child B’ in 1995 (denied potentially lifesaving but expensive 
treatment for leukaemia), variations in access to and quality of services across regions 
(postcode rationing), and comparisons between the UK and Western European health 
care systems (in which the UK particularly faired badly) brought negative publicity for 
the NHS; the health care system appeared to be in ‘perpetual crisis’ (Klein, 2001, p224). 
At the heart of these shortcomings lay the ever-present gap between virtually limitless 
demands and finite resources. Scarcity required rationing, defined as decision-making 
about the allocation of scarce resources over competing needs, for which the 
government was increasingly held responsible.19 The issue of rationing, made apparent 
by the presence of waiting lists, and the challenges this poses for future governments is 
further explored in section 4.4. 
4.3 UK HEALTH CARE IN 2004: SOME FACTS AND FIGURES 
This section gives a global picture of the current situation of health services in the UK 
in terms of provision, finance and performance, which result from the political reforms 
described previously.  
4.3.1 Service delivery and coverage: public versus private care 
The UK health system is dominated by the state provision, via the NHS, to which every 
person normally resident in the UK is entitled. With the arrival of the NHS in 1948 the 
private sector was virtually eliminated overnight. In the 1970s and 1980s private health 
care provision increased dramatically, primarily as the result of the growth of 
 
19
  The establishment of NICE should be seen as the government’s response to it no longer being able to 
diffuse blame onto the medical profession for controversial rationing decisions.    
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employment-based insurance schemes. Since the 1990s private health insurance 
coverage and the share of private in total health care expenditure have remained fairly 
constant at around 11.5% and 16% respectively.20 Over two thirds of private health 
insurance is employer-provided, and coverage is skewed towards the higher 
socioeconomic groups. Private health care use is not confined to the insured but also 
includes patients (approximately 20% of private patients) who pay for treatment 
themselves.21 Private provision is mostly of secondary (hospital) care, but dominates in 
the sector of tertiary (social) care, which offers long-term care in residential and nursing 
homes to the mentally ill, people with learning difficulties and the elderly, together with 
a range of domiciliary services provided to people in their own homes. Private primary 
care is very small.22
The distinction between public and private health care becomes increasingly blurred by 
the hiring of skills and facilities from the state sector by private providers and vice 
versa.23 For example, all NHS medics working in the secondary sector have contracts 
that allow them to provide private treatment, about two thirds doing so24, and many 
 
20
  The former is likely to be the result of the economic recession and sharp increases in insurance 
premia (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1999, p43). The latter is largely due to the 
government’s commitment to increase public health expenditure (see for example DoH, 2000a). 
21
  Emmerson et al. (2000, Section 5), King’s Fund (2001a, Chapter 2), European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems (2002), King and Mossialos (2002). 
22
  European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999, 2002), Smee (2000), King’s Fund (2001a, 
Chapter 2), National Audit Office (2003a). 
23
  King’s Fund (2001a, Chapter 4) further explores public-private boundaries in UK health care, the 
way they are shifting and become obscure, and the government’s stance on these. 
24
  King’s Fund (2001a, p85). Consultants working full-time are permitted to earn up to 10% of their 
gross income from private practice, those working part-time may engage in private practice without 
restriction by giving up payment for one NHS session per week (King’s Fund, 2001a, p83-89; 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2002, p107).  
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NHS facilities are available for hire by private providers (e.g. NHS pay beds25). 
Conversely, the Secretary of State for Health signed a Concordat with the private sector 
in November 2000 which allows renting of spare operating theatres from the private 
sector for hip operations and other elective surgery by NHS doctors and nurses.26 The 
government also seeks cooperation with the private sector to fund the building of acute 
hospital facilities through the so-called Private Finance Initiative (PFI), though their 
ownership remains in the public domain. One of the latest moves towards a more 
private, i.e. market, approach is the introduction of Foundation Trusts which, compared 
to the normal NHS Trusts, are allowed greater financial and managerial autonomy, 
although remaining part of the NHS.27
The increased use of private alternatives to the NHS is often regarded as proof that the 
public is increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of NHS provision, especially with  
long waiting times. Evidence shows, however, that private health care users also use 
public health care, suggesting that, in spite of increasing dissatisfaction with the NHS, 
people using private health care do support the concept of public provision (they regard 
private health care as ‘quicker’ but not necessarily ‘better’).28
Long waiting times for treatments and rising incomes combined with tight constraints 
on NHS funding might be expected to increase demand for private insurance. The 
 
25
  These are beds in NHS hospitals which consultants may use for private patients. King’s Fund (2001a, 
p53-54 and p80-83). 
26
  King’s Fund (2001c). 
27
  See the pages on Secretaries of State for Health, Alan Milburn and John Reid available at 
http://www.nhshistory.net/ for more information on Foundation Trusts. 
28
  European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999, p45), King’s Fund (2001a, p90), Propper 
(2000). 
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impact of an expansion of the private sector on the NHS remains unclear however. On 
the one hand, growth in private health care could reduce pressures on the NHS by, for 
example, reducing waiting lists and times in the NHS. On the other hand, NHS service 
provision could deteriorate as staff move into private health care, so that effectively a 
two-tier health system arises in which the NHS functions as a ‘poor service for the 
poor’.29 While NHS waiting lists fall if patients are diverted to the private sector, 
waiting times in the NHS could well rise as the private sector (using NHS staff) treats 
patients almost immediately.30  
4.3.2 Workforce  
The NHS workforce has risen by an impressive 224200 persons (21%) since 1997 and 
currently accounts for 1.3 million people. This amounts to approximately 24% of the 
public sector labour force, 4.3% of the total labour force, and makes it the world’s third 
biggest employer, after the Chinese Army and the Indian State Railways.31  
As shown in Figure 4.1, the majority of NHS workers, approximately 84%, are directly 
involved in patient care, which includes doctors (109000), nurses (386400), scientific, 
therapeutic and technical staff (122100), ambulance staff (16000) and support staff in 
each of these areas (360700 in total), as well as GP practice staff (88400). The 
remaining 16% (199800) provides infrastructure support, which comprises clerical and 
 
29
  Propper (2000, p856). 
30
  Emmerson et al. (2000, Section 5), Propper (2000; 2001, Section 8) and King and Mossialos (2002) 
discuss the interactions between public and private health care provision in more detail. The balance 
of evidence suggests that dual practice is detrimental to NHS waiting times (Jacobs et al., 2003). 
31
  “NHS is world’s biggest employer after Indian rail and Chinese Army”, Sam Lister, The Times, 20 
March 2004. 
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administrative staff in central functions and hotel, property and estates and managers.32 
The latter takes up only about 3% of total NHS staff (35300), a fact used by the 
government to contradict the myth that nearly everyone working in the NHS is a 
bureaucrat or manager and to show that extra money is spent efficiently.33 Even so, 
growth figures by staff category are in favour of critics of the government and show that 
over the period 2002-2003 the number of managers has risen faster than the number of 
doctors and nurses (9.4%, compared to 5.1% and 5.5% on the previous year 
respectively).  
Figure 4.1 NHS workforce categories September 2003 
Doctors, 8.5%
Qualified nurses 
(incl. practice 
nurses), 30.1%
Clinical staff 
support, 28.1%
GP practice staff, 
6.9%
NHS 
infrastructure 
support, 15.6%
Qualified 
scientific, 
therapeutic and 
technical staff, 
9.5%
Qualified 
amulance staff, 
1.2%
 
Source: DoH (2003c) 
 
Although the NHS employs over 1 million people, there are shortages of GPs, nurses, 
midwives and other health care staff such as physiotherapists and radiographers, which 
                                                 
32
  Figure 4.1 excludes opticians, dentists and pharmacists as they may work in the NHS or private 
sector. The number of doctors includes 32600 GPs (excluding retainers, i.e. qualified doctors who are - 
for the time being - unable to work in full time general practice usually for family or personal reasons, but 
wish to maintain their GP skills by working a limited number of hours). 
33
  See for example Audit Commission (2002, p14-15). 
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the government seeks to correct by, for example, improving employment conditions 
(including pay) to retain existing staff, investing in training and recruiting from 
abroad.34 Staff shortages are apparent from international comparisons.  
Figure 4.2 Number of practicing physicians 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 7). 
 
Over the past 20 years the number of physicians in the UK has risen steadily, by 40% in 
total; however other countries have generally reported even higher growth rates. 
Consequently, the number of doctors in the UK per 1000 population is the lowest of all 
10 comparator countries shown in Figure 4.2 (G7 plus Australia, New Zealand and 
Sweden). In terms of practising nurses, the UK is second lowest (Figure 4.3).35  
 
34
  See for example King’s Fund (2001d), National Audit Office (2001), Audit Commission (2002). 
Ironically, staff shortages are exacerbated by a relatively high rate of sickness absence: 4.9% across 
all NHS trusts compared to an average of 3.7% in the public sector (National Audit Office, 2003b, 
p1). 
35
  All data represented in this section need careful interpretation due to definitional differences across 
countries and other sources may report different figures. With respect to the UK data, the reported 
number of doctors and nurses are for the NHS only and, for nurses, are full-time equivalents. Private 
sector nurses account for approximately 25% of all qualified nurses. 
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Figure 4.3 Number of practicing nurses 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 9) 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2003) reports 
8.8 practicing nurses per 1000 population, in line with the EU average and slightly 
above the OECD average of 8.1, and 2 practising physicians per 1000 population. Using 
these data, the UK has a relatively high nurse to physician ratio of 4.4 which questions 
which of the countries adopts the ‘appropriate’ skill-mix in health service delivery.  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 conceal differences in the pattern of health service provision across 
countries. For example, the number of acute admissions and average length of stay are 
relatively low for the UK (147 per 1000 of population and 6.2 respectively in 200036), 
so that the UK performs better once the data are standardised for these variables, as 
shown in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 for the number of nurses.37
                                                 
36
  See Figure 4.20. OECD (2003) reports an average length of stay of 6.9 days. 
37
  Acute care is health care required for a brief but severe period of illness, for conditions resulting from 
disease or trauma, and recovery from surgery. 
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Figure 4.4 Practicing nurses per 1000 acute admissions 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 11) 
 
Figure 4.5 Practicing nurses per acute bed day 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 12) 
 
4.3.3 Capacity 
Since the establishment of the NHS in 1948, the number of hospital beds in Great 
Britain has fallen due to a switch from social care in hospital to care in the community, 
shorter lengths of stay and an increase in the use of day surgery. The decline has now 
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come to an end as the government aims to increase the acute bed availability in order to 
reduce bed blockages (King’s Fund, 2001b; OECD, 2003).  
The UK ranks relatively low in terms of bed numbers (Figure 4.6) and available 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) units (Figure 4.7). The latter is an indication of the 
level of investment in new technology and how advanced medical equipment is 
(National Audit Office, 2003a, p14).38 Again, these comparisons may be misleading as 
they conceal variations in, for example, utilisation. Figure 4.8 shows that the UK has the 
highest acute bed occupancy of all comparator countries for which information is 
available. 
Figure 4.6 Number of acute hospital beds per 1000 of population 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 13) 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
  OECD (2003) figures for the number of acute care hospital beds and the number of MRI units in the 
UK in 2000 are 3.9 per 1000 of population and 4.6 per million of population respectively. 
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Figure 4.7 Number of Magnetic Resonance units per million of population 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 15) 
 
Figure 4.8 Bed occupancy for acute beds 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 14) 
 
4.3.4 Pharmaceutical industry 
Pharmaceutical products either belong to the category of generic drugs (medicines 
marketed without a brand name) or branded drugs. The government in the UK requires 
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doctors to prescribe only from an approved lists of drugs, mostly generic products, 
which, being out of patent, are cheaper (but arguably less effective). Drugs on the so-
called “blacklist” are prohibited from being prescribed by GPs on the NHS, whereas 
products on the “grey list” may be prescribed under stringent criteria.39  
A different set of pricing rules applies to generic and brand name drugs under current 
UK legislation. Prices for generic drugs are regulated under the Maximum Price 
Scheme (MPS), whereas brand name medicines fall under the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS). Both schemes have been established to curb 
pharmaceutical prices (and profits) so that pharmaceuticals are available to the NHS at 
an affordable price, whilst recognising that prices should be sufficiently high to enable 
the pharmaceutical industry to develop and market new and improved medicines. 
Price regulation of brand-name products: the PPRS 
The PPRS is a voluntary agreement between the DoH and the branded pharmaceutical 
industry, represented by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), 
to limit branded medicine prices and profits on sales to the NHS.40 A series of such 
agreements have been in place since 1957, each lasting 5 years approximately, and have 
evolved over time resulting in the last agreement made under Section 33 of the Health 
Act 1999. Negotiations on a new scheme between all parties involved started at the end 
of the year 2003. The scheme does not cover generic drugs or branded products 
available without prescription, i.e. over the counter medicines, except those prescribed 
                                                 
39
  Kullman (2001, Section 3.1.1) 
40
  Information on the PPRS is based on ABPI (2003), DoH (2003e, 2003f). 
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on the NHS by a doctor. Whereas the PPRS allows companies freedom of pricing for all 
major new products within the constraint of their PPRS profit target, the DoH’s consent 
is required for further price increases. The UK-wide PPRS scheme applies to some 
10,000 products and covers approximately 80% of the value of medicines (of 
approximately £6.5 billion) and 47% of dispensed prescription items used in the NHS in 
primary and secondary care, the remainder being taken up by generic drugs. Since the 
first of October 1999, scheme members have been required to reduce prices of those 
medicines covered by the PPRS by 4.5%, which delivered annual savings to the NHS of 
about £200 to £250 million.  
As the PPRS limits companies’ ability to raise the prices of brand name drugs, it is not 
surprising that the market for brand-name products has experienced few price changes. 
Although the industry has not been found to be highly concentrated and the prices set by 
new entrants in the post-patent period are lower, the incumbent usually does not reduce 
its list price in reaction to new entry while it is able to retain most of its market share. 
The latter result is counterintuitive and suggests the presence of a first-mover 
advantage. On top of that, prescribers base their decision on medicines needed by the 
patient primarily on the basis of clinical need, while neither the prescriber nor the 
patient pay for the cost of the drug. This may have contributed to the absence of a clear 
link between the price and volume of brand-name pharmaceuticals under the PPRS. The 
latter rose by 7.8% (mostly represents a rise in prescriptions for heart disease, high 
blood pressure and mental illness), which is less than the 12.1% increase in NHS-
spending in 2001/02. The overall proportion of expenditures on medicines remains 
around 12% of total NHS cost, as in previous years. International comparisons of 
branded pharmaceutical products, although influenced by factors such as the mix of 
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medicines included, exchange rate volatility and international differences in price 
control policies, suggest that UK drug prices are significantly lower than those in the 
USA but higher than those in other European countries. The latter is primarily caused 
by the appreciation of the pound sterling.  
Price regulation of generic products: the MPS 
Up to mid-2000 the NHS relied on competition in the market for generic medicines to 
secure stable supply of generic drugs at affordable prices. In 1999 the generics market 
experienced significant price increases of many generic products which were 
accompanied by shortages in supply. Overall, prices increased by approximately 35%, 
which is estimated to have cost the NHS in England £200 million.  
Spiralling costs of generic pharmaceuticals sparked a wide-ranging investigation into 
alleged price-fixing and restrictive supply of drugs. The Serious Fraud Office is 
investigating six companies suspected of defrauding the NHS for up to £400 million 
over prices charged for penicillin-based antibiotics and the blood thinning drug 
Warfarin, used to counter strokes and heart attacks over a period of four years (1996 to 
2000). In 2002 a £28 million legal action was brought against 6 companies over 
Warfarin. In December 2003, the NHS launched a lawsuit of £30 million against seven 
pharmaceutical companies over alleged price fixing of a range of common, penicillin-
based antibiotics. The NHS further continues investigations into suspected anti-
competitive behaviour over more than 30 other drugs, with an estimated cost to the 
NHS of £170 million, which are expected to lead to further legal actions.41
                                                 
41
  See also “Drug firms face charges over £400m NHS ‘fraud’” (The Sunday Times, 9 November 
2003), “NHS investigates £210m drugs sales”, “NHS sues over drug makers ‘rip-off’” (The Times, 
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In response to the turbulence in the generics market, the government put in place a 
statutory Maximum Price Scheme in August 2000.42 This scheme prohibits the sale of 
certain unbranded generic medicines to community pharmacies and dispensing doctors 
for NHS use at more than the maximum price. It does not apply to over-the-counter 
medicines or the sale of generic medicines to hospitals, for which different rules 
apply.43 Generally speaking, the MPS applies to some 500 unbranded generics with the 
highest net ingredient cost (NIC). The maximum prices are primarily based on historic 
reimbursement prices.  
Since the scheme was implemented, reimbursement prices for generics (prices paid by 
the NHS) have returned to their pre-increase levels and the supply of generics to 
community pharmacies and dispensing doctors has stabilised. With a view to preserving 
secure and stable supply conditions and prices in the long-term the government has 
started negotiations on an alternative proposal in 2001, which it intends to implement in 
April 2004 in place of the MPS.44
Contribution to the economy 
The pharmaceutical industry is not only important for the health sector as an 
intermediate input (see health care finance and expenditures), but also a major 
                                                                                                                                               
22 December 2003), “NHS sues drug companies over price-fixing claims” (Tash Shifrin and 
agencies, Guardian Unlimited, 22 December 2003), “NHS seeks £30m from drug firms in price 
fixing claim” (James Meikle, Guardian Unlimited, 23 December 2003). 
42
  The scheme is laid down in the Health Service Medicines (Control of Prices of Specified Generic 
Medicines) Regulations 2000 (DoH, 2000b). Kullman (2001) provides an overview of 
pharmaceutical (pricing) policies in the UK.  
43
  See Kullman (2001, p18-22). 
44
    In short, the proposal as it stands (DoH, 2003g) allows for more price discretion where there are 
many manufacturers, whereas in case of a less competitive market consent of the DoH is required. 
The price of new generics may be set freely provided it is set below the price of the branded version. 
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contributor to the UK economy in terms of employment (it employs approximately 
70,000 people directly, with an estimated 250,000 in related activities), research and 
development (it accounts for around 24% of UK’s total manufacturing industry 
expenditure on R&D, a value of over £3.2 billion in 2002, which is higher than any 
other country in Europe) and exports (value of pharmaceutical exports is approximately 
£10.3 billion, generating a trade surplus of £2.8 billion).45
Figure 4.9 Public funding for drugs and other medical non-durables prescribed for 
outpatients (per capita US$) 
 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 16) 
 
Figure 4.9 shows public expenditures on pharmaceuticals and other non-durables 
prescribed to hospital outpatients for a selection of countries. Cross-country differences 
follow not only from definitional and/or time differences but also from disparities in the 
regulation of the pharmaceutical market. With $201 pharmaceutical expenditure per 
head the UK is the middle-ranking country. Compared to other European countries, only 
                                                 
45
  Data are for 2002 (DoH, 2003e, Section 5). 
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Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland have lower per capita pharmaceutical 
expenditures.46
4.3.5 Health care finance and expenditures 
Financial provision for the NHS is set by the government over a five-year planning 
period, and the responsible department (the DoH) must bid for a share of the overall 
budget (approximately 16% in 2003-04) in competition with other government 
departments such as the Ministry of Defence and the Education department. The NHS 
administration itself works to a rolling three-year planning horizon, and may seek 
marginal adjustments to state finance on an annual basis. The Treasury uses the Barnett 
formula to allocate health care resources over the UK constituencies, yielding a 
distribution which has historically favoured Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales over 
England.47 Whilst one may argue that this reflects needs because health outcomes 
compared to England are poorer, an equally valid observation is that the current pattern 
of health expenditures may actually be legitimising inefficiency in provision.48 The 
budget is further broken down between regions, based on needs and outcomes.49  
In the 2002 Budget, the government announced an annual average increase in NHS 
expenditures of 7.3% in real terms between 2002-03 and 2007-08, equivalent to a total 
increase of 42% in real terms over this period.50  
 
46
  Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (2003, p5). 
47
  Treasury Committee (1997). 
48
  Dixon et al. (1999). Poor health outcomes could for example reflect less efficient technology. 
49
  In the spirit of the RAWP weighted-capitation formula (discussed in Section 4.2.3), although it has 
become relatively more sophisticated over the years. 
50
  DoH (2004b). 
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Figure 4.10 NHS expenditure in 2003-04 by destination (total £63.7 billion) 
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Source: DoH (2004b) 
 
Figure 4.11 NHS expenditure increase in 2003-04 by destination (total £5.9 billion) 
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Source: DoH (2004b) 
 
For 2003-2004 NHS net expenditure will increase by £5.9 billion to a level of £63.7 
billion, which – as shown in Figure 4.10 - will be allocated to staff costs (59%), drugs 
(15%), investment in buildings, equipment and training (10%), other services (10%, 
predominantly utilities) and general medical supplies and services (6%), including 
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medical equipment, bandages, catering and cleaning. The additional resources are 
mostly to be spent on attracting new staff, increased prescribing, the provision of more 
goods and services and staff pay aimed at retaining existing staff and attracting new 
employees (see Figure 4.11).51
Figure 4.12 NHS sources of finance, 2003-04 
Consolidated 
Fund expenditure, 
73.5%
NHS NI 
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Source: DoH (2003d) 
 
The main sources of finance of the NHS budget are displayed in Figure 4.12. The 
majority of NHS spending is met from the Consolidated Fund - general taxation - and 
the NHS element of National Insurance contributions, 93.3% in total; the remaining 
6.7% comes from user charges and receipts, including land sales and proceeds from 
income generation schemes. While payments towards National Insurance are separated 
from general taxation for accounting purposes, National Insurance contributions do not 
influence eligibility for NHS care and are thus tantamount to an income tax. User 
charges generate 2% of NHS resources and operate in the area of NHS pay beds and, 
                                                 
51
  A further breakdown of expenditure by, for example, type of condition, region, type of care and 
age/client group is provided in the Departmental Reports (DoH, 2003d and 2004b). 
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more importantly, in the area of family health services, where they are levied on 
pharmaceutical, dental and ophthalmic services. Prescription charges for pharmaceutical 
products are £6.40 per item in England52, but exempt large sections of the population, 
including children, elderly, people on low income, chronic ill and for specific uses (e.g. 
contraception). Approximately 85% of prescriptions are charge exempt. A similar 
practice occurs in dentistry, where co-payments of 80% of the cost of treatment up to a 
ceiling of £378 are not levied on certain priority groups, and ophthalmic services, where 
eye tests are provided for free to priority groups and government support is available to 
meet the cost of spectacles.53  
According to the latest estimates of the Office for National Statistics (ONS)54, private 
health care accounted for a further £13.7 billion in 2002, which brings total health care 
expenditures in the UK up to £80.6 billion in 2002, 7.7% of GDP, of which 83% is 
public and 17% is private. Private health care expenditures comprise out of pocket 
payments for treatments and over the counter medicines (approximately 12%) and 
private medical insurance (approximately 5%). 
UK spending on health care is typically below the OECD and the EU average. In 2001, 
total health care expenditure accounted for 7.6% of GDP in the UK, compared to an 
 
52
  Data are valid from the 1st of April 2004 (see also HC12 form “NHS prescription Charges from the 1 
April 2004” available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/07/37/06/04073706.pdf [13 July 2004]).  
53
  For more information on user charges in the NHS see European Observatory on Health Care Systems 
(1999, 2002). With respect to dentistry, from the late 1990s many people have been unable to find an 
NHS dentist in there area - just 44% of adults and 60% of children are registered with an NHS 
practice, and have turned to private health care, bearing the full cost of treatment (around 75% of 
people) or choosing or paying towards a private insurance plan (approximately 25%). This is the 
consequence of disputes with the government over pay in recent years, which have led NHS dentists 
to reduce the amount of NHS services or to withdraw from the NHS altogether. 
54
  Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ [13 July 2004]. 
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OECD average of 8.4% and an EU average of 8.3%. The share of expenditure 
accounted for by the public sector is relatively high. In 2001 the share of public 
expenditure in the UK was 82%, compared to 72% and 73% on average for the OECD 
and the EU respectively.55 The relatively low level of health spending has prompted the 
government to commit itself to the aforementioned increases in health spending, which 
would lift total spending on health care to 9.4% of GDP in 2008. Figures 4.13 to 4.15 
illustrate. Comparisons may be misleading, however, due to definitional and/or time 
differences, and more importantly due to differences in health system performance, the 
subject of the next section.56
Figure 4.13 Health expenditure as a % of GDP in recent years 
 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 2) 
 
                                                 
55
  Data are from OECD (2003). 
56
  For example, the UK’s health system may be more cost-effective than other countries, thereby 
delivering more value for money despite low levels of health spending. 
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Figure 4.14 Health expenditure as a % of GDP, 1980-2001 
 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 3) 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Per capita health expenditure (US$) 
 
National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 4) 
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4.3.6 Health care performance 
This section assesses the performance of health care provision in the UK, where 
possible relative to other countries, using indicators of health outcomes, efficiency, 
equity and quality.  
Health status 
In general, the health of the population is not only dependent on the health sector (and 
health policy), but also varies with factors such as lifestyle (smoking, drinking) and diet, 
income, income distribution, housing and education. Moreover, a range of health 
measures exist which may yield different country rankings.57  
Commonly used health measures are life expectancy at birth and potential years of life 
lost, as displayed in Figure 4.16 and 4.17.58 In terms of the former the UK ranks 
relatively low, but with smallest gender differences, whereas in terms of the latter the 
UK performs significantly better.  
Improvements in life expectancy are partially caused by declines in infant mortality59, 
shown in Figure 4.18. Countries with relatively high infant mortality rates in 1980 have 
decreased their rates relatively faster, resulting in a smaller spread in 2000. 
 
                                                 
57
  See for example the World Health Organization (WHO, 2000, p27-31 and WHO, 2002). 
58
  Calculated on the assumption that age-specific mortality and disability rates remain the same over 
time. The latter is based on an expected life span at birth of around 80 and 75 years for women and 
men respectively. 
59
  Defined as the number of deaths of babies under age 1 per 1000 live births in a given year. 
 4-41  
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
Figure 4.16 Life expectancy at birth 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 20) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Potential years of life lost 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 21) 
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Figure 4.18 Infant mortality for 1980-2000 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 23) 
 
The most common causes of death from illness in developed countries are cancer 
(malignant neoplasms) and cardio-vascular (circulatory) diseases (Figure 4.19). The UK 
has the highest mortality rate of all countries and ranks highest in the group of 
respiratory diseases. In the UK age-standardised death rates from cancer have 
historically been high compared to other countries (with 184.7 deaths from cancer per 
100000 in the UK, only New Zealand ranks higher), although displaying a downward 
trend, and cancer-survival rates have been relatively low. This has motivated the 
government to target its health budget to improve the quality of medical intervention in 
the area of cancer. The same is true for cardio-vascular diseases. The data in Figure 4.19 
mask differences between (and within) countries by disease type.60
                                                 
60
  For more detailed information across countries see the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/) and the WHO 
(http://www.who.int/). National data are available from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/health [13 July 
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Figure 4.19 Age-standardised death rates by cause of death 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 24) 
 
Efficiency 
Efficiency in the context of the NHS usually refers to the ratio of outputs to inputs given 
the quality and specifications of products, i.e. productivity, an approach followed in this 
section. Thus if outputs rise for a given bundle of inputs, or the same outputs are 
produced with less inputs, there has been a gain in efficiency.  
Given the complexity of health care systems, efficiency is difficult to measure. One 
frequently used indicator is the average length of stay in hospital. Assuming that the 
appropriate amount, type and quality of treatment are provided, a lower length of stay 
                                                                                                                                               
2004]. Morbidity data and data on the use of health services by various socio-economic 
characteristics in the UK have also been discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. 
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indicates a more efficient use of acute beds (National Audit Office, 2003a, p21). The 
UK is the middle-ranking country with 6.2 days (Figure 4.20).61  
Figure 4.20 Average length of stay - acute care 
 
Source: National Audit Office (2003a, Figure 36) 
 
Within the UK, there is a large body of anecdotal evidence that there are inefficiencies 
in health care provision.62 Evans et al. (2001) compare the overall efficiency of health 
systems in 191 countries, as part of a broader attempt by the WHO to analyse the 
performance of health systems worldwide.63 Overall performance is based upon the 
level of attainment of five components: fairness in funding, level of and inequalities in 
responsiveness (including waiting times), and the level of and inequalities in health 
attainment. A comparison of the overall indicator of attainment (or the score with 
                                                 
61
  Cross-country comparisons show that the UK makes better use of resources in terms of, for example, 
beds and staff (Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). 
62
  Evidence is available from the Audit Commission at http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk [13 July 
2004]. An example is the Audit Commission (2003a) report on inefficiencies in the use of operating 
theatres. 
63
  WHO (2000). 
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respect to a specific component) with what might have been achieved with the resources 
available in the country yields an indicator of (overall) performance, i.e. the efficiency 
with which the goal(s) are achieved. The WHO calculates efficiency in terms of 
attaining health and the overall indicator of attainment based on all five aforementioned 
objectives (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Efficiency (performance) score and 80% uncertainty interval, 50 highest 
ranking countries, 1993-1997. 
 
Source: WHO (2000, Annex Table 10) 
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In terms of efficiency in improving health, the UK is ranked 24th, ahead of, for example 
the US (72nd), Australia (39th) and New Zealand (80th), but behind Italy (3rd), France 
(4th) and Spain (6th), whereas in terms of overall health performance the UK ranked 18th 
with France first on the list. The results need to be interpreted carefully though due to 
problems of definition (‘what is a health system?’), measurement of performance 
(indicators used and weights applied to obtain the overall performance indicator), scope 
of health care (there are many other factors influencing health), within country 
variations (between regions and/or the various components of a health system) and data 
availability and comparability across countries.64 With respect to the UK’s relatively 
poor efficiency rating, the government responded that the WHO data were from 1993 to 
1997 and so did not reflect recent policy initiatives.  
The latest confidential estimates which have been leaked to the press are nevertheless 
discouraging, showing that since 1997 public sector productivity in health and education 
has dropped by 15% to 20% (compared to previous estimates of 3%), where 
productivity - the production per worker - is a key indicator of efficiency. Whereas the 
health service had received a 20% increase in resources, treatments only went up by 2% 
after allowing for inflation.65 In support of these findings, Le Grand (2002) finds that 
efficiency gains that were realised since the introduction of the internal market in 1991 
seemed to fall at an ever increasing rate from 1997/98 onwards. Similarly, Pritchard 
(2002) reports an increase in NHS activity of only 15.3% against an increase in 
resources of 25.3% for the period 1995-2000. Again, the government’s reaction is to 
 
64
  McKee (2001), Mulligan et al. (2000).  
65
  The Times and The Sunday Times, various articles, 25 April 2004. 
 4-47  
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
query the accuracy of the productivity figures, despite the fact that the latest findings 
have been endorsed by the OECD and the European Central Bank, and that the ONS’ 
method of measuring public sector productivity is regarded as a ‘best practice’ model 
for the rest of the world.  
The NHS is working with the ONS and the Atkinson Review to develop a new measure 
of productivity.66 It is argued that the current measure is flawed in that it (1) regards 
investments in future capacity (such as new hospitals and training places for new 
doctors) as a decline in productivity, (2) ignores spending that may have led to better 
outcomes but does not add to output as measured for the national accounts, (3) does not 
necessarily monitor all outputs produced by the health service (most notably primary 
care services) and (4) fails to recognise improvements in quality (e.g. shorter waiting 
times, more effective drugs, higher observed survival rates after treatment). In many 
instances, quality improvements are counted as a productivity decrease (e.g. preventive 
campaigns which reduce the number of visits to a family doctor or hospital stays). 
Equity 
Successive UK governments have had a strong commitment to equity (fairness) in 
finance and delivery of health care. As part of a wider study of expenditure on health 
care in the UK, Propper (2001) investigates to what extent this commitment has been 
realised and has translated into a more equitable distribution of outcomes.  
The system of funding of health care resources in the UK is relatively equitable 
compared to other countries, principally because the NHS is financed largely from 
                                                 
66
  Tuke (2004). Articles describing the progress made in the measurement of government output and 
productivity are regularly published in Economic Trends. See for example Pritchard (2001, 2002, 
2003). 
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general taxes, which are broadly progressive. With respect to the allocation of health 
care resources, Propper finds that disparities at regional, district and possibly ward level 
have fallen and follow the measures of need used in RAWP type allocation formulae. 
Empirical studies on equity in the distribution of health care across individuals reviewed 
by Propper generally show slight departures from the ‘equal treatment for equal need’ 
principle of the NHS, also known as ‘horizontal equity’67, in that the allocation of health 
care since the 1980s is found to be mildly pro-poor, also relative to other countries – 
though this seems to be unrelated to the progressivity in finance. Despite a more equal 
distribution of health care resources across regions, geographical inequities in health 
outcomes have not been reduced since the 1970s and may well have worsened. The 
same observation is made for health inequalities across individuals (also documented in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2). The presence of such (rising) inequities suggests that resource 
equalisation at the regional level cannot impose equal spending patterns at the 
individual level and that health outcomes depend on more than health spending alone 
(Propper, 2001, p163).68
 A review by Dixon et al. (2003) focuses exclusively on the question of horizontal 
equity in the NHS, using evidence from macro- and micro-studies. Whereas early macro 
studies on the use of NHS services in general show that utilisation by higher income 
groups was higher than that by lower income groups when adjusted for needs, more 
 
67
  Using this definition of equity, an equitable service is one that offers equality of access to health care 
to individuals in equal need, irrespective of other factors, such as socio-economic status, except in so 
far as this affects need. Observed inequities in utilisation of health care are usually taken as proxy for 
inequalities in access, whereas need is usually measured by indicators of health status: the worse the 
latter, the greater is the need for treatment (See also Dixon et al. 2003, Section 2). Vertical equity is 
the principle that people who are unequal should be treated differently (examples are health care 
financing based on ability to pay –as in the UK, and differential access based on differences in need).  
68
  Audit Commission (2002) also contains some evidence of inequities in the distribution of health care 
resources, health care delivery and health outcomes. 
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recent macro-studies suggest that the NHS currently is pro-poor (in line with Propper, 
2001). In contrast, a recent macro study, using more disaggregated data, and the vast 
majority of micro-studies on the use of specific NHS services, suggest that inequities in 
access persist. These conflicting outcomes result from differences in methodology and 
data used. Specifically, the macro-studies finding broad equity in utilisation rely on self-
reported morbidity as the indicator of need and on aggregate measures of utilisation 
which conceal differences in benefits from utilisation across socio-economic groups. 
This not only casts doubt on the validity of the findings of these studies relative to the 
micro-studies and macro-studies using more sophisticated indicators of need and 
utilisation, but also lends support to the observation made by the latter studies that the 
NHS is indeed inequitable. Potential barriers to access, which are behind these 
inequities and which the government should attempt to address, are found to be mostly 
related to transport difficulties, employment and personal commitments, the ability to 
use one’s ‘voice’ to demand better and more extensive services, health beliefs and 
health seeking behaviour, all of which tend to disadvantage the poor in terms of first 
access to NHS care and follow up treatments. 
Quality: waiting for health care  
The quality of health care  has many facets, such as accessibility of health care (waiting 
time), coordination of different types of care, environment in which care is provided 
(cleanliness, safety, comfort, food) and facilities used, the provision of information and 
education of staff, patient involvement and choice, the extent to which the physical and 
emotional needs of patients are met (including time spent with a patient) and the respect 
and dignity with which patients are treated (friendliness of staff).  
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One method of assessing the quality of care is to look at the patients’ satisfaction with 
the health care system. The Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS of May 2004 provides 
evidence that the majority of patients are satisfied with inpatient, outpatient and 
accident and emergency (A&E) care (Figure 4.21), though there is further scope for 
improvement, given the variations in quality across the UK.  
Figure 4.21 How do inpatient, outpatient and A&E patients rate care? 
 
Source: DoH (2004c, Graph H) 
 
Evidence of variations in quality and progress made in improving performance is 
provided by the various institutions that monitor the quality of health care provision, 
including the Commission for Health Improvement, the Audit Commission, the King’s 
Fund and National Audit Office. The Audit Commission (2002) report on the 
performance of the NHS in England covers patient’s experience of hospital food, the 
cleanliness of hospitals, standards of GP surgeries and waiting for care. The King’s 
Fund (2004) reviews progress made in key areas of major concern, including shorter 
waiting times for cancer and heart care, improved accident and emergency departments 
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and cleaner hospitals. A study by the Commission for Health Improvement (2004) 
shows that up to 16% of the overall variation in patient experience observed in surveys 
of NHS care in England is explained by patient characteristics, such as age, level of 
education, gender, ethnic background, and so on. The remainder may be attributed to 
differences in the quality of health care provision across the country. 
Patient satisfaction surveys reveal that waiting times for care are a major cause for 
concern. While waiting, patients may experience considerable pain and discomfort (and 
uncertainty), which impacts upon their (working) life, and in some cases the patient’s 
condition may worsen.69  The Commonwealth Fund (2001), for example, finds that the 
most common reason cited for not having adequate access to health care in the UK is 
the presence of long waiting times (46% of respondents). More detailed evidence on 
waiting lists in the UK (and other countries) is provided in the remainder of this section.  
In the UK the GP looks after the health of the local population. If a GP cannot deal with 
a health problem herself she may refer patients to a hospital to see a consultant for a 
specialist opinion (outpatient appointment). After seeing the specialist, the patient may 
be deemed to require further treatment in hospital which either (a) necessitates the use 
of a hospital bed during the day (day patient appointment) or (b) requires overnight stay 
(inpatient appointment). At each stage of the referral process, and for emergency 
admissions to A&E departments, there is typically a wait (see Figures 4.22 to 4.25). 
 
69
  Although the general public fear these adverse effects, a cross-country review of patients waiting for 
a couple of months for several types of elective procedures by Hurst and Siciliani (2003) shows that 
there is surprisingly little evidence of a deterioration in health whilst waiting. Moreover, among those 
waiting, patients are found to be tolerant of short to medium waits. 
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Figure 4.22 Patients awaiting admission by length of wait, all specialities, overnight 
cases, 1999-2004, England 
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Source: Hospital Inpatient Waiting List Statistics, Provider Based, England70
 
Figure 4.23 Patients awaiting admission by length of wait, all specialities, day 
cases, 1999-2004, England 
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70
  Data for Figures 4.21 to 4.23 are from: http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/ [13 July 
2004].  
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Figure 4.24 Waiting times for first outpatient attendance following a written GP 
referral by length of wait, all specialities, 1999-2004, England 
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Figure 4.25 A&E attenders spending  4 hours or less in A&E, 2002-2004, England 
  
Source: DoH (2004c, Graph D) 
                                                 
71
  Outpatient data only cover first referrals by the GP, approximately 25% of all outpatient activity. 
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Inpatient and day patient waiting lists in England have fallen since the second quarter of 
1999, whereas outpatient waiting lists have risen.72 Since the early 1980s, day patient 
waiting lists have risen relative to inpatient waiting lists (the former exceeding the latter 
from around 1997), which marks a trend towards increasing the utilisation of the beds 
stock and so lowering unit costs of treatment. Although the large waiting lists attract 
adverse attention by the media and the public, it is not the number of patients waiting 
that matters, but how long these patients have to wait. For each type of admission the 
longest waits - for inpatient and day patient waits exceeding five months and for 
outpatients waits exceeding twenty six weeks - have fallen, but often at the expense of 
the shorter waits (as shown by the last four quarters of all graphs). A&E waiting times 
have also improved: 94% are now seen and treated within four hours, compared to 77% 
in the 3rd quarter of 2002.  
These patterns reflect efforts by the government to drastically reduce (long) waiting 
times. The NHS Plan 2000 targets for reducing waiting times for aforementioned 
admission types declared that: by the end of 2005 the maximum waiting time for an 
outpatient (inpatient) appointment should be reduced to three months (six months), and 
the average waiting time for an outpatient (inpatient) should fall to five weeks (seven 
weeks). With respect to A&E, by the end of 2005 no one should be waiting more than 
four hours from arrival to admission, transfer, or discharge and average waiting times 
 
72
  Data refer to England only. Especially in Wales and Northern Ireland waiting times are relatively 
long and have risen since 2000. Waiting lists are dominated by routine operations in a few 
specialities: orthopaedics, ear, nose and throat conditions and ophthalmology accounted for 50% of 
the total waiting list and 33% of admissions in March 2003 (Jacobs et al., 2003, p6).  
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should fall to 75 minutes.73 Measurement difficulties aside, associated interim targets, 
apart those for A&E, have so far roughly been met.74
While reducing waiting lists is in principle a good thing, the cost-effectiveness is 
unclear as the money could have been spent on other areas of the NHS. It remains to be 
seen whether efforts to reduce waiting lists and times can be sustained in the long term 
due to positive feedback effects from reductions in waiting times to demand (via 
increased referrals and admissions) and the long-run rising trend in demand which  
reflects technological progress and an ageing population. Target setting with respect to 
waiting times also entails adverse incentives. Evidence suggests that the targets are met 
at the expense of longer waits for patients who should have clinical priority (for 
example, first outpatient appointment targets are met at expense of follow-up treatments 
with detrimental health consequences) and that inappropriate adjustments to waiting 
lists are made to meet the targets.75 A further complication is that waiting lists exist for 
a variety of reasons, some of which suggest that the optimal waiting time for treatment 
is positive: short queues may be cost-effective as a short period of delay allows some 
conditions (such as tonsillitis) to improve, adverse health effects - if any - are small and 
they help in reducing unused hospital capacity.76  
 
73
  DoH (2000a). 
74
  See for example DoH (2004c). Waiting list data are typically inaccurate due to the recording of 
people who should no longer be on the list, inappropriate adjustments by Trusts to meet targets and 
inaccuracies in short and long waits, respectively due to missing the census date and being counted in 
several censuses. The Audit Commission (2003b) discusses ways in which waiting time statistics can 
be improved. See also Hurst and Siciliani (2003, Section 2.5). 
75
  See for example the websites of the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission. See also 
King’s Fund (2004, p19-20, p22). 
76
  Hurst and Siciliani (2003, Section 2.7). A succinct overview of the interpretation of and reasons for 
waiting lists is given by Jacobs et al. (2003). 
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An OECD study on waiting times shows that waiting lists typically exist in countries 
with public health insurance (with limited or no cost sharing) and constraints in surgical 
capacity, such as in the UK.77 As the NHS is free at the point of consumption, patients 
will continue to consume until the marginal benefit of consumption is zero. This leads 
to potentially infinite demand in excess of supply, i.e. waiting lists. In the absence of a 
price mechanism to realign demand with supply (which is considered to be unfair), 
waiting lists serve as a method of rationing demand. Patients essentially ‘pay’ a time 
price for health care by having to wait for treatment (‘rationing by delay’).78
The study finds a negative association between capacity, measured by number of beds 
or practicing physicians, and waiting times. The same is true for the level of health 
spending. Increases in health spending and capacity may significantly reduce waiting 
times. Evidence also shows that changing the remuneration system for specialists - from 
salary to fee-for-service - and for hospitals - from fixed budgets to activity-based 
funding - may enhance productivity.79
Further potential to improve productivity and capacity/resource levels is also evident 
from UK data. Reviews by the Audit Commission on availability and utilisation of 
operation theatres, beds and staff show that capacity may be used more efficiently by 
reducing length of patient stays, increasing operations carried out in day surgery and 
more intensive use of operating theatres. For some specialties capacity increases are 
 
77
  Hurst and Siciliani (2003).  
78
  The NHS also ‘rations by denial’ in blocking, or at least delaying, the adoption of new technologies. 
The fear is that, if a new, superior, technology is approved, there will be a significant increase in 
demand, whereas if it is not available then patients ‘will not miss what they do not have’.  
79
  Siciliani and Hurst (2003). 
 4-57  
THE UK HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
                                                
required.80 Variations in waiting times (between Trusts, and even between consultants 
in the same Trusts/hospitals, for the same specialties) suggest the presence of both 
insufficient funding and inefficiencies in current working practices.81
4.4 THE FUTURE NHS IN THE PRESENCE OF RATIONING 
The previous sections identified a large number of problems in health care provision of 
the UK (and other countries), of which a few lend themselves to modelling in a CGE 
framework. All of these, and those that can be handled in a CGE setting, have as a 
common feature that they impinge upon the issue of rationing, either alleviating the 
rationing constraint or straining it.  
4.4.1 Balance sheet 
The balance sheet so far for health care provision in the UK is mixed. On the one hand - 
and in contrast to many other countries - the UK has managed to keep a tight lid on 
expenditure by funding health care primarily from, mildly progressive, general taxation, 
whilst providing universal and comprehensive health care coverage to its population and 
reaching overall satisfactory health outcomes. The UK health system thus appears to be 
highly cost-effective in achieving reasonable outcomes at substantially lower costs, 
which explains the reluctance of this and previous governments to change the system of 
funding.  
 
80
  See for example the Audit Commission (2003a, 2003b). The latter includes evidence on the use of 
operating theatres. Underlying data are available from the Acute Hospital Portfolio section of the 
Audit Commission website (http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk [13 July 2004]).  
81
  Jacobs et al. (2003). Waiting times for a range of non-emergency treatments at local NHS hospitals 
by type of appointment and by individual consultant are available from the NHS website: 
http://www.nhs.uk [13 July 2004].  
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But although the NHS delivers good value for money, many argue - using cross-country 
comparisons - that the public control of total expenditures has led to insufficient 
spending on the NHS, which has caused problems in terms of, for example, poor health 
outcomes in terms of specific diseases (such as cancer), inequities in access and health 
outcomes, and poor quality of services, including long waiting times for treatment. 
Inadequate services may however also reflect poor, i.e. inefficient or unproductive, use 
of existing resources. Evidence on this is mixed (depending on the data used), though on 
balance it suggests that productivity in the NHS remains unsatisfactory, and has even 
declined, despite unprecedented increases in expenditures over the last few years. 
Improvements in productivity in certain areas of the NHS seem feasible.  
4.4.2 Future prospects 
What of the future prospects for the UK health care system? Rationing had always been 
present in the past and is unlikely to disappear in the future. On the contrary, the gap 
between finite resources and potentially infinite demands seems to be rising - as in the 
past - due to a combination of increases in demands for health care (in terms of quantity, 
quality and outcomes) from rising incomes, partly fuelled by advances in technology 
and by an ageing population. Although devoting more resources to health care would 
alleviate the rationing constraint, it is unlikely to satisfy all demands as ‘the more we 
have the more we want’: rationing is inevitable and difficult decisions regarding the 
allocation of health care, ‘who gets what type of health care and when’, will have to be 
made in future.  
Apart from demand pressures there are cost pressures from public sector workers 
demanding wages in line with private sector wages - necessary to retain staff and to 
attract new staff - and rising prices of pharmaceutical inputs. The rising cost of 
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provision of health care implies fewer services can be delivered for the same value of 
expenditures, which thereby worsens the rationing constraint.  
Finally, rationing reduces the ability of health systems to cope with unanticipated 
disease outbreaks.82 This has been illustrated by, for example, influenza outbreaks 
throughout this century. The most infamous pandemic was the “Spanish Flu” of 1918-
1919, which killed around 20 to 40 million people worldwide. Other influenza 
pandemics occurred in 1957 (the “Asian Influenza”) and 1968 (the “Hong Kong 
influenza”).  
Influenza is a highly contagious viral infection which, in developed countries, occurs 
primarily in winter. Whereas earlier pandemics led to deaths also among healthy, 
young, people, influenza nowadays primarily affects ‘high-risk’ groups such as the 
elderly, children and the chronically ill. Nevertheless, influenza affects people in all age 
groups (an estimated 10% to 15% of the UK population each year83). It is an 
uncomfortable and self-limiting illness of which the main symptoms, fever, chills, 
painful muscles, head- and backache and cough, can last up to a week or two. Costs to 
society in terms of health care, working days lost and productivity declines are 
significant: “Epidemiological models project that in industrialized countries alone, the 
 
82
  Anticipated conditions related to life style, for example in terms of smoking (lung cancer) and - 
recently acknowledged as the future health problem of developed countries - diet (obesity and related 
chronic diseases such as diabetes and asthma) are just as likely to put a heavy claim on future health 
resources, but the government at least has more time in designing and implementing appropriate 
policies, thereby reducing the availability of resources for other, unanticipated, health problems. 
83
  DoH website on Immunisation Policy: ‘Summary of flu immunisation policy’ available at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/HealthAndSocialCareTopics/Flu/fs/en [13 July 2004]. 
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next pandemic is likely to result in 57-132 million outpatient visits and 1-2.3 million 
hospitalisations, and 280000-650000 deaths over less than 2 years.” 84
Most common health measures in response to influenza are vaccinations and - 
complementary - antiviral drugs to prevent and treat influenza. Following WHO 
recommendations, the UK government has since 2000 run a highly successful flu 
immunisation programme, supported by advertising campaigns, to encourage high risk 
groups to get a free flu jab, and so to reduce the impact of the winter as a ‘special event’ 
on primary care services and hospital admissions. This has led to an increase in flu 
injection uptake of 65% in 2000/01 to 71% in 2003/04 of those aged 65 and over (DoH, 
2004c, p29). 
The frequent genetic changes of influenza viruses, which are more likely to happen in 
an increasingly globalised world (e.g. via increased air travel) and which require 
reformulation of influenza vaccines, are a major cause of concern. The most recent 
outbreaks, of 1997 and 2003 in Hong Kong, were caused by a new subtype of influenza 
which is transmitted from birds to humans. New vaccines must be designed each year to 
match those current strains that are most likely to cause the next epidemic. 
4.4.3 Policies aimed at alleviating rationing 
What can governments do to alleviate the rationing constraint? Hurst and Siciliani 
(2003) discuss policies carried out by twelve OECD countries to reduce waiting times 
for elective (non-urgent) surgery. If the volume of surgery is considered insufficient, 
supply-side policies - which include raising capacity (in terms of staff and bed numbers, 
 
84
  Data are from the WHO website on influenza: ‘Pandemic preparedness’, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/ [13 July 2004]. 
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the use of private sector capacity and sending patients abroad), raising productivity (via 
funding extra activity, increasing the share of day case treatments, activity-related 
payments for doctors and hospitals and improving the management of waiting lists) and 
encouraging patient choice - can reduce waiting times. If the volume of surgery is 
considered to be sufficient (or the most that is affordable), demand side policies - which 
include prioritisation of patients according to need and encouraging private health 
insurance and care - may reduce waiting times in the public sector. Supply side policies 
have different implications in terms of cost and health outcomes compared to demand 
side policies: the former enhance health but are relatively costly, whereas the latter are 
unlikely to improve health, but are relatively cheap to implement. Policies affecting 
both demand and supply are those acting directly on waiting times, such as maximum 
waiting time guarantees and financial and non-financial incentives to reduce waiting 
lists.  
The authors argue that in the NHS the volume of surgery is likely to fall short of the 
‘optimal’ rate of surgery (where marginal benefits equal marginal costs) because the 
government exercises direct control over the health care budget, and so has the power to 
‘squeeze capacity in the interest of saving public expenditure’, and due to the absence of 
activity-related remuneration. Supply side policies are thus warranted.  
Docteur and Oxley’s (2003) overview of the health care reform experience of OECD 
member countries covers cost containment initiatives. These generally focused on 
controlling prices and volumes of health-care and inputs into health care (wage controls 
and pharmaceutical price regulation, encouraging prescribing of generic drugs and 
limiting medical school places), caps on health care spending and increased cost-sharing 
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with the private sector (in the form of user charges). Limiting wages and restricting 
medical personnel has, in their opinion, been taken too far in many countries, including 
the UK, and has led to shortages of health care personnel. As a consequence, increases 
in the health care budget in the short term may lead to higher wages for health care 
personnel (from the perspective of the government unwanted), instead of desired 
increases in the services provided. 
4.4.4 CGE modelling exercises 
Having discussed the balance sheet of UK health care so far, and future prospects and 
policies, this section selects the issues which will or could be examined using the CGE 
model.  
Policies to alleviate rationing 
From an economic viewpoint there are two (supply side) policy measures to alleviate 
the rationing constraint within the current system of funding, i.e. allocate more 
resources so that capacity in terms of number of beds, operating theatres and other 
forms of capital and staff numbers can be expanded and more pharmaceutical inputs can 
be purchased, or to increase the productivity of these available inputs.85 Both of these 
increase the amount of health care in terms of number and/or quality of treatments 
provided.  
The economy-wide impact of an increase in government expenditures on health care 
will be examined using two alternative factor market closures - perfectly mobile factors 
of production and health care-specific skilled labour and capital. The latter scenario, 
                                                 
85
  Demand side policies such as to increase private health care provision are not so straightforward as 
private health care is only separated from public health care in final consumption and no separate 
private health care sector exists (Chapter 6, Section 6.2). 
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more suited to the short run, takes into account the fact that some labour and capital is 
respectively highly trained or highly specialised and therefore specific to health care and 
immobile.  
The repercussions of an increase in productivity of health care will be modelled via 
technological progress in three fashions: (1) an improvement in the cost-effectiveness of 
pharmaceuticals which, given government expenditures on health care and a more 
expensive (but more effective) pharmaceutical product, will treat and cure more people; 
(2) factor-neutral (i.e. Hicks-neutral) technological change and (3) factor-biased 
technological change. The first technology change can be interpreted as mimicking the 
increasing importance of primary health care in health service provision, observed over 
the last decade, which has reduced the number of people going to hospitals.86 The 
second and third method of technological change respectively simulate improvements in 
the efficiency of all factors employed in health care and the efficiency of skilled labour 
employed in health care.    
Cost pressures 
In parallel with (generally successful) efforts to restrict medical salaries, maintain 
current working practices, and so on, the government has sought to limit the ever-
increasing cost of pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, prices of pharmaceuticals are not 
within direct government control. Therefore, an increase in the price of drugs poses 
problems for the government. Again, two scenarios are implemented which reflect two 
extreme responses to the pharmaceutical price rise. One is to maintain the official 
budget expenditure, implying a reduction in expenditure on other treatment costs 
                                                 
86
  This can be extended to the increased importance of day case treatment relative to inpatient care.  
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(numbers treated, time spent in hospital). The alternative is to expand the budget at the 
cost of offsetting cuts elsewhere.  
Alleviating the labour market constraint 
Finally, the CGE model is applied to the issue of importing labour from abroad to work 
in the UK health care sector, applying different assumptions regarding remittances that 
are sent home. This will lower the wage of health care-specific skilled labour (if it is 
allowed to fall) and, given government expenditures on health care, increase health care 
output and so the numbers of people treated and cured. 
Disease outbreak 
Another potential application of the model is to analyse the impact of a major disease 
outbreak, such as influenza. Since this requires some adjustments to the model of 
Chapter 6, this simulation is not as yet included in the modelling exercises.87
                                                 
87
  Other potential applications are the issue of an ageing population and the health tourism 
phenomenon. The modelling of the former is more appropriate in a dynamic CGE model (such as an 
overlapping generation model). The latter issue, although it is recognised to be a problem for some 
localities in the UK, does not play a major role at the national level. Health tourism is estimated to 
cost in between £50-£200 million a year, which represents approximately 0.07%-0.3% of NHS 
expenditure (BBC News Online, 14 May 2004, “Are health tourists draining the NHS?”). 
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CHAPTER 5  
A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX (SAM) 
FOR THE UK WITH DETAILED HEALTH 
CARE DATA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the augmented UK 2000 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to 
which the Static Computable General Equilibrium (SCGE) model in Chapter 6 is 
calibrated. A SAM represents the benchmark equilibrium data set in matrix format and 
thereby provides a comprehensive and consistent picture of the interrelationships in the 
economy at a point in time.1 Since the model is applied to the United Kingdom, features 
that are unique to the UK, and especially its health care system - as discussed in Chapter 
4, are emphasised. The SAM is predominantly compiled from the United Kingdom 
Input-Output Supply and Use Tables (SUT) for the year 2000,2 supplemented with data 
from the General Household Survey for the year 2000-2001 (GHS).3 The structure of 
production, output, demand and trade are taken from the former data source, which 
provides a commodity-by-industry use matrix for 123 commodities and industries. A 
commodity-by-industry make matrix is derived from data on industry and commodity 
output in 2000 and the most recent published make matrix for the UK, for 1990.4 The 
 
1
 See Reinert and Roland-Holst (1997) for a discussion of social accounting matrices. 
2
 Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2002). 
3
  ONS (2001a). The raw data and supporting material are available online via the United Kingdom 
Data Archive (UKDA). The ONS and UKDA bear no responsibility for the analysis or interpretation 
of the data as laid out in this chapter.  
4
  ONS (1995). 
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latter data source provides detailed information on a range of topics, including health, 
the use of health care, earnings and benefits for people living in private households in 
Great Britain and, for the purpose of this analysis, is also employed in the 
disaggregation of labour and household data from the SUT. The purpose-built GHS 
database, available in electronic form from the author upon request, is described in more 
detail in the appendix to Chapter 5. The UK National Accounts Blue Book is used to 
ensure that household aggregates are correct.5  
Section 5.2 proceeds with a discussion of the method of aggregating the GHS and SUT 
data. Section 5.3 provides a descriptive analysis of the UK economy, its health care 
system and its households by presenting the data in tables. The last section concludes.  
5.2 CLASSIFICATIONS 
5.2.1 Sectors 
The sector/commodity structure of the SCGE model is an aggregation of the 123 
industry/product classification of the SUT (Table 5.1). Sectors that supply a significant 
part of output to health care as intermediate inputs, the pharmaceutical sector (2) and the 
sector producing medical instruments (3), are explicitly modelled, as is health care itself 
(sector 10). The construction sector (6) is distinguished as an important supplier of 
capital equipment to health care in the form of buildings. The financial sector (8) - 
including private pensions and private health insurance - and the public sector (9) - 
including compulsory social security, such as national insurance contributions and 
public pensions - capture the financial side of the UK health care system. 
 
5
 ONS (2001b). 
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Table 5.1 Sectoral aggregation in the SCGE model 
# SECTOR/COMMODITY DESCRIPTION CORRESPONDENCE  123 INDUSTRY LEVEL 
1 Primary Agriculture, mining and quarrying 1,..,7 
2 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals 
and botanical products 43 
3 Medical instruments      Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 76 
4 Other manufacturing 
Manufacturing, excluding 
pharmaceuticals and medical 
instruments 
8,..,84, excluding 43, 76 
5 Energy Electricity, gas and water supply 85, 86, 87 
6 Construction Construction 88 
7 Distribution and transport Wholesale and retail trade, transport 
and communication 89,..,99 
8 Finance Financial intermediation 100,..,114 
9 Public administration and  defence                
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security 115 
10 Health care Human health and veterinary activities 117 
11 Other services Education, social work activities and 
other services 116, 118,..,123 
Source: SUT 
5.2.2 Factors 
The model distinguishes two production factors, capital (mainly land, buildings and 
equipment) and labour. The latter is subdivided into skilled labour and unskilled labour 
to address the differences in health outcomes across, and input use of, labour types 
(Table 5.2). The GHS categorises labour according to the 1990 Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC).6 A skilled-unskilled division is obtained using Winchester’s 
(2002) cluster analysis. Winchester measures skills by observing National Vocational 
Qualification (NVQ) scores, which evaluate a wide range of educational qualifications, 
and wages to capture skills acquired informally.7 Skilled labour employed by health 
care typically includes medical practitioners, dental practitioners, nurses, technicians 
and managers. Unskilled labour includes hospital ward assistants and ambulance staff. 
                                                 
6
  Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Employment Department Group (OPCS, EDG, 1990). 
7
 Winchester distinguishes four skill types: highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. In this 
study the first three are grouped into the skilled labour category.  
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Table 5.2 Classification of labour types in the SCGE model 
SOC 
code 
Occupation  SOC 
Code 
Occupation  
 Skilled 63 Travel attendants & related occupations 
10 General managers in government & 
large companies 
70 Buyers, brokers & related agents 
11 Production managers in manufacturing 71 Sales representatives 
12 Specialist managers 87 Road transport operatives 
13 Financial institution & office managers 88 Other transport & machinery operatives 
14 Managers in transport & storing  Unskilled 
15 Protective service officers 16 Managers in farming, forestry & fishing 
17 Managers & proprietors in service 
industries 
44 Stores & despatch clerks, storekeepers 
19 Managers & administrators nec 46 Receptionists, telephonists and related 
occupations 
20 Natural scientists 50 Construction  trades 
21 Engineers & technologists 55 Textiles, garments and related trades 
22 Health professionals 56 Printing and related trades 
23 Teaching professionals 58 Food preparation trades 
24 Legal professionals 59 Other craft and related occupations 
25 Business & financial professionals 62 Catering occupations 
26 Architects, town planners & surveyors 64 Health and related occupations 
27 Librarians & related professionals 65 Childcare and related occupations 
29 Professional occupations nec 66 Hairdressers, beauticians and related 
occupations 
30 Scientific technicians 67 Domestic staff and related occupations 
31 Draughtspersons, quantity & other 
surveyors 
69 Personal and protective service occupations nec 
32 Computer analysts/programmers 72 Sales assistants and checkout operators 
33 Ship & aircraft officers, air traffic 
controllers 
73 Mobile, market and door-to-door salespersons 
34 Health associate professionals 79 Sales occupations nec 
35 Legal associate professionals 80 Food, drink and tobacco process operatives 
36 Business & financial associate 
professionals 
81 Textiles and tannery process operatives 
37 Social welfare associate professionals 82 Chemicals, paper, plastics and related operatives 
38 Literary, artistic & sports professionals 83 Metal making and treating process operatives 
39 Associate professional & technical 
occupations 
84 Metal working process operatives 
40 Administrative/clerical officers & 
assistants  
85 Assemblers/line workers 
41 Numerical clerks & cashiers 86 Other routine process operatives 
42 Filing & records clerks 89 Plant and machine operatives nec 
43 Clerks (not otherwise specified) 90 Other occupations in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
45 Secretaries, personal assistants etc 91 Other occupations in mining and manufacturing 
49 Clerical & secretarial occupations nec 92 Other occupations in construction 
51 Metal machining & instrument making 
trades 
93 Other occupations in transport 
52 Electrical/electronic trades 94 Other occupations communications 
53 Metal forming, welding & related 
trades 
95 Other occupations in sales and services 
54 Vehicle trades 99 Other occupations nec 
57 Woodworking trades   
61 Security & protective service 
occupations 
  
Source: adapted from Winchester (2002) 
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5.2.3 Households 
Households in the GHS are aggregated into five types by exploiting the various socio-
economic characteristics of household members. The result is a comprehensive 
classification based on the age and the economic (i.e. working) status of household 
members that reflects differences in health claims and primary sources of income 
between households (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Classification of households in the SCGE model 
Household member 
Working age (men: 16-64, 
women: 16-59) 
 
Pensioners 
(men: 65+, 
women: 60+) 
Children (age: 
under 16) Not 
Working Working
 
Pensioner 
households X
1
   
Non-working 
households with 
children 
 X X  
Non-working 
households without 
children 
  X  
Working 
households with 
children 
 X X X 
 
 
 
 
 
Household 
type 
Working 
households without 
children 
  X X 
Source: GHS.1An ‘X’ indicates that the specific type of household member features in the household. 
Economic status, i.e. the separation of households with no working members8 from 
households with one or more working members9, is crucial in various respects. Firstly, 
to account for the health selection effect, i.e. the observation that entry to and exit from 
                                                 
8
  Definition of not-working: Under 16, those on government scheme with employer, those on 
government scheme at college, unemployed (ILO definition), other unemployed, permanently unable 
to work (longstanding illness), retired, keeping house, students, other economic inactive. This 
includes a very small percentage (0.02%) of individuals whose economic status was not known 
(either did not know answer or refused to answer). 
9
  Definition of working: people aged 16 or over who did at least one hour of paid work in week prior 
to interview or if they have a job that they are temporarily away from (includes unpaid family work). 
Note that this definition cannot separate part-time from full-time work. 
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the labour market is health-related.10 Secondly, it separates individuals who contribute 
to the economy in the form of supplying labour from those who do not and thus are net 
receivers of health care.11 Moreover, the working status indirectly encompasses the 
notion that health, however measured, is positively related to income.12 Furthermore, in 
the UK income determines consumption, especially of non-health care goods; most 
health care is publicly provided via the National Health Service (NHS).  
The second criterion used to classify households, the age of household members, is of 
interest as children, those of working age and pensioners have different health needs 
and, again, to distinguish the net receivers of health care (children and pensioners) from 
those that are contributing to the country’s GDP in terms of supplying labour and so 
finance health care (working age people).13
For the purpose of reducing the number of households, all pensioners living with others 
in a household have been transferred to the first household type of pensioners.14 This 
class thus contains true pensioner households and the members of all other household 
 
10
 Dahl (1993) and Stronks et al. (1997). 
11
  Note that those who have bought (and continue to buy) health care from the private sector also 
effectively contribute to the NHS in that they do not make (as many) demands on its services. The 
same is true for capital owners who do contribute towards the financing of health care but not in 
terms of the supply of labour.  
12
 See for example Crémieux et al. (1999), Ettner (1996) and Pritchett and Summers (1996). 
13
 The definition of pensioners does not exclude working pensioners and similarly, some of those of 
working age are not working because of early retirement. Based on the grossed up data, there are 
very small percentages of early retired and working pensioners, 2.6% of working age are early retired 
and  only 7.4% of the pensioners are working (full-time or part-time), so that the argument still holds. 
14
  In total approximately 1.8 million, generally non-working, pensioners have been transferred, forming 
1.6 million new households. A pensioner or pensioners living with non-pensioners form a new 
pensioner household; one pensioner forms a single person household, two pensioners form a two-
person household, etc. The transfer slightly lowers the average number of persons and thus average 
household income for all household types. Nevertheless, per capita income for some households, 
childless working and non-working households, rises. The effect is largest for the latter: on average 
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types who are of pensionable age. Presenting the pensioner type as a separate, 
independent household unit is justifiable on the grounds that this group has very 
different health needs compared to other age groups and is mostly economically inactive 
in that they do not supply labour services; and thus its major source of income is formed 
by income from capital and/or state and/or occupational pensions.15 Information on 
children is deducible from a comparison of households with and without children.16  
5.3 DATA 
This section presents the GHS and SUT data, and data from other sources, which are 
employed in the compilation of the UK 2000 SAM using the aggregations defined in the 
previous section. Additional background information not directly used in the SAM is 
provided for illustrative purposes.17 The data are grouped according to themes, each 
discussed in a separate section: population data, general health and use of health 
services, household income by source and household expenditure by destination. 
5.3.1 Population data 
The classification of households defines the various types of individuals in the model. 
We distil from the GHS the number of households in Great Britain by type and then for 
each type the average number of pensioners, children and people of working age. 
People who are working are either skilled or unskilled, in line with the classification of 
 
the number of persons in this household falls by 16%, leading to a 15% fall in average household 
income, though per capita income rises slightly by 1.5%. 
15
 After the transfer, household incomes have been recalculated from individual level data using the 
GHS procedure. Possible sharing arrangements (in terms of income and costs) within households 
with pensioners could work both ways and are therefore assumed to cancel out in aggregate. For 
example, pensioners may provide child care to the household and, conversely, working children may 
support retired parents. 
16
 It is empirically incorrect to put children in a separate household as they are not economically 
independent; they rely upon parents and/or carers and do not earn much (if any) income of their own.
17
  Explicit mention is made when data are employed in the compilation of the SAM. 
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factors. Skill type information does not exist for some, notably non-working, adults.18 A 
complete representation of the skill distribution is obtained by assigning skills to this 
category using the skill proportions of the sample for which skill information is 
present.19 In the category of people who are not working, people who are permanently 
unable to work are further distinguished as an indicator of the number of long-term ill.20 
Table 5.4 displays the composition of the various households in Great Britain (GB).  
Of the 26 million households, most are non-working households without children (38%) 
or pensioner households (28%). Nevertheless, the majority of the population lives in 
‘working, with children’ or ‘working, without children’ households (37% and 34% of 
the population respectively). The age groups of children and pensioners each comprise 
approximately 20% of the population. Whereas, non-working households on average 
consist of 1 adult and working households have 2 (mostly working) adults, both types 
on average have the same number of children (2). The decision not to work made by the 
single parent is likely to be correlated with the presence of children. This is in contrast 
to the childless, non-working household, which has the highest concentration of 
permanently unable to work (i.e. long-term ill), the majority of which is unskilled. The 
working population in Britain (48% of the total population) is mostly skilled (64%).
 
18
  Generally, GHS information is missing if: people did not know the answer/refused to answer, were 
not eligible to answer, or were routed passed the question by the flow of the questionnaire.  
19
 Unless stated otherwise, this is done for all missing data where information should be present.  
20
  This group is permanently receiving care and essentially consumes a fixed part of resources. 
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Table 5.4 Composition of households in GB, 2000-01  
Children 0 0% 1.91 58% 0 0% 1.73 45% 0 0% 0.44 20%
Pensioners                         1.34 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.38 18%
Working age 0 0% 1.37 42% 1.32 100% 2.11 55% 1.92 100% 1.34 62%
Skilled workers 0.06 4.5% 0 0% 0 0% 1.09 28.4% 1.10 57.0% 0.66 30.5%
Unskilled workers 0.04 3.0% 0 0% 0 0% 0.66 17.2% 0.58 30.3% 0.37 17.1%
Permanently unable to work 
- skilled 0.01 0.7% 0.06 1.7% 0.20 14.9% 0.01 0.3% 0.02 1.0% 0.03 1.5%
Permanently unable to work 
- unskilled 0.02 1.4% 0.13 3.9% 0.25 18.9% 0.02 0.5% 0.03 1.4% 0.05 2.1%
Other unemployed/inactive - 
skilled (excl. children) 0.63 46.9% 0.36 11.0% 0.45 34.0% 0.14 3.6% 0.10 5.1% 0.30 13.8%
Other unemployed/inactive - 
unskilled (excl. children) 0.58 43.6% 0.82 25.1% 0.43 32.2% 0.19 5.0% 0.10 5.2% 0.32 14.6%
Note on age groups, economic status and skill type: figures represent average number of persons per household and % of average number of persons respectively.
Pensioners Non-working, children Non-working, no children Working, children Working, no children All households
Age groups
Economic 
status and 
skill type
Household type
Number of households (millions)
Average number of persons
9983597 26436930
1.34 2.16
7528464 1122272 2307148 5495448
3.28 1.32 3.84 1.92
Source: GHS 
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Table 5.5 Households’ use of health care resources in GB, 2000-01 
Number of: Household type Pensioners Non-working, children Non-working, no children Working, children Working, no children All households
Total / year 63522886 22163262 19319875 77442218 70966545 253414786
Share 25% 9% 8% 31% 28% 100%
Average 8.4 19.7 8.4 14.1 7.1 9.6
Total / year 445763 0 247753 1026646 917879 2638042
Share 17% 0% 9% 39% 35% 100%
Average 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Total / year 63968649 22163262 19567628 78468865 71884424 256052828
Share 25% 9% 8% 31% 28% 100%
Average 8.5 19.7 8.5 14.3 7.2 9.7
Total / year 1966836 412986 604094 1325127 1336920 5645964
Share 35% 7% 11% 23% 24% 100%
Average 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
Total / year 3191723 638184 1941033 2507532 2532792 10811265
Share 30% 6% 18% 23% 23% 100%
Average 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.4
Total / year 18851819 4169963 7021378 17735973 20999353 68778485
Share 27% 6% 10% 26% 31% 100%
Average 2.5 3.7 3.0 3.2 2.1 2.6
Notes: excludes persons for whom information is not available because they: are routed past the question by the flow of questionnaire; did not know the answer or refused to answer; 
or were not eligible to answer. Inpatient and day patient visits exclude maternity stays.
NHS GP consultations
Private GP consultations
GP consultations
Inpatient visits
Days in hospital as daypatient
Outpatient visits
 
Source: GHS 
5-10 
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5.3.2 General health and use of health services 
Table 5.5 shows the claims that households in Great Britain make on the health system 
in terms of primary care and secondary care, using GHS data on the number of publicly 
and privately financed consultations with a general practitioner (GP), the number of in- 
and outpatient visits to a hospital, and the number of days in hospital as a day patient.21 
Working households with children account for the majority (31%) of GP consultations. 
Close second and third are childless working households and pensioners, with shares of 
28% and 25% of all GP consultations respectively. This partly reflects the relative size 
of the households and household groups in the GHS (see Table 5.4). For example, a 
household with one or more children visits a GP approximately twice as often in a year 
compared to a childless household (whether working or not working). Next to having 
children, working status matters most: a non-working household with or without 
children, though being smaller in size, consults the GP more times in a year than a 
working household. In terms of GP consultations, households rely heavily on the public 
sector, which accounts for 99% of all consultations in a year. Pensioners and working 
households in particular use private sector GPs.  
Secondary care use matches that of primary care. Secondary care is mostly used by 
working households and pensioner households, though childless non-working 
households also account for a relatively high share of day patient visits made in 2000-01 
(18%). At the household level, not participating in the labour market while having 
children generally increases the number of times secondary care is used by a household.  
 
21
  Tertiary care, i.e. informal care for others, forms a relatively small part of the health care system and 
is therefore not included. 
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Due to its relatively small size, a pensioner household on average makes a relatively 
low number of claims on the health system. Nevertheless, pensioner households account 
for a relatively large share of total primary and secondary care usage owing to the 
relatively large size of this household category (28% of households in Great Britain are 
of the pensioner type) and - more importantly - as a consequence of the relatively high 
cost of treatment for people of old age.22
The household data indicate that the use of primary and secondary care in Great Britain 
varies with the socio-economic characteristics of households in the SCGE model, such 
as economic status (participation in the labour market by household members) and age 
composition. Figures 5.1 to 5.5 further explore these relationships by examining a 
selection of general population health measures, organised in terms of three socio-
economic characteristics of the population: labour market participation (distinguishes 
working, permanently unable to work and other unemployed / inactive), age (identifies 
pensioners, working age individuals and children) and skill type (skilled versus 
unskilled).23 The reported population health measures rely upon respondents’ own 
assessments and may thus reflect increased expectations which people have about their 
health as well as changes in the actual prevalence of sickness.24  
 
22
  See for example Emmerson et al. (2000, p 46).  accounts for treatment cost in terms of the 
number of times health care services are used, but does not show how costly they are. 
Table 5.5
23
  Individuals for whom information is not available (routed past the question by the flow of the 
questionnaire; did not know, refused or were not eligible to answer) are excluded from the data. The 
‘all’ category reports data on individuals for whom information on the respective socio-economic 
characteristic and health measure is available. As the size of this category varies by socio-economic 
characteristic, health outcomes may vary slightly across the ‘all’ categories.  
24
  Evidence shows that there is a high level of agreement between incidence based on self-reporting and 
on medical examinations, and between self-reporting and doctor diagnosis of specific conditions 
(ONS, 2001a, p77). 
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Not surprisingly, the percentage of the population reporting good general health falls 
with age and rises with skills and participation in the labour market (Figure 5.1), 
averaging 64% across all ages. 
Figure 5.1 Self-perception of general health in GB, GHS 2000-01 
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Figure 5.2 Prevalence of self-reported longstanding illness in GB, GHS 2000-01 
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Figure 5.3 Days of restricted activity in GB, GHS 2000-01 
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Likewise, prevalence of (non-) limiting longstanding illnesses25 (Figure 5.2) - averaging 
19% (14%) for limiting (non-limiting) illnesses, increases by age and falls with skills 
and labour market participation. The majority (98%) of persons permanently unable to 
work suffer from one or more longstanding illnesses, of which 94% is considered to be 
limiting. It is this group that also reports the highest number of days of restricted 
activity (Figure 5.3). The latter measure - averaging 31 days per year across all age 
groups (28 for those of working age, 19 for those working and 35 across all skill types) 
- yet again increases by age and decreases in skills and labour market participation. 
Details of reported longstanding illnesses are coded using the 9th revision of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD)26, and are aggregated into groups 
                                                 
25
  The underlying GHS question is: ‘Do you have any longstanding illness, disability or infirmity? By 
longstanding, I mean anything that has troubled you over a period of time or that is likely to affect 
you over a period of time?’. Those answering positively are asked if this limits their usual activities 
(about the house, at work, or in free time) in any way. If answered affirmatively, the number of days 
of ‘restricted activity’ is recorded ( ). Figure 5.3
26
  Published by the World Health Organization (WHO, 1977). 
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approximating to the ICD chapter headings (Table 5.6). Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the 
illnesses that respectively are most and least prevalent across the population.27
Figure 5.4 Longstanding illness prevalence: 7 major ICD groups, GHS 2000-01 
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 Figure 5.5 Longstanding illness prevalence: 8 minor ICD groups, GHS 2000-01 
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27
 Note that respondents may indicate more than one complaint, with a maximum of six coded, so that 
percentages do not add up to 100%. 
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The most common condition reported by respondents suffering from at least one 
longstanding illness were musculoskeletal problems (34%), especially for adults, heart 
and circulatory problems (24%), especially for pensioners, and respiratory problems 
(22%), especially for children. Whereas for all conditions skill type variations are 
minor28, the type of longstanding illness reported varies considerably by age and labour 
market participation of the population. 
With respect to age differences, the share of people with one or more longstanding 
illnesses being ill from musculoskeletal problems, heart and circulatory problems, 
endocrine and metabolic conditions, neoplasms and benign growths and illnesses of 
blood and related organs rises with age, whereas respiratory problems and skin 
problems become less important with age. Compared to other age categories, working 
age individuals with longstanding illnesses have a higher prevalence of mental disorders 
and problems of the nervous system, but a lower prevalence of ear and eye complaints.  
Concerning labour market participation variations, the working population reporting at 
least one longstanding illness, compared to those not participating in the labour market, 
are less likely to be affected by musculoskeletal, heart and circulatory problems but 
show higher rates of respiratory problems. The permanently unable to work with one or 
more longstanding illnesses display prevalence rates for mental disorders, problems of 
the nervous system and musculoskeletal problems well above rates for other 
unemployed or inactive (rates for mental disorders and nervous system problems are 
respectively four and three times higher compared to the latter). 
 
28
  With the notable exception of the reported prevalence of musculoskeletal complaints, which falls as 
skills rise. 
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Table 5.6 Classification of diseases in the GHS 
Condition group ICD 
code Condition 
1 Infectious diseases 37 Infectious and parasitic disease 
2 Neoplasms and benign growths 1 
Cancer (neoplasm) including lumps, masses, tumours and 
growths and benign (non-malignant) lumps and cysts 
2 Diabetes 3 Endocrine and metabolic 3 Other endocrine / metabolic 
4 Blood and related organs 38 Disorders of blood and blood forming organs 
4 Mental illness / anxiety / depression / nerves(nes) (include 
neuroses) 5 Mental disorders 
5 Learning difficulties 
6 Epilepsy / fits / convulsions 
7 Migraine / headaches 6 Nervous system 
8 Other problems of nervous system 
9 Cataract / poor eye sight / blindness 7 Eye complaints 10 Other eye complaints 
11 Poor hearing / deafness 
12 Tinnitus / noises in the ear 
13 Meniere’s disease / ear complaints causing balance problems 
8 Ear complaints 
14 Other ear complaints 
15 Stroke / cerebral haemorrhage / cerebral thrombosis 
16 Heart attack / angina 
17 Hypertension / high blood pressure / blood pressure (nes) 
18 Other heart problems 
19 Piles / haemorrhoids 
20 Varicose veins / phlebitis (lower extremities) 
9 Heart and circulatory system 
21 Other blood vessels / embolic 
22 Bronchitis / emphysema 
23 Asthma 
24 Hay fever 10 Respiratory system 
25 Other respiratory complaints 
26 Stomach ulcer / ulcer (nes) / abdominal hernia / rupture 
27 Other digestive complaints (stomach, liver, pancreas, bile ducts, small intestine - duodenum, jejunum and ileum) 
28 Complaints of bowel / colon (large intestine, caecum, bowel, colon, rectum 
11 Digestive system 
29 Complaints of teeth / mouth / tongue 
30 Kidney complaints 
31 Urinary tract infection 
32 Other bladder problems / incontinence 12 Genito-urinary system 
33 Reproductive system disorders 
13 Skin complaints 39 Skin complaints 
34 Arthritis / rheumatism / fibrositis 
35 Back problems / slipped disc / spine / neck 14 Musculoskeletal system 
36 Other problems of bones / joints / muscles 
40 
Other complaints (incl. insomnia, sleepwalking, fainting, 
adhesions, hair falling out, alopecia, travel sickness, nose 
bleeds, no smell, no speech, dumb) 15 Other complaints 
41 
Unclassifiable (no other codable complaint; including old 
age / weak with old age, general infirmity and conditions 
nes) 
Source: GHS 
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5.3.3 Household income by source 
Individuals, and thus the households in which they are grouped, receive income from 
mainly two sources: factor income (labour income and capital income) and income from 
government transfers. With respect to the former, the SUT provides information on each 
factor’s share in sectoral value added, i.e. income generated by capital and labour, by 
sector of employment. The GHS is used to disaggregate these types of income further 
over household types and, where relevant, to skill types. Specifically, labour income by 
sector of employment is apportioned to skilled and unskilled labour using the GHS 
distribution of yearly gross earnings by sector over skill types (Table 5.7).29
 Table 5.7 Gross labour income by skill type and sector of employment, UK 2000 
million £
(% of 
sector 
total)
million £
(% of 
sector 
total)
million £ (% )
1 Primary 2480 40% 3683 60% 6163 1%
2 Pharmaceuticals 2893 89% 369 11% 3262 1%
3 Medical instruments    2992 76% 930 24% 3922 1%
4 Other manufacturing 75625 73% 27674 27% 103299 20%
5 Energy 4641 93% 346 7% 4987 1%
6 Construction 14835 68% 7133 32% 21968 4%
7 Distribution and transport 92124 73% 33669 27% 125793 24%
8 Finance 101066 96% 4152 4% 105218 20%
9 Public administration and  defence              31999 93% 2347 7% 34346 7%
10 Health care 26346 84% 5031 16% 31377 6%
11 Other services 67130 79% 17425 21% 84555 16%
422130 80% 102760 20% 524890 100%Total
Skilled Unskilled Sector total
Sector
 
Source: adapted from GHS, SUT 
Table 5.7 shows that the primary sector is least skill-intensive in its use of labour 
(generating only 40% of gross labour income) whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, 
finance is relatively most skill-intensive (generating 97% of gross labour income in that 
                                                 
29
  Income data for both main and second jobs - which respondents hold in addition to a main full-time 
or part-time job - are included in the calculations.  
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sector). Health care lies in between these two extremes, but with 84% of gross labour 
income earned by skilled labour, is still relatively skill-intensive. Health care, however, 
generates only 6% of gross labour income in the UK, compared to 24% for distribution 
and transport, and 20% for both finance and other manufacturing. 
Gross labour income by skill type is subsequently distributed over households using 
GHS data on yearly gross earnings organised by skill and household type. Similarly, 
gross capital income from the SUT is allocated to households according to the 
distribution of income from other sources,30 regular payments31 and other regular 
payments32 in the GHS (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 Gross factor income by household type, UK 2000  
million £
(% of 
household 
total)
million £
(% of 
household 
total)
million £
(% of 
household 
total)
million £ (% )
Pensioners 139526 95% 5664 4% 1787 1% 146977 18%
Non-working, children 3049 100% 0 0% 0 0% 3049 0%
Non-working, no children 28659 100% 0 0% 0 0% 28659 3%
Working, children 68264 27% 151043 59% 36064 14% 255370 31%
Working, no children 55971 14% 265423 69% 64909 17% 386303 47%
Total factor income 295469 36% 422130 51% 102760 13% 820359 100%
Household type
Capital Skilled Unskilled Total household 
Source: adapted from GHS, SUT 
Factor income is mostly received by working households (78% of total gross factor 
income), the remainder accrues to pensioner households (18%) and childless non-
working households (3%). The latter household groups rely heavily on capital as source 
of factor income, whereas working households’ factor income mainly takes the form of 
payments to skilled labour (in the range of 59% to 69% of factor income). 
                                                 
30
  Including occupational pensions from former employer/spouse’s former employer, redundancy 
payments, private pensions and training schemes like YT allowance. 
31
  Including rent from property or subletting, educational grants, regular payments from friends and 
family outside the household and maintenance-, alimony-, or separation allowance. 
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Total disposable household income (Table 5.9) is the result of adjusting the gross 
earnings data for income or employment taxes and adding income from government 
transfers. The total value of income taxes is obtained from the National Accounts Blue 
Book and allocated to factors of production by postulating a net capital employment tax 
of 20% and an employment tax for skilled labour of 1.5 times that of unskilled labour, 
yielding net labour employment taxes of 22% and 14% respectively. In gross terms - the 
definition of input taxes employed in the SCGE model in Chapter 6 - this implies 
employment taxes of 25%, 28% and 17% for capital, skilled and unskilled labour 
respectively.33 Income from state benefits, also from the National Accounts Blue Book, 
is disaggregated using the distribution of income from state benefits in the GHS.34 
Disposable household income from the SUT is approximately 1.4% lower than the 
resulting total of factor income plus government transfers by household type, so that the 
latter source of income is reduced by 1.4% of each household type’s disposable income.  
Table 5.9 Disposable income by type of household, 2000 
million £ (% of total) million £ (% of total) million £ (% )
Pensioners 117586 66% 59702 34% 177287 23%
Non-working, children 2439 17% 11685 83% 14125 2%
Non-working, no children 22927 65% 12103 35% 35030 5%
Working, children 203764 88% 26767 12% 230531 30%
Working, no children 308193 99% 3953 1% 312146 41%
All households 654910 85% 114209 15% 769119 100%
Disposable factor income Government transfers TotalHousehold type
Source: adapted from GHS, SUT 
                                                                                                                                               
 
32
  Such as income from interest, shares and bonds. 
33
  An employment tax defined as a net tax implies that owners of factors of production 
receive   , whereas an employment tax defined as a gross tax implies that the 
owners of factors of production receive the , which excludes the tax. 
1 taxrate market price 
 market price
34
  These comprise child benefits, state pensions, disability living allowance, attendance allowance, job 
seekers allowance, incapacity benefits, statutory sick pay, working family tax credit and 
housing/council tax benefits. 
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Table 5.9 shows that pensioners and non-working households rely relatively heavily on 
income from government transfers as a source of disposable income compared to 
working households. Non-working households with children, for example, receive 83% 
of their disposable income in state benefits, whereas for childless non-working 
households and pensioners this share is significantly lower, 35%. 
5.3.4 Household expenditure by destination 
Households allocate income over consumption and savings. Assuming that only 
working households save, total nominal savings are distributed over these households in 
proportion to their income. This yields a savings rate of 30% of disposable household 
income, equivalent to a national savings rate of 21%. Consumption expenditures by 
type of household are the resultant of subtracting household savings from disposable 
income (from Table 5.9). Private health care expenditures are allocated to households 
using the share of each household in the number of total private GP consultations (from 
Table 5.5). Accordingly, working households with and without children and pensioners 
account for most of private health care expenditures (35%, 39% and 17% 
respectively).35 A disaggregation by type of commodity other than private health care is 
obtained by applying common household consumption shares. The results, displayed in 
Table 5.10, reveal that the bulk of household expenditure on goods is concentrated in 
other manufacturing, finance, distribution and transport and other services (45%, 21%, 
14% and 12% of private consumption expenditures respectively).  
 
35
  These data agree with Emmerson et al. (2000), King and Mossialos (2002) and Propper (2000), 
which suggest that private health insurance coverage or the use of private health facilities is 
positively related to factors such as income, employment, age (up to 55),  and not having children.  
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Table 5.10 Household expenditures by type of household, 2000 
Pensioners Non-working, 
children
Non-working, 
no children
Working, 
children
Working, no 
children Total
Consumption 
shares
1 Primary 2995 241 583 2679 3654 10151 2%
2 Pharmaceuticals 927 74 181 830 1132 3144 1%
3 Medical instruments    859 69 167 769 1048 2913 0%
4 Other manufacturing 80992 6506 15766 72464 98820 274547 45%
5 Energy 4643 373 904 4154 5665 15740 3%
6 Construction 1307 105 254 1169 1594 4430 1%
7 Distribution and transport 25286 2031 4922 22624 30852 85715 14%
8 Finance 36831 2958 7170 32953 44938 124850 21%
9 Public administration and  defence              343 28 67 307 419 1163 0%
10 Health care 1438 799 3312 2961 8509 1%
11 Other services 21665 1740 4217 19383 26433 73439 12%
177287 14125 35030 160644 217516 604602 100%
69887 94630 164517
30% 30% 21%
177287 14125 35030 230531 312146 769119Disposable income
Savings rate (% of 
disposable income)
Household expenditures 
(million £)
Total savings
Total consumption 
expenditures
Source: adapted from GHS, SUT 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has discussed the compilation of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) which 
is suitable for use in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model applied to the 
UK with a detailed health care component. The sector/commodity classification 
distinguishes the main input suppliers to health care, pharmaceuticals, medical 
instruments and construction as the supplier of capital, health care itself, and financial 
and public sectors to account for health care financing. Labour is grouped into two 
types, skilled and unskilled labour, to capture differences in health outcomes and input 
use, whereas households are allocated to five types based on the age and labour market 
participation of its members. The SAM is constructed mainly from the Supply and Use 
Tables (SUT) for 2000, using the aggregations of households, sectors/commodities, and 
factors. These data are subsequently enriched with data from the 2000-01 General 
Household Survey (GHS), which are directly employed in determining: the distribution 
of labour income across skill types; the disaggregation of factor income and income 
from state benefits over households; and the allocation over households of private 
health care expenditures. The GHS provides valuable insight into the differences in 
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health care use across households, using information on the numbers and the 
composition of households and a selection of general population health measures which 
vary by age, labour market participation and skill type. The purpose-built GHS database 
(see also the appendix to Chapter 5), is available in electronic form upon request. 
The income data reveal that the health care sector is relatively skill-intensive but small 
in terms of gross labour income. Working and pensioner households with working 
members receive most of factor income. For pensioner households and non-working 
households this type of income comes mainly in the form of payments to capital, 
whereas working households rely primarily on skilled labour. Especially for non-
working households with children, income from state benefits is an important source of 
disposable income. Part of disposable income is saved by working households, the 
remainder being allocated to the consumption of goods, especially other manufacturing, 
finance, distribution and transport and services. Private health care expenditures form 
only 1% of total household consumption expenditures, again suggesting a relatively 
small (private) health sector. 
The population data show that the majority of the 26 million households is of the 
childless non-working type or pensioner type, although working households, which are 
bigger in average household size, have the highest population numbers (71% of the 
population in total). Pensioners and children approximate 20% of the population each. 
Of the population that is working, the majority is skilled (approximately 2/3), whereas 
the bulk of those permanently unable to work and, to a lesser extent, other unemployed 
or inactive are unskilled. The average childless non-working household has the highest 
propensity of the former group of non-workers. 
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From data on health care use, it is apparent that working households and pensioners 
account for most of the General Practitioner (GP) consultations. This is partly explained 
by household numbers and average household size and partly by household 
characteristics: the number of GP consultations is positively associated with having 
children and negatively associated with labour market participation. The use of 
secondary care across households demonstrates a similar picture. Pensioner- and 
working households are the main users of private sector GPs, though most GP 
consultations are provided by the National Health Service (NHS). Pensioners typically 
need more and more costly care, though the cost of health services used cannot be 
discerned from the GHS database. 
Self-reported data on population health provide background information on the use of 
health care by households. In spite of the smallness of the health sector, these data show 
that a significant proportion of the population suffers from ill health. Only 64% of the 
population is positive about their health status, whereas 19% (14%) indicates having 
one or more limiting (non-limiting) longstanding illnesses. The latter report an average 
of 31 restricted activity days per year, which amounts to a share of 8.5%. Typically, the 
share of the population reporting good general health falls with age and rises with skills 
and labour market participation. Likewise, the prevalence of (non-) limiting 
longstanding illnesses and the number of restricted activity days increases with age and 
falls with skills and labour market participation. The most common complaints are 
musculoskeletal problems, heart and circulatory problems and respiratory problems. 
The type of reported condition varies considerably by age and labour market 
participation, though not so much by skill type.  
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CHAPTER 6 
A STATIC CGE (SCGE) MODEL FOR THE UK 
WITH HEALTH CARE PROVISION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports on simulations carried out with a Static Computable General 
Equilibrium (SCGE) model for the UK, which includes health care provision effects. 
The SCGE model takes the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 as its starting point, but 
deviates from that where it is deemed insufficient to depict reality, in particular 
concerning key features of the UK health system, discussed in Chapter 4. The SCGE 
model is calibrated to the UK 2000 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) with special detail 
in terms of health care provision and use (developed in Chapter 5), and programmed in 
MPSGE (Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium analysis), which 
is a subsystem of the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) software. The 
model files are included in the appendix to Chapter 6 and available in electronic form 
from the author upon request. The simulations cover current issues, specifically the 
economy-wide effects of a rise in public health expenditures, a pharmaceutical price 
rise, the immigration of health care-specific skilled labour and technological progress, 
which is factor-neutral, skill-biased, or embodied in pharmaceuticals, respectively.1 The 
experiments are carried out using alternative model specifications, mainly regarding 
factor markets and the government budget. A short outline of the model is given below. 
 
1  A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the International Conference on Policy 
Modeling in Istanbul, 2003, organised by the EcoMod Network and the Third Annual GEP 
Postgraduate Conference, 2004, organised by the GEP (Rutten et al., 2003, 2004). 
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The SCGE model has in most respects a standard structure, the novelty coming from the 
explicit modelling of the health sector, comprising public and private health care, and its 
interaction with the rest of the economy through its differential impact across skilled 
and unskilled labour, and across households, characterised by the age and working 
status of its members. The effects on welfare of higher health provision are two-fold: it 
directly increases the well-being of the population and indirectly improves welfare by 
increasing the size of the effective (i.e. able to work) endowments of skilled and 
unskilled labour for use in non-health activities. All other sectors are perfectly 
competitive, the production technologies are Constant Returns To Scale (CRTS), 
household preferences are homothetic and factors are homogenous. Domestic sectors 
are multi-product industries. Cross-border trade is treated using the assumption that the 
UK is a small open economy facing exogenous world prices for imports and exports. In 
addition, the Armington assumption is imposed on both production and consumption: 
goods produced are destined for either the domestic market or for the export market, 
while consumers differentiate between domestic and imported varieties of the same 
good. The government uses its revenue from a variety of taxes to purchase a fixed 
expenditure of goods and to accommodate the trade surplus. The remainder of its 
budget is spent on income transfers to households which adjust so as to maintain the 
government account balance. Consumers allocate the latter income and earnings from 
the supply of capital, skilled and unskilled labour to savings and consumption. With the 
exchange rate as numéraire and the trade balance fixed in terms of foreign exchange, 
investments are savings-driven so that the model closure adopts a neoclassical 
approach.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the 
SCGE classifications and the equations of the model respectively. Section 6.4 discusses 
the assumptions underlying the calibration process. Model simulations and results are 
presented in section 6.5 and compared in section 6.6. The sensitivity of results to key 
parameter values is addressed in section 6.7. The final section concludes.  
6.2 CLASSIFICATIONS 
The classifications of primary production factors, households and sectors, summarised 
in Table 6.1, are drawn from the UK 2000 SAM.  
Table 6.1 The SCGE model classifications 
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION (f) HOUSEHOLDS (h) 
Hse1.    Pensioners 
Hse2.    Non-working, children 
Skill.   Skilled labour 
Unsk.  Unskilled labour 
Cap.    Capital Hse3.    Non-working, no children 
Hse4.    Working, children  
Hse5.    Working, no children 
SECTORS (i) / COMMODITIES (j) 
1.    Primary 7.     Distribution and transport 
2.    Pharmaceuticals 8.     Finance 
3.    Medical instruments      9.     Public administration and defence 
4.    Other manufacturing 10.   Health care 
5.    Energy 11.   Other services 
6.    Construction  
Note: labour types, households and sectors are classified using the techniques outlined in Chapter 5.  
Skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital are distinguished as production factors. The 
owners of factors of production, households, are grouped into five types reflecting 
differences in age and working status composition. The SAM distinguishes eleven 
sectors (commodities), including health care and its principal sources of inputs, the 
pharmaceutical sector and the sector producing medical instruments. In terms of final 
demand for commodities a division between the National Health Service (NHS) and 
private health care (PHC) is created. This rests upon the assumption that both the NHS 
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and PHC purchase health care from the health sector, but that while the NHS sells its 
health care to the government, PHC sells to households.  
6.3 MODEL EQUATIONS 
6.3.1 Effective endowments and waiting lists 
The effective supply of factor endowments f  by households h  is specified in equations 
(6.1) and (6.2).  
 
hfE hfF F WL  hf        (6.1) 
 hf f hfWL FK         (6.2) 
where 0 f 1K   for labour types f l , ^ `,l Skill Unsk ; otherwise (for capital) 
0fK  .  denotes the effective supply by household h  of factor hfEF f , hfF  is the total 
potential factor endowments of f  owned by household , of which  identifies the 
part that is not working, i.e. the waiting list. The waiting list, which records ill persons 
who have not yet been successfully treated and are thereby unable to work, is defined to 
be positive only for labour (
h hfWL
f l ), and is modelled as a fraction of the total given 
labour endowments in the economy of household .h 2 Capital is always fully effective 
and fully employed.3
                                                 
2  While, for simplicity of exposition, waiting lists and effective labour endowments are defined in 
terms of numbers of workers, a definition involving scaling in terms of worker-hours is equally valid.   
3  This does of course ignore the loss in effective capital when, for instance, machines break down. 
However, the cost of repairing a machine is internal to the firm, and is assumed to be assimilated into 
the cost of capital services, whereas the repair (treatment) of ill workers is a cost to the state or to the 
workers insurers. 
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The fraction of people on the waiting list, the non-participation rate, is assumed to be 
identical across all households and is defined as a constant elasticity function of a health 
composite: 
 0
ff l ff HC
HK K          (6.3) 
where f lK   denotes the non-participation rate for l , 0 0f lK  !  is a scale parameter 
which is calibrated so that 1f lK   ,4 f lHC   is a health composite, and 0f lH  !  is an 
elasticity parameter.   
The health care composite for labour type l  is a measure of the healthiness, i.e. health 
status, of this labour type and is modelled as a function of its public and private health 
care consumption using a Cobb Douglas (CD) formulation:  
  (1 )"10" "10" fff l hhHC G C XX   ¦      (6.4) 
where 0 1lXd d  denotes the share of public health care in the health status of labour 
type l .  denotes health care (commodity 10 in Table 6.1) provided via the NHS, 
and represents the level of private health care provisioning, PHC. The former 
is given by government consumption, 
"10"G
"10"hh C¦
jG , of health care and the latter by the sum of 
household consumptions, , of private health care. jhC
                                                 
4  Note that , but that the upper constraint for  lim 0
f
f
HC
Kof  fK  is not automatically satisfied. 
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The scale parameter 0 f lK   measures the non-participation rate for 0f lH   . Health care 
is then completely ineffective (i.e. does not cure people) and therefore does not affect 
waiting lists. Alternatively, for a given level of health care, a reduction in the scale 
parameter 0 f lK   implies a lower non-participation rate, hence a lower waiting list and a 
higher effective labour supply.  Accordingly, 0 f lK   measures the effectiveness of a 
given level of health care in treating and/or curing people.  
The elasticity parameter     0f l hf f f fWL HC HC WLH    w w  !  represents the 
proportionate change in the size of labour type l s waiting list for household  
following a change in the health composite, i.e. the waiting list elasticity. For a given 
change, the higher the value of the elasticity parameter, the greater the reduction in the 
waiting list and the increase in effective labour. 
h
f lH   thus measures the effectiveness of 
a change in health provisioning in treating and/or curing people.  
For each labour and household type, the waiting list and the effective labour supply as  
functions of the health composite follow from equations (6.2) and (6.3): 
   10 0  fhf f f f f f hf fff lWL HC HC L WL HCHH K H w w      and 
         222 2 01 1fhf f f f f f f f hf fff lWL HC HC L WL HCHH H K H H w w     0! ; 
hence waiting lists are decreasing in the health composite at a decreasing rate. 
Equivalently,   0 hfE f hf ff lF HC WL HCw w  w w ! and  
 2 2 2 0hfE f hf ff lF HC WL HCw w  w w 2  , implying that the effective labour supply is 
increasing  in the health composite, but at a decreasing rate. Figure 6.1 illustrates. 
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Figure 6.1 Waiting lists and effective endowments 
 
6.3.2 Production by sector and commodity 
The structure of production in each of the sectors is shown in Figure 6.2. Production of 
sector , i iX , is a Leontief (constant coefficient) function of value added,  - itself a 
CD function of factor demand for factor 
iV
f , fiDF  - and intermediate inputs from sectors 
j , jiN . Sector i s production is a CD composite of the commodities j  it produces, 
jiQ . The resulting first order conditions are given by (6.5) to (6.8):5
          (6.5) i X iV A X i
                                                
 
 
5  The underlying CD equations for sectoral production and value added are 
Q ji
i Q jijiX A Q
D   and 
V fi
i Vi D fifV A F
D  respectively. The Leontief production function is represented by: 
min ,
ii i X ji jiX V A N Aª º ¬ ¼ . 
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 Figure 6.2 The nested production function 
  
 
" "  Skill iFD
"11"  iQ "1"  iQ
Output commodity j   at price 
jji QQ Pª º¬ ¼  
Demand by sector i for factor f 
at price fi fD FF Pª º¬ ¼  
Value added sector i 
 at price 
ii VV Pª º¬ ¼  Demand by sector i for intermediate 
inputs from j  at price 
jji DN Pª º¬ ¼  CD 
 > @Output tax iptax  
Output sector i   at price 
ii XX Pª º¬ ¼
Leontief 
CD 
 
Employment tax
       e ftax
ª º« »¬ ¼
 
"11" iN  "1"  iN  
" "  Cap iFD   
 ji jiN A X i          (6.6) 
 fi fi iD V i V FF V P fPD        (6.7) 
 
ji i jji Q i X QQ X P PD        (6.8) 
where 0 1fiVDd d , 0 1jiQDd d , 1fiVf D  ¦  and 1jiQjD  ¦ . , A XA ,  and VA QA   are 
the scale parameters for the Leontief and CD functions respectively, VD  and QD  are the 
share parameters of the CD functions for value added and commodity supply, and 
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XP , ,  and  respectively denote the (domestic) sectoral producer price, value 
added price, the factor price and the individual commodity producer price. 
VP FP QP
6.3.3 Domestic supply, exports and imports 
Domestic and foreign supplies of commodities in terms of exports and imports are 
summarised in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3 Market supply and demand 
 
 
Margins  
"7"
at price TM DjQ Pª º¬ ¼  
Aggregate supply 
at price 
jj CCES Pª º¬ ¼ES  
Domestic supply
at price 
j jS QQ Pª º¬ ¼  
CES
Imports  
at price 
jj MM Pª º¬ ¼  
[Consumption tax ]jctax
Domestic demand 
at price 
j jD DQ Pª º¬ ¼  at price jj EE Pª º¬ ¼
CET
Aggregate demand 
at price 
jj CETCET Pª º¬ ¼
Leontief 
 
Exports
Domestic supply of commodity j  is equal to the sum of the output of commodity 
j produced by each sector : i
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jiQ  jS iQ  ¦         (6.9)  
Aggregate market supply and demand for commodity j  embody the Armington 
assumption (Armington, 1969), whereby goods are differentiated according to country 
of origin and destination (so-called double Armington). 
The commodities produced are allocated between domestic demand, 
jDQ , and foreign 
demand (i.e. exports), jE , according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function and consumers differentiate between total imports, jM , and domestic supply, 
jSQ , of commodity j  via a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function: 
   11Tj T jj j jj T T T Dj jCET A E QU TjU UD Dª  «¬ ¼º»     (6.10) 
   11S j S jj j jj S S S Sj jCES A M QU US j UD D  ª  «¬ ¼º»    (6.11) 
where  denote the CET and CES composites respectively;  are the 
scale parameters; 
 and CET CES ,T SA A
,T SD D  the share parameters; and ,T SU U  are the transformation and 
substitution parameters of the CET and CES function respectively.  
The first order conditions for equations (6.10) and (6.11) yield: 
 
1
T j
j j
j
j j
T E
j D
T D
P
E Q
P
VD
D
§ ·¨ ¨ ¸© ¹
¸       (6.12) 
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1
S j
j j
j
j j
S Q
j S
S M
P
M Q
P
VD
D
§ ·¨ ¨ © ¹
¸¸       (6.13) 
where , DP EP  and MP  denote the domestic consumer price (as opposed to the 
domestic producer price, ), the export price and the import price for commodities 
respectively. The elasticities of transformation and substitution are defined as 
QP
 1 1j jT TV U  0!  and  1 1j jS SV U 0  !  respectively, so that 1jTU !  and 
1
jSU !   . 
Aggregate domestic market demand for commodity j , 
jDQ , equals the sum of 
intermediate input demands by sectors i , ji
i
N¦ , private consumption demands by 
households , h jh
h
C¦ , government consumption demand,  and investment demand, jG
jINV :  
 
jD ji jh j
i h
Q N C G IN    jV¦ ¦      (6.14) 
In order to account for transport costs incurred when delivering goods for domestic or 
export demand, aggregate supply  for commodity j ,  is combined with transport 
and trade margins for commodity 
jCES
j , 
jTMQ  in a Leontief function, 
min ,
j jj j C TMCET CES A Q A jTMª º ¬ ¼  so that from the first order conditions: 
 
jj CCES A CET j        (6.15) 
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T 
j jTM TM jQ A CE        (6.16) 
where  are the parameters of the Leontief production function.,C TMA A
6 Equation (6.15) 
represents the product market clearing condition, adjusted for transport and trade 
margins. 
6.3.4 Prices 
The structure of production, market supply and demand generates a system of price 
equations. Equations (6.17) and (6.18) are the equivalent of the unit price equations for 
sector , adjusted for ad valorem taxes. Output taxes (i ,i jptax ctax ) are defined as a net 
tax so that producers receive  1 taxrate market price    and the market price is a gross 
price, whereas factor input taxes ( fetax ) are defined as a gross tax so that producers 
purchase factor inputs at    and the market price is a net price. 1 taxrate market price   
j
  1
i i iX i X V ji DjP ptax A P A P  ¦      (6.17) 
      (6.18) 1i fi fV i D F ffP V F P etax ¦ 
The total value of output by sector by definition equals the aggregate value of the output 
of commodities j produced by this sector, yielding: 
 
i jX i jijP X Q P ¦ Q
                                                
       (6.19) 
 
6 This construction states that aggregate market supply of commodities, combined with fixed transport 
and trade margins, equals aggregate market demand for commodities. It is unusual in that it 
accommodates entrepôt trade, i.e. the re-exporting (re-importing) of imported (exported) goods.  
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Moreover, the total values of commodity supply and demand in the market, i.e. the 
values of the CES and CET composites, by definition equal the sum of the values of the 
domestic and foreign components: 
 
j j jCES j M j Q SP CES P M P Q  j      (6.20) 
  1j j jCET j E j D j DP CET P E P ctax Q   j     (6.21) 
where the price paid by domestic consumers, 
jDP , includes a consumption tax, jctax . 
Equations (6.22) and (6.23) link domestic prices for imports and exports to world prices 
(
j
W
MP  and j
W
EP  respectively) by multiplication by the exchange rate, . ER j
W
MP  and j
W
EP  
are fixed so as to model the UK as a small country having no influence on world prices. 
         (6.22) 
j j
W
M MP P E R
R         (6.23) 
j j
W
E EP P E 
Equation (6.24) describes the price relation between composite aggregate demand, 
, and each of its components, CES  and :   CET TMQ
 
"7"j j j jCET C CES TM DP A P A P       (6.24) 
where  denotes the cost of distributing commodity j (transport and trade margins) 
as given by the domestic consumer price of distribution and transport (commodity 7 
in Table 6.1). 
"7"DP
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hT
6.3.5 Household income, savings and expenditure 
The income generated in the production of commodities is allocated to the 
representative agents in the model, five households and the government, who spend it 
on consumption, savings and transfers. Figure 6.4 summarises the flow of income and 
expenditures in the economy. 
Figure 6.4 Flow of income, savings and expenditures 
 
 
Factor income 
hf fE Ff F P¦  
Private households 
hY  
Trade surplus 
> @ at price TS ER
Transfers
TR  
Direct taxation 
fetax  
Indirect taxation 
 ,j ictax ptax
Government  
GY  
Government 
consumption 
 at price 
jj DG Pª º¬ ¼  
Private consumption  
 at price 
jjh DC Pª º¬ ¼  
Savings 
> @ at price h SS P  
Households receive income from two sources, the employment of factors of production 
(capital, skilled and unskilled labour) and transfers from the government, , as shown 
in equation (6.25):  
hT
        (6.25) 
hf fh E FfY F P ¦
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Transfers to household  are modelled as a constant share, h TRhD , of total government 
transfers, TR , yielding: 
 h TRhT TRD         (6.26) 
where 0 1TRhDd d , 1hTRhD  ¦ .  
Household income, , is subsequently spent on the consumption of goods and savings. 
Consumption of good 
hY
j  and real savings by household , h jhC  and  respectively,  
follow from the optimisation of a CD utility function, 
hS
jh
h jhjU C S
Sh
h
E E  , subject to 
the household budget constraint, 
jh jh DjY C P S  h SP¦ , yielding: 
 
jjh jh h DC Y PE        (6.27) 
 h Sh hS Y SPE        (6.28) 
where 0 1jhEd d , 0 1ShEd d , 1Sh jhjE E  ¦  and  denotes the price of savings 
(see equation (6.36)).  
SP
Summation of real savings by household yields total real savings, : TS
 T hS  hS¦         (6.29) 
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j jD
6.3.6 Government income and expenditure 
Government receives income, , from direct taxation of factors of production (via the 
employment taxes) and indirect taxation of sectoral and commodity outputs (via the 
production and consumption taxes): 
GY
 
i f fG i X i f F E j Di f jY ptax P X etax P F ctax P Q  ¦ ¦ ¦    (6.30) 
The government allocates its income to expenditures on good j, , household 
transfers, , and purchases a fixed amount of foreign exchange at rate  in order to 
accommodate the trade surplus, TS : 
jGEXP
TR ER
       (6.31) G j
j
Y TR GEXP ER TS   ¦
Government expenditures on good j  are fixed relative to the numéraire at benchmark 
expenditure levels, 0jGEXP , and defined as (real) government consumption of 
commodity j , , multiplied by its domestic consumption price, jG jDP :  
 0
jj j DGEXP ER GEXP P G   j

     (6.32) 
The trade surplus is simply the difference in value between exports and imports 
measured in foreign currency: 
       (6.33)  j jW WE j M jjTS P E P M ¦
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6.3.7 Investments 
Total investments in the economy, i.e. total real savings , are a Leontief function of 
investment demand for commodity j, 
TS
jINV , min jT jS INV IAª º ¬ ¼ , which gives the 
first order condition: 
  
jj I TINV A S         (6.34) 
6.3.8 Factor market clearing 
Equilibrium in factor markets is represented by: 
 fE D fi
i
F F ¦         (6.35) 
Finally, equilibrium in the capital goods market requires the value of total savings to 
equal the value of total investments: 
        (6.36) 
jS T D j
j
P S P INV ¦
6.3.9 Welfare 
The model includes two measures of changes in household and overall welfare. Firstly, 
changes in household welfare are calculated from private household utility using the 
equivalent variation. The equivalent variation reveals the income to which a particular 
change that has taken place between equilibria is equivalent.7 For linear homogeneous 
preferences, the equivalent variation can be written as: 
                                                 
7  Shoven and Whalley (1992, p125). 
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h h
h
h
U UEV Y
U
 h        (6.37) 
where superscript 0 and 1 respectively refer to the equilibria before and after a particular 
shock occurs.  
The change in overall welfare using this measure of household welfare is computed as: 
 h
h
EV E V¦         (6.38) 
A second measure of the change in household welfare is reported, , which includes 
the direct change in well-being related to changes in government consumption of goods, 
including health care provision via the NHS, assuming that each household receives a 
share 
hTEV
jhGD  (where 0 1,jh jhG G
h
D Dd d  1¦ ): 
 
1 0
0
0h jh
j j
T h G
j j
G G
EV EV GEXP
G
D § ·¨ ¸   ¨ ¸© ¹
¦ j
T
    (6.39)8
The associated measure of overall welfare changes computes the sum of household 
equivalent variations plus the sum of changes in the real government consumption of 
goods (i.e. public good provisioning, including health services): 
 
hT
h
EV EV ¦         (6.40) 
                                                 
8  Note that private health care is already included in the utility function and thus in welfare. The 
current and, for the purpose of this analysis, more appropriate welfare specification postulates that an 
increase in the public provision of health care (and other goods) constitutes a direct welfare gain. The 
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6.3.10 Closure 
The term closure refers to the choice of endogenous and exogenous variables in a 
general equilibrium model. This determines which variables can and cannot adjust, so 
that the manner in which a new equilibrium is achieved and the equilibrium outcome are 
sensitive to the choice of closure.9 In this model 0,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,
j j
W W
j hf M E iTS GEXP F P P ptax  
,  and j fctax etax  are chosen as exogenous variables. Furthermore, since in general 
equilibrium models absolute prices cannot be determined, the price of foreign exchange, 
, acts as the numéraire.ER 10  
The closure of the savings-investment balance, the macro-closure, adopts a neoclassical 
approach by postulating that total savings determine total investments. Foreign savings, 
, are fixed in foreign currency thereby avoiding free lunches taken from or given to 
the rest of the world after a shock is applied to the model.
TS
11 With respect to the 
government account, government expenditures on goods are fixed in foreign exchange 
at benchmark levels, , whereas transfers to households, TR , adjust to equate 
government income with expenditures on commodities and the trade surplus. Since 
households save and consume fixed proportions of their income, changes in private and 
hence total savings originate from adjustments in household income.
0GEXP
12 Alternative 
                                                                                                                                               
resulting overall welfare measure, displayed in equation (6.40), is equivalent to a social welfare 
function with equal weights, i.e. a common utilitarian social welfare function (Johansson 1991, p32). 
9  See Reinert and Roland-Holst (1997, p115) for a short overview of closure issues. 
10  MPSGE automatically deletes the corresponding equation so that Walras Law is implemented.  
11  The term free lunch is used by De Melo and Tarr (1992, p42) to describe a sudden in- or outflow of 
foreign capital following a policy shock, which complicates the evaluation of the welfare effects of a 
domestic policy change. 
12  Note that positive (negative) foreign savings in the form of a negative (positive) trade surplus are 
sold (bought) by the government, which does not save; private (household) savings are thus the only 
source of savings in the economy. 
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model specifications, especially those affecting the government account and factor 
markets, are experimented with when performing simulations. 
6.4 CALIBRATION 
In order to operationalise the model, values need to be specified for the parameters of 
the model equations. In CGE modelling this process is known as calibration. It 
involves choosing parameter values (given exogenously specified behavioural 
elasticities) such that the model will replicate the benchmark data set, represented by the 
UK 2000 SAM, as an equilibrium solution.13 The Harberger convention is used 
throughout, so that prices that are unaffected by taxes are equal to one in the benchmark 
and quantities can be derived from the SAM.  
6.4.1 Taxes 
Where taxes are in place, prices may diverge from unity. Specifically, the price 
producers pay for factor inputs,  1fFP etax f

, the net price they receive for the 
production of goods, 1
iX iP pta x
j
, and the net price domestic consumers pay for 
goods, , diverge from 1. Employment taxes are derived from the National 
Accounts Blue Book (Office for National Statistics, 2001b), yielding average values for 
1jDP ctax
fetax  of 25%, 28% and 17% for capital, skilled and unskilled labour respectively. 
Production and consumption taxes, iptax  and jctax  respectively, are displayed in Table 
6.2.  
                                                 
13  Shoven and Whalley (1984) and Reinert and Roland-Holst (1997) provide an excellent account of the 
calibration process. 
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Table 6.2 Production and consumption taxes in the SCGE model 
Sector   / commodity  i j
Tax (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
iptax  0 0.4 0.7 0.6 2.6 0.5 2 0.7 0.5 0 1.1 
jctax  -3.6 6.8 8.1 10.7 2.1 7.2 2.4 3.4 0 -0.2 4.5 
 
6.4.2 Substitution and transformation elasticities 
Values of behavioural elasticities are usually estimated outside the model or taken from 
other studies. The advantage of the MPSGE software is that it automatically performs 
the calibration of functional forms, given that all elasticity parameters are specified.14 
Leontief and CD functions are defined by a substitution elasticity of 0 and 1 
respectively. The CES and CET functional forms respectively have substitution and 
transformation elasticities equal to 
jSV  and jTV , which are set to 2 in this model.15
6.4.3 Household rates and shares 
Household savings rates, , and shares in government transfers, hs TRhD , are obtained 
from the UK 2000 data set, which was described in Chapter 5.16 The latter shares are 
computed from Table 5.9, whereas the former follow from Table 5.10, assuming that 
only working households save. Welfare changes related to changes in public good 
provisioning are allocated to households in proportions 
jhGD , which for health care 
correspond to each households share of the total number of NHS GP consultations 
                                                 
14  A description of the MPSGE programming language and a variety of examples is available online 
from: http://www.gams.com/solvers/mpsge [13 July 2004]. 
15  The majority of goods produced in the UK is traded with similar high-income countries and are of 
the same high quality so that substitution and transformation elasticities are reasonably high. At the 
multi-commodity level, elasticities in GTAP version 5 (http://www.gtap.org [13 July 2004]) are 
around 2 to 2.5. 
16  MPSGE calibrates these by including real savings (with a price of savings) in the CD utility function 
and by introducing an artificial commodity transfers, exogenously fixed for each household (and 
thus in total), but with an endogenous (uniform) price. Both procedures ensure constant shares. 
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(from Table 5.5) and for other goods (public administration and defence, and other 
services) correspond to each households share in the total population (computed from 
Table 5.4). The resulting parameter estimates are displayed in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Rates and shares by type of household 
Parameter (%) jhGD  
Household type 
hs  TRhD  Public administration 
and defence 
Health care Other services 
Pensioners  52.3 17.6 25.1 17.6 
Non-working, 
children 
 10.2 6.4 8.7 6.4 
Non-working, 
no children 
 10.6 5.4 7.6 5.4 
Working, 
children 
30.3 23.4 37 30.6 37 
Working, no 
children 
30.3 3.5 33.6 28 33.6 
 
6.4.4 Waiting list parameters 
The contribution of public health care to the health status of skilled and unskilled 
labour, as measured by X , is obtained from Emmerson et al. (2000, Table 5.1). Using 
Family Resource Survey data for the period 1994/1995 to 1997/1998, they calculate the 
percentage of adults with private medical insurance by social class. By applying 
population weights corresponding to each social class from the GHS, the proportions of 
skilled and unskilled labour having private medical insurance are estimated at 16.6% 
and 4% respectively, yielding a residual of 83.4% and 96% of skilled and unskilled 
labour for whom health care is financed via the NHS. The latter serve as proxies for X .    
The scale parameter 0K  is calibrated to the benchmark non-participation rate. Its value 
is based on the Barmby et al. (2002, 2003) measure of sickness absence, calculated as 
the ratio of the number of hours absent due to sickness to the number of hours 
contracted to work. Using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, Barmby et al. find a fairly 
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stable long-run average for the (yearly) sickness absence rate in the UK of around 
3.20%.  These and other studies17 find that sickness absence varies by socio-economic 
characteristics. Typically, the higher the wage and the higher the level of responsibility 
involved in the job, the lower the absence from work. Illness-related absence from work 
is approximately 1.5 times higher for manual than that for non-manual workers. 
Assuming that the non-participation rate in the base year for unskilled workers is 1.5 
times that of skilled workers and postulating an overall benchmark non-participation 
rate of 3.20% yields 0K = 2.89% for skilled and 0K = 4.34%  for unskilled workers.  
In the absence of a reliable empirical estimate, the waiting list elasticity parameter, H , is 
set to 2 for both labour types, so that a 10% increase in health status leads to a 20% 
decrease in waiting lists. Given the remaining parameter estimates in Table 6.4, this 
implies that the elasticities of effective (labour) endowments with respect to the health 
composite in the benchmark are 0.06 and 0.09 approximately for skilled and unskilled 
labour respectively.18 These numbers are consistent with health care elasticity estimates 
of in between 0.03 and 1 based on US data (Folland et al. 2001, p108-109). The 
elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to the health composite is higher for 
unskilled labour due to the fact that a relatively higher proportion of the unskilled suffer 
illness, so that health expenditures leverage is greater for this labour type. Alternative 
values of the waiting list elasticities are considered in Section 6.6. Table 6.4 displays all 
waiting list parameters. 
                                                 
17  See for example the Confederation of British Industry (2001) and Barham and Leonard (2002) for an 
overview. 
18  These elasticities measure the proportionate change in the size of effective (labour) endowments of 
skilled and unskilled labour following a change in the health composite, and are calculated 
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Table 6.4 Waiting list parameters 
Parameter Skilled labour  Unskilled labour 
X  83.4% 96% 
0K  2.89% 4.34% 
H  2 2 
 
6.5 SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
In order to illustrate the functioning of the SCGE model and potential areas of 
application five shocks are simulated under alternative model specifications. Results are 
compared with the benchmark equilibrium values for 2000. Tables and figures 
containing changes in key variables are presented at the end of the section. 
The first shock (Experiment 1) examines the impact of a 10% rise in government 
expenditures on health care (£5.384 billion approximately), i.e. NHS expenditures, 
equivalent to the average yearly increase in NHS expenditures from 1999-2000 and 
planned up to 2007-2008.19 The expansion of public health care, while drawing 
resources away from other sectors in the economy, improves both worker income, 
through increased labour market participation, and welfare, via direct increases in the 
well-being of the population. Results are reported for two different factor market 
specifications. Experiment (1a) assumes capital and labour are fully mobile across 
sectors, in line with the original model specification, whereas Experiment (1b) reports 
results on the assumption that parts of skilled labour and capital are specific to the 
health care sector. The latter assumption limits factor movements between the health 
sector and other sectors and puts upward pressure on specific factors remunerations.  
                                                                                                                                               
    1hf f f hf f hf hf f f fFE HC HC FE WL FEH H K Kw w   as . This corresponds to GH  
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Experiment (2) simulates a 20% increase in the domestic consumer price of 
pharmaceuticals. This figure corresponds to the increase in the average cost per 
prescription item dispensed in the community in England from £9.48 to £11.37 over the 
period 1999-2000 to 2002-2003, reported in the Annual Report of the NHS Chief 
Executive.20 Here, the assumptions regarding the closure of the government account are 
that either the government keeps its (overall) health care budget fixed in value 
(Experiment 2a) according to the original model specification (see equation (6.32)), or 
that the government increases expenditures on the NHS, so that total real public health 
expenditures and the number of treatments (of a certain quality and cost) provided by 
the NHS are maintained to previous, benchmark, levels (Experiment 2b). For a given 
nominal health care budget as in Experiment (2a), the increase in the cost of 
pharmaceutical inputs implies lower levels of health care provisioning and that, given 
the cost-effectiveness of treatments, less people are being treated and cured. This has 
repercussions for welfare, both directly and through reduced household income (via 
changes in effective labour supply). 
Experiment (3) models government policy aimed at encouraging foreign health care-
specific skilled workers, i.e. doctors and nurses, to come and work in the UK in order to 
mitigate the shortage of highly skilled workers. It is assumed that an equivalent of 10% 
of domestic endowments of health care-specific skilled labour takes up this offer.21 The 
 
19  See the Department of Health (DoH)s Expenditure Plans for the NHS (DoH 2003a, p3 and p20).  
20  DoH (2003b, p9). 
21  Currently, an estimated 1 in 12 nurses in England have come from abroad (see for example Buchan, 
2003). With respect to the international recruitment of doctors, in 2002, the NHS in England 
launched an International Fellowship scheme which aimed to offer up to 450 International 
Fellowships for the coming three years in clinical practice working as a consultant (Press Releases 
Notice, Wednesday 27-02-2002, reference number 2002/0101, available at http://www.dh.gov.uk [13 
July 2004]). Given that the majority (at least of nurses) aims for a long-term career in the NHS and is 
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government may accommodate the immigration of foreign skilled workers in two 
fashions. In Experiment (3a) the wage of health care-specific skilled labour is allowed 
to fall following a rise in the supply of this labour type. Consequently, unit costs of 
health care provision fall and, given government expenditures on health care, public 
health care output and its numbers of people treated and cured is expected to rise, with 
the associated welfare consequences. In Experiment (3b), the government adjusts public 
health care provision (and expenditures) so as to counteract the fall in health care-
specific skilled wages.22 This induces even larger increases in NHS provision levels. 
Both experiments are carried out using three alternative assumptions regarding the share 
of foreign worker income remitted abroad, adopting values of 0, 0.5 and 1 respectively. 
Remittances have further welfare effects by influencing the trade balance. 
The fourth modelling exercise (Experiment 4) investigates the general equilibrium 
effects of a 10% improvement in the productivity of factors employed in health care, 
modelled via technical change, as opposed to a 10% improvement in health care 
resources investigated in Experiment (1). Two alternative forms of technological 
progress in factors are contrasted with each other (see also Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
Experiment (4a) models Factor-Neutral Technical Change (FNTC), which enhances the 
productivity of all factors of production in health care by 10%, whereas Experiment (4b) 
simulates Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC), which enhances the productivity of 
skilled labour in health care only by 10%. Given government expenditures on health 
 
expected to stay, and given more planned international recruitment of nurses and doctors, it seems 
reasonable to look at the effects of an increase in health care-specific skilled labour of 10%. 
22  It is often argued that there is a lack of certain, highly skilled, health care professionals in the NHS 
due to the relative low pay compared to the private sector. This provides an argument for the 
government to sustain the wages of health care-specific skilled workers. 
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care, health care output, levels of health and labour market participation are anticipated 
to improve, yielding (direct and indirect) welfare gains. 
The final modelling exercise, Experiment (5), assesses the general equilibrium effects of 
technical change in pharmaceuticals. It takes the setup of Experiment (2a) as point of 
departure by modelling an increase in the domestic consumer price of pharmaceuticals 
of 20% (observed over the period 1999-2000 to 2002-2003) whilst keeping the 
government budget spent on health care (and other goods) fixed in value. The higher 
price of pharmaceuticals is assumed to reflect technical (quality) improvements which 
make the health service more efficient in its use of pharmaceutical and other inputs, so 
that it may treat and cure more people, improve labour market participation and the 
well-being of households. The values for the productivity gains in (i.e. savings in the 
use of) pharmaceuticals and other inputs in health care are varied in the exercise. 
Experiment (5a) considers a rise in productivity of pharmaceuticals only, whereas 
Experiment (5b) considers cumulative effects of introducing productivity gains for other 
intermediate and factor inputs in health care as well.  
6.5.1 Experiment 1a: increasing the NHS budget with mobile factors 
Government expenditures are fixed in terms of foreign exchange, so that the immediate 
effect of an expansion of public health care - implemented by raising  by 10% - 
is, given tax revenues, to reduce transfer payments to households by 4.3%. The 
additional NHS resources result in an increase in public health care provision by 10% 
and, via input-output linkages, increase the demand for and domestic production of 
pharmaceutical products (by 4.9%), and medical, precision and optical instruments (by 
1.9%). As a consequence health care, pharmaceuticals and instruments become slightly 
0GEXP
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more expensive, which increases the costs to and hence reduces the size of private 
health care provision (by 0.3%).  
The increase in public health care boosts the health of unskilled labour by 9.6%, which 
is more than the improvement of 8.2% in the health of skilled labour, as the former is 
affected primarily by changes in public health care, whereas the latter also responds to 
changes in private health care provision which contracts. In agreement with this pattern, 
participation in the labour market (i.e. effective labour supply) increases by 0.43% and 
0.76% for skilled and unskilled labour respectively, equivalent to reductions in the 
waiting lists (across all households) of 14.6% and 16.7%. 
The expansion of health and related sectors (and contraction of other sectors), combined 
with the increase in labour market participation due to improved health, induces 
changes in factor remunerations: unskilled wages fall by 0.5%, whereas skilled wages 
and capital rents rise (by 0.02% and 0.18% respectively). Despite the fall in unskilled 
wages, the increase in labour market participation ensures that all households income 
from unskilled labour rises. 
The fall in income from state benefits, from which the health care budget increase is 
financed, leads to reductions in income for working households with children (0.2%), 
but relatively more so for pensioners (1.3%), non-working households with children 
(3.6%) and childless non-working households (1.4%). Only childless working 
households, who own 63% of skilled labour endowments - generating 67% of their 
household income - and rely least on government transfers (see Table 5.9 Chapter 5), 
gain slightly (by 0.3%) from higher treatment levels in the NHS.  
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The same pattern emerges for absolute (and relative) changes in household welfare, 
measured by ; pensioners suffer a welfare loss of £2.389 billion, and all other 
households (except for childless working households who gain by £955 million) lose 
around £500 million on average. Adjusting these figures for changes in levels of public 
good provisioning (including health care) reduces each households welfare loss, 
especially for pensioners and working households who receive a large share of public 
good provisioning (see Table 6.3). Consequently, only pensioners still experience a 
significant deterioration in welfare of £1.04 billion. Non-working households with and 
without children lose by £36 million and £80 million respectively, whereas their 
working counterparts gain by £1.17 billion and £2.46 billion. Overall welfare (including 
government consumption of goods) increases by £2.474 billion (a relative gain of 
0.26%).  
hEV
6.5.2 Experiment 1b: increasing the NHS budget with health care-specific factors 
Experiment (1a) overlooks the fact that a large part of the labour and capital employed 
in health sector are, respectively, highly trained or highly specialised and therefore 
arguably specific to health care and immobile. This scenario provides an alternative 
specification more suited to the short run by introducing health care-specific skilled 
labour and capital. The former type consists of mainly doctors and nurses (85% of 
skilled labour employed in health care)23 and the latter consists of buildings and land 
 
23  Calculated as the share of professionally qualified clinical staff relative to the total of professionally 
qualified clinical staff, managers and senior managers and central functions for 1999-2000 in the 
NHS in England (DoH, 2004a, Table D1). 
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(approximately 90% of capital employed in health care)24, and both earn a health care-
specific remuneration.25  
Key findings are that, unsurprisingly, the presence of health care-specific skilled labour 
and capital constrains the production expansion of health care and related sectors. A 
10% increase in the public health care budget leads to a lesser increase in levels of 
provisioning, of 4.4%, so that the domestic outputs of pharmaceuticals and medical 
instruments rise by 1.7% and 0.7% respectively (less than half of the rise in Experiment 
1a).  
The mounting pressure on health care-specific factors translates into higher 
remunerations - health care-specific skilled wages and rents rise by 11.7% and 11.9% 
respectively - which drive up unit costs and prices for public and private health care (by 
5.4%), so that the public health expenditures increase crowds out private health care by 
approximately the same percentage.26  
Within the health sector, some substitution towards (relatively cheaper) mobile factors 
takes place to relieve the constraint of specific factors. The relative changes in 
 
24  Calculated as the share of land, buildings and assets under construction relative to the total net book 
value of capital including equipment in the NHS for 1996-1997, from DoH (1998, Annex 1).  
25  The process of adjusting the model for health care-specific factors is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2, section 4. When modifying the dataset for this assumption, total endowments of health 
care-specific capital and skilled labour (90% and 85% of capital and skilled labour employed in 
health care respectively) are apportioned to individual households according to each households 
share of, respectively, mobile capital and skilled labour endowments. Health care-specific factors of 
production are also assumed to have the same labour market characteristics, i.e. same non-
participation rate and health status, as their mobile counterparts. 
26  One could argue that the government exerts more or less direct control on wages of NHS personnel, 
whereas capital rents are given on the market. If wages of health care-specific skilled labour are kept 
at pre-shock levels so as to control labour costs of extra health care, provision of NHS care increases 
by 9%, approximately equal to the rise in public provision when factors are fully mobile. The results 
of such a scenario are therefore equivalent to those reported in Experiment (1a).  
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production levels across sectors induce changes in factor remunerations of opposite sign 
to Experiment (1a); unskilled wages rise by 0.2%, whereas wages of mobile skilled 
labour and rents on mobile capital fall (by less than 0.1%). Nevertheless, households 
income from mobile unskilled and skilled labour rises due to the health-induced 
changes in effective labour supply. The health status of both unskilled labour and 
skilled labour increases by 4% and 2.8% respectively - much smaller health 
improvements than in (1a) due to relatively lower levels of health care provisioning - so 
that labour market participation increases by 0.16% and 0.34%, equivalent to reductions 
in the waiting lists (across all households) of 5.3% and 7.6% for all skilled and 
unskilled labour respectively.  
Government transfers to households fall by slightly (0.3 percentage points) less than 
before to finance a (smaller) expansion of public health care, so that compared to 
Experiment (1a) income losses (gains) of households fall (rise). The same is true for 
absolute and relative changes in household welfare excluding government consumption 
of goods. However, once the changes in the public provision of goods (including public 
health care, which expands by much less in the presence of health care-specific factors) 
is accounted for in household welfare, losses are higher and gains are lower relative to 
Experiment (1a). Overall welfare (including government consumption) increases by 
£920 million (a relative gain of 0.1%). 
6.5.3 Experiment 2a: a pharmaceutical price rise under an exogenous NHS budget 
The price simulation is implemented by adding to the model the following equation, 
which fixes the domestic consumer price for pharmaceuticals (commodity 2) at a 
level of 120% relative to the numéraire: 
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ER 
"2"
1.2DP          (6.41) 
In order to maintain the number of endogenous variables, the pharmaceutical price rise 
is postulated to originate from an increase in the exogenous world price of 
pharmaceutical imports, .  
"2"
W
MP
The simulation results demonstrate by how much the world import price (and in fact all 
other endogenous prices) of pharmaceuticals needs to change in order to generate a rise 
in the domestic consumer price of 20%27; the former rises by 42% whereas, for 
example, the domestic producer price of pharmaceuticals rises by 4%. As 
pharmaceuticals become more expensive, imports fall by 43% and domestic production 
of pharmaceuticals grows by 6.5%. Confronted with higher unit costs of intermediate 
inputs, public and private health care commodity prices increase by 1.8%. 
Consequently, private health care demand falls by 2.1% and, given the government 
closure rule, the production of public health care via the NHS decreases by 1.7%. 
Lower levels of public and private health care imply a fall in the level of health for 
skilled and unskilled labour by 1.8% and 1.76% respectively. The change in health 
status is slightly more pronounced for skilled labour as they consume relatively more of 
private health care, which contracts relatively more. Effective labour supplies fall by 
0.11% and 0.16% for skilled and unskilled workers respectively, leading to a relative 
rise in waiting lists (across all households) of 3.7% and 3.6% for skilled and unskilled 
                                                 
27  Note that this is a different simulation from one which investigates a rise in the world price of 
imports directly, as this will lead to a rise in domestic consumer price of less than 20% as the latter is 
the Armington composite of domestic and import prices (see nesting ). Figure 6.3
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labour respectively. The changes in factor supply and demand lead to a fall in all factor 
rewards (including rental rates of capital) in the range of 0.2% to 0.3%.  
Government income from taxes falls by 0.3%. In order to keep its finances balanced the 
government reduces transfers to households by 0.7%. Given that factor rewards and 
effective labour endowments fall, income from labour and capital falls as well so that all 
households experience a deterioration in income (of 0.6% or less). Working households 
are worse off compared to non-working households by losing labour income on top of 
the losses in income from capital (which are also relatively high for these households) 
and state benefits. For working households with children the loss in state benefits also 
plays a significant role (these households receive 23% of state benefits; see Table 6.3). 
Pensioners are worse off compared to non-working households by suffering significant 
reductions in state benefits (of which they receive 52%; see Table 6.3) as well as 
income from capital, of which they own 47% (from Table 5.8, Chapter 5). Relative to 
original income, the losses for non-working households and pensioners exceed those of 
working households since they have a much smaller income to begin with and rely 
relatively heavily on state benefits (see Table 5.9, Chapter 5).   
A similar picture is obtained for changes in household welfare, measured in terms of the 
; the welfare loss for pensioner households is relatively high and equal to £554 
million. Working households with and without children experience similar welfare 
losses of £564 million and £638 million respectively. The welfare loss for the remaining 
non-working households is much less pronounced in absolute terms - losses of £69 
million and £120 million for non-working household with and without children 
respectively - because they do not enter the labour market so that the deterioration in 
hEV
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health does not affect their labour supply. The  as a measure of change in 
household welfare incorporates the fall in public provision of health care and therefore 
increases the welfare loss for each household. Overall, welfare thereby falls by £2.64 
billion, a deterioration of 0.28%.     
hTEV
6.5.4 Experiment 2b: a pharmaceutical price rise under exogenous NHS provision 
In contrast to the previous experiment, here the government increases its health care 
expenditure in order to maintain real provision levels under the NHS. This scenario is 
implemented by changing the original government closure. Specifically, the exogenous 
variable 0jGEXP  is removed for health care (commodity 10), and equation (6.32) for 
health care is replaced by: 
       (6.42) 
"10""10" "10"DGEXP P G 
where real government consumption of health care, , is exogenous. When 
implementing the pharmaceutical price rise as in Experiment (2a), public health care 
remains at pre-shock levels. The results of Experiment (2a) show that the price of health 
care increases by approximately 1.8% following a 20% pharmaceutical price rise. 
Hence, in order to maintain original levels of public health care provision the 
government matches the price increase by the appropriate increase in expenditures on 
public health care. As this is such a minor change, results differ marginally and a short 
summary is given below. 
"10"G
Domestic output of pharmaceuticals rises by an additional percentage compared to 
Experiment (2a) as more intermediate inputs from the pharmaceutical industry are 
needed to produce the additional public health care. For identical reasons, production of 
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medical, precision and optical instruments expands slightly (instead of contracting as in 
Experiment 2a). By construction, public health care provision is constant, whereas 
private health care contracts by 2.13% relative to the base (2.1% in Experiment 2a).  
In contrast to previous results, the health of unskilled labour, which depends primarily 
on levels of NHS provisioning, is maintained approximately at its original level. Thus, 
unskilled labour participates at a similar rate as before and supplies approximately the 
same amount of labour. In contrast, skilled labour is worse off in terms of health (health 
status falls by 0.4%) and labour participation (falls by 0.02%), leading to a rise in the 
waiting list of 0.7% relative to the base; compared to (Experiment 2a) these changes are 
however small.  
In order to maintain levels of public health care following an increase in the cost of 
provisioning, the government reduces transfer payments to households by more 
compared to Experiment (2a), given expenditures on other goods. In contrast, 
households income from all factors of production falls by less: rents on capital fall by 
slightly less, whereas wages for skilled labour are approximately constant and wages for  
unskilled labour fall by almost twice as much relative to Experiment (2a). As effective 
unskilled labour supply is maintained close to the pre-shock level, overall income from 
this factor of production is higher. However, most households are still worse off 
compared to Experiment (2a), the exception being childless working households who 
least rely on state benefits and supply over half of skilled labour endowments. Adding 
changes in public good provisioning mitigates welfare losses: overall welfare falls by 
£2.14 billion, a deterioration of 0.23% relative to the benchmark; £508 million or 0.05 
percentage points less compared to Experiment (2a), by maintaining levels of NHS care. 
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6.5.5 Experiment 3a: immigration of health care-specific skilled labour under an 
exogenous NHS budget 
In Experiment (1b), the presence of health care-specific skilled labour constrained the 
expansion of the health sector following a rise in government expenditures. In this 
section, the government allows foreign health care-specific skilled workers, 10% of 
domestic endowments of this labour type, to come and work in the UK so as to alleviate 
this constraint, given the government budget for the NHS. Using the same model 
specification as Experiment (1b), foreign workers earn the health care-specific skilled 
wage and possess the same labour market characteristics (i.e. non-participation rate and 
health status), as their domestic counterparts.  
In the presence of remittances further adjustments have to be made to the SCGE model. 
Foreign workers effectively employed in the health care sector, denoted by EFW , 
receive the health care-specific skilled wage, denoted by , so that foreign 
worker income, , amounts to:    
" ,"10FS skillP "
FY
       (6.43) " ,"10"F FS skill EY P FW 
This income is transferred to households in the form of foreign worker transfers, FWT , 
or abroad in the form of remittances, denoted in foreign currency by REM :     
 FY ER REM FWT         (6.44) 
The value of remittances in domestic currency is modelled as a share of foreign worker 
income, RD , where 0 1RDd d : 
 R FER REM YD          (6.45) 
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The value of RD  is varied in the experiment, adopting a value of 0 (no remittances), 0.5 
(50% of foreign worker income is remitted) or 1 (all income is remitted abroad) 
respectively.  
The remittances abroad lower the trade surplus, so that the expression for the trade 
balance, equation (6.33), becomes the balance of payments condition: 
      (6.46)  j jW WE j M jjTS P E P M REM  ¦
The remainder of foreign worker income is distributed over domestic households 
according to each households share of health care-specific skilled labour endowments, 
hFD , where , yielding foreign worker transfers to households, 1hF
h
D  ¦ hFT : 
 
h hF FT FWTD        (6.47) 
The income of household , given by equation (6.25), is adjusted accordingly: h
       (6.48) 
hf f hh E F hfY F P T ¦ FT
In the absence of remittances, a 10% increase in the supply of health care-specific 
skilled workers, from abroad, reduces health care-specific skilled wages and so the 
income of domestic workers of this type by approximately 12% so that unit costs of 
health care output fall and (public and private) health care output rises by 4.9%. This 
stimulates demand for and (domestic) output of pharmaceuticals and medical 
instruments by 3% and 1.3% respectively. As both the public and private health sectors 
expand, the unskilled and the skilled workers benefit equally in terms of health, which 
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improves by 4.9% approximately for both types of labour. Consequently, labour market 
participation increases by 0.3% and 0.4% for skilled and unskilled labour respectively, 
equivalent to a waiting list reduction of approximately 9.2% across all households and 
labour types. 
The changes in relative factor supplies and demand induce changes in factor 
remunerations. Wages of sectorally mobile skilled and unskilled labour fall by 0.06% 
and 0.35% respectively, due to factor substitution in favour of health care-specific 
skilled labour (which lowers demand for other production factors). Health care-specific 
capital rents fall by 3.2% whereas the rents on mobile capital rise by 0.3%.  
In the absence of remittances abroad, the income of all household types rises. 
Households benefit from a rise in income from all non-health care-specific factors, the 
additional income earned by foreign workers, who essentially form new households of 
the existing types (36% of new foreign workers belong to working households with 
children, the remainder belong to mainly childless working households), and from an 
increase in state benefits by 0.43% stemming from a rise in government tax revenues of 
0.17%. Pensioners and non-working households gain by relatively more (0.3% rise in 
income on average, compared to 0.1% for working households), though in absolute 
terms it is the pensioner and working household types that gain most. 
The same picture obtains from changes in household welfare, measured by ; all 
households gain, in absolute terms especially pensioners (who experience a gain of 
£505 million) and working households with and without children (gains of £398 and 
£301 million respectively), though in relative terms the gain for working (and 
pensioner) households is much less pronounced compared to non-working households. 
hEV
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Once changes in public good provisioning are accounted for, welfare gains rise by even 
more, to a total of £4.06 billion (a relative gain of 0.43%).28  
The general equilibrium effects of foreign workers sending remittances abroad operate 
via the trade balance. Since the balance of payments is exogenously fixed to benchmark 
levels, remittances are financed by an increase in exports and/or a reduction in imports 
compared to a situation where foreign worker income is spent domestically. The effects 
of remittances on health care production, and thus health, labour market participation 
and waiting lists are negligible. Nevertheless, household income gains are reduced: if 
50% of foreign worker income is remitted only working households experience income 
losses, whereas if immigrants send all income abroad, all households lose out. This is 
due to a combination of the direct effect of retaining less income from foreign workers, 
more pronounced factor price changes (most notably the fall in wages) and lower 
receipts from government transfers as government tax revenues rise by less or even fall 
(if all immigrant income is remitted). This is reflected in lower welfare gains (or higher 
welfare losses) for households, though when public good provisioning is included all 
households are still better off. Overall welfare (including government consumption of 
goods) rises by £3.231 billion (0.34% in relative terms) and £2.4 billion (0.35% in 
relative terms) if 50% and 100% of foreign worker income is remitted respectively. 
 
28  Excluding foreign workers (and so acknowledging that their domestic colleagues actually experience 
a decline in their earnings) from the welfare measures does not alter these outcomes by much since 
they only form a small percentage, approximately 0.5%, of the overall domestic work force. The 
measure of domestic overall welfare is found to fall by 0.5% compared to the reported overall 
welfare measure for all reported immigration experiments. Hence, our conclusions remain valid once 
foreign workers are excluded from the welfare evaluation. 
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6.5.6 Experiment 3b: immigration of health care-specific skilled labour at a given 
wage 
This experiment is identical to Experiment (3a) apart from the government closure rule. 
Here, the government adjusts public health care provision (and expenditures) so as to 
counteract the fall in health care-specific skilled wages. The latter are now effectively 
fixed relative to the numéraire, implemented as: 
 " ,"10" 1FS skillP E  R        (6.49) 
where the exogenous variable  is removed and   is endogenised, using 
equation (6.42) in place of (6.32) for health care (commodity 10). 
0
"10"GEXP "10"G
In the absence of remittances, NHS provision levels have to rise by 10.3% (equivalent 
to an 11.6% increase in expenditures), compared to 4.9% in Experiment (3a), so as to 
guarantee the foreign (and domestic) workers the original health care-specific skilled 
wage. This induces higher increases in the demand for and domestic production of 
pharmaceutical products (by 5.2%), and medical instruments (by 2.2%) and since unit 
costs of health care provision rise by 1.2% (compared to a reduction of approximately 
4.9% before), the private sector now contracts by 1.2%. 
Given that the public sector expands and the private sector contracts unskilled workers 
benefit relatively more in terms of health compared to skilled workers; health gains for 
the unskilled equal 9.9%, compared to health gains of 8.3% for the skilled, but both 
exceed those in Experiment (3a). Consequently, labour market participation increases 
by 0.4% and 0.8% for skilled and unskilled labour, equivalent to reductions in the 
waiting lists of 15% and 17%, respectively. Factor reward changes are notably different 
as well. Apart from the unchanged health care-specific skilled wage, rents on health 
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care-specific capital rise by 10.5% compared to a fall of 3.2% in Experiment (3a). 
Factor rewards for mobile capital (labour types) rise (fall) as before so that households 
experience a rise in income from all factors of production. 
While government income from taxes increases by 0.5%, the additional government 
expenditures on health care are financed from a reduction in household transfers (which 
fall by 4.2%). As a result of the latter, the incomes of pensioners and non-working 
households fall in the range of 1% to 3.5% approximately. Working households, 
benefiting from the income generated by foreign workers and associated factor price 
changes, gain by relatively more (0.4% versus 0.1% in Experiment 3a).  
The income changes are reflected in welfare changes. Whereas welfare gains (including 
public good provisioning) are approximately £1 billion higher compared to Experiment 
(3a), amounting to £5.124 (0.54% in relative terms), disparities across households have 
grown. Excluding changes in public good provisioning,  non-working households with 
and without children lose by £485 million and £407 million respectively, which 
combined is still less than the welfare loss suffered by pensioners of £1.94 billion 
(though in relative terms the income loss for pensioners compared to non-working 
households is less). In contrast, working households with and without children benefit 
by £261 million and £2.075 billion respectively. Remittances operate as in Experiment 
(3a) and are therefore not discussed here.  
6.5.7 Experiment 4a: factor-neutral technical change (FNTC) 
The productivity of all factors of production (capital, skilled and unskilled labour) in 
health care is increased by 10%. This form of technological progress is implemented by 
reducing the constant term of the Leontief production function for health care, , "10"XA
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in equation (6.5) by 1 11 9.1%| . Hence, for the same volume of health care outputs, 
, 9.1% less factor inputs are used, captured by the value-added aggregate , or 
holding the volume of factor inputs constant, 
"10"X "10"V
 100 100 9.1 100 100 10%    ª º¬ ¼  more 
health care outputs are generated.    
Given government expenditures on health care, the direct effect of the rise in factor 
productivity is to enhance production of health care by 5.9% on average (6.3% for 
private health care and 5.9% for NHS care), reduce health care demands for factor 
inputs by 3.6%, 3.5% and 4.1% for skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital 
respectively, and reduce unit costs of health care production by 5.6%. Via input-output 
linkages this induces increased supply of, especially, pharmaceuticals (3.8%) and 
medical instruments (1.7%). 
Health improvements for skilled and unskilled labour are approximately identical, 6% 
for skilled labour and 5.9% for unskilled labour, due to a corresponding rise in both 
public and private health care provision. Hence, participation in the labour market rises 
by 0.3% and 0.5% and waiting lists fall by 11% and 10.9% for skilled and unskilled 
labour respectively.  
Changes in effective supplies and demands for factors generate changes in factor 
remunerations. Both skilled and unskilled workers receive lower wages, by 0.1% and 
0.3% for skilled and unskilled labour respectively, whereas capital owners are better off 
by 0.4%. Despite reductions in wages, household income from all factors rises due to 
increased effective labour supplies. 
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The adjustments to factor income, combined with a rise in income from state benefits of 
0.9% (originating from a rise in government tax income of 0.3%), yield income gains 
across all households, especially for pensioners and working households, though the 
relative gains (in the range of 0.2% to 0.8%) are higher for pensioners and non-working 
households as they have a smaller income in the first place (and rely relatively heavily 
on state benefits).  
An examination of welfare variables yields similar results. In absolute terms, and 
excluding changes in public good provisioning, pensioners gain by £1 billion. For non-
working households with and without children these gains are £112 million and £236 
million respectively. Welfare of working households with and without children also 
improves significantly, by £871 and £806 million. Including changes in the 
governments consumption of goods improves welfare, especially of pensioners and 
working households who receive a relative large share (see Table 6.3), by even more, 
resulting in a total welfare gain of £6.3 billion (a relative gain of 0.67%). 
6.5.8 Experiment 4b: skill-biased technical change (SBTC) 
In contrast to Experiment (4a), here technological progress in the health sector enhances 
only the productivity of skilled labour by 10% (this amounts to savings in skilled labour 
inputs of 1 11 9.1%|  given health care outputs).  
An improvement in the productivity of only one factor enhances health care production 
by 3.9% on average (4.1% and 3.9% for private and public health care respectively), 
unsurprisingly less than with the 10% FNTC improvement. Given government 
expenditures on health care, the health sector demands 5.4% less skilled labour, but 
3.6% and 3.4% more unskilled labour and capital respectively and produces at a 3.7% 
A SCGE MODEL FOR THE UK WITH HEALTH CARE PROVISION 
 
 6-44
lower unit cost, approximately two percentage points less than in Experiment (4a). 
Domestic outputs of the main input suppliers of health care rise by 2.6% and 1.1% for 
pharmaceuticals and medical instruments respectively.  
Since fewer health improvements are realised (3.9% gain in health compared to 5.9% in 
Experiment 4a), effective supplies of skilled and unskilled labour rise only by 0.2% and 
0.3% and waiting lists fall by 7.4% and 7.3% respectively for skilled and unskilled 
labour. The fall in demand for skilled labour in health care, combined with the rise in its 
effective supply, results in lower skilled wages (a fall of 0.3%), whereas unskilled 
wages and capital rents rise by 0.1% and 0.4% respectively. Consequently, income from 
skilled labour falls and income from other factors of production rises. These factor 
market adjustments, combined with lower rises in government tax revenue and state 
benefits (0.1% and 0.4% lower respectively) yield less generous household income 
gains (which for SBTC lie in the range of 0.1% to 0.5%), although the previously 
observed patterns still hold.  
In absolute terms, and excluding government consumption, households are better off by 
£837 million for pensioners, £72 and £190 million for non-working households with 
and without children and £493 and £328 for their working equivalents. These figures 
are low compared to FNTC, an outcome exacerbated once changes in public good 
provisioning are included in welfare. Overall welfare then improves by £4.1 billion (a 
relative gain of 0.4%) for SBTC, compared to £6.3 billion observed for FNTC.  
6.5.9 Experiment 5a: technical change in pharmaceuticals - increasing the price 
and productivity of pharmaceuticals in health care 
This simulation acknowledges that the 20% price increase in pharmaceuticals observed 
over the last three years may well be a sign of improvements in the effectiveness of 
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pharmaceuticals, which yield savings in the health care sector. Starting off with the 
setup of Experiment (2a), technical change in pharmaceuticals is assumed to generate a 
rise in the productivity of pharmaceuticals in the health care sector of ȕ%. The constant 
term  in equation (6.6) accordingly falls by "2","10"A  1 100 100 100%E  ª¬ º¼ . ȕ § 20% 
is the minimum productivity rise required for the health care sector to expand29, whereas 
ȕ § 30% is the lower boundary for a positive overall welfare impact (including public 
good provisioning; excluding the latter requires  ȕ § 60%). Results are reported for 20% 
 ȕ  100%. 
For ȕ  20% the productivity improvements counteract the negative health and welfare 
effects of higher intermediate input costs observed in Experiment (2a). The savings in 
the use of more expensive pharmaceuticals yield a fall in the unit costs of health care, an 
equivalent expansion of public health care production (given government expenditures 
on health care), and lower health care demands for pharmaceutical inputs, with a value 
close to  1 100 100 100%E  ª¬ º¼
                                                
, since the health sector expands little (by less than 
5%). The increase in public health care provision partially crowds out private health 
care, which expands by approximately 0.2% less compared to public health care (or 
even contracts for the lower boundary of ȕ = 20%). The rise in the domestic consumer 
price of pharmaceuticals, driven by a 42% rise in the world price of imports and a 4% 
rise in the domestic producer price (see also Experiment 2a), induces a fall in final 
demands of all categories (domestic and export demands), whereas intermediate 
demand declines due to the more efficient use of pharmaceuticals in the health care 
 
29  This is also the condition for adoption of the technique (i.e. progress) that per unit of output of health 
care, production costs should fall, , where 
superscripts 0, 1 indicate the situation before and after the technical change respectively.   
1 1 0 1 0 0
"2" "2","10" "2" "2","10" "2" "2","10"1.2PD A PD A PD A    d 
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sector. In response, domestic commodity supply and sectoral production of the 
pharmaceutical industry adjust downwards. Similarly, the foreign supply of 
pharmaceuticals from imports drops due to the rise in world import prices.  
The expansion of the health care sector, albeit small, brings about a rise in the health of 
the unskilled and skilled population (of less than 5%), and only slightly more so for the 
former as they primarily consume public health care (the difference never exceeds 
0.03% and approaches zero as ȕ rises). Consequently, effective labour supplies increase 
and waiting lists fall, by less than 0.4% and 9% respectively. Factor demand changes 
follow the adjustments in sectoral production and, combined with the rise in labour 
market participation, induce reductions in all factor remunerations of less than 0.4%. In 
addition, government transfers to household fall by 0.6% or less due to lower receipts 
from taxes on products and factors so that, combined with income losses from all 
factors of production, all households experience a decline in income (but of less than 
0.5%). The fall in incomes becomes even less pronounced as higher productivity gains 
of pharmaceuticals in health care are realised.  
In absolute terms pensioners, and to a lesser extent working households with children, 
suffer especially from losses in state benefits, the former also being relatively hard hit 
by the fall in rental income on capital, whereas working households lose a significant 
amount of labour income. Consequently, pensioners and working households suffer the 
largest declines in incomes compared to non-working households, whereas in relative 
terms pensioners and non-working households are relatively hard hit compared to 
working households as their income, consisting largely of state benefits, is much 
smaller.  
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The same pattern emerges for absolute and relative welfare changes. Excluding changes 
in public good provisioning, pensioners and non-working households with and without 
children experience welfare losses of at most £387 million, £55 million and £77 million 
respectively, whereas working households with and without children lose £283 million 
and £275 million at most. Adding benefits from public good provisioning to these 
figures turns the losses into gains for most households for ȕ  32%, with the exception 
of pensioner households who benefit only for ȕ  41%. Overall welfare gains (including 
public good provisioning) depend positively on ȕ and lie in the range of -£714 million (-
0.075%) to £3.22 billion (0.34%) for the specified range for ȕ. 
6.5.10 Experiment 5b: technical change in pharmaceuticals - increasing the 
pharmaceutical price and productivity of all inputs in health care  
The issue investigated in this experiment is that of the improvement in the cost-
effectiveness of pharmaceuticals modelled in Experiment (5a) leading to a more 
efficient use of other inputs in the health service as well. Let Ȗ indicate the productivity 
rise (in %) in all intermediate and factor inputs other than pharmaceuticals in health 
care.  Naturally, adding a Ȗ% rise in productivity of non-pharmaceutical inputs to a 
given ȕ% rise in the productivity of pharmaceuticals used in health care yields higher 
welfare gains. Driving this result is that the savings in other inputs yield a greater fall in 
unit cost of health care and, given the health care budget, a greater expansion of public 
health care. Consequently, health care demands for pharmaceuticals fall by less and the 
contraction of the pharmaceutical sector observed in Experiment (5a), and the fall in 
pharmaceutical exports and imports, is less pronounced. Private health care expands 
relatively (0.02 percentage points) more than public health care since the additional 
productivity gains yield income gains, as opposed to losses in Experiment (5a), across 
all households, who subsequently buy more of health care and other goods. 
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The greater expansion of public and private health care yields higher health gains 
compared to Experiment (5a). For example, adding a Ȗ = 5% rise in productivity of non-
pharmaceutical inputs to a given ȕ% rise in the productivity of pharmaceuticals yields 
an additional health gain of approximately eight percentage points for both skilled and 
unskilled labour, with the former benefiting relatively more as they consume more 
private health care (again the difference disappears for larger ȕ). The improved health 
impacts upon effective labour supplies, which expand by an additional 0.5 percentage 
points, and induces a fall in waiting lists of an extra 14 percentage points.  
The larger increase in effective labour supplies, despite inducing bigger reductions in 
wages and a rise in rents on capital, yields income gains for all factors of production so 
that, combined with a rise in income from state benefits, all households income rises: 
in relative terms especially for pensioners and non-working households, since they have 
a much smaller income compared to working households (consisting for a large part of 
state benefits); in absolute terms mainly for pensioners and working households, who 
gain from increased earnings in the factor market (labour and capital) and, for 
pensioners and to a lesser extent working households with children, from the rise in 
state benefits. Similar conclusions follow from absolute and relative welfare changes. 
The rise in public good provisioning yields significant overall welfare gains, for 
example for Ȗ = 5%, and 20%  ȕ  100%, overall welfare gains (including public 
goods) lie in the range of £7.45 billion (0.79%) to £11.6 billion (1.23%). 
To put these welfare gains into perspective, if the technical change embodied in a more 
expensive pharmaceutical product is such that the productivity of non-pharmaceutical 
inputs in health care rises by Ȗ = 1%, then an increase in the productivity of 
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pharmaceuticals in health care of ȕ § 9% or more is sufficient to guarantee overall 
welfare gains (including gains from public good provisioning; excluding the latter ȕ § 
28% is required). In contrast, productivity improvements in non-pharmaceutical health 
care inputs of Ȗ = 2% do not require any productivity gains in pharmaceutical inputs for 
overall welfare effects to be positive (excluding public good provisioning ȕ § 7% is 
required, and Ȗ = 3% does not require any productivity gains in pharmaceutical inputs).  
In conclusion, small productivity gains (i.e. savings) in all health care inputs are 
sufficient for technical progress in pharmaceuticals to enhance overall welfare.  
6.6 A COMPARISON OF THE POLICIES/SHOCKS  
Tables 6.5, 6.6 and Figure 6.5 to 6.9 summarise the key results of the experiments.30  
The last column of Table 6.5 shows that encouraging an inflow of foreign skilled 
workers of 10% (Experiment 3) generally leads to higher welfare gains than an increase 
in the health care budget of 10% (Experiment 1), and certainly so if one compares the 
experiments with the same model specification (i.e. Experiment 3 and 1b). In addition, 
welfare gains of a 10% FNTC (Experiment 4a) or a 10% SBTC (Experiment 4b) 
outweigh those realised when increasing the health care budget by the same percentage 
(Experiment 1a), or when increasing the inflow of health care-specific skilled labour by 
10% using immigrant labour (Experiment 3), but where the government maintains 
health care-specific skilled wages (Experiment 3b), only if more than half of foreign 
worker income is remitted. 
 
30  Figures 6.5 to 6.7 report values for Experiment 3 in the absence of remittances as the effect on health 
related variables is negligible. The results of Experiment 5a and b are not included as values for the 
productivity gains are highly experimental. 
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Table 6.5 Welfare changes in Equivalent Variations including changes in public 
good provisioning31
 
EVT HSE1 HSE2 HSE3 HSE4 HSE5 Overall
Millions £ -1040 -36 -80 1169 2460 2474
% -0.49 -0.13 -0.17 0.40 0.67 0.26
Millions £ -1460 -248 -270 657 2244 920
% -0.69 -0.93 -0.59 0.22 0.61 0.10
Millions £ -747 -135 -178 -763 -821 -2640
% -0.35 -0.50 -0.39 -0.26 -0.22 -0.28
Millions £ -909 -140 -188 -537 -363 -2140
% -0.43 -0.52 -0.41 -0.18 -0.10 -0.23
Millions £ 1175 284 330 1219 1052 4060
% 0.55 1.06 0.72 0.42 0.29 0.43
Millions £ 1070 271 313 951 625 3231
% 0.50 1.01 0.68 0.32 0.17 0.34
Millions £ 965 258 297 683 198 2400
% 0.45 0.96 0.65 0.23 0.05 0.25
Millions £ -533 3 19 1984 3651 5124
% -0.25 0.01 0.04 0.68 0.99 0.54
Millions £ -656 -13 -0.4 1678 3166 4174
% -0.31 -0.05 0.00 0.57 0.86 0.44
Millions £ -778 -29 -20 1371 2679 3223
% -0.37 -0.11 -0.04 0.47 0.73 0.34
Millions £ 1835 394 482 1870 1720 6300
% 0.86 1.47 1.05 0.64 0.47 0.67
Millions £ 1382 261 355 1175 952 4126
% 0.65 0.98 0.77 0.40 0.26 0.44
50%
100%
EXP1A
EXP1B
Scenario
EXP4A
EXP4B
EXP2A
EXP2B
EXP3A 
(Remittances 
in % of 
foreign 
worker 
income)
EXP3B 
(Remittances 
in % of 
foreign 
worker 
income)
0%
50%
100%
0%
 
 
As expected, the picture that emerges from the welfare effects of the simulations is a lot 
less optimistic if changes in public good provisioning are excluded from the welfare 
measures (Table 6.6). In Experiment (1), (2b), (3) and (4) welfare gains fall and losses 
rise since the expansion of the public health care sector does not constitute a welfare 
gain (in Experiment (2a) welfare losses are reduced since the contraction of the public 
health care sector does not constitute a welfare loss). Additionally, a 10% increase in 
public health care expenditures under fully mobile factors of production (Experiment 
1a) yields higher welfare losses compared to a rise in the domestic consumer price of 
                                                 
31  The (change in household welfare) and  (change in overall welfare) both include changes 
in public good provisioning and are reported in absolute terms (£ million) and relative to original 
income, i.e. as a % of original expenditures on goods (including government consumption) and 
savings. Household equivalent variations may not add up to overall welfare changes due to small 
measurement errors. 
hTEV TEV
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pharmaceuticals (Experiment 2). This somewhat counterintuitive result is explained by 
the reduction in other expenditures (in this model, state benefits) needed to finance the 
increase in the health care budget. Furthermore, only technical progress of 10% in 
health care (Experiment 4) and the immigration of foreign health care-specific skilled 
workers of 10% of domestic endowments, with wages adjusting accordingly and 50% or 
less of income remitted abroad, are welfare enhancing.  
Table 6.6 Welfare changes in Equivalent Variations excluding changes in public 
good provisioning32
EV HSE1 HSE2 HSE3 HSE4 HSE5 Overall
Millions £ -2390 -504 -489 -476 955 -2900
% -1.35 -3.57 -1.39 -0.21 0.31 -0.38
Millions £ -2060 -457 -452 -80 1570 -1480
% -1.16 -3.23 -1.29 -0.03 0.50 -0.19
Millions £ -554 -69 -120 -564 -638 -1940
% -0.31 -0.49 -0.34 -0.24 -0.20 -0.25
Millions £ -952 -155 -201 -626 -444 -2380
% -0.54 -1.10 -0.57 -0.27 -0.14 -0.31
Millions £ 505 52 127 398 301 1384
% 0.28 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.10 0.18
Millions £ 371 29 102 77 -174 404
% 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.03 -0.06 0.05
Millions £ 238 5 76 -246 -651 -577
% 0.13 0.03 0.22 -0.11 -0.21 -0.08
Millions £ -1940 -485 -407 261 2075 -496
% -1.09 -3.43 -1.16 0.11 0.66 -0.06
Millions £ -2100 -512 -436 -106 1533 -1620
% -1.18 -3.63 -1.25 -0.05 0.49 -0.21
Millions £ -2250 -540 -466 -475 991 -2740
% -1.27 -3.82 -1.33 -0.21 0.32 -0.36
Millions £ 1023 112 236 871 806 3048
% 0.58 0.79 0.67 0.38 0.26 0.40
Millions £ 837 72 190 493 328 1921
% 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.21 0.11 0.25
Scenario
EXP1A
EXP1B
EXP2A
EXP2B
EXP3A 
(Remittan
ces in % 
of foreign 
worker 
income)
0%
50%
100%
EXP4A
EXP4B
EXP3B 
(Remittan
ces in % 
of foreign 
worker 
income)
0%
50%
100%
 
 
The observed patterns from Table 6.5 nevertheless carry over to the welfare measures 
excluding changes in public good provisioning: Experiment (3) still outperforms 
Experiment (1) (apart from Experiment (3b), which, if approximately 50% or more of 
                                                 
32  In absolute terms and relative to original income, i.e. expenditures on goods (excluding public goods) 
and savings. Household EVs may not add up to the total due to small measurement errors. 
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foreign worker income is remitted, yields higher welfare losses compared to Experiment 
1b), and Experiment (4) yields the greatest welfare gains. 
Nevertheless, as is obvious from Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, if the government maintains 
health care-specific skilled wages (Experiment 3b), attracting foreign workers performs 
better in terms of health status, participation in the labour market and reducing the 
waiting list compared to technological change in the health sector (Experiment 4) and 
increasing the health care budget (Experiment 1). If the government allows health care-
specific skilled wages to adjust (Experiment 3a), such a policy still yields greater health 
and labour market participation gains compared to an increase in health expenditures 
using the same model specification (i.e. Experiment 1b), but it does only better than 
skill-biased, not factor-neutral, technical change in the health care sector. 
The latter policy of a 10% increase in the health budget yields relatively low health and 
welfare gains if specificity of skilled labour and high-tech capital in health care 
(Experiment 1b) is taken into account, if one acknowledges the welfare effects from 
changes in public good provisioning (see Table 6.5). Pharmaceutical price rises 
(Experiment 2) also lower welfare. Otherwise, using Table 6.6, any measure which 
curbs the expansion of the health care sector and associated costs, e.g. the presence of 
health care-specific factors (Experiment 1b relative to 1a) or not maintaining NHS 
provision levels when pharmaceutical prices rise (Experiment 2a relative to 2b), reduces 
welfare losses. 
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Figure 6.5 Change in health status
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Figure 6.6 Non-participation rate of labour
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Figure 6.7 Change in waiting list
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The negative welfare effects of a 20% rise in the domestic consumer price of 
pharmaceuticals may become welfare gains if it is assumed that the more expensive 
pharmaceutical product embodies a technical (quality) improvement, which makes the 
health care sector more efficient in terms of the use of pharmaceuticals and other inputs 
(Experiment 5). It was found that small productivity gains across a wide range of health 
care inputs are sufficient to enhance overall welfare.  
Figure 6.8 Changes in household welfare (incl. 
public goods)
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Figure 6.9 Changes in household welfare (excl. 
public goods)
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Furthermore, according to Table 6.5 and Figure 6.8 household interests do not always 
align. Technical change (Experiment 4) benefits and thus will be supported by all 
households. The same is true for foreign health care-specific skilled workers coming to 
work in the UK at an endogenous wage (Experiment 3a), although in this case domestic 
health care-specific skilled workers lose out. Conversely, pharmaceutical price rises 
(Experiment 2) make all households worse off and thus will be unpopular with all 
households. With respect to the remaining policies, household interests differ strongly. 
Government policy aimed at encouraging highly skilled foreign doctors and nurses to 
come and work in the UK at the current wage will benefit working households, whilst 
non-working households, and especially pensioner households, generally lose. A similar 
argument holds with respect to an expansion of the government budget on health care, 
which will have to be at the cost of other government expenditures (here transfers to 
households, on which pensioners and non-working households rely relatively heavily as 
a source of income). Excluding direct improvements in well-being from public good 
provisioning generally, apart from Experiment (2a), lowers the values of the equivalent 
variations so that fewer households gain and those that were already losing, lose by 
more (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.9). 
Whereas it is useful to rank the experiments based purely on the outcomes, from the 
perspective of policy making, a proper evaluation of policies necessitates a comparison 
of the outcomes relative to the costs of implementation. The policies which improve the 
productivity of health care inputs via technical change that is factor-neutral or skill-
biased are essentially free lunches in the sense that these policies come at no 
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additional cost to the government33, so that - based on solely the two overall welfare 
measures - these experiments are found to outperform the policy of increasing the health 
care budget.34  Whether this conclusion still holds if costs faced by the government are 
taken into account remains an empirical question and no estimates are available as yet to 
comment on this. Further insights into the policy of technical change in health care may 
be obtained by translating the effects in terms of the rise in the government budget on 
health care required to obtain the same overall welfare gain (including public good 
provisioning). It can be shown that an increase in government expenditures on health 
care of 37.9% yields the same overall welfare gain as when implementing a 10% factor-
neutral technical change (Experiment 4a), whereas an increase of 19.1% results in an 
identical rise in overall welfare as a 10% skill-biased technical change (Experiment 4b).  
With respect to the policies of importing health care-specific skilled labour and 
technical change which improves the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals in health 
care, some additional costs could have been involved, respectively, in terms of wage 
payments and a more expensive pharmaceutical product.  However, in Experiment (3a) 
and (5) the government budget was held fixed. Hence, the conclusion, that a policy of 
encouraging foreign skilled workers equal to 10% of domestic endowments to come and 
work in the UK health sector, whilst allowing their wage to adjust, outperforms the 
policy of a 10% increase in the health care budget (especially using the same model 
specification), remains valid once additional costs to the government are accounted 
 
33  These technological improvements may be funded by, say, charitable institutions, or may have been 
made in other countries yet be freely available. 
34  Technical change in factors is imposed exogenously and not modelled as an endogenous process.  
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for.35 Only in Experiment (3b) do government expenditures on health care rise so as to 
sustain health care-specific skilled wages. Specifically, when foreign worker income is 
remitted, government health expenditures have to rise by 11.64% to sustain their wage. 
Such an increase in expenditures per se can be shown to yield a rise in welfare including 
changes in welfare from public good provisioning of respectively £2.808 billion (£1.038 
billion) in the presence of mobile (health care-specific) factors, i.e. using the model 
specification of Experiment (1a) (1b). These gains are lower than those following from 
the immigration policy such that, again, the conclusion must be that immigration of 
foreign skilled workers at the current wage, even when the costs to the government of 
such a policy are acknowledged, yields higher overall welfare gains.36  
6.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In Chapter 1 it was noted that one of the main weaknesses of CGE modelling is the 
sensitivity of results to assumptions made, for example with regards to the behaviour of 
agents, the functioning of markets and the choice of key parameter values. Whereas 
Experiments (1) to (5) have tested the results for sensitivity with respect to especially 
the first two types of assumption, this section reports on the sensitivity of the results to 
alternate parameter specifications. In Chapter 2 it was shown that the effects of changes 
in health care provision on non-health care outputs crucially depend upon the magnitude 
of the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health care, i.e. the waiting list 
elasticity and the dependency ratio. Whereas the latter has been empirically estimated in 
 
35  Such conclusions with respect to Experiment (5) cannot be made due to the uncertainty regarding the 
productivity gains in health care relative to the price increase of pharmaceuticals. 
36  Using the indicator of changes in private welfare, an 11.64% rise in the government budget on health 
care results in welfare losses of £3.448 and £1.741 billion respectively using the model specification 
of Experiment (1a) and (1b). Hence, only if more than 50% of foreign worker income is remitted, an 
increase in the health care budget of 11.64% will yield lower welfare losses, using the same model 
specification.  
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Section 6.4.4, the waiting list elasticity parameter has been assigned a value of 2. Given 
that no reliable estimate exists, the sensitivity analyses focus mainly on that waiting list 
elasticity (H ).37 The remainder of this section investigates the sensitivity of the results 
to the elasticities of transformation and substitution. 
6.7.1 Waiting list elasticity 
Firstly, values for this parameter are varied while adhering to the assumption of equal 
elasticities across labour types. Secondly, this section considers unilateral changes in the 
waiting elasticity for skilled labour, whilst keeping the waiting list elasticity for 
unskilled labour at the benchmark level of 2. The former procedure tests the sensitivity 
of model results to the effectiveness of a change in health care provisioning in treating 
and/or curing people across all labour types, whereas the latter procedure shows how 
model outcomes are altered by allowing for skill-biased health effects - implying that a 
given increase in health care provisioning treats and/or cures more skilled workers 
relative to unskilled workers.38 As altering the level of the waiting list elasticity 
impinges upon the effectiveness of a change in health care provisioning, the sensitivity 
analysis is carried out for Experiment (1a), which simulates an increase in public health 
care expenditures. The observed patterns carry over to the other experiments. 
The results of Experiment (1a) are relatively robust to skill-biased and skill-neutral 
changes in the waiting list elasticity - differences are generally within the margin of 1-2 
percentage points - though the sign of effects and magnitudes for health (care) and 
labour market related variables (including changes in welfare) is affected. When 
                                                 
37  Subscripts are omitted for simplicity. The waiting list elasticity is referred to in absolute value. 
38  In other words, health care expenditures are either targeted more towards skilled workers or skilled 
workers respond better to treatment. 
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simulating a 10% increase in levels of NHS care (Experiment 1a), the following 
patterns can be observed from uniform increases in the waiting list elasticities:  
The higher the waiting list elasticity, the more the non-participation rate and the size of 
the waiting lists are reduced for a 10% increase in public health care expenditures. 
Eventually, the more pronounced expansion in effective labour endowments ensures 
that the production of all goods rises. This includes both public and private health care 
provisioning, which in turn magnifies the positive health effects. Skilled and unskilled 
labourers are relatively less scarce in supply, so that wages for both labour types fall 
whereas rents on capital rise. As more people return to the labour force and so more is 
produced in the economy for a given increase in NHS expenditures, the government 
sees its tax revenue rise so that it needs to reduce transfer payments to households by 
less in order to finance the increase in the health care budget. Consequently, more and 
more households gain; at first only working households, but for higher levels of the 
waiting list elasticity also pensioners and non-working households. Overall welfare 
(including government consumption of goods) rises for relatively low values of the 
waiting list elasticities (the boundary value is 0.375) and increases by more for higher 
values. The overall welfare measure which ignores direct improvements in well-being 
from public good provisioning requires much higher waiting list elasticity values for 
welfare effects to become positive (the boundary value is 4.285).  
Skill-biased increases in the waiting list elasticities reveal much the same tendencies, 
except when it comes to labour market variables; a given 10% increase in public health 
care expenditures reduces the non-participation rate and the size of the waiting list for 
skilled labour by more, the higher the waiting list elasticity for skilled labour. Given 
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that the waiting list elasticity for unskilled labour remains at the benchmark level of 2, 
the changes in the non-participation rate and the waiting list for this type of labour in 
Experiment (1a) are not affected by the increase in the waiting list elasticity. For higher 
levels of the waiting list elasticity of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour, only 
skilled labour becomes relatively less scarce in supply, so that wages for skilled labour 
fall, whereas rents on capital and unskilled wages rise. Comparison of the sensitivity of 
overall welfare changes in Experiment (1a) to uniform and skill-biased changes in the 
waiting list elasticity reveals that welfare gains are lower if the waiting list elasticity for 
unskilled labour lags behind that of skilled labour, i.e. if the change in NHS treatment 
levels treats and/or cures relatively more skilled workers.  
The effect of changing the waiting list elasticity is illustrated in Figure 6.10 for a 
selection of variables. Results are reported for uniform or skill-biased changes in the 
waiting list elasticities, where the relevant elasticities parameters are set to values of 0, 
1... 10 (in scenario sc0, sc1... sc10, respectively).39 A waiting list elasticity of zero 
illustrates the direct impact of additional health expenditures on the economy (and 
welfare), and suppresses the indirect effects of improving (household) income through 
increased labour market participation. This may be interpreted as the short run 
economic impact of expanding health care, as opposed to the long run, in which 
consequent health improvements materialise. For completeness, the impact of uniform 
changes in the waiting list elasticities for the remaining experiments are reported as well 
in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, using indicators of overall welfare changes which respectively 
include and exclude public goods.  
 
39  For skill-biased changes, the waiting list elasticity for unskilled labour remains at a level of 2, 
whereas the skilled waiting list elasticity adopts aforementioned values. 
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Figure 6.10 Sensitivity of results in Experiment (1a) to the waiting list elasticity 
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Table 6.7 Relative change in overall welfare (incl. public goods) 
Scenario: H  Experiment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1a -0.065 0.104 0.261 0.407 0.542 0.667 0.783 0.889 0.988 1.078 1.161 
1b -0.030 0.034 0.097 0.161 0.224 0.288 0.351 0.414 0.476 0.537 0.598 
2a -0.200 -0.239 -0.279 -0.321 -0.363 -0.408 -0.453 -0.501 -0.550 -0.602 -0.655 
2b -0.213 -0.220 -0.226 -0.232 -0.238 -0.244 -0.251 -0.257 -0.264 -0.271 -0.277 
3a -0% 0.232 0.331 0.429 0.525 0.619 0.710 0.799 0.885 0.969 1.048 1.125 
3a - 50% 0.143 0.243 0.341 0.438 0.532 0.624 0.713 0.800 0.883 0.963 1.040 
3a - 100% 0.054 0.155 0.253 0.350 0.445 0.538 0.627 0.714 0.798 0.878 0.955 
3b -0% 0.211 0.379 0.541 0.696 0.843 0.981 1.109 1.228 1.338 1.438 1.529 
3b - 50% 0.110 0.279 0.441 0.596 0.743 0.881 1.009 1.128 1.237 1.337 1.428 
3b - 100% 0.009    0.178    0.340  0.496  0.643  0.780  0.909  1.028 1.137   1.237  1.328    
4a 0.430 0.550 0.665 0.775 0.879 0.978 1.072 1.161 1.246 1.325 1.401 
4b 0.277 0.358 0.436 0.512 0.586 0.657 0.727 0.794 0.859 0.922 0.983 
                                                                                                                                                                
Table 6.8 Relative change in overall welfare (excl. public goods) 
Scenario: H  Experiment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1a -0.765 -0.564 -0.377 -0.204 -0.044 0.105 0.242 0.369 0.485 0.592 0.691 
1b -0.339 -0.266 -0.193 -0.120 -0.046 0.027 0.100 0.172 0.243 0.314 0.383 
2a -0.159 -0.205 -0.253 -0.302 -0.353 -0.405 -0.460 -0.516 -0.575 -0.635 -0.699 
2b -0.295 -0.302 -0.309 -0.317 -0.324 -0.331 -0.339 -0.347 -0.354 -0.362 -0.370 
3a -0% -0.046 0.068 0.180 0.290 0.398 0.503 0.605 0.704 0.799 0.891 0.979 
3a - 50% -0.175 -0.060 0.053 0.163 0.271 0.377 0.480 0.579 0.674 0.766 0.855 
3a - 100% -0.303 -0.188 -0.075 0.036 0.145 0.251 0.354 0.454 0.550 0.642 0.730 
3b -0% -0.427 -0.243 -0.064 0.106 0.267 0.418 0.559 0.689 0.809 0.919 1.019 
3b - 50% -0.574 -0.389 -0.210 -0.040 0.121 0.272 0.413 0.544 0.663 0.773 0.872 
3b - 100% -0.720 -0.535 -0.356 -0.186 -0.025 0.127 0.267 0.398 0.517 0.627 0.726 
4a 0.117 0.260 0.396 0.526 0.650 0.768 0.879 0.985 1.085 1.180 1.269 
4b 0.061 0.157 0.250 0.340 0.428 0.513 0.596 0.676 0.753 0.828 0.900 
 
The shaded areas indicate values for the waiting list elasticity in between which a sign 
change occurs. As the results show, for the welfare indicator which acknowledges the 
direct improvements in well-being from better health (Table 6.7) such changes occur 
only for Experiment (1), but at a relatively low level (less than 1). The welfare indicator 
which does not incorporate direct gains in well-being is less robust and changes sign in 
Experiments (1) and (3). For the former the change occurs at a relatively high level of 
the elasticity (between 4 and 5), whereas for the latter experiment the sign change 
occurs at a low level (less than 1), but gradually moves up if more remittances are sent 
home (and if the health-care specific skilled wage is maintained at pre-shock levels).   
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Figure 6.11 Combinations of the waiting list elasticity and the rise in the 
government health budget yielding identical overall welfare gains (incl. public 
goods) - using the model specification of Experiment (1a) 
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The importance of making the additional health care expenditures count, i.e. ensuring 
value for money, is shown in Figure 6.11 by plotting the increase in the government 
health budget required to achieve the same overall welfare gains (including gains from 
public good provisioning) as a 100% rise in this budget assuming a waiting list 
elasticity of 2, when the waiting list elasticity for skilled and unskilled labour (in 
absolute value) rises incrementally by 50 percentage points, using the model 
specification of Experiment (1a). It shows the potential savings in the government 
health budget when the additional expenditures are more effectively treating and/or 
curing people. For example, an increase in the waiting list elasticity for skilled and 
unskilled labour from 2 to 3 requires a rise in public health expenditures of only 28.5% 
compared to 100% before, yielding savings in public health expenditures of 71.5%. 
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6.7.2 Elasticities of substitution and transformation 
This section assesses the sensitivity of the results to the elasticities of substitution ( SV ) 
and transformation ( TV ) in the CES and CET functions respectively, as well as the 
elasticity of substitution in the value-added composite, referred to in this section as 
VV .40 The former two elasticities were assigned values of 2 in the SCGE model, 
whereas the latter, which uses the CD functional form, has been assigned a value of 1. 
The alternative values that are considered are 50% and 200% of the original values.41 
These changes are introduced separately for the respective elasticities and the impact 
upon key welfare indicators is shown in Table 6.9 and 6.10, reporting changes in overall 
welfare including public goods and excluding public goods respectively.42
Table 6.9 Relative change in overall welfare (incl. public goods) 
Scenario: % change in overall 
welfare (incl. public 
goods) 
Base 
elasticities 0.5 VV  2 VV  0.5 SV  2 SV  0.5 TV  2 TV  
Experiment 1a 0.261 0.263 0.261  0.261 0.262 0.261  0.262 
Experiment 1b 0.097 0.060 0.143  0.097  0.098 0.097 0.098 
Experiment 2a -0.279 -0.280 -0.279 -0.278 -0.283  -0.279 -0.279 
Experiment 2b -0.226 -0.226  -0.226 -0.231 -0.221  -0.224 -0.226 
Experiment 3a -0% 0.429 0.454 0.394  0.429 0.428 0.429 0.429 
Experiment 3a - 50% 0.341 0.371 0.303 0.341  0.341  0.341 0.341 
Experiment 3a - 100% 0.253  0.287  0.212 0.253   0.253   0.254 0.253 
Experiment 3b -0% 0.541 0.535 0.544  0.541 0.542 0.541 0.542 
Experiment 3b - 50% 0.441 0.434 0.445 0.440  0.442 0.441  0.441  
Experiment 3b - 100% 0.340 0.333 0.345 0.339  0.342  0.340   0.341 
Experiment 4a 0.665 0.667 0.664 0.665 0.666 0.665  0.666 
Experiment 4b 0.436 0.437  0.435  0.436 0.436  0.435 0.436 
 
 
                                                 
40  Subscripts are omitted for simplicity. 
41  This is conform common practice. Devarajan et al. (1997, p166 and further) note that with respect to 
the elasticity of substitution and transformation, for developed countries, its value is likely to lie 
above 1. Trade is usually with similar high-income countries and goods are of the same high quality 
and so highly substitutable. See also footnote 15. 
42  Experiment 5 is not shown in the table, though unreported simulations confirm that welfare changes 
from changing the respective elasticities are negligible for any combination of gamma and beta. 
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Table 6.10 Relative change in overall welfare (excl. public goods) 
Scenario: % change in overall 
welfare (excl. public 
goods) 
Base 
elasticities 0.5 VV  2 VV  0.5 SV  2 SV  0.5 TV  2 TV  
Experiment 1a -0.377 -0.378 -0.377  -0.377  -0.378   -0.376 -0.378 
Experiment 1b -0.193 -0.154 -0.242  -0.192 -0.194  -0.192 -0.194  
Experiment 2a -0.253 -0.252  -0.253  -0.303  -0.192  -0.240  -0.259 
Experiment 2b -0.309 -0.308  -0.310  -0.354  -0.256 -0.298  -0.314  
Experiment 3a - 0% 0.180 0.135 0.226 0.179  0.181 0.180  0.180  
Experiment 3a - 50% 0.053 0.014  0.093 0.046 0.060 0.046 0.059 
Experiment 3a - 100% -0.075 -0.107  -0.040 -0.087 -0.062  -0.088   -0.062 
Experiment 3b -0% -0.064  -0.089 -0.052 -0.064   -0.065    -0.063 -0.066  
Experiment 3b - 50% -0.210  -0.234 -0.200  -0.216 -0.204  -0.217 -0.204 
Experiment 3b - 100% -0.356 -0.379 -0.347  -0.369 -0.343 -0.371 -0.342 
Experiment 4a 0.396 0.386 0.402 0.396 0.397  0.397 0.396 
Experiment 4b 0.250   0.231 0.260  0.250 0.250 0.250  0.250  
 
The results of the analyses indicate that, generally, the direction of effects is unaffected 
or not much affected by the changes in elasticity values, though magnitudes differ. 
Generally speaking, greater quantity changes are observed as elasticities are increased 
and smaller price changes, which conforms to expectations. This, naturally, impacts 
upon the magnitude of macroeconomic variables. Some peculiarities are commented on. 
Changing the CD function for value-added into a CES function, with the elasticity of 
substitution between factors ( VV ) equal to 0.5 and 2 respectively, impacts particularly 
upon factor markets (i.e. factor prices and sectoral employment). A higher elasticity 
implies that factors are more easily substitutable so that factor price changes are 
dampened. In Experiment (1b), for example, the constraint imposed by the presence of 
specific factors becomes less stringent as the elasticity of substitution between factors is 
increased so that higher welfare gains are reported in Table 6.9, whereas in Table 6.10 
higher welfare losses are reported since a greater expansion of the health care sector 
does not constitute a direct improvement in well-being (indeed, via the reduction in 
government transfers, they imply a welfare loss). Simulations using Experiments (1), 
(3) and (4) reveal that factor price changes may change sign so that households 
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earnings from factors of production may change from positive (negative) to negative 
(positive) as well. This holds especially for capital since each households capital 
endowment is fixed. The impact upon overall household income is nevertheless 
negligible in the sense that no sign changes occur there.  
Alternative values for the elasticity of substitution in the Armington composite ( SV ) 
principally affect domestic supply of goods (and sectoral production), imports and 
hence (as the trade balance is fixed) exports and all related prices. Simulations of 
Experiments (2) and (5) reveal that changes in some of these variables may change in 
sign when varying the elasticity. This has repercussions for factor markets as well. It 
appears that in Experiment (2), for a greater substitution elasticity (of around 4) the 
domestic production of pharmaceuticals expands (and imports contract) to such an 
extent that factor reward changes generally change from negative to positive. Combined 
with lower reductions in state benefits eventually, i.e. for sufficiently high elasticity 
values, all households incomes rise. Due to the contraction of the health care sector 
welfare losses are still reported. In Experiment (5), the previously reported productivity 
improvements in health care which were sufficient for an expansion of the health care 
sector or an increase in overall welfare variables are no longer sufficient for higher 
values of the elasticity of substitution. Consequently, the lower boundary values for 
productivity improvements to yield overall welfare gains must go up.  
Variations in the elasticity of transformation in the CET composite ( TV ) affect the same 
variables. For example, using Experiment (2), it can be shown that for a greater 
elasticity of transformation (of around 4), domestic production of pharmaceuticals falls. 
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This however does not yield any major changes in terms of remaining model variables, 
including health, household income and welfare variables. 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented results from a Static Computable General Equilibrium 
(SCGE) model applied to the UK, which incorporates interactions between public and 
private health care, outputs of non-health goods and national welfare in a small open 
economy. The effects on welfare of higher provision may come through direct gains 
affecting the well-being of households, distinguished by the age and working status of 
its members, and indirectly through increases in the effective (i.e. able to work) 
endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health activities. The 
endogenous labour supply, i.e. working time, effect of changes in the quantity of health 
care provided are modelled, whilst recognising the resource claims this requires in terms 
of capital and, more importantly, labour inputs. Endogeneity of effective labour 
endowments is achieved by using an artificial waiting list variable, which records the 
working time lost due to ill health by skill type. The size of the waiting list is indirectly, 
via a health status measure, determined by the levels of National Health Service (NHS) 
and private health care provisioning.  
The model is calibrated in MPSGE (Mathematical Programming System for General 
Equilibrium analysis) to the purpose-built UK dataset for the year 2000 and 
subsequently employed in a variety of simulations covering current health care issues in 
the UK.  The model files are documented in the appendix to Chapter 6 and available in 
electronic form from the author upon request. 
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The simulation results reveal that a 10% increase in government expenditures on the 
NHS (£5.384 billion), while drawing away resources from other non-health related 
sectors and its private counterpart, leads to an overall welfare gain of £2.474 billion (a 
relative gain of 0.26%) through increased worker (and capital) incomes and direct 
increases in the well-being of the population. The overall welfare gain is reduced to 
£920 million (a relative gain of 0.1%) if health care-specific skilled labour and capital in 
the short run are accounted for and shows the importance of tackling rigidities in the 
health sector. 
A 20% rise in the domestic consumer price of pharmaceuticals, one of the main 
intermediate inputs into health care, has adverse overall welfare effects of £2.64 billion 
(0.28% in relative terms) through falling household incomes and direct decreases in the 
well-being of the population. These welfare losses are mitigated by $500 million if the 
government allows the health care budget to grow by 1.8% so as to cover additional 
costs of health care provision and maintain previous treatment levels under the NHS. 
The immigration of health care-specific skilled workers equal to 10% of domestic health 
care-specific skilled endowments alleviates the shortage of highly skilled workers in 
UK health care. As the latter labour types wages fall, the same government health 
budget allows for more people to be treated and cured. Consequently, overall welfare 
rises by £4.06 billion (a relative gain of 0.43%), which can be shown to derive from a 
rise in income for all non-health care-specific factors, the additional foreign worker 
income, which remains in the economy in the absence of remittances, an increase in 
state benefits and direct improvements in population well-being. The effect of remitting 
foreign worker income abroad is to reduce the welfare gains; ultimately, if all income is 
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remitted, to a level £2.4 billion (a relative gain of 0.25%). If the government invites 
these foreign skilled doctors and nurses to the UK at a wage equal to the pre-
immigration level, public health expenditures have to rise by 11.6% inducing even 
larger increases in NHS provision levels (and lower private provision levels) compared 
to a situation where the wage would not be kept at the original level. As a result, overall 
welfare gains are higher and amount to £5.124 billion (0.54% in relative terms). As 
before, these gains fall in the presence of remittances, ultimately to £3.223 billion (a 
relative gain of 0.34%) if all foreign worker income is remitted.  
Technical change in all factors employed in health care (Factor-Neutral Technical 
Change, FNTC), modelled as a 10% rise in the productivity of these factors, results in a 
reduction in the unit costs of health care provision of 5.6% and, given the health care 
budget, an equivalent rise in the production of health care. The consequent gains in 
income from state benefits, income from factors of production, and direct improvements 
in population well-being yield overall welfare gains of £6.3 billion (0.67% in relative 
terms). If the technical change in health care is confined to skilled labour (Skill-Biased 
Technical Change, SBTC), the health care provision increase and reduction in unit costs 
are approximately two percentage points smaller compared to FNTC, giving rise to 
lower overall welfare gains of £4.1 billion (a relative gain of 0.4%). 
The final simulation models technical change embodied in pharmaceuticals which gives 
rise to a 20% increase in the domestic consumer price and a more effective 
pharmaceutical product in the health sector. The simulations reveal that a 20% rise in 
the productivity of pharmaceuticals in health care only is sufficient for the health sector 
to expand, whereas a 30% productivity rise is sufficient to ensure overall welfare gains. 
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In that situation the direct improvements in well-being counteract the private welfare 
losses from falling factor incomes and state benefits. If the technical change embodied 
in pharmaceuticals also ensures a more efficient use of non-pharmaceutical inputs into 
health care, overall welfare gains are shown to rise. This result is driven by a greater 
expansion of public health care, a bigger increase in effective labour endowments, 
yielding a rise in income from all factors of production, a rise in income from state 
benefits and greater direct improvements in well-being. A rise in the productivity of 
non-pharmaceutical inputs into health care of 2% is sufficient to guarantee overall 
welfare gains. 
Distributional effects of the counterfactual simulations are unequal across sectors, 
factors and households. Firstly, with respect to sectoral effects, changes in public health 
care provision seem to particularly impact upon its private counterpart and health-
related sectors, i.e. the pharmaceutical industry and the sector producing medical, 
precision and optical instruments. Specifically, an expansion of the public health care 
sector may crowd out private health care provision, for example when public health 
expenditures rise, and via input-output linkages increase the price of pharmaceuticals 
and medical instruments. On the other hand, if an intermediate input such as 
pharmaceuticals becomes more expensive this yields a contraction in both public and 
private health care (unless of course the government maintains levels of public 
provisioning). In sum, input-output linkages seem decisive in explaining variations in 
production across sectors.43  
 
43  The role of relative factor-intensities in sectoral effects will be assessed in Chapter 7, where an 
attempt is made to draw parallels with the results of Chapter 2. 
A SCGE MODEL FOR THE UK WITH HEALTH CARE PROVISION 
 
 6-71
Secondly, with respect to the impact on skilled and unskilled workers, unskilled 
workers are at least as well off, and frequently better off, in terms of improvements in 
health status and labour market participation relative to skilled workers. The former 
type of workers largely benefits from public health care, whereas some of the latter 
consume private health care which, as shown, often becomes more costly and less 
available. Another contributing factor is that the health expenditures leverage is 
assumed greater for unskilled labour relative to skilled labour. Depending on changes in 
relative factor demands and (effective) supply of labour endowments, factor 
remunerations rise or fall. If effective labour endowments rise and wages fall, a rise in 
labour income is often observed (the exception being SBTC where skilled labour 
income falls, a rise in the price and productivity of pharmaceuticals in health care where 
income from skilled and unskilled labour falls, and the immigration of health care-
specific skilled labour under endogenous wages where the wage income of the domestic 
endowments of this type falls, and, in the presence of remittances, unskilled labour 
income falls). Hence, the endowment-enhancing effect of an expansion in health care 
provision often, though not generally, outweighs the negative wage effect. 
Thirdly, with respect to the impact of health-related policies or shocks on households, a 
distinction can be made between households with and without working members. 
Working households benefit indirectly from health improvements through increased 
participation in the labour market and directly from improvements in well-being from 
changes in public good provisioning (of which pensioners and working households 
receive a relatively large share). Non-working households and the majority of 
pensioners only profit from the latter. Furthermore, while pensioners and working 
households with children receive a relatively large proportion of state benefits, relative 
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to household income pensioners and non-working households rely most heavily on this 
source of income. Hence, if the expansion of the health sector, as follows for example 
from a rise in the government budget on health care or the immigration of foreign health 
care-specific skilled workers at the current wage, is financed from a reduction in state 
benefits, these households are generally found to lose out as opposed to working 
households who gain. If the health sector contracts, as when the pharmaceutical price 
rises, this works to their advantage, because in this case these households do not suffer 
from losses in labour income due to lower treatment levels. Nevertheless, since the 
income from state benefits falls, relative to their original income or welfare these 
households are still worse off. If the income from this source rises, as in the case of 
immigration of foreign skilled labour at an endogenous wage, and technical change in 
factors employed in health care, pensioners and non-working households are, in relative 
(though not absolute) terms, better off than working households.  
A ceteris paribus comparison of the policies/shocks in terms of their impacts upon 
overall welfare, whilst accounting for cost differences and, where possible, using the 
same model specification, reveals that encouraging a 10% inflow of foreign health care-
specific skilled workers to come and work in the UK health sector yields higher welfare 
gains compared to a 10% rise in the health care budget.  FNTC and SBTC of 10%, 
whose implementation is costless, also outweigh the welfare gains of the latter policy 
and perform better compared to the immigration policy, but if the wage is kept at the 
original level, a 10% SBTC will only do better if more than half of foreign worker 
income is remitted. The policies of FNTC and SBTC were demonstrated to be 
equivalent to a rise in the NHS budget of 38% and 19% respectively, showing the 
potential savings of such technical improvements. In terms of health status and labour 
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market participation, the immigration of health care-specific skilled workers at the 
current wage does better than the FNTC and SBTC and increasing the health care 
budget by 10%. Immigration at an endogenous wage outperforms both the increase in 
the health care budget and SBTC, but not FNTC.  
A ceteris paribus comparison of the policies/shocks in terms of their impact upon 
household welfare reveals that the policies of SBTC, FNTC and immigration of health 
care-specific skilled workers at a flexible wage benefits and thus will be supported by 
all households (though in case of the latter not by domestic health care-specific skilled 
workers who earn less), whereas a rise in the price of pharmaceuticals will make all 
households worse off and thus will be uniformly unpopular. Technical change in 
pharmaceuticals, yielding a more expensive but more effective product, will be 
welcomed by all households if productivity gains in pharmaceuticals and other inputs in 
health care are high enough. Immigration of aforementioned workers at the current 
wage and an increase in government expenditures benefits working households and 
generally harms non-working households and pensioners so that the former will support 
and the latter will object to such policies.  
A sensitivity analysis of the elasticity of the waiting list with respect to health status, for 
which reliable estimates do not exist, suggests that, in the presence of increasingly 
strong skill-neutral health effects, an expansion of NHS care following from a 10% 
increase in the health care budget, although representing an immediate cost to society, 
may lead to substantial welfare gains in the long-run through increases in effective 
labour supply and production, and by enhancing the tax earning ability of the 
government which benefits both working households (in terms of wage income) and 
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non-working households (in terms of income from state benefits). Overall welfare is 
shown to rise for relatively low values of the waiting list elasticity (between 0 and 1). A 
rise in the waiting list elasticity has been shown to significantly reduce the health 
budget increase required to attain a certain overall welfare gain and demonstrates the 
importance of ensuring value for money by some technical or administrative 
improvement in health care. Skill-biased increases in the waiting list elasticity are also 
considered so as to test the assumption of skilled workers being treated more 
effectively. Welfare gains rise but are found to be lower relative to those from skill-
neutral increases in the waiting list elasticity. The remaining experiments are relatively 
robust to changes in the waiting list elasticity in the sense that with respect to overall 
welfare only magnitudes vary but no sign changes occur. The same conclusion follows 
from a sensitivity analysis for the elasticities of substitution and transformation: 
although sign changes do occur for some variables, the impact of changing the 
respective elasticities upon overall welfare is negligible. 
 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this thesis. Before summarising the main 
results, in an attempt to answer the research questions posed in the introductory chapter, 
deriving policy implications, and outlining limitations and recommendations for future 
research, the chapter commences with a comparison of the results of the theoretical 
model (Chapter 2) and the empirical model (Chapter 6) used to study the economic 
impact of health care provision.  
7.1 A SYNTHESIS BETWEEN THEORY AND APPLICATION? 
Two of the major contributions of this thesis are Chapter 2, which presented the 
theoretical model casting light on some of the resource allocation issues related to the 
provision of health care, and the applied SCGE model of Chapter 6, which in essence 
accomplishes the same objective but, given its applied nature, allows for a more 
accurate and detailed modelling of the UK economy, its health care system, health and 
welfare effects. A logical avenue of research is therefore to compare the outcomes of 
these two components, insofar as the model specifications allow, and investigate 
whether or not the predictions that were made in the theoretical model are validated by 
the applied model. Although in theory three simulations may be compared (being an 
increase in the government budget under the assumption of respectively, mobile and 
specific factors; the immigration of health care-specific skilled labour; and technical 
change in factors of production), the comparisons are initially limited to the first of 
these, for which the pair-wise comparison of Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 is the least 
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demanding in terms of parameter restrictions. If no analogy of outcomes between 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 with respect to this simulation holds, one may reasonably 
argue that the same is true for the remaining experiments carried out with both models.  
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predictions of the effects of an increase in public 
health expenditures have been outlined in Table 2.3. For given relative factor-intensities 
in health care and the two tradables sectors and a given size of the waiting list elasticity 
times the dependency ratio, i.e. the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to 
health care, this table presents the rankings of relative output changes. The variant of the 
theoretical model that is closest to the SCGE model is given by Case 2, as explained 
below.  
Firstly, using Table 5.7, the ratio of payments to skilled and unskilled labour by sector 
and in total gives the following ranking in decreasing order of skill-intensity for sectors 
and overall labour endowments (with mobile factors of production): 24.34 (sector 8), 
13.63 (sector 9), 13.41 (sector 5), 7.83 (sector 2), 5.24 (sector 10, i.e. the health sector), 
4.11 (overall endowment ratio), 3.85 (sector 11), 3.22 (sector 3), 2.74 (sector 7), 2.73 
(sector 4), 2.08 (sector 6) and 0.67 (sector 1). Hence, the health sector is relatively skill-
intensive (ranked in fifth position), its intensity in skills exceeding that of the overall 
endowment ratio, which itself exceeds the intensity of some six sectors. Given that the 
health sector is not the only sector with a skill-intensity exceeding that of the overall 
endowment ratio, Cases 4 to 7 are ruled out.  
Furthermore, from Section 6.4.4 the elasticity of effective labour endowments with 
respect to health care (in Chapter 6 the health status variable) is close to zero, equalling 
0.06 for skilled labour and 0.09 for unskilled labour, which rules out Cases 1 and 3.  
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Using Case 2, the theoretical model predictions are that on average the relatively skill-
intensive sectors (sectors 2, 5, 8 and 9) contract and the relatively unskilled-intensive 
sectors (sectors 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 11) and the health sector expand.1 In the SCGE model 
the health care sector is skill-intensive in that its skilled-unskilled ratio is greater than 
the endowment ratio, so that an expansion of health care will reduce the skilled-
unskilled endowment ratio for the rest of the economy. However, the skill-intensity for 
health is only just above the endowment ratio, so we would expect the correlation to 
be low. Does the SCGE model behave accordingly? The changes in the production of 
sectors (variable X in the model) are reported in the second column of Table 7.1.     
Table 7.1 Relative changes in sectoral production in the SCGE model (%) 
Sector Experiment 1a Experiment 1b 
8. Finance -0.125 -0.011 
9. Public administration and defence -0.023 0.033 
5. Energy -0.191 -0.104 
2. Pharmaceuticals 5.233 1.819 
10. Health care 8.245 2.876 
1. Primary -0.310 -0.122 
3. Medical instruments 2.086 0.793 
4. Other manufacturing -0.211 -0.091 
6. Construction 0.052 0.258 
7. Distribution and transport -0.123 -0.070 
11. Other services -0.142 -0.096 
Note: the shaded rows represent the outcomes of the relatively skill-intensive sectors. 
Sectors 5, 8 and 9 do contract, albeit mildly, but the pharmaceuticals sector expands. 
This suggests that, following a rise in the health care budget and the consequent 
expansion of the health sector, the increased demand for intermediate inputs from this 
sector outweighs the reduced availability of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour. 
                                                 
1  When there are many sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Rybczynski Theorem becomes a 
correlation. As Falvey (1994) states, There is a tendency for an increase in those outputs using 
intensively those factors whose endowments have risen and a decline for others. Further uncertainty 
about outcomes in induced by the existence of intermediate inputs. 
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Also, most of the unskilled-intensive sectors contract, apart from construction and the 
medical instruments sector. The latters expansion is much more pronounced and, as 
before, may be due to the intermediate demand effect from the health sector, rather than 
the increased availability of unskilled relative to skilled labour. The predictions of the 
theoretical HO model of an increase in public health expenditures thus do not generally 
seem to carry over to the applied SCGE model. 
The Specific-Factors (SF) model predictions of an increase in public health 
expenditures have been outlined in Table 2.5. The parameters that need specification to 
determine which row of the table is appropriate are: the substitution elasticity, the 
waiting list elasticity times the dependency ratio (i.e. the elasticity of effective labour 
supply with respect to health care) and the health sectors use of unskilled labour 
relative to the tradables sectors.  
As before, the elasticity of effective labour endowments with respect to health care is 
close to zero, 0.09 for unskilled labour and 0.06 for health care-specific and non-health 
care-specific skilled labour types. Furthermore, Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.2) postulates a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form for sectoral value-added, giving a substitution elasticity 
between factors in health care of 1. The health sectors use of unskilled labour relative 
to the remaining (tradables) sectors may be derived from Table 5.7 as 5031/(102760-
5031) § 0.05. The closest match between Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 is thus provided by 
the upper row of Table 2.5, which predicts that the health sector and tradables sectors 
output rises but that the skilled-intensive sectors expand by relatively more than the 
unskilled-intensive sectors.  
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Does the SCGE model behave in this fashion? The changes in sectoral production are 
reported in the third column of Table 7.1. Only two of the four skilled-intensive sectors 
increase production (pharmaceuticals, public administration and defence), whereas four 
of the six unskilled-intensive sectors (primary, other manufacturing, distribution and 
transport, other services) lower as opposed to increase production. It is impossible to 
pinpoint the precise causes of the differences in results, but among the many potential 
candidates related to the production side are the presence of intermediate inputs (the 
pharmaceuticals and medical instruments sectors report the biggest output changes) and 
the specificity of two types of factors in health care (skilled labour and capital) rather 
than one. Consequently, the conclusion that follows is that the predictions of the 
theoretical SF model of an increase in public health expenditures do not generally agree 
with the applied SCGE model. 
A comparison between the theoretical model of Chapter 2 and the applied model of 
Chapter 6 in terms of welfare effects, rather than sectoral output effects, is less 
straightforward. The variable in Chapter 2 closest to an indicator of welfare change is 
the proportionate change in per capita income of the population, in this framework also 
equivalent to the proportionate change in total income or GDP and the total value of 
output at world prices (equation 2.41). According to this measure of welfare, an 
improvement in the health of both skilled and unskilled labour generates an increase in 
per capita income of the population, even if the health improvements are equal across 
labour types, but the increase in per capita income will be higher, the more the health of 
the skilled is improved relative to the unskilled. Does this outcome hold in the SCGE 
model? 
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As noted before, the SCGE model is parameterised with an elasticity of health care 
(health status) with respect to effective labour endowments of 0.06 and 0.09 for skilled 
and unskilled labour respectively, suggesting that the unskilled benefit relatively more 
from an increase in health care output. Using equation (2.41), an expansion of the health 
sector is predicted to yield a rise in the per capita income of the population (and total 
income). An analysis of changes in household income from skilled and unskilled labour 
following an increase in government health expenditures (Experiment 1a) shows that 
this is indeed the case: household income from skilled and unskilled labour (and capital) 
rises by 0.45 and 0.29 (and 0.18) percent respectively so that per capita labour (or, 
including capital, factor) income of the unchanged total population, including the ill and 
therefore unable to work, must rise as well. As observed in Chapter 6, the income gains 
become losses once the fall in income from state benefits (by 4.3%) is taken into 
account so that the indicator of overall private welfare declines by 0.38%. Nevertheless, 
overall welfare rises again (by 0.26%) when the direct improvements in well-being from 
an increase in the public provision of health care (and other goods) is taken into 
account. The simple framework of Chapter 2 is not able to capture the latter two effects 
and the changes in income from capital. Hence, the conclusion with respect to the 
income/welfare predictions of Chapter 2 is that they seem to be substantiated by the 
applied SCGE model if limited to changes in labour income only. Once changes in 
income from state benefits, capital and benefits from public good provisioning are taken 
into account, the analogy between the theoretical and applied model breaks down. 
In sum, the attempt to draw parallels between the outcomes of the theoretical model of 
Chapter 2 and the applied model of Chapter 6 seems to have failed. Although the 
outcomes of Chapter 2 provide some guidance to the effects operating in the 
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background of Chapter 6, the added complexities - for example in terms of 
dimensionality (more sectors, factors and households), the presence of intermediate 
inputs, health care-specific factors, differences in health effects across labour types, a 
tax-charging government providing transfer income to households and public goods 
yielding direct welfare gains, ensure that the predictions we may expect from the theory 
do not generally hold in reality. This is the strongest argument for the use of an applied 
model in addition to a theoretical model. 
7.2 A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
The interactions between health care, health and the remainder of the economy are 
multiple and complex. While the interdependencies between health care, health and the 
rest of the economy are now widely acknowledged, economic models which are used to 
assess these fail to incorporate the main channels through which interactions take place. 
This thesis seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of changes in health care 
provision using a general equilibrium model of the UK economy, whilst recognising the 
simultaneous effects of consequent changes in health upon effective labour supplies and 
the resource claims made by the health care sector. The resource allocation issues have 
been explored in theory, by developing an extension of the standard Rybczynski (R) 
theorem from a low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework, and empirically, by 
developing a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with an extended health 
care component, calibrated to a purpose-built dataset for the UK. These components 
constitute the three major contributions of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 examined the resource allocation effects of an expanding health sector in 
their simplest form, using a low-dimension HO model of a small open economy. It was 
shown that an identical improvement in the health of skilled and unskilled workers does 
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not affect the per capita income of the working population, whereas the per capita 
income of the total population rises. Furthermore, if the health improvement is relatively 
higher for skilled (unskilled) labour, per capita income of the working population will 
rise (fall), whereas per capita income of the total population always rises. Setting aside 
other considerations such as well-being and equity, both indicators thus favour a, 
morally questionable, government policy of health care provision biased towards skilled 
workers.  
The analysis henceforth proceeded with the modelling of effective endowment changes 
via a non-traded, government provided health sector while accounting for all those not 
(yet) succesfully treated and so unable to work by means of an artificial waiting list 
sector. The change in effective labour endowments following a change in health care 
provision was shown to depend positively on three multiplicative factors - the 
dependency ratio (the ratio of ill to non-ill, i.e. non-working to working population), the 
absolute value of the waiting list elasticity (measuring the proportionate reduction in the 
waiting list in response to a one percent rise in health care output) and the proportionate 
change in the output of health care - where the first two combined represent the 
elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health care. In the derivation of 
Rybczynski-style predictions of an increase in health expenditures on non-health 
outputs, the magnitudes of the dependency ratio and the waiting list elasticity were, in 
the absence of reliable estimates, assumed identical for both skilled and unskilled labour 
by employing the homogeneity assumption. This assumption postulates that skilled and 
unskilled labour are equal (homogeneous) in terms of illness, health and effectiveness of 
treatments so that an increase in health care provision, allocated in proportion to illness, 
results in balanced growth in the effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labour.  
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The impact of an increase in health expenditures on non-health outputs was shown to 
consist of a factor-bias and a scale effect. The former measures the impact of the health 
care sector on effective endowments remaining for tradables in terms of the resource 
claims it makes, whereas the latter measures the effect of improved health on effective 
labour supplies. Assuming that health care is the most skill-intensive sector, the factor-
bias effect is negative for the skill-intensive tradable and positive for the other good, 
since an expansion of the health sector reduces the skilled-unskilled effective labour 
endowment ratio available for the tradable good sectors. The scale effect is always 
positive for the skill-intensive good, but may be negative for the unskilled-intensive 
good depending on the ordering of the skill-intensity of the middle ranking sector 
relative to the overall effective endowment ratio.  
The analysis establishes that the rankings based on factor-bias effects alone are 
preserved when scale effects are added, provided that the elasticity of effective labour 
supply with respect to health care, i.e. the waiting list elasticity and dependency ratio 
combined, is small enough (and less than one). Gradually increasing the elasticity leads 
to a rise in the production of both the unskilled-intensive and skill-intensive goods 
provided it is less than one, whereas for improvements in the elasticity beyond one the 
output rise for the skill-intensive good exceeds that of the unskilled-intensive good, 
which could in one particular situation even show a decline. It was argued that, despite 
the uncertainty about the magnitude of the elasticity of effective labour supply with 
respect to health care for skilled relative to unskilled labour, for developed countries and 
hence the UK, the elasticity is likely to lie well below the value of one. Consequently, 
an exogenous increase in health expenditures is expected to benefit the unskilled-
intensive sector and harm (or possibly slightly benefit) the skilled-intensive sector. 
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The introduction of health care-specific skilled labour in the Specific-Factors (SF) 
model was demonstrated to alter these results by reversing the factor-bias effects of an 
increase in health expenditures. Specifically, an expansion of the health sector reduces 
the supply of unskilled labour remaining for tradables, so that, on the basis of the R 
theorem, the output of the unskilled-intensive good falls and the output of the other 
good rises. Restricting the elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to health 
care to a likely value of below one and assuming some substitution between factor 
inputs in health care, the incorporation of scale effects allows the reproduction of the 
factor-bias effects, although the output of the unskilled-intensive good may now rise if 
health care is relatively less reliant on the use of unskilled labour.  
The remainder of Chapter 2 was concerned with implementing policies or shocks aimed 
at alleviating the rationing constraint in health care and to contrast them with the policy 
of increasing the health care budget. The first is the immigration of foreign health care-
specific skilled labour in the SF model. In the absence of remittances abroad, the wage 
of this labour type and unit cost of health care is shown to fall, which - given the fixed 
health budget - results in an increase in health care provision. For limited factor 
substitution in health care in favour of skilled labour, factor-bias effects are found to be 
positive for the skill-intensive good and negative for the other good, since overall 
employment of unskilled labour in health care rises and so the relative supply of 
unskilled labour available for tradables falls, and vice versa. Adding scale effects and 
restricting the elasticity of effective endowments with respect to health care to a value 
below one preserves the factor-bias effects, although the contracting sector may now 
expand if health care is relatively less reliant on unskilled labour.  
 7-10   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The second shock applied to the HO and SF models is technical change in health care, 
which can be factor-neutral or skill-biased by respectively increasing the productivity of 
all labour types or increasing the productivity of skilled labour only. If technical change 
is neutral across factors, factor-bias effects are absent so that the relatively skill-
intensive tradable sector expands, whereas the unskilled-intensive tradable sector may 
or may not contract depending on the ordering of the skill-intensity of the middle 
ranking sector relative to the overall effective endowment ratio. In the SF model the 
scale effects result in balanced growth in tradables outputs since, due to the 
homogeneity assumption and an elasticity of effective endowments with respect to 
health care of less than one, tradables-specific skilled labour and unskilled labour grow 
in the same proportion. If technical change is skill-biased, the health sector saves on the 
employment of skilled labour so that factor-bias effects reappear and benefit (harm) the 
skilled- (unskilled-) intensive good. The inclusion of scale effects is shown to intensify 
the factor-bias effect in the skill-intensive sector and, depending on the relative rankings 
of skill-intensities, either reinforces or mitigates the factor-bias effect in the other sector, 
whilst magnifying the gap between the outputs of the two tradables sectors. Skill-biased 
technical change in the SF model yields similar factor-bias effects, since health care 
expands and needs more unskilled labour, thereby making skilled labour relatively more 
abundant. When allowing for scale effects and assuming the elasticity of effective 
endowments with respect to health care lies below one), factor-bias effects are 
maintained, though if health care is relatively less reliant on unskilled labour the 
formerly contracting unskilled-intensive sector may now expand.  
Chapter 3 investigated to what extent the simultaneous impacts of health care on 
effective labour endowments and the health sectors demand for production factors have 
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been incorporated in applied economic models by surveying CGE studies. The few 
CGE studies on health care and health that exist are arranged in three groups according 
to their research theme, being Basic Needs models, Externality models and HIV/AIDS 
models. The literature review clearly reveals a gap in the sense that most of these 
models do not endogenously assess the impact of changes in health care provision on 
the size and composition of the population, the labour force and its impact on 
production, income and welfare over time in a (developed country) CGE setting. The 
remaining chapters address this caveat by developing a CGE model for the UK with an 
extended health care component.  
As background to the UK CGE model and simulations, Chapter 4 provided an 
overview of the UK health care system and policy, dominated by state provision via the 
National Health Service (NHS). It was observed that, in funding health care from 
general taxation, the UK government has kept a tight lid on health care expenditures, 
whilst securing access to the majority of the population and reaching overall satisfactory 
health outcomes. However, evidence suggests that excessive public control has led to 
systematic underfunding of and inefficiencies in health care provision, leading to 
pressures in terms of poor health outcomes for some diseases (such as cancer), poor 
quality of services, including long waiting lists and waiting times for certain treatments, 
and inequities in access and health outcomes. These problems typically revolve around 
the issue of rationing, i.e. the conflict between potentially unlimited demands and 
limited financial means, and in this respect the UK does not differ from any other 
country. In future rationing is likely to get worse in the face of increased demand 
pressures from rising incomes, partly fuelled by an ageing population and advances in 
medical technology, and cost pressures from rising wages and pharmaceutical prices. 
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The analysis proceeded with identifying several policy options which address the issue 
of rationing. The UK government could, and has in recent years been observed to, 
allocate more resources to health care which buy more health care inputs, or instead 
may aim to increase the productivity (efficiency) of the available health care inputs via 
an improvement in technology. Three types of technical change were identified for 
modelling purposes, being factor-neutral technical change, skill-biased technical change 
or one that that is embodied in a more cost-effective pharmaceutical product. A policy 
measure that directly targets the constraint of the limited availability of highly skilled 
doctors is to encourage foreign skilled workers to work in the UK health sector. 
Chapter 5 presented the dataset, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), to which the 
UK CGE model is calibrated. It has been constructed by augmenting the UK Input-
Output Supply and Use Tables for 2000 using household data from the General 
Household Survey 2000-01. The latter purpose-built GHS database is a valuable source 
of information for a range of socio-economic characteristics of private households 
living in Great Britain, most notably health and health care use data.  
The economic data revealed that the health sector is relatively skill-intensive but small 
in terms of gross labour income and private health care expenditures. The data on health 
care use demonstrated that working households and pensioners account for most of the 
General Practitioner (GP) consultations. This is partly explained by household numbers 
and average household size and partly by household characteristics: the number of GP 
consultations is positively associated with having children and negatively associated 
with labour market participation. The use of secondary care across households 
 7-13   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
demonstrated a similar picture. In addition, pensioner- and working households are the 
main users of private GPs, though most GP consultations are provided by the NHS.   
Self-reported data on population health provided background information on the use of 
health care by households. In spite of the smallness of the health sector, these data show 
that a significant proportion of the population suffers from ill health which varies by 
socio-economic characteristic. Typically, the share of the population reporting good 
general health falls with age and rises with skills and labour market participation. 
Likewise, the prevalence of (non-)limiting longstanding illnesses and the number of 
restricted activity days increases with age and falls with skills and labour market 
participation. The most common complaints are musculoskeletal problems, heart and 
circulatory problems and respiratory problems. The type of condition was shown to vary 
considerably by age and labour market participation, though not so much by skill type.  
Chapter 6 outlined the Static CGE (SCGE) model for the UK employed in MPSGE 
with health care provision effects and presented simulation results which cover current 
issues in (developed country) health care systems and that of the UK in particular. The 
SCGE model has in most respects a standard structure, the novelty coming from the 
explicit modelling of the health sector and its interaction with the rest of the economy 
through its differential impact across labour and household types. The model 
differentiates between eleven sectors (among which are health care and its main 
intermediate input suppliers), three factors (capital, skilled and unskilled labour), the 
government and five types of households (characterised by age and working status of its 
members), and separates public from private health care in consumption. The effects on 
welfare of higher provision are modelled through direct gains affecting the well-being 
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of households and indirect gains via increases in the effective (i.e. able to work) 
endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health activities.  
Endogeneity of effective labour endowments is achieved by using an artificial waiting 
list variable, which records the working time lost due to ill health by skill type. The size 
of the waiting list is indirectly, via a health status measure, determined by the levels of 
NHS and private health care provisioning.  
The simulation results indicated that a 10% increase in government expenditures on the 
NHS, while drawing away resources from other non-health related sectors and its 
private counterpart, leads to an overall welfare gain, through increased worker (and 
capital) incomes and direct increases in population well-being, which is reduced if 
health care-specific skilled labour and capital in the short run are accounted for. 
A 20% rise in the domestic consumer price of pharmaceuticals, one of the main 
intermediate inputs into health care, was shown to impact negatively on overall welfare 
through falling household incomes and direct decreases in the well-being of the 
population, which are mitigated if the government allows the health care budget to grow 
so as to maintain previous treatment levels under the NHS. 
The (permanent) immigration of health care-specific skilled workers equal to 10% of 
domestic endowments of this labour type alleviates the shortage of highly skilled 
workers in UK health care. As the latter labour types wages fall, the same government 
health budget allows for more people to be treated and cured. Overall welfare improves 
due to a rise in income for all non-health care-specific factors, the additional foreign 
worker income, an increase in state benefits and direct improvements in population 
well-being. Furthermore, adjusting the government health budget upwards so as to give 
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these foreign (and domestic) skilled workers a wage equal to the pre-immigration level, 
was revealed to induce even larger increases in NHS provision levels (though lower 
private provision levels) so that overall welfare gains are higher. The effect of remitting 
foreign worker income abroad is to reduce the welfare gains. 
Finally, technical change in all factors employed in health care, modelled as a 10% rise 
in the productivity of these factors, gives rise to a reduction in the unit costs of health 
care provision and, given the health care budget, a rise in the production of health care. 
The consequent gains in income from state benefits, income from factors of production, 
and direct improvements in population well-being were shown to yield overall welfare 
gains. If the technical change in health care is confined to skilled labour only, the health 
care provision increase and reduction in unit costs are smaller, hence giving rise to 
lower overall welfare gains. Technical change embodied in a 20% more costly but more 
effective pharmaceutical product in health care may also yield overall welfare gains. 
The simulations suggested that a 20% rise in the productivity of pharmaceuticals in 
health care only is sufficient for the health sector to expand, whereas a 30% productivity 
rise is sufficient to ensure overall welfare gains. A productivity rise of 2% in non-
pharmaceutical inputs into health care is sufficient to guarantee overall welfare gains. 
The impacts of the policies/shocks were observed to differ widely across sectors, factors 
and households. Firstly, in terms of sectoral effects, changes in public health care 
provision seem to particularly impact upon its private counterpart, often crowding out 
private sector provision, and intermediate input sectors, i.e. the pharmaceutical industry 
and the sector producing medical, precision and optical instruments. Input-output 
linkages appear decisive in explaining the major production changes across sectors, a 
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finding corroborated by the comparison between the outcomes of the theoretical and the 
applied model carried out in Section 7.1. The main outcome of this attempted synthesis 
was that although the results of the theoretical model provide some guidance to the 
effects operating in the background of the SCGE model, the added complexities ensure 
that the predictions one may expect from the theory do not generally hold in reality. 
This provided the strongest argument for the use of an applied model in addition to a 
theoretical model in this thesis. 
Secondly, concerning the impact across skilled and unskilled workers, unskilled 
workers seem at least as well off, and are frequently better off, in terms of 
improvements in health status, reductions in the waiting list and labour market 
participation relative to skilled workers. Contributing factors are that some of the skilled 
consume public and private health care which often becomes more costly and less 
available, and that the health expenditures leverage is assumed greater for unskilled 
relative to skilled labour. Depending on changes in relative factor demands and 
(effective) supply of labour endowments, factor remunerations change. If effective 
labour endowments rise and wages fall, a rise in labour income is often, though not 
always, observed. Hence, the endowment-enhancing effect of an expansion in health 
care provision often, though not generally, outweighs the negative wage effect.  
Thirdly, the impact across households was found to be distinctively different for 
households with and without working members. Working households benefit indirectly 
from health improvements through increased labour market participation and directly 
from improvements in well-being from changes in public good provisioning, whereas 
non-working households and the majority of pensioners only profit from the latter. 
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Furthermore, pensioners and non-working households rely most heavily on state 
benefits as a source of income. Hence, if the expansion of the health sector, as follows 
from a rise in the government budget on health care or the immigration of health care-
specific skilled workers at the current wage, is financed from a reduction in state 
benefits, these households are generally found to lose out as opposed to working 
households who gain. If the health sector contracts, as when the pharmaceutical price 
rises, this works to their advantage, because in this case these households do not suffer 
from losses in labour income due to lower treatment levels. Nevertheless, since the 
income from state benefits falls, relative to their original income or welfare these 
households are still worse off than working households. If the income from this source 
rises, as in the case of immigration of foreign skilled labour at an endogenous wage, and 
technical change in factors used in health care, pensioners and non-working households 
are, in relative (though not absolute) terms, better off than working households.  
Sensitivity analyses for the elasticities of substitution and transformation show that the 
results of the counterfactual simulations are relatively robust: although sign changes do 
occur for some variables, the impact of changing the respective elasticities upon overall 
welfare is negligible. The same cannot be said for the waiting list elasticities for skilled 
and unskilled labour, for which no reliable estimates exist. In the presence of 
increasingly strong skill-neutral health effects, an expansion of NHS care following 
from a 10% increase in the health care budget, although representing an immediate cost 
to society, was shown to yield substantial welfare gains in the long-run through 
increases in effective labour supply and production, and by enhancing the tax earning 
ability of the government which benefits both working households (in terms of wage 
income) and non-working households (in terms of income from state benefits). Overall 
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welfare rises for relatively low values of the waiting list elasticity (between zero and 
one).  Skill-biased increases in the waiting list elasticity, which test the assumption of 
skilled workers being treated more effectively, yield lower welfare gains. The remaining 
experiments are relatively robust to changes in this elasticity in the sense that with 
respect to overall welfare only magnitudes vary but no sign changes occur.  
7.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A ceteris paribus comparison of the specified policies/shocks in terms of their impacts 
upon overall welfare, whilst accounting for cost differences and, where possible, using 
the same model specification, suggests that the policy of immigration of health care-
specific skilled workers in the UK health sector targeted towards alleviating the scarcity 
of highly skilled workers performs better than an identical rise in the health care budget 
which is spent on all health care inputs. The factor-neutral and skill-biased technical 
change shocks, whose implementation is costless, also outperform the latter policy and 
the immigration policy, but if the wage is kept at the original level, the skill-biased 
technical improvement only does better if more than half of foreign worker income is 
remitted.  
If health care-specific skilled labour and capital in the short run are accounted for, the 
welfare gains from a rise in the government expenditures on health care are markedly 
lower. For the specified 10% rise in the health budget, approximately two thirds of the 
health sectors production expansion is lost to higher wages and rents, thereby 
reducing overall welfare gains by 62%. The observation that the extra funds which have 
been allocated to the NHS are being absorbed by higher wage payments rather than 
resulting in an increase in levels of production, i.e. treatments of patients, has worried 
both current and recent governments, and shows the importance of tackling rigidities in 
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the health sector. As indicated by the simulations, a relatively quick way of doing this is 
via the recruitment of highly skilled foreign doctors and nurses, who do not need to be 
educated and, as evidence suggests, are likely to remain in the UK since the majority is 
aiming for a long-term career in the NHS. This is not to say that it is also a desirable 
policy since, from the perspective of the UK, domestic workers of this type earn less 
income if their wages are not sustained and thus may require some form of 
compensation, and, from the perspective of the country of origin, many come from 
developing countries which need their own educated staff (this form of brain-drain 
would be more appropriately analysed in a multi-country model). In the long-term, and 
in order to avoid relying purely on highly skilled health care personnel from abroad, 
increasing the number of medical school places is likely to reduce the scarcity of highly 
qualified health care workers and so improve overall welfare levels. Such a policy is 
itself a resource allocation issue as education increases the skill level of individuals, but 
also uses up resources which could have been employed elsewhere. This has not been 
investigated in this thesis and presents an interesting avenue of future research. 
A second health care cost-enhancing and welfare-reducing factor that has been 
identified in this thesis is the rising price of pharmaceutical products. A specified 20% 
increase in the (average) domestic purchase price of pharmaceuticals, identical to the 
increase in average cost of prescription items dispensed in England over the period 
1999/00 to 2002/03, was shown to reduce overall welfare by 0.28% or £2.64 billion. 
Efforts to maintain public provision levels would reduce these losses by 0.05 percentage 
points or £500 million only, indicating the importance of government policy to control 
pharmaceutical prices. If the latter proves difficult to implement, the specified rise was 
found to stem mainly from a rise in the world import price by 42%, the negative welfare 
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effects of rising pharmaceutical prices may be mitigated by purchasing a more effective 
pharmaceutical product, which yield savings in the health sector. The simulations 
revealed that a technical improvement which increases the productivity of 
pharmaceuticals in health care by 30% is sufficient to guarantee overall welfare gains, 
whereas if the improved pharmaceutical product yields savings in the use of other 
inputs, a productivity rise of 2% proved adequate. Hence, fairly small productivity gains 
of less than 2% across all inputs in health care are sufficient for technical progress in 
pharmaceuticals to be welfare enhancing.     
The policies of a 10% factor-neutral and skill-biased technical change generally resulted 
in the highest overall welfare gains and were demonstrated to be equivalent to a rise in 
the NHS budget of 38% and 19% respectively, showing the potential cost savings of 
such technological improvements. Both the factor-neutral and skill-biased technical 
changes were modelled as entailing no extra costs. In this context one may think of 
improved medical procedures which have been developed abroad yet are freely 
available, or have been funded by charitable institutions as often is the case. Another 
policy measure that one may classify within this category, and makes skilled labour 
more productive, is the UK governments determination to reduce administrative 
overhead, i.e. bureaucracy, in health care, so that doctors and nurses have more time to 
devote to the provision of medical services, and more resources can be devoted to 
frontline staff (a recent example is the Health Secretary John Reids announced 
intention to streamline the NHS arms length bodies). At the same time the 
Department of Health argues that the proportion of managers employed in the NHS, 
which amounts to three percent, is small relative to other private and public 
organisations (see also Section 4.3.2) and that good management is needed to 
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implement reforms in the NHS. This reminds us of the conflict between the centre 
(administrators) and the periphery (health care providers) which has been present since 
the creation of the NHS in 1948 (Klein, 2001, p37-40) and suggests that there is some 
optimum proportion of managers employed in the NHS at which overall costs of 
provision (including management) are minimised. Where exactly this optimum lies is a 
matter of opinion, though evidence on inefficiencies in the NHS makes many 
commentators believe that at present levels of managerial control are too high.  
A ceteris paribus comparison of the policies/shocks in terms of their impact upon 
household welfare indicates that the policies of skill-biased and factor-neutral technical 
change and the immigration of health care-specific skilled workers at a flexible wage 
benefits and thus will be supported by all households (though in case of the latter not by 
domestic health care-specific skilled workers who earn less and so may require some 
compensation), whereas the rise in the price of pharmaceuticals will make all 
households worse off and thus will be uniformly unpopular. As previously indicated, 
the rising pharmaceutical price may be accepted by the majority of the population if it is 
reflected in a more effective pharmaceutical product. Immigration of health care-
specific skilled workers at the current wage and an increase in government expenditures 
benefits working households and generally harms non-working households and 
pensioners so that the former will support and the latter will object such policies. This 
outcome points out that, in order to mitigate the adverse welfare consequences for these 
households, some sort of redistribution from the working to the non-working and 
pensioner households is warranted. 
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Finally the uncertainty surrounding the waiting list elasticities for skilled and unskilled 
labour demonstrates the importance of ensuring that additional care resources are 
effective in reducing waiting lists and increasing effective labour supplies, or using the 
catch phrase of the current labour government, ensuring value for money. In support 
of this observation, a rise in the absolute value of the waiting list elasticity was shown to 
significantly reduce the health budget increase required to attain a certain overall 
welfare gain. This may be achieved via the aforementioned technical and administrative 
improvements in health care. 
7.4 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this thesis health care and its effects on other product and factor markets, households 
and overall welfare have been summarised at a rather aggregate level by a few 
parameters, variables and simple functional forms. Consequently, the limitations of this 
research and the improvements which address these primarily concern providing more 
detail in terms of the modelling of the economic impact of health care provision. This 
not only enhances the richness of the model in terms of its outcomes and the predictions 
that it conveys, but also opens up new areas of application.  
The first set of limitations, which was observed in the introduction, relate to the 
modelling of health and health effects. In this thesis health is explicitly measured in 
terms of the size of effective, i.e. able to work, labour endowments and changes in 
health are assumed to have a parallel effect on effective labour endowments. In the 
SCGE model a health status measure was introduced as a function of public and private 
health care which impacts upon effective labour supplies, and direct improvements in 
well-being from an increase in the public provision of health care (and other goods) 
were added to household and overall utility functions.  
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Modelling health effects in this fashion precludes the modelling of improved health on 
the non-working populations, i.e. children and pensioners. Although the SCGE model 
accounts for these population groups, it does not model longer-term population 
processes (births, deaths, transitions from young to working and from working to 
retired), nor does it model the decomposition of those moving from young to 
working into skilled and unskilled. An obvious way forward is to change from a 
comparative static model to a dynamic model so that people can be tracked through 
their life cycle and births and deaths may be accounted for. As a first step, a recursive 
dynamic CGE model, which essentially links a series of single-period equilibria via the 
updating of the capital stock, may be considered, but more appropriate is an 
intertemporal dynamic model, which allows the modelling of behavioural changes over 
time (forward looking behaviour) and, ultimately, the overlapping generations (OLG) 
model, which also accounts for intergenerational processes.2  
OLG models are typically applied to social security issues, such the economic impact of 
ageing (i.e. the sustainability of pension schemes). An interesting area for future 
research is to link the issue of ageing with health care. Ageing may be modelled as the 
result of improved health and health care provision and, conversely, a larger population, 
in which the share of the elderly rises, increases the demands made on  health care and 
other sectors, which could otherwise have been devoted to the working population and 
are paid for by the latter in the form of state pensions.  
In addition, the modelling of health effects at present ignores the impact upon the choice 
between labour and leisure time, does not distinguish part-time from full-time work, and 
 
2  A prototype recursive dynamic model has been developed but not as yet applied to real world data. 
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takes no notice of time as opposed to money spent on health improvements. Some of 
those ill and not working (i.e. individuals on the waiting list), may not have been 
working anyway, and if cured may opt for a part-time rather than a full-time job. One 
should ideally try to incorporate these effects, as well as model the transition of 
individuals from falling ill to getting well in more detail. The latter includes 
considerations of how the benefits from household consumption of health care are 
distributed to individual household members, what factors cause individuals to become 
ill in the first place (such as age, income, skills, lifestyle, environment, and so on), and 
what factors contribute to them partially or fully recovering (which is likely to include 
health care consumption, age and possibly also income or skill-related variables).   
Finally, the indicators of changes in household and overall welfare in the SCGE model, 
which measure the direct benefits from a rise in the public provision of health care and 
other goods, in addition to changes in private utility, are rather rudimentary in the sense 
that: (1) they attach equal weights to private utility and public provision3, and more 
importantly (2) the direct improvement in well-being from a rise in public good 
provisioning is considered equal to the cost of providing these additional goods.  
Improved estimates for the direct gains in well-being may be elicited from the literature 
on happiness (see for example Clark and Oswald, 2002). Using the compensation 
principle, this literature typically attaches a very high welfare gain to an improvement in 
health so that some sort of scaling would be required to bring it in line with the 
 
3  Though at the household level the latter was distributed over households according to each 
households share of NHS GP consultations for health care and population shares for other goods. 
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monetary values in the model.4  The method of evaluating direct improvements in well-
being employed in the SCGE model may thus be considered as giving rather 
conservative, lower boundary, estimates.  
In sum, the measurement of health and benefits of improved health is and is likely to 
remain a highly contentious issue and this thesis has taken a crude, though simple and 
pragmatic approach to these matters. 
The second set of shortcomings relate to the level of disaggregation in health care 
and related sectors and markets. Firstly, a health care good/sector as such does not 
really exist. There are many different types of diseases which require different types of 
health care (treatments), which in turn demand different combinations of health care 
inputs, with different costs and different health effects. Currently, the types of care that 
are distinguished in the SCGE model are rationed public health care and (unrationed) 
private care, each with a different clientele. In future one may want to expand this 
classification for example in terms of primary and secondary (medical and surgical; 
inpatient versus outpatient and day patient) health care, possibly with a referral system, 
each of which differs in terms of health care inputs and costs and the impact upon the ill 
and effective labour supplies. This, as well as the inclusion of a variety of treatments for 
the same condition, may provide an indication of the cost-effectiveness of types of 
health care or treatments and the allocative efficiency of current health care spending.  
 
4  Clark and Oswald (2002) for example find that a decline in health from excellent to fair is 
equivalent to a loss of approximately £500,000 a year, 21 times the average yearly household income 
in the sample used. 
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Other useful distinctions are to separate preventive from curative care and palliative 
care, to separate public from private care in production as well as in consumption, to 
separate maternity care, and to distinguish the chronically ill  (who mainly consume 
palliative care) from other ill. Whereas preventive care ceteris paribus reduces the 
number of people falling ill, curative care impacts upon the number of people 
recovering from illness. Palliative care has no such effects other than softening the 
negative side-effects of illness. A public-private division in production seems 
appropriate since the private sector is arguably more efficient in production and more 
effective in treating and/or curing people, resulting in lower waiting lists. 
Secondly, further detail in terms of the health care workforce does justice to the wide 
variety of health care staff working in UK health care. An additional skill level, of semi-
skilled, would for example make a distinction possible between say unskilled ancillary 
staff, semi-skilled nurses and skilled doctors and managers. The skilled may be further 
categorised into a medical category of doctors and an administrative class of managers 
(similarly, capital may be divided between high-tech equipment, and buildings and 
land). This thesis has incorporated the latter to some extent by introducing health care-
specific skilled labour (and capital), where the remaining skilled labourers (capital) may 
be interpreted as managers (land and buildings).  
An interesting avenue of research is to investigate the effects of differential elasticities 
of substitution between these types of health care workers and types of capital. For 
example, nurses are more and more given additional responsibilities so as to reduce the 
workload of doctors and ultimately waiting lists, which could be modelled by an 
increase in the substitution elasticity between these two types of health care workers. 
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Also, some highly skilled doctors are depending upon high-tech equipment to carry out 
their duties, suggesting a very low elasticity of substitution. How these adjustments will 
impact upon the health sector is unclear, though generally higher (lower) elasticities of 
substitution soften (increase) price changes and increase (soften) volume changes. 
Finally, data constraints have limited the way in which the health improvements 
conditioned on the health sector have been modelled (for example no reliable data were 
available on the costs of provision of different types of care, the consumption by 
household and/or individual of these types of care and their effectiveness). Each of the 
suggestions for future research put forward in this section will be more demanding in 
terms of data and thus worsen these constraints so that improving the availability of data 
on health care provisioning and its effects on the rest of the economy will be crucial for 
any progress made in this area of research.  
The most obvious weakness of the SCGE model in terms of data is the lack of reliable 
estimates of the waiting list elasticity. Whereas for some conditions waiting lists and/or 
times have been falling, for others they have been rising and it is unclear how waiting 
lists in general respond to health care expenditures (note that distinguishing between 
types of care or treatments may solve this problem). Nevertheless, by varying the 
magnitude of the waiting list elasticities for skilled and unskilled labour in the 
sensitivity analysis, the importance of making health care more effective was shown.    
Other directions for future research include the modelling of productivity effects of 
improved health, modelling the health sector in more detail and the health insurance 
market (in line with the Health Sector and Health Insurance models discussed in Section 
3.1), varying the country of application and modelling the outbreak of a disease to see 
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how the health care system and the economy cope. Applying the analysis to a 
developing country is likely to produce different outcomes due to, for example, 
differences in workforce composition (likely to be unskilled abundant), differences in 
the relative importance of sectors (likely to be biased towards agro-based sectors) and 
differences in health effects across different population groups (in general the marginal 
effect of a rise in health care provision is likely to be greater as the flat of the curve 
has not yet been reached). Finally, with respect to the modelling of a specific type of 
disease, for a developed country one may think of modelling influenza, which is a 
recurring phenomenon in winter, and has claimed many lives, whereas for a developing 
country one may think of modelling the AIDS epidemic and the effect of different types 
of treatments (as in Dixon et al., 2004).  
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
A1. FACTOR-BIAS & SCALE EFFECTS HO MODEL: CASES 2-7 
Case 2: 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
      
The first part of the condition is the same as for Case 1 so that we know that sector 2’s 
output will rise, whereas sector 1’s output will rise or fall depending on whether the 
scale effect outweighs the factor-bias effect. Since 1GH   still holds, from equation 
(2.80) . But using equation (2.76), 2ˆ ˆT X!  2 21 U S
OGH O O    implies , i.e. the 
factor-bias effect dominates. 
1
ˆ 0X 
Figure A.1 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 2 
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Hence 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
    
H
1
 results in 
. Figure A.1 illustrates this situation. 2ˆ ˆ ˆ0T X X! ! !
Case 3: 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and 1GH !  
Given that 1 1 0S UO O !  and 1GH ! , equation (2.80) yields 2ˆ ˆX T! . Furthermore, 
1GH !  implies  2 21 U S
OGH O O!    and hence, from equation (2.76), . Using 
equation (2.82), 
1
ˆ 0X !
H Es s!  implies 0S UH HO O !  so that, given 1GH ! , 1 2ˆ ˆX X! .  
Therefore 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and 1GH !  yields . The scale effect of an 
expansion in health care on the outputs of sector 1 and 2 is so strong that both sectors 2 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X X T! ! !
and 1 experience a rise in output which exceeds the relative change in the health budget. 
Figure A.2 illustrates this situation. 
Figure A.2 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 3 
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2Case 4: 1H Es s s s! ! !  and   1 11 11 11
S U U SH H
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
!   
1
Compared to the previous cases, the ordering of the middle-ranking sector 1 relative to 
the economy-wide endowment ratio has now changed. The health sector is more skill-
intensive than sector 2, so 2
2
S H
U UH
SO O
O O! , or 2 2 0S U S UH HO O O O ! , and hence from 
equation (2.74) . Since the health sector is also more skill-intensive than sector 
1, 
1
ˆ 0FX 
1 1 0S U S UH HO O O O ! , and hence from equation (2.75) . Sector 1 now has a 
skilled-unskilled labour ratio lower than the effective endowment ratio, so that 
2
ˆ 0FX !
1 1 0S UO O  , and from equation (2.73) 2ˆ 0SX  . Similarly, sector 2 has a skilled-
unskilled labour ratio lower than the effective endowment ratio, so that 2 2 0U SO O !  
and from equation (2.72) . Whereas in cases 1, 2 and 3, sector 2’s output must 
rise, in cases 4, 5, 6 and 7 output of either 1 or 2 must expand. Whether output of the 
other good expands or contracts depends on whether the scale effect outweighs the 
factor-bias effect.
1
ˆ 0SX !
2
 This is again determined by the magnitude ofGH . 
                                                 
1
  The lower boundary for GH can be derived from either equation (2.71) or equation (2.77) by setting 
. Notice that the value of the lower boundary is positive and greater than 1, given that the 
health sector is more skill-intensive than sector 1, sector 1’s skill-intensity lies below the effective 
skilled-unskilled labour endowment ratio and 
2
ˆ 0X 
0O ! .  
2
  Notice that the factor-bias effect, i.e. the effect of a fall in the skilled-unskilled effective labour ratio 
on outputs, is always positive for sector 2 and negative for sector 1, whereas the scale effect is always 
positive for sector 1 but changes sign for sector 2. The negative scale effect for sector 2 is analogous 
to the R effect where an increase in skilled labour endowments decreases the output of the unskilled 
labour-intensive good. The borderline case where effective endowments are increased in the same 
proportion as the factor proportion of sector 1, replicates the R corollary mentioned in footnote 4 of 
Chapter 2, i.e. increases the output of sector 1 and leaves the output of the sector 2 unchanged.  
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Using equation (2.77),  1 11 S U
OGH O O!    implies 2ˆ 0X  .
3
 Subtracting 1ˆX  from  
yields the following expression: 
ˆT
 
  2 2
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
U ST X T
GH O O
O
ª º   «« »¬ ¼
»      (A.1) 
Since , 2Es s! 2 2 0U SO O !  and given   1 11 11 11 1
S U U SH H
S US U
O O O OO
O OO O
  ! , 1GH ! , 
so that 1ˆ ˆX T! .  
Figure A.3 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 4 
 
                                                 
3
  The same result is achieved by combining equation (2.71) and 1 1
1 1
S U U SH H
S U
O O O OGH O O
!  . 
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2Thus, 1H Es s s s! ! !  and   1 11 11 11
S U U SH
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
!   
H
2
 gives 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ0X T! ! ! X
2
 . Figure A.3 illustrates this situation. 
Case 5: 1H Es s s s! ! !  and   1 11 11 11 1
S U U SH H
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
      
From equation (2.77),  1 11 S U
OGH O O    implies . As 2ˆ 0X ! 1GH !  still holds, and 
given that 1 1 0S UO O  , equations (2.80) and (2.83) yield  1 2ˆ ˆ ˆX T X! ! . 
Consequently, 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and   1 11 11 11 1
S U U SH
S US U
O O O OOGH O OO O
    
H
 yields 
. Figure A.4  illustrates this situation. 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X T X! ! !
Figure A.4 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 5 
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2Case 6: 1H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
     
Since 1GH  , 2 2 0U SO O !  and 1 1 0S UO O  , equation (2.80) and (2.83) yield 
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1X T X! ! . Using equation (2.76),  2 21 U S
OGH O O!    implies . 1ˆ 0X !
Hence, 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 21 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OO GHO OO O
     implies 
. Figure A.5 illustrates this situation. 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ 0X T X! ! !
Figure A.5 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 6 
 
Case 7: 1 2H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH H
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
      
This is identical to Case 6, but now using equation (2.76)  2 21 U S
OGH O O    yields 
. 1
ˆ 0X 
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2Therefore, 1H Es s s s! ! !  and   2 22 22 20 1
U S S UH
U SU S
O O O OOGH O OO O
    
H
1
 implies 
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ0X T! ! ! X . Figure A.6 illustrates this situation. 
Figure A.6 Factor-bias and scale effects in the HO model - Case 7 
 
A2. DERIVATION OF THE R THEOREM FOR THE SF MODEL 
The derivation of the R theorem for the model in which skilled labour is assumed 
specific to respectively health care and tradables starts with the market clearing 
equations (2.83), (2.85) and (2.50). Manipulation using the factor demand equations 
(2.7), (2.8) and (2.45) yields for health care-specific skilled labour and skilled labour 
remaining for tradables: 
       (A.2)  H HSH H E Wa X S S S   H
T
W      (A.3) 1 21 2 T TS S Ea X a X S S S   
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H
H
For unskilled labour, equation (2.50) is rewritten as:  
     (A.4)  1 2 TE E H WU U U U U U U U      
where  is unskilled labour employed by the tradables sectors. Manipulation using 
the factor demand equations (2.9), (2.10) and (2.46) yields: 
T
EU
 1 21 2U U W U Ha X a X U U a X         (A.5) 
where  Tl l S Ui ia a w w   for  i = 1, 2, l = S, U and  Hl l S UH Ha a w w  for l = S, U. 
Since total unskilled, health care- and tradables-specific skilled labour, U ,  and , 
their respective illness rates, ,  and , and initial waiting lists, ,  and 
, remain unchanged, total differentiation of equations (A.2), (A.3) and (A.5) is 
simplified considerably. Firstly for health care-specific skilled labour, the proportionate 
change in effective endowments is given by: 
HS TS
Uir
H
Sir
T
Sir
0
WU
0H
WS
0T
WS
 
ˆ
ˆ
H
W
H
HW
S
S HH XSa X XG H  ˆ H       (A.6) 
where  ' 0; ,HW
H
H
S H H H HW H
W H W SX H
H W W
S X S X S ir S
X S S
H w 0HH
X   w !  denotes the absolute 
value of the waiting list elasticity for health care-specific skilled labour, and 
0H
W
H H
W ES S SG  !  the “dependency ratio” for health care-specific skilled labour. 
The proportionate change in effective tradables-specific skilled labour equals: 
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1 2 1 21 21 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
T
W
T T T T T
HW
S
S S XS S S S Sa a X XO O O O G H    ˆ HX    (A.7) 
where T
i
T
i ES S SO   denotes the proportion of  employed in sector TES i, and 1TiS
i
O  ¦ , 
for i = 1, 2.  ' 0; ,TW
H
T
S T T T TW H H
W H W SX T T
H W W
S X S X S ir S
X S S
H w    !w 0
X
 denotes the absolute 
value of the waiting list elasticity for tradables-specific skilled labour and 
0T
W
T T
W ES S SG  !  is the “dependency ratio” for tradables-specific skilled labour. 
The proportionate change in effective endowments of unskilled labour employed in the 
tradables sectors is given by (A.8): 
    
1 2 1 21 21 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ1
T T T T
W
H
U UU U U U
U
U H UW HX
a a X X
X a X
O O O O
G I H I
  
    H
    (A.8) 
where T
i
T
i EU U UO   is the proportion of  employed in sector i , TEU 1TiU
i
O  ¦  for 
, 1, 2i  0U W EW U UG  !  is the “dependency ratio” for unskilled labour, and  
 ' 0; ,W
H
U W H
W H W UX
H W W
U X U X U ir U
X U U
H w    !w 0
HX
 denotes the absolute value of the 
elasticity of the waiting list for unskilled labour with respect to health care output. 
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T
H EU UI   is the ratio of unskilled labour employed in health care to total unskilled 
labour employed in the tradables sectors.4  
Since   Tl l S Ui ia a w w   for  i = 1, 2 and l = S, U, from equations (2.97) and (2.98) 
factor prices  and  depend on commodity prices TSw Uw 1p  and 2p  only. As commodity 
prices for sector 1 and 2 are exogenously fixed to world prices by the small country 
assumption, the aforementioned factor prices remain the same such that  for ˆ 0lia  i = 
1, 2 and l = S, U.5 Equations (A.7) and (A.8) simplify into: 
 
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
T
W
T T T
HW
S
HXS S S
ˆX XO O G H  X      (A.9) 
    
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 WT T
H
U
U H UW XU UX X X a XO O G I H I     HH   (A.10) 
which can be solved for 1ˆX  and 2ˆX  once ˆ HX  and  are known. ˆU Ha
The solution for ˆ HX  results from equation (A.6): 
  
ˆ
ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H S H XSX a G H§ ©¨ ¹
· ¸
                                                
     (A.11) 
 
4
  Note that, using equation  (A.4), the term TW EU U  is rewritten as  1UWG I  in equation (A.8). 
5
  This simplification does not obtain if skilled labour is specific to all sectors; the two price equations 
for sectors 1 and 2 then contain three unknowns instead of two. 
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In contrast to the input-output coefficients for the tradables sectors,  and  are 
not equal to zero. From equations (2.94) and (2.95), 
ˆS Ha ˆU Ha
 Hl l S UH Ha a w w  , for l = S, U. 
With  being determined from one of the commodity price equations for tradables 
and ,  follows from the unit price equation for health care, equation (2.96), 
and  is fully explained by the relative change in the price of health care, 
Uw
ˆ 0Uw  HSw
ˆ
H
Sw ˆHp . The 
latter responds to the exogenously given change in the health budget, , from 
expression (2.55).  
ˆT
Total differentiation of (2.96) yields: 
    (A.12) HH S S U U S S UH H H Hdp w da w da a dw a dw   H U
From the first order condition for cost minimisation the slope of the unit-production 
isoquant equals the factor price ratio, HS U UH Hda da w w  S
 
H
H S S UHp wT T 
, or 
, such that, after further manipulation, the following expression 
results: 
0HS S U UH Hw da w da
       (A.13) ˆ ˆ ˆUH w
where HS S SH Ha w pT  H  and U U UH Ha w p HT   are the cost shares of health care-
specific skilled and unskilled labour in the output of health care respectively,  and 
1S UH HT T   by definition. 
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Since , the relative change in the wage of health care-specific skilled labour 
equals: 
ˆ 0Uw  
 
ˆ ˆ
H
S H S Hw p T        (A.14) 
From the health budget restriction (2.55), the exogenously given proportionate change 
in the health budget equals the sum of the proportionate changes in the health care price 
and quantity, so that ˆHp  equals: 
         (A.15) ˆ ˆˆHp T X  H
The proportionate change in the input output coefficients,  and , can be 
derived using two simple relationships.
ˆS Ha ˆU Ha
6
 Firstly, 0HS S U UH Hw da w da   is equivalent 
to: 
 
ˆ ˆ 0S S U UH H H Ha aT T        (A.16) 
And secondly, the relative change in the ratio of input-output coefficients in reaction to 
a relative change in the factor price ratio is given by the elasticity of substitution 
between factors. The definition of the elasticity of substitution between health care-
specific skilled labour and unskilled labour in health care is: 
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
U SH
H
S U
a a
w w
V  
H
                                                
       (A.17) 
 
6
  The derivation follows Jones (1971). 
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ˆSw
ˆSw
ˆ
Substitution of equation (A.16) in equation (A.17) and further manipulation of terms 
yields: 
        (A.18) ˆ HS UH Ha VT 
        (A.19) ˆ HU UH Ha VT 
Substituting equations (A.14), (A.15) and (A.18) into equation (A.11) yields:   
 
ˆ
HX BT         (A.20) 
where 1
H
W
H
HW
S
U SH HXSB V T G H T VT§ ·§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹U H . 
And thus: 
   ˆˆ 1Hp B T         (A.21) 
   ˆˆ 1HS Hw B T T  S        (A.22) 
    ˆˆ 1S U SH H Ha V T T   B T      (A.23) 
    ˆˆ 1U U SH H Ha V T T B T      (A.24) 
The solution outcomes for the proportionate changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2 are: 
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2 21
ˆ
ˆ 1 2
T H
W W
T T T H
WH HW W
S U
UX XU S S S
BTX O G H O G I H I G HO
ª º§ ·§    ¨¨ ¸« »© ¹© ¹¬ ¼
W
H
S
X
·¸
 (A.25) 
 
1 12
ˆ
ˆ 1 2
H
W W
T H
W H HW W
U S
U X XS S
BTX O G I H I G H O G HO
ª º§ ·§ ·    ¨ ¸¨ ¸« »© ¹© ¹¬ ¼
T
W
T T
H
S
XU S  (A.26) 
where 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
0T T T T T T T TS U U S S U U SO O O O O O O O O      !   under the assumption that 
sector 1 is relatively skill-intensive compared to sector 2.  
Equations (A.20) to (A.26) summarise the relative output, input, factor price and output 
price changes following a change in the size of the health budget in the SF model.  
To limit the number of possible outcomes of an expansion of the health sector, waiting 
lists are henceforth postulated as being homogeneous in ill health, and thus in treatment, 
across labour types. Using the homogeneity assumption 0
H T
W W W
H H H
S S U
X X XH H H H   !  
and 0H T
W W UWS S
G G G G   !  so that   1U SH HB V T GH T VT   U H  and the 
proportionate changes in outputs, inputs and prices are given by:  
   
 
 2
2 2
1
ˆ 2 1
ˆ
1
T
T T
SU H
S UH H U S
T
X
O I GHVT GHGH T VT O O
ª º« » « »  « »¬ ¼
   (A.27)  
   
 
 1
1 1
2
ˆ 2 1
ˆ
1
T
T T
SU H
S UH H S U
T
X
O I GHVT GHGH T VT O O
ª º« » « »  « »¬ ¼
   (A.28) 
   ˆ ˆ 1H U S UH HX TVT GH T VT   H     (A.29) 
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ˆˆ 1 1H S SH Hp TGH T GH T VT    U H

    (A.30) 
    ˆˆ 1 1HS S UH Hw TGH GH T VT        (A.31) 
     ˆˆ 1 1S U S UH H Ha TVT GH GH T VT     H    (A.32) 
     ˆˆ 1 1U U S UH H Ha TVT GH GH T VT    H
H
W
   (A.33) 
A3. IMMIGRATION OF HEALTH CARE-SPECIFIC SKILLED 
LABOUR IN THE SF MODEL 
The government allows foreign health care-specific skilled labour to enter the UK, 
whilst keeping the health care budget at the same level. It is assumed that the income 
generated by these additional foreign workers remains within the economy.  
Taking the differential of the right-hand side of equation (A.2) yields: 
        (A.34)  H HEdS dS dS 
where . After further manipulation of (A.34) the following expression for 0HdS ! ˆHES  
results:  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ1 HWH H HW W SH HE XS SS SG G H   HX      (A.35) 
Consequently, equation (A.6)  becomes: 
   ˆˆˆ 1 HWH H HW W SHS HH XS Sa X S XG G H    ˆ H      (A.36) 
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Equation (A.11) changes into:  
   ˆˆ ˆ1 1 HWH HW W SHH S H XSX S aG G§   ©¨ ¹HS H ·¸    (A.37) 
The remainder of the analysis is the same as the derivation of the R theorem for the SF 
model, with the difference that the health care budget does not change, i.e. ˆ 0T  .  
Substitution of (A.14), (A.15) and (A.18) into (A.37), yields: 
 
ˆˆ
H
HX BS          (A.38) 
where 
 1
1
H
W
H
W
H
HW
S HS
S
S UH HXS
B
G T
G H T VT

 § · ¨ ¸© ¹
. 
The proportionate changes in the remaining variables are as follows: 
 
ˆ
ˆ
H
Hp BS          (A.39) 
 
ˆ
ˆ
H H
S Hw BS ST         (A.40) 
 
ˆ
ˆ
H
S U SH Ha BSVT T H       (A.41) 
 
ˆ
ˆ
H
U UH Ha BS S HVT  T       (A.42) 
    2 21 ˆˆ 1 1TW WT T T WH HWH S UU U H HX XU S SBSX O G H O G I H I V T TO ª º    « »¬ ¼S  (A.43) 
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1 12 ˆˆ 1 1 TW WT T TW H HWH U SU U SH HX XS UBSX O G I H I V T T O G HO ª º    « »¬ ¼S  (A.44) 
Using the homogeneity assumption,   
1
1
S H
S UH H
B
G T
GH T VT
   , and the proportionate 
changes in outputs, inputs and prices are given by:  
 
 
 
  
 2
2 2
1
ˆ 11
ˆ
1
T
T T
H U SH HSS H
S UH H U S
S
X
O I GH V T TG T GHGH T VT O O
ª º  « » « »  « »¬ ¼
 (A.45) 
 
 
 
  
 1
1 1
2
ˆ 11
ˆ
1
T
T T
H U SH HSS H
S UH H S U
S
X
O I GH V T TG T GHGH T VT O O
ª º  « » « »  « »¬ ¼
 (A.46) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
S H
H
S UH H
S
X
G T
GH T VT
         (A.47) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
S H
H
S UH H
S
p
G T
GH T VT
          (A.48) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
H
S
S UH H
S
w
G
GH T VT
          (A.49) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
U H
S H
S UH H
S
a
VT G
GH T VT
         (A.50) 
 
 
 
ˆ1
ˆ
1
H
U H
U H
S UH H
S
a
VT G
GH T VT
         (A.51) 
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Equation (A.45) to (A.51) summarise the relative input, output and factor price changes 
following the immigration of health care-specific skilled labour in the SF model, using 
the homogeneity assumption.  
A4. FNTC IN HEALTH CARE USING THE SF MODEL 
FNTC in the production of health care implies that ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a    (and ˆ 0lia   for 
l = S, U and i = 1, 2). The new technology will be adopted if the unit cost of health care 
at current factor prices falls. At unchanged factor prices, total differentiation of the unit 
cost equation for health care (2.96) yields: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆH S S U UH H H Hp a aT T        (A.52) 
where HS S SH Ha w pT  H  and U U UH Ha w p HT   are the cost shares of health care-
specific skilled and unskilled labour in the output of health care respectively,  and 
1S UH HT T   by definition. Substituting ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a    in equation (A.52) gives  
ˆ ˆ 0Hp a  , so that unit cost of health care at current factor prices falls and the new 
technology will be adopted. 
Since in the SF model, the wage of health care-specific skilled labour may change, the 
total (i.e. allowing for factor price changes) proportionate change in the unit cost of 
health care, using (A.12), is given by: 
        (A.53) ˆ ˆ ˆ HH S Hp a wT  S
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
A-19
The derivation of the impact of FNTC on outputs proceeds in a similar fashion as 
Section A2. The proportionate changes in outputs are given by equation (A.9), (A.10) 
and (A.11), but substituting for ˆ ˆ ˆ 0S UH Ha a a   : 
 
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
T
W
T T T
HW
S
HXS S S
ˆX XO O G H  X      (A.54)  
    
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 WT T
H
U
U HW XU UX X X a XO O G I H I     H   (A.55) 
 
ˆ
ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H XSX a G H§ ©¨ ¹
· ¸
H
      (A.56) 
where the parameter definitions of Section A2 apply. 
Furthermore, given the health care budget, T , the following condition must hold:  
 
ˆ
ˆHX p          (A.57) 
Hence, equation (A.53) to (A.57) represent a system of five equations with five 
unknowns, 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , ,  and 
H
H H S 2
ˆX p w X X , which yields solution values: 
 
ˆ
ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H XSX a G H§ ©¨ ¹
· ¸       (A.58) 
 
ˆ ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H XSp a G H§  ©¨ ¹
·¸
      (A.59) 
 
ˆ ˆ 1
H H
W W
H H
H HW W
S SH
S HX XS Sw aG H G H TSª º§ ·  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼     (A.60) 
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2 2 2
1
ˆ
ˆ
1
T H
W W W
T T T T H
H H HW W
H
W
H
HW
S U U
U UW WX X XU S S S S
S
XS
a
X
O G H O G H O I G H G H
O G H
ª º§ ·  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼ § ·¨ ¸© ¹
W
H
S
X
 (A.61) 
1 1 1
2
ˆ
ˆ
1
T H
W W W
T T T T H
H H HW W
H
W
H
HW
U S U
U UW WX X XS U S S S
S
XS
a
X
O G H O G H O I G H G H
O G H
ª º§ ·  ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼ § ·¨ ¸© ¹
W
H
S
X

 (A.62) 
Using the homogeneity assumption the proportionate changes in outputs, inputs and 
prices are simplified to:  
 ˆ ˆ 1HX a GH         (A.63) 
  ˆ ˆ 1Hp a GH          (A.64) 
  ˆ ˆ 1HS Hw aGH GH Tª  ¬ S º¼       (A.65) 
 
 
 
2 2
1
ˆ
ˆ
1
T TU Sa
X
O O GH
O GH
ª º« »¬ 
¼
      (A.66) 
 
 
 
1 1
2
ˆ
ˆ
1
T TS Ua
X
O O GH
O GH
ª º« »¬ 
¼
      (A.67) 
Equations (A.63) to (A.67) summarise the relative input, output and factor price 
changes following factor neutral technical change in health care under the homogeneity 
assumption and within the SF model. 
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The rankings of relative output (and price) changes are relatively straightforward. 
Specifically for 0 1GHd   , ˆ 0HX ! ˆ 0Hp  , ˆ 0HSw d  and , whereas for  1 2ˆ ˆ 0X X t
1GH !  , ˆ 0HX  ˆ 0Hp ! ,  and ˆ 0HSw ! 1 2ˆ ˆ 0X X  . As in the HO model FNTC 
(Section 2.5.1) only yields scale effects (the proportionate change in health care 
employment equals    ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1H l HHL a X a a aGH GH GH       , for ,L S U ). But 
in contrast with this model, the changes in outputs of sector 1 and 2 are identical and 
follow the sign of the change in health sector output, which can also become negative.7
A5. SBTC IN HEALTH CARE USING THE SF MODEL  
SBTC in the production of health care implies that ˆ 0S Ha  ,  and ˆ 0U Ha  ˆ 0lia   for l 
= S, U and i = 1, 2. The new technology will be adopted if the unit cost of health care at 
current factor prices falls. Using expression (A.52), ˆ ˆ 0H S SH Hp aT  , so that the new 
technology will be adopted. 
Since in the SF model, the wage of health care-specific skilled labour may change, the 
total (i.e. allowing for factor price changes) proportionate change in the unit cost of 
health care, using (A.12), is given by: 
       (A.68) ˆ ˆ HH S S SH Hp aT  wˆ
                                                 
7
  Due to the homogeneity assumption, FNTC in the SF model replicates the R result that changing the 
endowments of both factors in the same proportion leads to a change in the production of both goods 
in that proportion. Note that, if 0H  , the SF and HO model yield the same result: FNTC reduces the 
unit-requirement of skilled and unskilled labour by  so that the unit cost falls and, given the health 
budget, the output of health care rises by this proportion so that in total the demand for skilled and 
unskilled labour in health care does not change and, hence, outputs of tradables are unchanged. 
aˆ
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Taking the proportionate changes in outputs of the SF model, given in equation (A.9), 
(A.10) and (A.11), but substituting for ˆ 0S Ha   and ˆ 0U Ha  , yields: 
 
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ
T
W
T T T
HW
S
HXS S S
ˆX XO O G H  X      (A.69)  
  
1 21 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 WT T
H
U
U HW XU UX X XO O G I H I    ˆ HX    (A.70) 
 
ˆ
ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H S H XSX a G H§ ©¨ ¹
· ¸
H
      (A.71) 
where the parameter definitions of Section A2 apply. 
Furthermore, given the health care budget, T , the following condition must hold:  
 
ˆ
ˆHX p          (A.72) 
Hence, equation (A.68) to (A.72) represent a system of five equations with five 
unknowns, 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , ,  and 
H
H H S 2ˆX p w X X , which yields solution values: 
 
ˆ
ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H S H XSX a G H§ ©¨ ¹
· ¸       (A.73) 
 
ˆ ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
S
H S H XSp a G H§  ©¨ ¹
·¸
     (A.74) 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
H
W
H
HW
SH
S S S SH H H XSw a a T G H§ §   ¨¨ © ¹© ¹
··¸ ¸     (A.75) 
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2 21 ˆˆ 11 TW WT T TH H HWWH
HW
S US H
UWX XU S SS
XS
a
X O G H O I G H I
G H O
ª º   « »¬ ¼§ ·¨ ¸© ¹
(A.76) 
   1 12 ˆˆ 11 TW WT TH H HWWH
HW
U SS H
UW X XS US
XS
a
X O I G H I O G H
G H O
TS
ª º   « »¬ ¼§ ·¨ ¸© ¹
(A.77) 
Using the homogeneity assumption the proportionate changes in outputs, inputs and 
prices simplify to:  
  ˆ ˆ 1H S HX a GH 

       (A.78) 
 ˆ ˆ 1H S Hp a GH          (A.79) 
   ˆ ˆ ˆ 1HS S S SH H Hw a a T GH         (A.80) 
     2 21 ˆˆ 11 T TS H U SaX O I O GH IOGH O ª  «¬ 2TS º »¼    (A.81) 
     1 1 12 ˆˆ 11 T T TS H S U SaX I O O GH IOGH O ª   «¬ º»¼    (A.82) 
Equation (A.78) to (A.82) summarise the relative input, output and factor price changes 
following skill-biased technical change in health care under the homogeneity 
assumption and within the SF model. 
In the absence of scale effects ( 0H  ), SBTC in the SF model replicates the results of 
SBTC the HO model:  and 1 1ˆ ˆ 0 
FX X ! 2 2ˆ ˆ 0FX X  , so that more (less) of skilled 
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and unskilled labour is employed in sector 1 (2). In health care, production and thus 
employment of unskilled labour rises by ˆ ˆ 0H S HX a  !  (note that employment of 
health care-specific skilled labour in health care remains the same since the fixed health 
care budget constrains the output expansion). Consequently, the innovation benefits the 
skilled-intensive sector and harms the unskilled-intensive sector by using more 
unskilled labour, thereby making skilled labour relatively more abundant in the rest of 
the economy. 
If scale effects are present, the rankings can be derived as shown in Table A.1, and are 
identical to the results obtained from increasing expenditures on health care, apart from 
the substitution elasticity, which does not play a role anymore (Table 2.5).  
Table A.1 Output changes in the SF model following SBTC in health care 
Waiting list elasticity 
and dependency ratio 
assuming 
homogeneous health 
and treatment 
The health sector’s use of 
unskilled labour relative to the 
tradables sectors 
Output changes for  ˆ 0S Ha !
 
 
1 1
1
0
1
T T
T
S U
S
GH O OI O GH

    1 2
ˆ ˆ 0X X! !
 
0 1
ˆ 0HX
GH 
 !  
  
 
1 1
1
2 1
T T
T
S U
S
GH O OI O GH

!   1 2
ˆ ˆ0X X! !
 
 
 
2 2
2
0
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O O
I O GH

    1 2
ˆ ˆ0 X X! !
 
1
ˆ 0HX
GH !
    
 
2 2
2
2 1
T T
T
U S
S
GH O O
I O GH

!   1 2
ˆ ˆ0X X! !
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
This appendix describes the General Household Survey (GHS) database which was used 
in the disaggregation of household and labour data and served as the main source of 
data on health and the use of health care of households in the UK. The purpose-built 
GHS database is available in electronic form from the author upon request. 
The database was constructed from the 2000/01 General Household Survey, which 
provides a wealth of information on people living in private households in Great 
Britain, including household/family information, demographic detail on household/ 
family members, earnings, benefits, employment, education, health, the use of health 
services, housing tenure, durable goods, migration, smoking and drinking patterns.8 The 
original data were obtained online from the United Kingdom Data Archive (UKDA) 
and subsequently imported to Microsoft Access.9  
The raw data consist of two files, GHS00client1.tab and GHS00hclient1.tab, containing 
person-level and household-level data respectively.10 The person-level file stores one 
record for each responding person, whereas the household-level file stores one record 
for each responding household. Each household is uniquely identified by a household 
serial number (HSERIAL) and this index is attached to all individuals belonging to this 
 
8
  Associated publication: ONS (2001a). 
9
  Registered Trademark. Software is copyrighted and available commercially.  
10
  Two other files were excluded from the database: the informal carers module (ghscare00.tab) and 
social capital module (scaparchive.tab). The former contains data on tertiary care, informal care for 
others, which forms a relatively small part of the health care system. The latter documents data on 
social capital (including civic engagement, neighbourliness and reciprocity, social networks, social 
support and views about the local area) which is not of direct relevance to the topic of study. 
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household in the person-level file. In this way each individual, who has also been given 
a unique identification number (ID) in this thesis, is linked to one household. As the 
GHS is based on a sample of the population of Great Britain (approximately 19266 
people living in 8221 households), a weighting factor (WEIGHT00) is included to 
adjust for non-response and grossing up to match known population distributions. A 
weight connected to a household (and so all household members) thus stands for the 
number of households in Great Britain that it represents. 
The GHS database, at this stage of data collection, was very large and slow when 
extracting specific data. Since it contained data that were irrelevant to the purpose of 
this study, a large number of variables were deleted, mostly concerning family 
information, housing tenure, durable goods, migration, smoking and drinking patterns.11 
Subsequently, for the purpose of aggregating the GHS data, households and individuals 
were classified into household types (Hholdtype1) and skill types (Skilltype1) 
respectively, and with respect to the latter a further categorisation in terms of sector of 
employment (Sector1) was made (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2; Chapter 6, Section 6.2).  
The classification of households is unique in that it presents pensioners as a separate 
household type, with different health care needs and income sources compared to the 
remaining households. In order to obtain this classification, all pensioners were 
removed from the households to which they belonged and put into separate household 
units. When transferring pensioners, it was assumed that a pensioner (pensioners) living 
with non-pensioners is “taken out” and put in a new pensioner household (one pensioner 
 
11
  These data are not ‘lost’: the unique ID and HSERIAL fields for individual- and household-level data 
ensures that, if deemed necessary, variables can be re-imported using the original data files. 
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forms a single pensioner household, two pensioners form a two-person household, et 
cetera). This led to the creation of 564 new households in the sample, representing 
approximately 1.6 million ‘pensioner’ households in Great Britain, and lowered the 
average number of persons in the remaining households. The manipulation of 
households meant breaking the link between the household- and person-level data files 
based on HSERIAL. To distinguish the ‘new’ households from the ‘old’ households 
identified by HSERIAL, all households in the household file were given a unique 
household identification number (HID). The person-level file contains both HSERIAL 
and HID so that it is obvious which households the pensioners belonged to in the survey 
as well as of which households they form a part for the purpose of this thesis.  
The resulting data are stored in three tables in Microsoft Access, recording household- 
level data and person-level health care and socio-economic data respectively. The 
content of the tables is shown below (identical to the ‘Design View’ in MS Access).  
Table: Household_data  
 
 Name  Description                
 HID  Household ID (unique) 
 HSERIAL  Old household serial number (before transfer pensioners, so not unique anymore) 
 WEIGHT00 Sample/population based weights 2000 
 Hholdtype1 Household types: 1=  pensioners (including pensioners from other household types), 
   2= non-working, children, 3= non-working, no children, 4= working, children,                 
   5=  working, no children 
 NPERSONS Number of persons 
 NUMCHILD Number of children (AGE < = 15) 
 NPENSNRS Number of pensioners (SEX = 2, AGE > = 60, SEX= 1 AGE> = 65) 
 NWORKAGE Number of working age persons (NPERSONS-NUMCHILD-NUMPENSNRS) 
 NWORKING Number of working persons (ECSTILO= 1)    
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Table: I ndividual_health_care_data 
 
 Name  Description        
 ID  Individual ID (unique) 
 HID  Household ID (unique) 
 HSERIAL  Old household serial number (before transfer pensioners, so not unique anymore) 
 WEIGHT00 Sample/Population based weights 2000 
 GENHLTH  Health on the whole in the last 12 months (1 good, 2 fairly good, 3 not good) 
 ILLNESS  Any longstanding illness or disability? (1 yes, 2 no) 
 LMATNUM Number of illnesses 
 ICD1  For first illness, illness type (using International Classification of Diseases 9th revision) 
 ICD2  For second illness, illness type 
 ICD3   For third illness, illness type     
 ICD4  For fourth illness, illness type    
 ICD5  For fifth illness, illness type        
 ICD6  For sixth illness, illness type 
 Condition Group1  Condition group first illness (1= infectious diseases, 2= neoplasms and benign growths, 
   3= endocrine and metabolic, 4= blood and related organs, 5= mental disorders,        
   6= nervous system, 7= eye complaints, 8= ear complaints, 9= heart and circulatory 
   system, 10= respiratory system, 11= digestive system, 12= genito-urinary system,  
   13= skin complaints, 14= musculoskeletal system, 15= other complaints 
 Condition Group2  Condition group second illness  
 Condition Group3  Condition group third illness      
 Condition Group4  Condition group fourth illness    
 Condition Group5  Condition group fifth illness       
 Condition Group6  Condition group sixth illness      
 LIMITACT  I f longstanding illness, limits activity? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 CUTDOWN  I llness/ injury in last 2 weeks reduce activity? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NDYSCUTD  Number of days cut down last 2 weeks 
 DOCTALK  Consulted doctor last 2 weeks, excl. hospital? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NCHATS   Number of consultations 
 CONSULN1 Consultation number 1 
 WHSBHLF1 On whose behalf? 
 FORPERN1 Person number consulted for 
 NHS1  Under NHS or private? (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 GP1   Type of doctor? (1= GP, 2= Specialist, 3= other) 
 DOCWHER1 Where talk to doctor? (1= by telephone, 2= at your home,    
   3= in the doctors surgery, 4= at a health centre, 5= elsewhere) 
 PRESC1  Given prescription? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 CONSULN2 
 WHSBHLF2  
 FORPERN2 
 NHS2 
 GP2 
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I ndividual_health_care_data continued 
 DOCWHER2 
 PRESC2 
 CONSULN3 
 WHSBHLF3 
 FORPERN3 
 NHS3 
 GP3 
 DOCWHER3 
 PRESC3 
 CONSULN4 
 WHSBHLF4 
 FORPERN4 
 NHS4  
 GP4  
 DOCWHER4  
 PRESC4  
 CONSULN5 
 WHSBHLF5 
 FORPERN5 
 NHS5 
 GP5 
 DOCWHER5 
 PRESC5 
 CONSULN6 
 WHSBHLF6 
 FORPERN6 
 NHS6 
 GP6 
 DOCWHER6 
 PRESC6 
 CONSULN7 
 WHSBHLF7 
 FORPERN7 
 NHS7  
 GP7  
 DOCWHER7  
 PRESC7  
 CONSULN8  
 WHSBHLF8  
 FORPERN8  
 NHS8  
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 I ndividual_health_care_data continued 
 GP8  
 DOCWHER8  
 PRESC8  
 CONSULN9  
 WHSBHLF9  
 FORPERN9  
 NHS9  
 GP9  
 DOCWHER9  
 PRESC9  
 OUTPATNT Hospital outpatient attended - last 3 months? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NTIMES1  How many times attended as outpatient in first month? 
 NTIMES2  How many times attended as outpatient in second month? 
 NTIMES3   How many times attended as outpatient in third month? 
 NTIMESOP Number of outpatient visits in last 3 months 
 CASUALTY Whether visit was to casualty department (1= at least one to casualty, 2= no casualty)  
 NCASVIS   Number of visits to casualty 
 PRVISTS  Whether outpatient visit under NHS or private (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 NPRVISTS  Number of private outpatient visits 
 DAYPATNT  In hospital as day patient in last year? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 MATDPAT  Any days as day patient for maternity? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NUMMATDP Number of separate days as day patient for having a baby 
 PRMATDP  Private or NHS maternity care (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 NPRMATDP  Number of private visits 
 NHSPDAYS Number of separate days in hospital as a day patient (excl maternity stays) 
 PRDPTNT  Whether day patient visit under NHS or private (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 NPRDPTNT  Number of private day patient visits 
 INPATNT   In hospital as inpatient in last year? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 MATINPAT  Whether inpatient for maternity (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NMTSTAY  Number of stays inpatient maternity 
 MTNIGHT1  Number of nights stay maternity (visit nr. 1) 
 MATNHST1 Treated under NHS or private (visit nr. 1) (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 MTPRVST1  Number of private maternity visits (visit nr. 1) 
 MTNIGHT2 
 MATNHST2 
 MTPRVST2 
 MTNIGHT3 
 MATNHST3 
 MTPRVST3 
 MTNIGHT4 
 MATNHST4 
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I ndividual_health_care_data continued 
 MTPRVST4 
 MTNIGHT5 
 MATNHST5 
 MTPRVST5 
 MTNIGHT6 
 MATNHST6 
 MTPRVST6 
 NSTAYS   Number of separate inpatient stays (excl maternity stays) 
 NIGHTS1   Number of nights altogether in hospital (first stay) 
 NHSTREA1 Whether treated NHS or private (first stay) (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 PRVSTAY1 Treated in NHS or private hospital (first stay) (1= NHS, 2= private) 
 NIGHTS2 
 NHSTREA2 
 PRVSTAY2 
 NIGHTS3 
 NHSTREA3 
 PRVSTAY3 
 NIGHTS4 
 NHSTREA4 
 PRVSTAY4 
 NIGHTS5 
 NHSTREA5 
 PRVSTAY5 
 NIGHTS6 
 NHSTREA6 
 PRVSTAY6 
 SEENURSE  Respondent saw GP practice nurse? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NNURSE  Number of times saw practice nurse 
 SEECHN1  saw nurse or clinic nr1 (1= practice nurse at GP surgery, 2= health visitor at GP surgery, 
   3= go to a child health clinic, 4= go to a child welfare clinic, 5= none of these) 
 SEECHN2  saw nurse or clinic nr2 
 SEECHN3  saw nurse or clinic nr3 
 NNHSGP   Number of NHS GP consultations last 2 weeks 
 NNHSGPY  Number of NHS GP consultations per year 
 NNHGPEL  Number of NHS GP consultations elsewhere last 2 weeks 
 NNHGPELY  Number of NHS GP consultations elsewhere per year 
 NNHGPHO  Number of NHS GP consultations at home last 2 weeks 
 NNHGPHOY  Number of NHS GP consultations at home per year 
 NNHGPSH  Number of NHS GP consultations at surgery last two weeks 
 NNHGPSHY  Number of NHS GP consultations at surgery per year 
 NNHGPTL  Number of NHS GP consultations by phone last two weeks 
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I ndividual_health_care_data continued 
 NNHGPTLY  Number of NHS GP consultations by phone per year 
 NOTHDOC Number of consultations other doctor last two weeks 
 NOTHDOCY  Number of consultations other doctor per year 
 NPRIVGP  Number of private GP consultations last 2 weeks 
 NPRIVGPY  Number of private GP consultations per year 
 NPRIVSP  Number of private specialist consultations last 2 weeks 
 NPRIVSPY  Number of private specialist consultations per year 
 NSTYSY  Number of inpatient stays last year 
 CNHGPEL  I f consulted NHS GP elsewhere last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consultation elsewhere, 2= no consultation elsewhere) 
 CNHGPHO If consulted NHS GP at home last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consultation at home, 2= no consultation at home) 
 CNHGPPS  I f consulted NHS GP and got prescription last 2 weeks?    
   (1= got prescription, 2= no prescription/consultation) 
 CNHGPSH  I f consulted NHS GP at surgery last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consultation at surgery, 2= no consultation at surgery) 
 CNHGPTL  I f consulted NHS GP by phone last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consultation by phone, 2= no consultation by phone) 
 CNHSGP  I f consulted NHS GP last 2 weeks? (1= consulted GP, 2= not consulted GP) 
 CNHSSP  I f consulted NHS specialist last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consulted NHS specialist, 2= no consultation NHS specialist) 
 COTHDOC If consulted other doctor last 2 weeks?      
   (1= consulted other doctor, 2= no consultation other doctor) 
 CPRIVGP   I f consulted GP privately last 2 weeks?      
   (1= consulted GP privately, 2= no consultation privately) 
 CPRIVSP  I f consulted specialist privately last 2 weeks?     
   (1= consulted specialist privately, 2= no private specialist consultation) 
 NIGHTS  Total number of nights spent in hospital 
 NTIMSOP  Number of outpatient visits in three months 
 NTIMSOPY  Number of outpatient visits per year. calculated 
 RADYS   Number of days of restricted activity in last two weeks 
 RADYSPYR Number of days of restricted activity per year. calculated 
 LONGILL  Limiting or non-limiting longstanding illness? (1= limiting longstanding illness, 2= non-
   limiting longstanding illness, 3= no longstanding illness) 
 LSIRA   Limiting (LMT) longstanding illness (LSI) or restricted activity (RA)? (1= LMT LSI +  RA, 
   2= RA non LMT LSI, 3= LMT LSI only, 4=non LMT LSI only, 5= RA only, 6= no reported 
   illness, 7= anything else) 
 PNURSE  Practice nurse consulted last 2 weeks? (1= yes, 2= no) 
 NPNY   Number of practice nurse consultations per year 
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Table: I ndividual_socio-economic_data 
 
 Name  Description                
 ID   Individual ID (unique) 
 HID   Household ID (unique) 
 HSERIAL   Old household serial number (before transfer pensioners, so not unique anymore) 
 WEIGHT00 Sample/Population based weights 2000 
 SEX  Male 1/ female 2 
 AGE   Age of person 
 AGEGROUP Children 1, working age 2, pensioners 3 
 SOC90   Standard occupational classification 1990 
 Skilltype   1 highly skilled, 2 skilled, 3 semi-skilled, 4 unskilled following Winchester (2002) 
 Skilltype1  Skill types: Skilltype =  1, 2, 3 gives skill type1=  1 (skilled),                                 
   skilltype 4 gives skilltype1=  2 (unskilled) 
 INDSTRY1  1980 Standard Industrial Classification 
 SIC92   1992 Standard Industrial Classification 
 INDSTRY123 123 industry/product classification 
 Sector1  Sector/Commodity structure (1 Primary, 2 Pharmaceuticals, 3 Medical instruments,         
   4 Other manufacturing, 5 Energy, 6 Construction, 7 Distribution and transport,  
   8 Finance, 9 Public administration and defence, 10 Health care, 11 Other services 
 SC   Social class (1 Professional, 2 Managerial and Technical, 3.1= Skilled non-manual, 
   3.2= Skilled manual, 4 Partly Skilled, 5 Unskilled, 6 armed forces) 
 WORKHRS  Total work hours 
 UNPAIDHR  Unpaid hours in last 7 days 
 UNPAIDHM  Unpaid work at home or away 
 TOTHRS   Hours usually worked excluding breaks, including overtime 
 ECSTILO   Economic status ILO (1 Working, 2 Government scheme with employment,    
   3 Government scheme at college, 4 Unemployed (ILO definition),   
   5 Other unemployed, 6 Permanently unable to work, 7 Retired, 8 Keeping house, 
   9 Student, 10 Other economically inactive) 
 W_NW   Working or not working (derived from ECSTILO =  1) working= 1, permanently unable    
   to work= 2, other inactive = 3 
 WKSTILO  Working status (1 Full time 2 Part time 3 Working NA hours 4 Government scheme         
   5 Unemployed (ILO def) 6 Econ inactive) 
 NVQLEV   NVQ/SVQ 
 GNVQ   GNVQ/GSVQ 
 HIQUAL   Highest qualification 
 EDLEV00   Education level -2000 
 EDLEV7   Education level -2000 (3 groups) 
 EDLEV10   Education level -2000 (4 groups) 
 BENTOT   Annual income from state benefits 
 GROTHER  Gross annual income from other sources 
 NTOTHER  Net annual income from other sources 
 REGLRTOT  Annual income from regular payments 
 OTHREG   Other regular payments per year 
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I ndividual_socio_economic_data continued 
 GRMAINJB  Usual gross annual earnings from main job (employee plus bonus, self employed/profits) 
 NTMAINJB  Usual net annual earnings from main job 
 GRSECJOB  Gross annual earnings from other jobs 
 NTSECJOB Net annual earnings from other jobs 
 GREARN  Gross earned income (main and other jobs) per year 
 NTEARN   Net earned income (main and other jobs) per year 
 GRIND   Usual gross annual income (GREARN+ BENTOT+ GROTHER+ REGLRTOT+ OTHREG) 
 NTIND  Usual net annual income      
 
 
 
Some further notes regarding the tables are relevant. Firstly, by nature of the direct link 
between the household and individual data provided by HID, the household data 
displayed in the Table Household_data (i.e. Hholdtype1, NPERSONS, NUMCHILD, 
NPENSNRS, NWORKAGE and NWORKING) can be constructed directly from the 
Table Individual_socio-economic_data using the appropriate definitions.  
Secondly, longstanding illnesses in the Table Individual_health_care_data (ICD1-6) 
have been recorded using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Revision 9 
(WHO, 1997) and were aggregated using the ICD chapter headings (Condition Group1-
6).  
Thirdly, the sector/commodity classification (Sector1) has been derived using the 
variable INDM92M - available online from the UKDA as Variable 589, Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey, September-November 2002 - and the 123 industry/product 
classification of the Supply and Use Tables (ONS, 2002). The former decodes the GHS 
version of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC92), whereas the latter 
categorises these into 123 industry/products, which in turn were grouped into Sector1. 
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Fourthly, missing values are generally reported by a ‘-6’, a ‘-8’ or a ‘-9’ value:  
x ‘-6’ means that the person was not eligible to answer a particular section;  
x ‘-8’ means ‘No answer’ and was used if the respondent either did not know the 
answer or refused to answer a particular question; 
x ‘-9’ means ‘Does not apply’ and is used when a household/individual is eligible 
to answer but is routed past the question by the flow of the questionnaire. 
For the income section, missing values are reported by a ‘-7’ (the person refuses to 
answer the whole income section), a ‘-8’ (see above) or a ‘-9’ (combines ‘-6’ and ‘-9’ 
from above). 
Finally, the income data of the GHS provided values in excess of National Statistics 
data from the ONS, so that the data had to be scaled down (usually by a factor between 
1.5 and 2) in order to match the totals. Consequently only the distribution of income 
across labour and household types in the GHS was used and the use of its totals was 
avoided. The GHS does not seem to be a reliable source of income data.12 For example, 
closer inspection of gross income (GRIND) yields many strange values, including zero 
(approximately 950 respondents representing 3 million individuals) or close to zero 
incomes. The source of these anomalies is not clear. In contrast, all other non-income 
data extracted from the GHS seem in line with other National Statistics Publications 
(apart from minor differences associated with the transfer of pensioners to a separate 
household unit).  
 
12
  Indicative in this respect is that the GHS report only contains one table on income: usual gross 
weekly household income by family type (Table 3.11, ONS, 2001a). 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
This appendix contains the GAMS model files employed in the calibration of and the 
simulations carried out with the static CGE model for the UK with health care provision 
effects. The files are available in electronic form from the author upon request. 
Explanatory text is included (either by insertion of an ‘*’ at the beginning of a sentence, 
or using the commands $ontext and $offtext before and after a paragraph). 
READDATA.GMS 
* This file imports data from the Excel data file (HealthSAM.xls) and puts data in 
* HealthSAM.dat using libinclude routine gams2prm. This is a routine to write parameters 
* or level values in GAMS readable form to an external file (text file HealthSAM.dat) 
* and so is a relatively easy way of transfering data to and from a spreadsheet program 
 
* Import data from HealthSAM.xls and put in parameters Use, Make and SAM 
Parameters Use(*,*), Make(*,*), SAM(*,*); 
$libinclude xlimport Use HealthSAM.xls Use 
$libinclude xlimport Make HealthSAM.xls Make 
$libinclude xlimport SAM HealthSAM.xls SAM 
 
* declare GAMS readable file 
file mydata /'HealthSAM.dat'/; 
 
* make it current (i.e. file to be written to) 
put mydata; 
 
* write output to HealthSAM.dat 
$libinclude gams2prm Use 
$libinclude gams2prm Make 
$libinclude gams2prm SAM 
 
 
DATA.GMS 
* This file defines all sets (sectors or activities, households, 
* factors of production), multiplier to check for homogeneity and 
* performs calculations on data put in HealthSAM.dat: 
*       scaling (all values in MPSGE represent billions) 
*       calculation of ad valorem tax rates 
*       reformating health expenditures into NHS and PHC 
 
$offlisting 
 
 
$include healthsam.dat 
Sets a  all activities/ 
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1       Primary 
2       Pharmaceuticals 
3       Medical instruments 
4       Other manufacturing 
5       Energy 
6       Construction 
7       Distribution and transport 
8       Finance 
9       Public administration and defence 
10     Health care 
11     Other services 
NHS       Dummy sector for National Health Service 
PHC        Dummy sector for private health consumption 
SKILL     Skilled labour 
UNSK     Unskilled labour 
CAP        Capital (operating surplus) 
TAX       Net taxation on products 
HSE1      Pensioners 
HSE2      Non-working with children 
HSE3      Non-working without children 
HSE4      Working with children 
HSE5      Working without children 
INV         Investment 
GOVT     Government 
EXPORT  Exports 
MARGIN  Margins 
IMPORT    Imports 
/; 
alias(a,b); 
 
set i   sectors and commodities/ 
1       Primary 
2       Pharmaceuticals 
3       Medical instruments 
4       Other manufacturing 
5       Energy 
6       Construction 
7       Distribution and transport 
8        Finance 
9        Public administration and defense 
10      Health care 
11      Other services 
NHS   Dummy sector for National Health Service 
PHC   Dummy sector for private health consumption 
/; 
alias (i,j); 
 
set f   factors of production/ 
skill     Skilled labour 
unsk    Unskilled labour 
CAP    Capital (operating surplus) 
/; 
alias (f,d); 
set h   households/ 
HSE1    Pensioners 
HSE2    Non-working with children 
HSE3    Non-working without children 
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HSE4    Working with children 
HSE5    Working without children 
/; 
alias(h,g); 
 
* Reformat health expenditures (NHS and PHC) 
*       NHS buys health care from the health sector and sells it to the government 
*       PHC buys health care from the health sector and sells it to households 
 
Use("10","NHS")        = Use("10","GOVT"); 
Use("NHS","GOVT") = Use("10","GOVT"); 
Use("10","GOVT")     = 0; 
 
Use("10","PHC")   = sum[h, Use("10",h)]; 
Use("PHC",h)        = Use("10",h); 
Use("10",h)            = 0; 
 
Make("NHS","NHS") = Use("NHS","GOVT"); 
Make("PHC","PHC")  = sum[h, Use("PHC",h)]; 
 
Display Use,Make; 
 
* Scaling: (SCALE can be declared previously, otherwise default of 1,000) 
$if not declared Scale Scalar Scale /1E3/; 
Use(a,b)   = Use(a,b) / Scale; 
Make(a,b)=Make(a,b) / Scale; 
alias(*,all1,all2); 
sam(all1,all2) = sam(all1,all2) / Scale; 
 
* Calculation ad valorem tax rates: 
*       output tax (ctax,ptax) are net tax, so producers receive (1-taxrate)* market price 
*       input tax (etax) defined as gross tax, so producers pay  (1+taxrate)* market price 
 
Parameters 
CTAX    consumption tax 
PTAX    production tax 
ETAX    employment tax 
 
CTAX0,PTAX0,ETAX0; 
 
PTAX(j)$sum[a, USE(a,j)] = USE("TAX",j) / sum[a, USE(a,j)]; 
PTAX0(j)= PTAX(j); 
 
ETAX(f)$sum[h, SAM(h,f)] = SAM("tax",f) / sum[h, SAM(h,f)]; 
ETAX0(f) = ETAX(f); 
 
Parameters 
VE        Value of exports 
VM       Value of imports 
VD        Value of domestic demand including consumption tax 
VDN     Value of domestic demand excluding consumption tax; 
 
VE(i)    = Use(i,"EXPORT")          ; 
VM(i)   = Make(i,"IMPORT")         ; 
VD(i)    = sum[a, Make(i,a)] - VE(i); 
VDN(i) = VD(i) - MAKE(i,"TAX")    ; 
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CTAX(i)$VD(i) = 1 - VDN(i)/VD(i); 
CTAX0(i)      = CTAX(i)         ; 
 
display PTAX,ETAX,CTAX; 
 
Scalar  Mult Check homogeneity of model /1/; 
 
 
MODEL.GMS 
* This is a simple static CGE model for the UK 
 
* stops echoprinting input file 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
* GAMS cannot read MPSGE syntax, so make it a GAMS text section 
$ontext 
 
* declare model name 
$model:SCGE 
 
* declare quantity variables for production sectors 
* (solutions from zero profit conditions) 
$sectors: 
         X(i)              ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)         ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST               ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$VM(i) ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)   ! exports of commodity i 
 
* declare price variables for commodities 
* (solutions from market clearing equations) 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)          ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)          ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)      ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i)    ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)          ! price of factor f 
         PS              ! price of savings 
         ER              ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG           ! price of artificial commodity 'real tax income' 
         PTR            ! price of artificial commodity 'transfer' 
 
* declare income variables of consumers 
* (solutions from income balance equations) 
$consumers: 
         YG             ! government income 
         TR              ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)           ! household income 
 
* specify production functions 
* note you need benchmark quantities Q (1st order approximation: anchor point), 
* prices P(2nd order approx: slope) and s (3rd order approx: curvature) 
$prod:X(i)        s:0     t:1     va:1 
      O:PQ(j)   Q:Make(j,i)                  A:YG  T:PTAX(i)  P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)     Q:(Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f)))       A:YG T:ETAX(f)  P:(1+ETAX0(f)) va: 
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      I:PD(j)     Q:Use(j,i) 
 
$prod:CET(i)      s:0     t:2   arm:2 
      O:PD(i)      Q:VD(i)                                  A:YG T:CTAX(i)  P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)      Q:VE(i) 
      I:PQ(i)       Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j)))              arm: 
      I:PM(i)      Q:VM(i)                                  arm: 
      I:PD("7")   Q:Make(i,"Margin") 
 
$prod:ST          s:0 
      O:PS        Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)     Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
$prod:M(i)$VM(i) 
      O:PM(i)     Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER           Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
 
* specify demand functions 
$demand:YG 
      D:PYG       Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR        s:1 
      E:PYG       Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)      Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT")) 
      E:ER          Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
      D:PTR       Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
 
$demand:Y(h)      s:1 
      E:PF(f)     Q:(Mult*SAM(h,f)) 
      E:PTR      Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
      D:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS        Q:SAM("inv",h) 
 
* report variable levels 
$report: 
      V:U(h)      W:Y(h) 
$offtext 
 
* SCGE model is defined: invokes MPSGE preprocessor to declare model for GAMS 
* reads MPSGE code and generates GAMS readable code including generator file 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication (marginals are slack variables, should be zero): 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 0    ; 
 
* numeraire (fix variable implies equation is omitted) 
ER.FX = 1; 
 
* SCGE model is generated: replicates model with values instead of parameter 
* names. All functions in the model are calibrated at this point (using Q, P 
* and s el info; not T: field!) so do not include GAMS statements between this 
* statement and the solve statement. Note that calibration tax levels are 
* denoted by a 0, and simulation levels (in T: field) are not. If you want to 
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* change starting values of taxes (incorporated in calibration) then change the 
* former, whereas if you want to perform a counter-factual simulation then 
* change the latter. 
$include SCGE.GEN 
 
* check  what model looks like after last statement using the 
* execute 'dos command'; statement where ' ' is any valid dos command or 
* program name 
* execute 'pause'; 
 
* SCGE model is solved: using Mixed Complementarity Programming 
* (solves quantities, prices and income levels from zero-profit, 
* market clearing and income balance equations respectively    
solve SCGE using mcp; 
 
* residual after solving model should be close to zero 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000 ; 
ER.FX                 = 10      ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX  = 1           ; 
MULT  = 10         ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
 
MODEL2.GMS 
* This is the simple static model (model.gms) with additions: 
*  (1) health care affects effective labour supply (Thesis Chapter 6) 
*  (2) government expenditures on each good (incl. health care) fixed in value 
*      (measured in fe terms (ER)) or in real terms (see GCMult(i)) 
*  (3) pharmaceuticals price which domestic consumers pay (PD) is set by 
*      world import price (if target("2")>0). The purpose is to generate an import 
*      price that leads to a certain rise (20%) in PD. The price rise is fully 
*      compensated in foreign exchange so does not alter government account 
*      in which imports are put. 
 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
Parameter 
Target(i)        If target(i)>0 commodity i's price is set by world price 
GCMult(i)     Government consumption multiplier 
 
* Parameters associated with effective labour supply and waiting lists 
Eta0              Non participation rate if health care does not affect WL 
Fbar              Fixed endowment of factor f by household h 
Upsilon(i,f)   Share parameter health composite 
Epsilon(f)     Waiting list elasticity; 
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* Price of pharmaceuticals is set on world market 
Target(i)      = 0; 
Target("2")  = 1; 
 
* government expenditures on each good (incl. health care) fixed in value 
GCMult(i)    = 1; 
 
* Waiting list elasticity values 
Epsilon(f)   = 2; 
 
* with HC = 1 in benchmark, eta0 is also benchmark non-participation rate 
Eta0("skill")   = 0.0289; 
Eta0("unsk")  = 0.0434; 
Fbar(h,f)         = SAM(h,f) * 1/(1-Eta0(f)); 
 
* Share of 'health' determined by public (NHS) care: 
Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") = 0.960; 
Upsilon("NHS","Skill")  = 0.834; 
 
* Share of 'health' determined by private (PHC) care: 
Upsilon("PHC","Unsk")   = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") ; 
Upsilon("PHC","Skill")    = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Skill"); 
 
* if there is a parent file that includes this file then solution and solver 
* status file not printed 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" option sysout=off;option solprint=off; 
 
$ontext 
$model:SCGE 
$sectors: 
         X(i)              ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)         ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST                                                ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0)    ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)                                   ! exports of commodity i 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)               ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)               ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)     ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i)   ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)                ! price of factor f 
         PS                    ! price of savings 
         ER                   ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG                ! price of artificial commodity real tax income 
         PTR                 ! price of artificial commodity transfer 
$consumers: 
         YG                   ! government income 
         TR                    ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)                 ! household income 
 
* Specify auxiliary variables that are solved in the $constraint block 
* The constraints are applied by using the label R: in endowment field 
* the auxiliary variable enters as multiplier 
$auxiliary: 
         QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))   ! Auxiliary var imports 
         NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))  ! Auxiliary var foreign exchange 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
A-43
         GOVCONS(i)$(USE(i,"GOVT"))    ! Real government consumption 
         HC(f)                         ! Health composite 
         EPR(f)                       ! Effective participation rate 
 
$prod:X(i)       s:0  t:1  va:1 
      O:PQ(j)    Q:Make(j,i)                            A:YG T:PTAX(i) P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)      Q:(Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f)))   A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PD(j)      Q:Use(j,i) 
 
$prod:CET(i)     s:0  t:2  arm:2 
      O:PD(i)     Q:VD(i)                     A:YG T:CTAX(i) P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
      I:PQ(i)      Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j)))       arm: 
      I:PM(i)     Q:VM(i)                           arm: 
      I:PD("7")  Q:Make(i,"margin") 
 
$prod:ST         s:0 
      O:PS       Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
* Imports modelled as usual if prices not determined on world market 
$prod:M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0) 
      O:PM(i)    Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER          Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
 
$demand:YG 
      D:PYG      Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR                   s:1 
      E:PYG                              Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)$Use(i,"GOVT")  Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT"))         R:GOVCONS(i) 
      D:PTR                              Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
      E:ER                                 Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
* Put imports here if price is determined on world market: 
* Instead of import sector the government buys imports with foreign exchange 
* and sells at price PM. QM: Quantity of imports normalised to 1 replacing M 
* for positive target required to meet target price equation. 
* NET: value of foreign exchange of these imports. Is fully compensated so does 
* not alter government account; ER#(i): undocumented GAMS feature: 
* foreign exchange for i if target(i)>0 
      E:PM(i)$Target(i)      Q:(Mult*VM(i))                   R:QM(i) 
      E:ER#(i)$Target(i)     Q:(-Mult*VM(i))                 R:NET(i) 
 
$demand:Y(h)                 s:1 
      E:PF(f)                Q:(Mult*Fbar(h,f))              R:EPR(f) 
      D:PD(i)               Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS                    Q:SAM("inv",h) 
      E:PTR                 Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
 
$report: 
      V:U(h)     W:Y(h) 
      V:FD(f,i)   I:PF(f)         prod:X(i) 
      V:N(j,i)     I:PD(j)         prod:X(i) 
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      V:QS(i)     I:PQ(i)         prod:CET(i) 
      V:QTM(i)  I:PD("7")    prod:CET(i) 
      V:INV(i)   I:PD(i)         prod:ST 
      V:C(i,h)    D:PD(i)       demand:Y(h) 
      V:S(h)       D:PS           demand:Y(h) 
 
* Domestic consumer price PD is targeted by world import price 
* (PWM = 1 in benchmark) 
$constraint:QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
        PD(i) =E= Target(i) * ER; 
 
* test constrain imports pharmaceuticals (condition is always met) 
*       PM(i) =E= ER; 
 
* Government pays correct amount of foreign exchange for imports 
$constraint:NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
        NET(i)=E= QM(i)* PM(i)/ER; 
 
* GCMult(i)=0: govt exp on good i are fixed in real terms 
* GCMult(i)>0: govt exp on good i are fixed in value (ER) and equal to: 
* PD(i)*Mult*Use(i,"GOVT")*GCMult(i)*ER/PD(i), so (real) government 
* consumption of good i equals: Mult*Use(i,"GOVT")*GCMult(i)*ER/PD(i) 
* Fixed in terms of another price (here numeraire ER) to prevent choice of / 
* change in numeraire to affect outcome. Rewrite constraint:PD(i)*GOVCONS(i)= 
* ER* GCMULT(i): lhs is fixed in ER terms, GCMULT(i)>1 simulates rise exp on i 
$constraint:GOVCONS(i)$Use(i,"GOVT") 
         GOVCONS(i) =E= GCMult(i) * ER/PD(i) + 1$(GCMult(i) = 0); 
 
* Specification of health composite as a function of NHS and PHC 
$constraint:HC(f) 
         HC(f)      =E= prod[i, (CET(i)/Mult)**Upsilon(i,f)]; 
 
* Effective participation rate = 1- non-participation rate 
$constraint:EPR(f) 
         EPR(f)     =E= 1-Eta0(f)/(HC(f)**Epsilon(f)); 
 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 0        ; 
QM.L(i)      = Target(i); 
NET.L(i)     = Target(i); 
HC.L(f)       = 1        ; 
EPR.L(f)     = 1-Eta0(f); 
GOVCONS.L(i) = 1        ; 
ER.FX        = 1        ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* store utility to quickly save variable values, changes and % changes 
$libinclude store these X CET ST M E PQ PD PE PM PF PS ER YG TR Y QM NET 
$libinclude store these GOVCONS HC EPR U FD N QS QTM INV C S 
 
* EV = change utility for each household 
$libinclude store calc Utility (h)= u.l(h)*[sum[i,Use(i,h)]+Sam('inv',h)]; 
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* total EV (sum of each household's EV + govt cons (incl. public health care): 
$libinclude store calc Welfare = sum[h,utility(h)] + sum[i, GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
Table alphaG(i,h) Share of household h in public good provisioning of i 
         HSE1     HSE2  HSE3  HSE4   HSE5 
9        0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336 
NHS  0.251    0.087   0.076   0.306   0.280 
11      0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336; 
 
* EV, including welfare changes related to public goods (incl. health care): 
$libinclude store calc Utility1 (h) = utility(h) + sum[i, alphaG(i,h)*GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
* total EV (sum of household EV's excluding public good provisioning): 
$libinclude store calc WelfareEx = sum[h,utility(h)]; 
 
* Household income from factors and transfers 
$libinclude store calc YHF (h,f) = PF.l(f)*Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHTR (h) = PTR.l* SAM(h,"gov"); 
 
* Variables waiting list (WL), effective endowments (FE) and 
* non-participation rate (eta): 
$libinclude store calc FE (h,f)= Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc WL (h,f)= Fbar(h,f)-FE(h,f)   ; 
$libinclude store calc eta (f) = 1-EPR.l(f)          ; 
 
* Government expenditures 
$libinclude store calc GEXP (i) = GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")*PD.l(i); 
 
* set the model name and base scenario in the store utility: 
$libinclude store setmodel SCGE 
$libinclude store base 
$libinclude store setbase base 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000; 
ER.FX        = 1.5; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX = 1; 
MULT  = 2; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
MULT  = 1; 
 
* if there is a parent file that includes this file then do not include following 
* simulations and display statement, but go directly to the label end 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" $goto end 
 
* test increase in pharmaceutical price, govt exp all goods i fixed in value: 
* Target("2") = 1.2; This statement followed directly by the $batinclude 
* statement gives errors in equations. GAMS just carries on from where it came 
* to - the levels (.L) of variables don't get reset, so instead do it stepwise: 
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Target("2") = 1.1 ; 
$include SCGE.gen 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
 
Target("2") = 1.2 ; 
 
* statement invokes solve file 
$batinclude solve exp2a 
Target("2")   = 1; 
 
* test increase in pharmaceutical price, govt cons health care (NHS) fixed 
* for other goods govt expenditures still fixed in value: 
GCMult("NHS") = 0; 
Target("2") = 1.2; 
 
$batinclude solve exp2b 
Target("2")   = 1; 
GCMult("NHS") = 1; 
 
* test an increase in health expenditure, govt exp all goods i fixed in value 
* pharmaceutical price NOT determined on world market: 
Target("2")   = 0; 
GCMult("NHS") = 1.1; 
$batinclude solve exp1A 
GCMult("NHS") = 1; 
Target("2")   = 1; 
 
* test constraints imports of pharmaceuticals (compare with NHS): 
* while replacing constraint on QM by PM(i) =E= ER 
* Target("2")   =1; 
* GCMult("NHS") = 1.1; 
* $batinclude solve test 
 
* display the variable values, changes and % changes 
$libinclude store display changes percent 
 
* Write results to text file (readable in Excel): 
* declare file 
file myresults /'resultsm2.csv'/; 
* make it current (i.e. file to be written to) 
put myresults; 
* write output to results.csv 
$libinclude writecsv  p_PF v_EPR v_ETA p_HC c_Utility1 p_Utility1 
*ResultsCh ResultsPer 
Parameters p_FEunsk,p_FEsk,p_WLunsk, p_WLsk, p_Welfare, c_Welfare; 
p_FEunsk(h,sims) = p_FE(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_FEsk(h,sims)   = p_FE(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_WLunsk(h,sims) = p_WL(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_WLsk(h,sims)   = p_WL(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_Welfare(sims)  = ResultsPer("Welfare",sims); 
c_Welfare(sims)  = ResultsCh("Welfare",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_FEunsk p_FEsk p_WLunsk p_WLsk p_Welfare c_Welfare 
 
Parameter c_WelfareEx, p_WelfareEx; 
p_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsPer("WelfareEx",sims); 
c_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsCh("WelfareEx",sims); 
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$libinclude writecsv c_Utility p_Utility c_WelfareEx p_WelfareEx  
 
$label end 
 
 
MODEL3.GMS 
* This is the same as model2, but with possibility of sector-specific factors 
 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
Parameter 
Target(i)     If target(i)>0 comm i's price is set by world price 
GCMult(i)  Government consumption multiplier 
Eta0            Non participation rate if health care does not affect WL 
Fbar            Fixed endowment of factor f by household h 
SFbar          Fixed endowment of sector-specific factor by household h 
Upsilon(i,f) Share parameter health composite 
Epsilon(f)   Waiting list elasticity; 
 
Target(i)      = 0; 
Target("2")  = 1; 
GCMult(i)   = 1; 
 
Epsilon(f)      = 2; 
Eta0("skill")  = 0.0289; 
Eta0("unsk") = 0.0434; 
 
Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") = 0.960; 
Upsilon("NHS","Skill")  = 0.834; 
Upsilon("PHC","Unsk") = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") ; 
Upsilon("PHC","Skill")  = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Skill"); 
 
* Introduce sector-specific factor: share of factor f in sector i immobile 
Parameter FSHARE(f,i) Share of sector-specific factor in factor use sector; 
FSHARE(f,i)            = 0   ; 
* doctors and nurses in health care are immobile (85%) 
FSHARE("skill","10")   = 0.85; 
 
* 90% of capital (buildings) in health care are immobile 
FSHARE("cap","10")     = 0.90; 
 
* Adjust endowments households accordingly 
Fbar(h,f)      = SAM(h,f); 
SFbar(h,f,i) = (Fbar(h,f)/sum(g,Fbar(g,f)))*FSHARE(f,i)*Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f)); 
Fbar(h,f)     = Fbar(h,f)-sum(i, SFbar(h,f,i)); 
Fbar(h,f)     = Fbar(h,f)*1/(1-Eta0(f))       ; 
SFbar(h,f,i) = SFbar(h,f,i)*1/(1-Eta0(f))    ; 
 
* Adjust factor use in production accordingly 
Parameter Mfactor(f,i) Use of mobile factor by sector 
                 Sfactor(f,i) Use of sector-specific factor; 
Sfactor(f,i)  = Use(f,i)*FSHARE(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f))    ; 
Mfactor(f,i) = Use(f,i)*(1-FSHARE(f,i))/(1+ETAX0(f)); 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" option sysout=off; option solprint=off; 
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$ontext 
$model:SCGE 
$sectors: 
         X(i)           ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)         ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST                ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0)    ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)   ! exports of commodity i 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)              ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)              ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)   ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i) ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)              ! price of factor f 
         PFS(f,i)$fshare(f,i)    ! sector specific factors 
         PS                              ! price of savings 
         ER               ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG            ! price of artificial commodity 'real tax income' 
         PTR             ! price of artificial commodity transfer 
$consumers: 
         YG             ! government income 
         TR             ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)           ! household income 
$auxiliary: 
         QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))   ! Auxiliary var imports 
         NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))  ! Auxiliary var foreign exchange 
         GOVCONS(i)$(USE(i,"GOVT"))    ! Real government consumption 
         HC(f)                         ! Health composite 
         EPR(f)                        ! Effective participation rate 
 
$prod:X(i)       s:0  t:1  va:1 
      O:PQ(j)    Q:Make(j,i)     A:YG T:PTAX(i) P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)     Q:Mfactor(f,i)  A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PFS(f,i) Q:Sfactor(f,i)   A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PD(j)     Q:Use(j,i) 
 
$prod:CET(i)     s:0  t:2  arm:2 
      O:PD(i)    Q:VD(i)         A:YG  T:CTAX(i) P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)    Q:VE(i) 
      I:PQ(i)     Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j))) arm: 
      I:PM(i)     Q:VM(i)                    arm: 
      I:PD("7")  Q:Make(i,"Margin") 
 
$prod:ST         s:0 
      O:PS       Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
$prod:M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0) 
      O:PM(i)    Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER          Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
 
$demand:YG 
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      D:PYG     Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR             s:1 
      E:PYG                              Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)$Use(i,"GOVT")  Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT"))     R:GOVCONS(i) 
      D:PTR                       Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
      E:ER                          Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
      E:PM(i)$Target(i)     Q:(Mult*VM(i))              R:QM(i) 
      E:ER#(i)$Target(i)    Q:(-Mult*VM(i))             R:NET(i) 
 
$demand:Y(h)                 s:1 
      E:PF(f)                  Q:(Mult*Fbar(h,f))          R:EPR(f) 
      E:PFS(f,i)             Q:(Mult*SFbar(h,f,i))       R:EPR(f) 
      D:PD(i)                Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS                     Q:SAM("inv",h) 
      E:PTR                   Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
 
$report: 
      V:U(h)      W:Y(h) 
      V:FD(f,i)   I:PF(f)         prod:X(i) 
      V:SFD(f,i) I:PFS(f,i)     prod:X(i) 
      V:N(j,i)     I:PD(j)         prod:X(i) 
      V:QS(i)     I:PQ(i)         prod:CET(i) 
      V:QTM(i) I:PD("7")     prod:CET(i) 
      V:INV(i)   I:PD(i)         prod:ST 
      V:C(i,h)    D:PD(i)       demand:Y(h) 
      V:S(h)       D:PS           demand:Y(h) 
 
 
$constraint:QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
         PD(i)      =E= Target(i) * ER; 
$constraint:NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
         NET(i)   =E= QM(i)* PM(i)/ER; 
$constraint:GOVCONS(i)$Use(i,"GOVT") 
         GOVCONS(i) =E= GCMult(i) * ER/PD(i) + 1$(GCMult(i)=0); 
$constraint:HC(f) 
         HC(f)      =E= prod[i, (CET(i)/Mult)**Upsilon(i,f)]; 
$constraint:EPR(f) 
         EPR(f)    =E= 1-Eta0(f)/(HC(f)**Epsilon(f)); 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 0        ; 
QM.L(i)      = Target(i); 
NET.L(i)     = Target(i); 
HC.L(f)       = 1        ; 
EPR.L(f)     = 1-Eta0(f); 
GOVCONS.L(i) = 1        ; 
ER.FX         = 1        ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
$libinclude store these X CET ST M E PQ PD PE PM PF PS ER YG TR Y QM NET 
$libinclude store these GOVCONS HC EPR U PFS FD SFD N QS QTM INV C S 
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$libinclude store calc utility (h)  = u.l(h)*[sum[i,Use(i,h)]+Sam('inv',h)]; 
$libinclude store calc welfare     = sum[h,utility(h)] + sum[i, GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
$libinclude store calc WelfareEx = sum[h,utility(h)];  
 
Table alphaG(i,h) Share of household h in public good provisioning of i 
         HSE1     HSE2  HSE3  HSE4  HSE5 
9        0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336 
NHS  0.251    0.087   0.076   0.306   0.280 
11      0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336; 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility1 (h) = utility(h) + sum[i, alphaG(i,h)*GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
$libinclude store calc YHF (h,f) = PF.l(f)*Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f); 
* YHFS (income household from specific factors) 
$libinclude store calc YHFS (h,f,i) = PFS.l(f,i)*SFbar(h,f,i)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHTR (h)     = PTR.l* SAM(h,"gov"); 
 
$libinclude store calc FE (h,f)  = Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc WL (h,f) = Fbar(h,f)-FE(h,f)   ; 
$libinclude store calc eta (f)      = 1-EPR.l(f)          ; 
 
* store SFE (effective endowment specific factor) and SWL (its waiting list) 
$libinclude store calc SFE (h,f,i)  = SFbar(h,f,i)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc SWL (h,f,i) = SFbar(h,f,i)-SFE(h,f,i); 
 
$libinclude store calc GEXP (i) = GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")*PD.l(i); 
 
$libinclude store setmodel SCGE 
$libinclude store base 
$libinclude store setbase base 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000; 
ER.FX                 = 1.5; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX = 1; 
MULT  = 2; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
MULT  = 1; 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" $goto end 
 
* test an increase in health expenditure, govt exp all goods i fixed in value 
* pharmaceutical price NOT determined on world market: 
* skilled wage in health care is fixed 
* PFS.fx("skill","10")= 1; 
Target("2")                 = 0; 
GCMult("NHS")        = 1.1; 
$batinclude solve exp1B 
GCMult("NHS")       = 1; 
Target("2")                = 1; 
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$libinclude store display changes percent 
 
file myresults /'resultsm3.csv'/; 
put myresults; 
 
$libinclude writecsv  p_PF v_EPR v_ETA p_HC c_Utility1 p_Utility1 
 
Parameters p_FEunsk,p_FEsk,p_WLunsk, p_WLsk, p_Welfare, c_Welfare; 
p_FEunsk(h,sims) = p_FE(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_FEsk(h,sims)     = p_FE(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_WLunsk(h,sims) = p_WL(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_WLsk(h,sims)     = p_WL(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_Welfare(sims)     = ResultsPer("Welfare",sims); 
c_Welfare(sims)     = ResultsCh("Welfare",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_FEunsk p_FEsk p_WLunsk p_WLsk p_Welfare c_Welfare 
 
Parameter c_WelfareEx, p_WelfareEx; 
p_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsPer("WelfareEx",sims); 
c_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsCh("WelfareEx",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv c_Utility p_Utility c_WelfareEx p_WelfareEx  
 
$label end 
 
 
IMPORTSKILLEDWORKERSMODEL3.GMS 
* This is the same as model3, but with import of skilled workers in health care 
 
* Foreign workers (FW) earn the health care specific skilled wage. 
* The income (YF) can be sent home in the form of remittances (REM) or kept 
* in the economy in the form of foreign worker transfers (FWT) at an artifical 
* price (PFWT). These are distributed over households according to each 
* household's share (alphaf) of the endowment of hc spec skilled labour (yielding 
* YFW). Foreign skilled workers in health care benefit in the same way from health 
* improvements as their domestic counterpart (yielding effective endowment FWE 
* and waiting list FWL). 
 
* Target variable fixing import p of pharmaceuticals is removed for simplicity 
 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
Parameter 
GCMult(i)     Government consumption multiplier 
Eta0              Non participation rate if health care does not affect WL 
Fbar              Fixed endowment of factor f by household h 
SFbar           Fixed endowment of sector-specific factor by household h 
Upsilon(i,f)  Share parameter health composite 
Epsilon(f)    Waiting list elasticity; 
 
GCMult(i)    = 1; 
 
Epsilon(f)     = 2; 
Eta0("skill") = 0.0289; 
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Eta0("unsk")= 0.0434; 
 
Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") = 0.960; 
Upsilon("NHS","Skill")  = 0.834; 
Upsilon("PHC","Unsk") = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") ; 
Upsilon("PHC","Skill")  = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Skill"); 
 
Parameter FSHARE(f,i) Share of sector-specific factor in factor use sector; 
FSHARE(f,i)            = 0   ; 
FSHARE("skill","10")   = 0.85; 
FSHARE("cap","10")     = 0.90; 
 
Fbar(h,f)    = SAM(h,f); 
SFbar(h,f,i) = (Fbar(h,f)/sum(g,Fbar(g,f)))*FSHARE(f,i)*Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f)); 
Fbar(h,f)     = Fbar(h,f)-sum(i, SFbar(h,f,i)); 
Fbar(h,f)     = Fbar(h,f)*1/(1-Eta0(f))       ; 
SFbar(h,f,i) = SFbar(h,f,i)*1/(1-Eta0(f))    ; 
 
Parameter Mfactor(f,i) Use of mobile factor by sector 
                 Sfactor(f,i) Use of sector-specific factor; 
Sfactor(f,i)  = Use(f,i)*FSHARE(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f))    ; 
Mfactor(f,i) = Use(f,i)*(1-FSHARE(f,i))/(1+ETAX0(f)); 
 
Parameter 
 
alphaf(h)  share of income foreign worker to household h 
FW(f,i)     foreign worker of type f employed in sector i 
alphar       remittances of income foreign workers to ROW as share; 
 
FW(f,i)                 = 0; 
alphar                   = 0; 
alphaf(h)               = 0; 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" option sysout=off; option solprint=off; 
 
$ontext 
$model:SCGE 
$sectors: 
         X(i)              ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)         ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST                ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$VM(i) ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)   ! exports of commodity i 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)              ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)              ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)    ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i)  ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)               ! price of factor f 
         PFS(f,i)$fshare(f,i) ! sector specific factors 
         PS                           ! price of savings 
         ER                   ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG                ! price of artificial commodity 'real tax income' 
         PTR                 ! price of artificial commodity transfer 
         PFWT$(SUM(i,SUM(f,FW(f,i))) AND (1-alphar)) ! price of art.comm. for. worker transfer 
$consumers: 
         YG                           ! government income 
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         TR                            ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)                          ! household income 
         YF$SUM(i,SUM(f,FW(f,i)))      ! income of foreign workers 
$auxiliary: 
         GOVCONS(i)$(USE(i,"GOVT"))    ! Real government consumption 
         HC(f)                          ! Health composite 
         EPR(f)                        ! Effective participation rate 
 
$prod:X(i)       s:0  t:1  va:1 
      O:PQ(j)    Q:Make(j,i)      A:YG T:PTAX(i) P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)      Q:Mfactor(f,i)  A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PFS(f,i)  Q:Sfactor(f,i)   A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PD(j)    Q:Use(j,i) 
 
$prod:CET(i)     s:0  t:2  arm:2 
      O:PD(i)    Q:VD(i)         A:YG  T:CTAX(i) P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)    Q:VE(i) 
      I:PQ(i)     Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j))) arm: 
      I:PM(i)     Q:VM(i)                    arm: 
      I:PD("7")  Q:Make(i,"Margin") 
 
$prod:ST         s:0 
      O:PS       Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
$prod:M(i)$VM(i) 
      O:PM(i)    Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER          Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
 
$demand:YG 
      D:PYG     Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR                   s:1 
      E:PYG                  Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)$Use(i,"GOVT")  Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT"))     R:GOVCONS(i) 
      D:PTR                  Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
      E:ER                     Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
 
$demand:Y(h)                 s:1 
      E:PF(f)                 Q:(Mult*Fbar(h,f))          R:EPR(f) 
      E:PFS(f,i)             Q:(Mult*SFbar(h,f,i))      R:EPR(f) 
      D:PD(i)                Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS                    Q:SAM("inv",h) 
      E:PTR                  Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
      E:PFWT$(1-alphar)      Q:(Mult*alphaf(h)) 
 
$demand:YF$SUM(i,SUM(f,FW(f,i)))      s:1 
      E:PFS(f,i)$FW(f,i)          Q:(Mult*FW(f,i))   R:EPR(f) 
      D:ER                                Q:alphar 
      D:PFWT                          Q:(1-alphar) 
 
$report: 
      V:U(h)     W:Y(h) 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
A-54
      V:FD(f,i)    I:PF(f)         prod:X(i) 
      V:SFD(f,i)  I:PFS(f,i)     prod:X(i) 
      V:N(j,i)      I:PD(j)         prod:X(i) 
      V:QS(i)      I:PQ(i)         prod:CET(i) 
      V:QTM(i)  I:PD("7")     prod:CET(i) 
      V:INV(i)    I:PD(i)         prod:ST 
      V:C(i,h)    D:PD(i)         demand:Y(h) 
      V:S(h)       D:PS            demand:Y(h) 
      V:REM     D:ER            demand:YF 
      V:FWT      D:PFWT      demand:YF 
 
$constraint:GOVCONS(i)$Use(i,"GOVT") 
GOVCONS(i)$(GCMult(i)<>2)+PFS("SKILL","10")$(GCMult(i)=2)=E= 
1$(GCMult(i)=0)+(ER/PD(i))$(GCMult(i)=1)+ER$(GCMult(i)=2); 
 
$constraint:HC(f) 
         HC(f)      =E= prod[i, (CET(i)/Mult)**Upsilon(i,f)]; 
$constraint:EPR(f) 
         EPR(f)     =E= 1-Eta0(f)/(HC(f)**Epsilon(f)); 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 0        ; 
HC.L(f)      = 1        ; 
EPR.L(f)    = 1-Eta0(f); 
GOVCONS.L(i) = 1        ; 
ER.FX       = 1        ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
$libinclude store these X CET ST M E PQ PD PE PM PF PS ER YG TR Y PFWT YF 
$libinclude store these GOVCONS HC EPR U PFS FD SFD N QS QTM INV C S REM FWT 
 
$libinclude store calc utility (h)   = u.l(h)*[sum[i,Use(i,h)]+Sam('inv',h)]; 
$libinclude store calc welfare      = sum[h,utility(h)] + sum[i, GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
$libinclude store calc WelfareEx  = sum[h,utility(h)];   
 
Table alphaG(i,h) Share of household h in public good provisioning of i 
         HSE1     HSE2  HSE3  HSE4  HSE5 
9        0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336 
NHS  0.251    0.087   0.076   0.306   0.280 
11      0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336; 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility1 (h) = utility(h) + sum[i, alphaG(i,h)*GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
$libinclude store calc YHF (h,f) = PF.l(f)*Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHFS (h,f,i) = PFS.l(f,i)*SFbar(h,f,i)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHTR (h)  = PTR.l* SAM(h,"gov"); 
 
$libinclude store calc FE (h,f)  = Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc WL (h,f) = Fbar(h,f)-FE(h,f)   ; 
$libinclude store calc eta (f)      = 1-EPR.l(f)          ; 
 
$libinclude store calc SFE (h,f,i)  = SFbar(h,f,i)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc SWL (h,f,i) = SFbar(h,f,i)-SFE(h,f,i); 
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$libinclude store calc GEXP (i) = GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")*PD.l(i); 
 
* Foreign worker income to household h, effective endowment (FWE), waiting list 
* (FWL) and trade surplus TS (=TS1). The trade surplus is financed by government 
* and fixed in value so it shouldn't change. Note also that M and E are 
* normalised to 1 in benchmark so need to multiply by their benchmark values. 
$libinclude store calc TF (h)      = alphaf(h)*FWT.l*PFWT.l; 
$libinclude store calc FWE (f,i) = FW(f,i)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc FWL (f,i) = FW(f,i)-FWE(f,i); 
$libinclude store calc TS         = YG.l-TR.l-sum(i,GEXP(i)); 
$libinclude store calc TS1       = sum(i, E.l(i)*VE(i)-M.l(i)*VM(i))-REM.l; 
 
$libinclude store setmodel SCGE 
$libinclude store base 
$libinclude store setbase base 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000; 
ER.FX        = 2; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX = 1; 
MULT = 2; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
MULT  = 1; 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" $goto end 
 
* import skilled labour in health care: 10% of hc spec skilled labour 
* if relevant income foreign workers is distributed over 
* households according to share of spec factor. skilled wage in health 
* care is endogenous and government expenditures are fixed in value. 
 
* no remittances abroad 
FW("SKILL","10")   = 0.1*SUM(h,SFbar(h,"SKILL","10")); 
alphar                        = 0; 
alphaf(h)                    = SFbar(h,"SKILL","10")/SUM(g,SFbar(g,"SKILL","10")); 
display alphaf; 
$batinclude solve IM1a 
 
* half of income foreign workers is remitted abroad 
alphar = 0.5; 
$batinclude solve IM2a 
 
* all income foreign workers is remitted abroad 
alphar = 1; 
$batinclude solve IM3a 
 
* import skilled labour in health care: 10% of hc spec skilled labour 
* if relevant income foreign workers is distributed over households 
* according to share of spec factor. government consumption of health care 
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* in real terms are endogenous and adjust so that skilled wage in health care 
* does not change. 
 
* no remittances abroad 
alphar                                 = 0; 
GCMULT("NHS")            = 2; 
$batinclude solve IM1b 
 
* half of income foreign workers is remitted abroad 
alphar = 0.5; 
$batinclude solve IM2b 
 
* all income foreign workers is remitted abroad 
alphar = 1; 
$batinclude solve IM3b 
 
$libinclude store display changes percent 
 
file myresults /'importlabour.csv'/; 
put myresults; 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_PF v_EPR v_ETA p_HC c_Utility1 p_Utility1 c_TF 
$libinclude writecsv Results ResultsCh ResultsPer 
 
Parameters p_FEunsk,p_FEsk,p_WLunsk, p_WLsk; 
*p_Welfare, c_Welfare, c_TS; 
p_FEunsk(h,sims)  = p_FE(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_FEsk(h,sims)      = p_FE(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_WLunsk(h,sims) = p_WL(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_WLsk(h,sims)     = p_WL(sims,h,"skill"); 
*p_Welfare(sims)   = ResultsPer("Welfare",sims); 
*c_Welfare(sims)   = ResultsCh("Welfare",sims); 
*c_TS(sims)           = ResultsCh("TS",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_FEunsk p_FEsk p_WLunsk p_WLsk 
 
Parameter c_WelfareEx, p_WelfareEx; 
p_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsPer("WelfareEx",sims); 
c_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsCh("WelfareEx",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv c_Utility p_Utility c_WelfareEx p_WelfareEx  
*p_Welfare c_Welfare c_TS 
 
$label end 
 
 
TECHNCHANGEFACTORSMODEL2.GMS 
* This is model 2 with 2 forms of technical change: FNTC, SBTC 
* Target variable to fix import price of pharmaceuticals is removed for simplicity 
 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
Parameter FNTC(i)    Factor Neutral Technical Change 
                 SBTC(f,i)  Skill Biased Technical Change; 
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FNTC(i)    = 1  ; 
SBTC(f,i)  = 1  ; 
 
Parameter 
GCMult(i)     Government consumption multiplier 
Eta0               Non participation rate if health care does not affect WL 
Fbar               Fixed endowment of factor f by household h 
Upsilon(i,f)    Share parameter health composite 
Epsilon(f)      Waiting list elasticity; 
 
GCMult(i)    = 1; 
Epsilon(f)     = 2; 
Eta0("skill") = 0.0289; 
Eta0("unsk")= 0.0434; 
Fbar(h,f)       = SAM(h,f) * 1/(1-Eta0(f)); 
Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") = 0.960; 
Upsilon("NHS","Skill")  = 0.834; 
Upsilon("PHC","Unsk") = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") ; 
Upsilon("PHC","Skill")  = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Skill"); 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" option sysout=off;option solprint=off; 
 
$ontext 
$model:SCGE 
$sectors: 
         X(i)           ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)      ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST             ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$VM(i)   ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)     ! exports of commodity i 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)               ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)               ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)    ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i)  ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)          ! price of factor f 
         PS              ! price of savings 
         ER             ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG          ! price of artificial commodity real tax income 
         PTR          ! price of artificial commodity transfer 
$consumers: 
         YG            ! government income 
         TR             ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)           ! household income 
$auxiliary: 
         GOVCONS(i)$(USE(i,"GOVT"))    ! Real government consumption 
         HC(f)                         ! Health composite 
         EPR(f)                        ! Effective participation rate 
 
$prod:X(i)       s:0  t:1  va:1 
      O:PQ(j)  Q:Make(j,i)                 A:YG T:PTAX(i)  P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)    Q:(SBTC(f,i)*FNTC(i)*Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f))) A:YG T:ETAX(f) P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PD(j)    Q:Use(j,i) 
 
$prod:CET(i)     s:0  t:2  arm:2 
      O:PD(i)    Q:VD(i)                     A:YG T:CTAX(i) P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
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      I:PQ(i)      Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j)))       arm: 
      I:PM(i)     Q:VM(i)                           arm: 
      I:PD("7")  Q:Make(i,"margin") 
 
$prod:ST         s:0 
      O:PS       Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
$prod:M(i)$VM(i) 
      O:PM(i)    Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER          Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)     Q:VE(i) 
 
$demand:YG 
      D:PYG      Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR                   s:1 
      E:PYG                              Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)$Use(i,"GOVT")  Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT"))         R:GOVCONS(i) 
      D:PTR                  Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
      E:ER                    Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
 
$demand:Y(h)                 s:1 
      E:PF(f)                Q:(Mult*Fbar(h,f))              R:EPR(f) 
      D:PD(i)               Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS                   Q:SAM("inv",h) 
      E:PTR                 Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
 
$report: 
      V:U(h)     W:Y(h) 
      V:FD(f,i)   I:PF(f)         prod:X(i) 
      V:N(j,i)     I:PD(j)         prod:X(i) 
      V:QS(i)     I:PQ(i)         prod:CET(i) 
      V:QTM(i) I:PD("7")     prod:CET(i) 
      V:INV(i)   I:PD(i)         prod:ST 
      V:C(i,h)   D:PD(i)        demand:Y(h) 
      V:S(h)     D:PS             demand:Y(h) 
 
$constraint:GOVCONS(i)$Use(i,"GOVT") 
         GOVCONS(i) =E= GCMult(i) * ER/PD(i) + 1$(GCMult(i) = 0); 
 
$constraint:HC(f) 
         HC(f)      =E= prod[i, (CET(i)/Mult)**Upsilon(i,f)]; 
 
$constraint:EPR(f) 
         EPR(f)     =E= 1-Eta0(f)/(HC(f)**Epsilon(f)); 
 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 0        ; 
HC.L(f)      = 1        ; 
EPR.L(f)    = 1-Eta0(f); 
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GOVCONS.L(i) = 1        ; 
ER.FX                = 1        ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
$libinclude store these X CET ST M E PQ PD PE PM PF PS ER YG TR Y 
$libinclude store these GOVCONS HC EPR U FD N QS QTM INV C S 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility (h)= u.l(h)*[sum[i,Use(i,h)]+Sam('inv',h)]; 
$libinclude store calc Welfare = sum[h,utility(h)] + sum[i, GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
$libinclude store calc WelfareEx = sum[h,utility(h)];      
 
Table alphaG(i,h) Share of household h in public good provisioning of i 
         HSE1     HSE2 HSE3   HSE4  HSE5 
9        0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336 
NHS  0.251    0.087   0.076   0.306   0.280 
11      0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336; 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility1 (h) = utility(h) + sum[i, alphaG(i,h)*GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
$libinclude store calc YHF (h,f) = PF.l(f)*Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHTR (h)  = PTR.l* SAM(h,"gov"); 
 
$libinclude store calc FE (h,f)= Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc WL (h,f)= Fbar(h,f)-FE(h,f)   ; 
$libinclude store calc eta (f) = 1-EPR.l(f)          ; 
 
$libinclude store calc GEXP (i) = GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")*PD.l(i); 
 
$libinclude store setmodel SCGE 
$libinclude store base 
$libinclude store setbase base 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000; 
ER.FX        = 1.5; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX  = 1; 
MULT  = 1.5; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
MULT  = 1; 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" $goto end 
 
* FNTC in health care: 
* 10% more output (X) given factor inputs (V) implies 1/11 less inputs (V) given output (X) 
FNTC("10") = 10/11; 
$batinclude solve FNTC 
FNTC("10") =1; 
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* SBTC in health care: skilled labour is 10% more productive 
SBTC("SKILL", "10")= 10/11; 
$batinclude solve SBTC 
SBTC("SKILL", "10")=1; 
 
$libinclude store display changes percent 
file myresults /'FactorTechnCh.csv'/; 
put myresults; 
$libinclude writecsv  p_PF v_EPR v_ETA p_HC c_Utility1 p_Utility1 Results ResultsCh ResultsPer 
 
Parameters p_FEunsk,p_FEsk,p_WLunsk, p_WLsk; 
*p_Welfare, c_Welfare 
p_FEunsk(h,sims)  = p_FE(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_FEsk(h,sims)      = p_FE(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_WLunsk(h,sims) = p_WL(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_WLsk(h,sims)    = p_WL(sims,h,"skill"); 
*p_Welfare(sims)  = ResultsPer("Welfare",sims); 
*c_Welfare(sims)  = ResultsCh("Welfare",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_FEunsk p_FEsk p_WLunsk p_WLsk 
 
Parameter c_WelfareEx, p_WelfareEx; 
p_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsPer("WelfareEx",sims); 
c_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsCh("WelfareEx",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv c_Utility p_Utility c_WelfareEx p_WelfareEx  
*p_Welfare c_Welfare 
 
$label end 
 
 
TECHNCHANGEPHARMAMODEL2.GMS 
* This is the same as model2.gms with Technical Change (TC) in Pharmaceuticals (Pharma): 
 
$offlisting 
$include data.gms 
 
Parameter 
TCQ(i,j)   TC Intermediate Inputs - intermediate inputs more productive 
TP(i)        Input Neutral TC            - increase productivity of all inputs; 
 
TP(i)       = 1  ; 
TCQ(i,j)  = 1  ; 
 
Parameter 
Target(i)        If target(i)>0 commodity i's price is set by world price 
GCMult(i)     Government consumption multiplier 
 
Eta0             Non participation rate if health care does not affect WL 
Fbar             Fixed endowment of factor f by household h 
Upsilon(i,f)  Share parameter health composite 
Epsilon(f)    Waiting list elasticity; 
 
Target(i)       = 0; 
Target("2")   = 1; 
GCMult(i)    = 1; 
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Epsilon(f)      = 2; 
Eta0("skill")  = 0.0289; 
Eta0("unsk") = 0.0434; 
Fbar(h,f)        = SAM(h,f) * 1/(1-Eta0(f)); 
 
Upsilon("NHS","Unsk")  = 0.960; 
Upsilon("NHS","Skill")   = 0.834; 
Upsilon("PHC","Unsk")  = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Unsk") ; 
Upsilon("PHC","Skill")   = 1-Upsilon("NHS","Skill"); 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" option sysout=off;option solprint=off; 
 
$ontext 
$model:SCGE 
$sectors: 
         X(i)           ! production of sector i 
         CET(i)         ! armington aggregate demand (domestic and export) 
         ST                ! total (real) savings 
         M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0)    ! imports of commodity i 
         E(i)$VE(i)   ! exports of commodity i 
$commodities: 
         PQ(i)          ! producer price commodity i 
         PD(i)          ! domestic consumption price commodity i 
         PE(i)$VE(i)      ! export price commodity i 
         PM(i)$VM(i)    ! import price commodity i 
         PF(f)          ! price of factor f 
         PS              ! price of savings 
         ER              ! exchange rate (price of foreign exchange) 
         PYG           ! price of artificial commodity real tax income 
         PTR            ! price of artificial commodity transfer 
$consumers: 
         YG             ! government income 
         TR              ! transfers to households 
         Y(h)            ! household income 
 
$auxiliary: 
         QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))   ! Auxiliary var imports 
         NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i))  ! Auxiliary var foreign exchange 
         GOVCONS(i)$(USE(i,"GOVT"))    ! Real government consumption 
         HC(f)                         ! Health composite 
         EPR(f)                        ! Effective participation rate 
 
$prod:X(i)       s:0  t:1  va:1 
      O:PQ(j)  Q:(Make(j,i)*TP(i))              A:YG T:PTAX(i)  P:(1-PTAX0(i)) 
      I:PF(f)    Q:(Use(f,i)/(1+ETAX0(f)))  A:YG T:ETAX(f)  P:(1+ETAX0(f))  va: 
      I:PD(j)    Q:(Use(j,i)*TCQ(j,i)) 
 
 
$prod:CET(i)     s:0  t:2  arm:2 
      O:PD(i)    Q:VD(i)                     A:YG T:CTAX(i) P:(VDN(i)/VD(i)) 
      O:PE(i)    Q:VE(i) 
      I:PQ(i)      Q:(sum(j, Make(i,j)))       arm: 
      I:PM(i)     Q:VM(i)                           arm: 
      I:PD("7")  Q:Make(i,"margin") 
 
$prod:ST         s:0 
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      O:PS       Q:(sum(i,Use(i,"inv"))) 
      I:PD(i)    Q:Use(i,"inv") 
 
$prod:M(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)=0) 
      O:PM(i)    Q:VM(i) 
      I:ER          Q:VM(i) 
 
$prod:E(i)$VE(i) 
      O:ER       Q:VE(i) 
      I:PE(i)      Q:VE(i) 
 
$demand:YG 
      D:PYG     Q:SAM("gov","tax") 
 
$demand:TR                   s:1 
      E:PYG                              Q:(Mult*SAM("gov","tax")) 
      E:PD(i)$Use(i,"GOVT")  Q:(-Mult*Use(i,"GOVT"))         R:GOVCONS(i) 
      D:PTR                  Q:(sum(h,SAM(h,"gov"))) 
      E:ER                     Q:(Mult*(SAM("gov","row")-SAM("row","gov"))) 
      E:PM(i)$Target(i)      Q:(Mult*VM(i))                  R:QM(i) 
      E:ER#(i)$Target(i)     Q:(-Mult*VM(i))                R:NET(i) 
 
$demand:Y(h)                 s:1 
      E:PF(f)                Q:(Mult*Fbar(h,f))              R:EPR(f) 
      D:PD(i)               Q:Use(i,h) 
      D:PS                    Q:SAM("inv",h) 
      E:PTR                  Q:(Mult*SAM(h,"gov")) 
 
$report: 
      V:U(h)      W:Y(h) 
      V:FD(f,i)   I:PF(f)         prod:X(i) 
      V:N(j,i)     I:PD(j)         prod:X(i) 
      V:QS(i)     I:PQ(i)         prod:CET(i) 
      V:QTM(i) I:PD("7")     prod:CET(i) 
      V:INV(i)   I:PD(i)         prod:ST 
      V:C(i,h)    D:PD(i)       demand:Y(h) 
      V:S(h)      D:PS            demand:Y(h) 
 
$constraint:QM(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
        PD(i) =E= Target(i) * ER; 
 
$constraint:NET(i)$(VM(i) and Target(i)) 
        NET(i)=E= QM(i)* PM(i)/ER; 
 
$constraint:GOVCONS(i)$Use(i,"GOVT") 
         GOVCONS(i) =E= GCMult(i) * ER/PD(i) + 1$(GCMult(i) = 0); 
 
$constraint:HC(f) 
         HC(f)      =E= prod[i, (CET(i)/Mult)**Upsilon(i,f)]; 
 
$constraint:EPR(f) 
         EPR(f)     =E= 1-Eta0(f)/(HC(f)**Epsilon(f)); 
 
$offtext 
$sysinclude mpsgeset SCGE 
 
* check benchmark replication: 
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SCGE.ITERLIM = 0        ; 
QM.L(i)      = Target(i); 
NET.L(i)     = Target(i); 
HC.L(f)       = 1        ; 
EPR.L(f)     = 1-Eta0(f); 
GOVCONS.L(i) = 1        ; 
ER.FX        = 1        ; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(SCGE.OBJVAL > 1e-3) "benchmark replication failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
$libinclude store these X CET ST M E PQ PD PE PM PF PS ER YG TR Y QM NET 
$libinclude store these GOVCONS HC EPR U FD N QS QTM INV C S 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility (h)= u.l(h)*[sum[i,Use(i,h)]+Sam('inv',h)]; 
$libinclude store calc Welfare   = sum[h,utility(h)] + sum[i, GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
$libinclude store calc WelfareEx = sum[h,utility(h)];      
 
Table alphaG(i,h) Share of household h in public good provisioning of i 
         HSE1    HSE2  HSE3   HSE4  HSE5 
9        0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336 
NHS  0.251    0.087   0.076   0.306   0.280 
11      0.176    0.064   0.054   0.370   0.336; 
 
$libinclude store calc Utility1 (h) = utility(h) + sum[i, alphaG(i,h)*GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")]; 
 
$libinclude store calc YHF (h,f) = PF.l(f)*Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f); 
$libinclude store calc YHTR (h)  = PTR.l* SAM(h,"gov"); 
 
$libinclude store calc FE (h,f) = Fbar(h,f)*EPR.l(f)  ; 
$libinclude store calc WL (h,f)= Fbar(h,f)-FE(h,f)   ; 
$libinclude store calc eta (f)     = 1-EPR.l(f)          ; 
 
$libinclude store calc GEXP (i) = GOVCONS.L(i)*Use(i,"govt")*PD.l(i); 
 
* Sectoral outputs need to be recalculated: X is normalised to 1 so needs 
* to take into account technical progress which affects the benchmark 
* quantity field! Note $report block reports values (not normalised to 1) and 
* so does not have this problem. 
$libinclude store calc X1 (i) = X.L(i) * sum[j, Make(j,i)*TP(i)]; 
 
$libinclude store setmodel SCGE 
$libinclude store base 
$libinclude store setbase base 
 
* numeraire check: 
SCGE.ITERLIM = 1000; 
ER.FX        = 1.5; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
abort$(abs(ST.l-1) > 1e-5) "numeraire check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
 
* homegeneity check: 
ER.FX = 1; 
MULT = 2; 
$include SCGE.GEN 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
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abort$(abs(PS.l-1) > 1e-5) "homegeneity check failed", SCGE.OBJVAL; 
MULT  = 1; 
 
$if not "%system.incparent%"=="" $goto end 
 
* TC in pharma which increases the cost-effectiveness of pharma in health care: 
 
*   The domestic consumer price of pharmaceuticals rises by 20% as in exp 2a. 
*   Government budget is fixed in value as in exp 2a: negative welfare effect! 
*   From exp 2a we know pharma sector expands just a little so domestic pharma 
*   sector does not expand too much in response to p increase i.e. do not need 
*   to curb production by imposing: TP("2") = 100/(100+20); 
Target("2")  = 1.1; 
$include SCGE.gen 
solve SCGE using mcp; 
Target("2") = 1.2 ; 
 
*   TC makes pharma and other inputs in health care more effective, 
*   i.e. the better quality pharmaceuticals make the health service more 
*   efficient in use of pharma and other inputs: Productivity of pharma and 
*   other inputs in health care rises by beta% and gamma% respectively 
*   In Exp 5a gamma=0. Beta is 20% is needed approx for health care 
*   to expand (techn change is adopted). Beta is 30% is needed approx for 
*   welfare effects to be positive. 
*   In Exp 5b. vary gamma and beta: gamma=1%, beta=9% is sufficient for welfare 
*   effects to be positive. gamma=2%, then beta=0% already yields welfare gains 
 
*   Beta/gamma is 33.1% over three years is equivalent to 10% a year 
 
$ontext 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(beta-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a 
 
TP("10")         = 1+gamma/100  ; 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(beta-gamma)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b 
$offtext 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(20-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a20 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(30-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a30 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(40-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a40 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(50-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a50 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(100-0)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5a100 
 
TP("10")     = 1+5/100  ; 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(20-5)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b20 
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TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(30-5)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b30 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(40-5)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b40 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(50-5)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b50 
 
TCQ("2","10")= 100/(100+(100-5)); 
$batinclude solve Exp5b100 
 
$libinclude store display changes percent 
 
file myresults /'TCPharma.csv'/; 
put myresults; 
$libinclude writecsv  p_PF v_EPR v_ETA p_HC c_Utility1 p_Utility1 Results ResultsCh ResultsPer 
Parameters p_FEunsk,p_FEsk,p_WLunsk, p_WLsk; 
p_FEunsk(h,sims)  = p_FE(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_FEsk(h,sims)      = p_FE(sims,h,"skill"); 
p_WLunsk(h,sims) = p_WL(sims,h,"unsk") ; 
p_WLsk(h,sims)     = p_WL(sims,h,"skill"); 
 
$libinclude writecsv p_FEunsk p_FEsk p_WLunsk p_WLsk 
 
Parameter c_WelfareEx, p_WelfareEx; 
p_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsPer("WelfareEx",sims); 
c_WelfareEx(sims)  = ResultsCh("WelfareEx",sims); 
 
$libinclude writecsv c_Utility p_Utility c_WelfareEx p_WelfareEx  
 
$label end 
